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Foreword 
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) 
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and 
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the 
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over 
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal 
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal 
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involves a change also in 
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed 
an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In pub-
lishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, 
the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of 
British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and 
Tinker respectively.1 The successful completion of The transfer of power and The 
struggle for independence, both of which were based on British records, emphasised 
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of 
the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle 
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. In their absence, scholars both 
from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule, as well as from 
Britain itself, lack an important tool for understanding and teaching their respective 
histories. But BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by 
successive British governments to locate Britain's position in an international order. 
Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument 
of the domestic, foreign and defence policies of successive British governments. The 
project is therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual 
territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, 
economic and strategic considerations involved in that at another. 
BDEEP is a sequel, not only to the India and Burma series but also to the still 
earlier series of published Foreign Office documents which continues as Documents 
on British Policy Overseas (DBPO). The contemporary volumes in DBPO appear in 
two parallel series covering the years 1945 to 1955. In certain respects the 
documents published in the BDEEP volumes will complement those published in 
DBPO. On issues where there is, or is likely to be, direct overlap, BDEEP will not 
provide detailed coverage. The most notable examples concern the post-Second 
World War international settlements in the Far East and the Pacific, and the 
immediate events of the Suez crisis of 1956. 
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 
!942- 47, 12 vols, (London, 1970- 1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and 
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944- 1948, 2 vols, (London, 1983-1984) . 
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Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its prede-
cessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater magnitude 
than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major differences can be 
identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent empire took place over 
a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of the twentieth century, 
while having its roots in the Second World War and before. Secondly, the empire con-
sisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, population, wealth and in many 
other ways, each with its own individual problems, but often with their futures linked 
to those of neighbouring territories and the growing complexity surrounding the 
colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the documentary record for certain matters 
of high policy could be encapsulated within a relatively straightforward 'country' 
study, in the case of the colonial empire the documentary record is more diffuse 
because of the plethora of territories and their scattered location. Finally, the docu-
ments relating to the ending of colonial rule are not conveniently located within one 
leading department of state but rather are to be found in several of them. As the pur-
pose of the project is to publish documents relating to the end of empire from the 
extensive range and quantity of official British records, private collections and other 
categories of non-official material are not regarded as principal documentary sources. 
In BDEEP, selections from non-official material will be used only in exceptional cases 
to fill gaps where they exist in the available official record. 
In recognition of these differences, and also of the fact that the end of empire 
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than 
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP 
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents 
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents 
relating to the empire as a whole will be published. Series B represents the country 
or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British 
government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independ-
ence, and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. 
In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series - series C - will be 
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire 
which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). The handbooks will be 
published in two volumes as an integral part of BDEEP and also as PRO guides to the 
records. They will enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the 
ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published 
record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B. 
Volume One of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of The records of the 
Colonial and Dominions Office (by R B Pugh) which was first published in 1964, is 
entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Commonwealth Office. It covers over two hundred years of activity down 
to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume Two, entitled Cabinet, Foreign Office, 
Treasury and other records, focuses more specifically on twentieth-century depart-
mental records and also includes references to the records of inter-departmental 
committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations. These two 
volumes have been prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne 
Thurston, honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the 
University of London. 
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The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in 
individual volumes will be explained in the introductions written by the specialist 
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in 
previous series. Each volume will also list the PRO sources which have been 
searched. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles 
which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is 
first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense, in which the empire is viewed in 
terms of Britain's position as a world power, and of the inter-relationship between 
what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. 
Here Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider 
context of Britain's relations with the United States, with Europe, and with the 
Commonwealth and United Nations. The central themes are the political constraints, 
both domestic and international, to which British governments were subject, the 
economic requirements of the sterling area, the geopolitical and strategic questions 
associated with priorities in foreign policy and in defence planning, and the 
interaction between these various constraints and concerns and the imperatives 
imposed by developments in colonial territories. Secondly, there is investigation into 
colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were 
specifically-but not exclusively-the concern of the leading department. In the 
period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,2 the leading depart-
ment of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; 
for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Common-
wealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of 
economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and 
constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the 
civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from 
European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of 
political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of 
governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial 
dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British 
government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to 
document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular 
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source 
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which 
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major 
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these 
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in 
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate 
those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the 
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail matters which will be fully 
documented in the country volumes, but some especially significant documents do 
appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of sifting 
and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance or to be 
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Common-
wealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
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ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive quantity of 
material devoted to appointments and terms of service - salaries, gradings, 
allowances, pension rights and compensation - within the colonial and related 
services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the official 
documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to address 
potentially significant issues because the information was not available. Much in this 
respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by the different 
colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government had been 
reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local information to 
London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the 
records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and DBPO, BDEEP is not an 
official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in 
the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to the records at the 
PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the time a volume is in 
preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years, 
or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records 
Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. 
Where necessary, volume editors will provide details of potentially significant files or 
individual documents of which they are aware and which they have not been able to 
consult. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general 
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological 
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India 
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the 
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have 
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the 
sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any 
internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first 
line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type 
of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, 
committee, department) and the recipient (if any). In headings, a subject entry in 
single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. 
An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator devised by the editor. This 
latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or 
where the original title is too unwieldly to reproduce in its entirety. Security 
classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have 
generally been omitted as confusing and needlessly complicating, and are retained 
only where they are necessary to a full understanding. In the headings to documents 
and the summary lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not 
the title of the office (ie, Mr Lyttelton, not secretary of state for the colonies).4 In the 
same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In general 
3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 
371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the 
file. 
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were 
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials. 
FOREWORD xiii 
volumes in series A, ambassadors, governors, high commtsswners and other 
embassy or high commission staff are given in the form 'Sir E Baring (Kenya)'. 
Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, 
or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each part of a volume 
provides a select list of which principal offices were held by whom, with a separate 
series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the 
documents. Minor figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first 
appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square 
brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are sometimes used 
to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has 
been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been 
inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. 
Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-
command executive instructions, and some redundant internal referencing has been 
removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No 
substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. 
In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their entirety. The footnote 
reference 'not printed' has been used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an 
annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note 
of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred 
to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Each part of a 
volume has a list of abbreviations occurring in it. A consolidated index for the whole 
volume appears at the end of each part. 
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and 
Burma series, is that BDEEP will reproduce many more minutes by ministers and 
officials. 
Crown copyright material is used by permission of the Public Record Office under 
licence from the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. All references and 
dates are given in the form recommended in PRO guidelines. 
* * * * 
BDEEP has received assistance and support from many quarters. The project was 
first discussed at a one-day workshop attended by over thirty interested scholars 
which, supported by a small grant from the Smuts Memorial Fund, was held at 
Churchill College, Cambridge, in May 1985. At that stage the obstacles looked 
daunting. It seemed unlikely that public money would be made available along the 
lines provided for the India and Burma projects. The complexities of the task looked 
substantial, partly because there was more financial and economic data with which 
to deal, still more because there were so many more territories to cover. It was not at 
all clear, moreover, who could take institutional responsibility for the project as the 
India Office Records had for the earlier ones; and in view of the escalating price of the 
successive India and Burma volumes, it seemed unlikely that publication in book 
form would be feasible; for some while a choice was being discussed between 
microfilm, microfiche and facsimile. 
A small group nevertheless undertook to explore matters further, and in a quite 
remarkable way found itself able to make substantial progress. The British Academy 
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adopted BDEEP as one of its major projects, and thus provided critical support. The 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies served as a crucial institutional anchor in taking 
responsibility for the project. The Institute also made office space available, and 
negotiated an administrative nexus within the University of London. Dr Anne 
Thurston put at the disposal of the project her unique knowledge of the relevant 
archival sources; while the keeper of the Public Records undertook to provide all the 
support that he could. It then proved possible to appoint Professor Michael Crowder 
as project director on a part-time basis, and he approached the Leverhulme Trust, 
who made a munificent grant which was to make the whole project viable. Almost all 
those approached to be volume editors accepted and, after consultation with a 
number of publishers, Her Majesty's Stationery Office undertook to publish the 
project in book form. There can be few projects that after so faltering a start found 
itself quite so blessed. 
Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a 
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial 
history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony 
Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the British Commonwealth in the 
University of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. At the outset Professor 
Michael Crowder became general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the 
University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. 
Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general 
editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at 
the Open University. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and 
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Ashton who had 
previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the 
India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and 
general editor in 1993. When BDEEP was launched in 1987, eight volumes in series 
A and B were approved by the Project Committee and specialist scholars were 
commissioned to research and select documents for inclusion in each. Collectively, 
these eight volumes (three general and five country)5 represent the first stage of the 
project which begins with an introductory general volume covering the years 
between 1925 and 1945 but which concentrates on the period from the Second World 
War to 1957 when Ghana and Malaya became independent.6 
It is fitting that the present general editor should begin his acknowledgements 
with an appreciation of the contributions made by his predecessors. The late 
Professor Crowder supervised the launch of the project and planned the volumes 
included in stage one. The volumes already published bear lasting testimony to his 
resolve and dedication during the project's formative phase. Professor Murray played 
a no less critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in 
5 Series A general volumes: vol1 Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925-1945 (published 1996); vol 2 
The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951 (published 1992); vol 3 The Conservative 
government and the end of empire 1951-1957 (published 1994). 
Series B country volumes: vol 1 Ghana (published 1992); vol 2 Sri Lanka (published 1997); vol 3 
Malaya (published 1995); vol 4 Egypt and the defence of the Middle East (published 1998); vol 5 Sudan 
(published 1998). 
6 Research is currently in progress for a second stage covering the period 1957-1964. 
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negotiating contracts with the volume editors and HMSO. His invaluable advice and 
expertise during the early stages of editing are acknowledged with particular 
gratitude. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British 
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant 
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major 
projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to 
employ a research assistant on a fixed-term contract. The principal funding for the 
project has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust and the volumes are a tribute to 
the support provided by the Trustees. A major debt of gratitude is owed to the 
Trustees. In addition to their generous grant to cover the costs of the first stage, the 
Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the duration of the grant, and also 
provided a supplementary grant which enabled the project to secure Dr Ashton's 
appointment. 
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encourage-
ment. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a singular 
contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and 
presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtru-
sive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership and 
experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and staff of the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and the 
congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of 
volumes in stage one have profited considerably from the researches undertaken by 
Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants during the preparation of the records 
handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the general editor wishes to 
acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the Historical Section of 
the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation 
emanating from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor of the volume in series 
A on The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951, played an important 
role in the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is 
acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The Stationery Office for 
assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design 
and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribution of the keeper of the 
records and the staff, both curatorial and administrative, at the PRO must be 
emphasised. Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at Kew, 
the project would not be viable. 
S RAshton 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
March 1998 
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SAM Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani 
SAR Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi 
SDF Sudan Defence Force 
Sec secretary 
SIME Special Intelligence Middle East 
S ofS secretary of state 
SPA Sudan Press Agency 
SPIS Sudan Political Intelligence Summary 
SPS Sudan Political Service 
SRP Socialist Republican Party (Sudan) 
tel telegram 
UK United Kingdom 
UKTC United Kingdom Trade Commission(er) 
Umma Umma (Party) (Sudan) 
UN(O) United Nations (Organisation) 
UNP Upper Nile Province 
US(A) United States of America 
VFM Verona Fathers Mission (now Missionari Comboniani) 
WM Workers' Affairs Association (Sudan) 
Wash Washington, DC 

xxiii 
Principal Holders of Offices 1942-1950: 
Part I 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1. Ministers 
(a) Wartime coalition (10 May 1940-23 May 1945) and Conservative caretaker 
government (23 May-26 July 1945) 
Prime minister 
Chancellor of Exchequer 
S of S foreign affairs 
Mr W L S Churchill (10 May 1940) 
Sir Kingsley Wood (12 May 1940) 
Sir John Anderson (24 Sep 1943) 
Mr RA Eden (22 Dec 1940) 
(b) Labour governments from 26 July 1945 to 17 Dec 1950, the concluding date 
for part I of this volume 
Prime minister 
Lord chancellor 
S of S foreign affairs 
S of S colonies 
S of S air 
2. Junior ministers 
Foreign Office 
M of S (not formally attached 
until 1950) 
Mr C R Attlee (26 July 1945) 
Lord Jowitt (27 July 1945) 
Mr E Bevin (27 July 1945) 
Mr G H Hall (3 Aug 1945) 
Mr A Creech Jones (4 Oct 1946) 
Mr J Griffiths (28 Feb 1950) 
Viscount Stansgate (3 Aug 1945) 
Mr P J Noel-Baker (4 Oct 1946 & office 
not in Cabinet) 
Mr P J Noel-Baker (3 Aug 1945) 
Mr H McNeil (4 Oct 1946) 
Mr. K Younger (28 Feb 1950) 
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Parliamentary under-secretary 
of state 
3. Civil Servants 
(a) Foreign Office 
(i) Permanent under-
secretary of state 
(ii) Superintending under-
secretaries of state 
(iii) Assistant secretary/ 
counsellor, head 
Egyptian Dept 
(African Dept 
from Oct 1948) 
(iv) Assistant secretary/ 
counsellor, head 
of Eastern Dept 
(v) Legal adviser 
(vi) Ambassador to the UN 
(vii) Sudan agent, London 
(b) Colonial Office 
(i) Permanent under-
secretary of state 
(ii) Deputy under-secretary 
of state 
Mr H McNeil (4 Aug 1945) 
Mr C P Mayhew (4 Oct 1946) 
Lord Henderson (7 June 1948) 
Mr E J Davies (2 Mar 1950) 
Sir Alexander Cadogan (1 Jan 1938) 
Sir Orme Sargent (1 Jan 1946) 
Sir William Strang (1 Feb 1949) 
Sir Maurice Petersen (Egyptian Dept, 
1942-1944) 
Sir Orme Sargent (Southern Dept, 
1945-1946) 
(Sir) R G Howe (Egyptian Dept, 1946-1947) 
M R Wright (Egyptian/African Dept, July 
1948) 
R J Bowker (African Dept, 27 Nov 1950) 
PS Scrivener (Mar 1942) 
D W Lascelles (Apr 1947) 
G L Clutton (Apr 1948) 
R Alien (Feb 1950) 
C W Baxter (Sept 1944) 
BA B Burrows (Nov 1947- Dec 1949) 
(Sir) WE Beckett (1945-1953) 
Sir Alexander Cadogan (1946-1950) 
RC Mayall (1941-1951) 
Sir George Cater (1942-1947) 
Sir Thomas Lloyd (1947-1956) 
Sir Arthur Dawe (1945-1947) 
Sir Sydney Caine (1947-1948) ) r.·oint 
Sir Charles Jeffries (1947-1956) 
Sir Hilton Poynton (1948-1959) joint 
PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF OFFICES 1942-1950: PART I XXV 
(iii) Assistant under-
secretary of state 
(iv) Select governors 
Gov of Kenya 
Gov of Uganda 
AB Cohen (Mrica Division, 1947-1951) 
Sir Philip Mitchell (1944-1952) 
Sir John Hall (1944-1952) 
SUDAN 
1. Governor-General's Council (1942-1947) 
Governor-general 
Civil secretary 
Financial secretary 
Legal secretary 
Major-gen Sir Hubert Huddleston 
(1940-1947) 
Sir Robert Howe (1947-1955) 
(Sir) Douglas Newbold (1939-1945) 
(Sir) James W Robertson (1945-1953) 
F D Rugman (1934-1944) 
J WE Miller (1944-1948) 
(Sir) Louis Chick (1948-1953) 
T P Creed (1941-1948) 
C Cumings (1948-1953) 
2. Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan (1944-1947) 
President 
Vice presidents: 
Honorary members: 
Ordinary members: 
Sir Hubert Huddleston (1944-1947) 
Sir Robert Howe (1947) 
(Sir) Douglas Newbold (1944-1945) 
J W Robertson (1945-1947) 
T P Creed (1944-1947) 
J WE Miller (1944-1947) 
Sayyid Sir Ali al-Mirghani Pasha 
Sayyid Sir Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi Pasha 
Shaikh Abu Shamma Abd al-Mahmud 
Dr Ali Badri 
Shaikh Ahmad Uthman al-Qadi 
Abdallah Khalil 
Yaqub Ali al-Hilu 
Shaikh Hamid al-Sayyid 
Abd al-Karim Muhammad 
Nuh Abdallah 
EA Turner (chamber of commerce) 
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Mustafa Abu Ala (chamber of commerce) 
Shaikh Babu Uthman Nimr (Kordofan 
Province) 
Shaikh Yahya Ahmad (Kordofan Province) 
Khalil Akasha (Kordofan Province) 
Shaikh Ibrahim Musa Madibbu (Darfur 
Province) 
Sultan Muhammad Bahr al-Din (Darfur 
Province) 
Hamid al-Sayyid (Darfur Province) 
Shaikh Muhammad Muhammad al-Amin 
a!-Tirik (Kassala Province) 
Shaikh Abdallah Bakr (Kassala Province) 
Hasan Ali Shakalawi (Kassala Province) 
Shaikh Ayub Abd al-Majid (Northern 
Province) 
Shaikh Zubair Hamad al-Malik (Northern 
Province) 
Uthman Abd al-Qadir (Northern Province) 
Mak Hasan Adlan (Blue Nile Province) 
Shaikh Fahal Ibrahim (Blue Nile Province) 
Makki Abbas (Blue Nile Province) 
Mirghani Hamza (Khartoum Province) 
Muhammad Ali Shawqi (Khartoum 
Province) 
Shaikh Surur Muhammad Ramli 
(Khartoum Province) 
3. Executive Council and Legislative Assembly (1948-1950) 
President (gov-gen) 
Civil secretary 
Financial secretary 
Legal secretary 
C-in-C of the SDF 
Minister of agriculture 
& leader of the LA 
Minister of health 
Minister of education 
Under-secretary for 
irrigation 
Under-secretary for 
economics & trade 
Councillor-without -portfolio 
Councillor-without-portfolio 
Sir Robert Howe 
(Sir) James Robertson 
Sir Louis Chick 
Sir Charles Cumings 
Major-gen Sir Lashmer Whistler (1948) 
Major-gen Sir Geoffrey Scoones (Sept 1950) 
Abdallah Khalil 
Dr Ali Badri (Bedri) 
Abd al-Rahman Ali Taha 
Abd al-Rahman Abdun (Abdoun) 
Abd al-Majid Ahmad (Abd el Magid 
Ahmed) 
R J Hillard (Sudan Railways) 
A Gaitskell (Sudan Plantations Syndicate, 
1948-1950) 
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Councillor-without-portfolio 
Councillor-without-portfolio 
Speaker of LA 
1. Government of Egypt 
Head of State 
Prime minister 
Foreign minster 
Muhammad Ahmad Abu Sinn (Sept 1950) 
Ibrahim Ahmad (vice-principal Cordon 
College) 
Muhammad Salih al-Shinqiti (Shingeiti) 
(Umma) 
EGYPT 
King Faruq (28 Apr 1936) 
Husain Sirri (Sirry) (Independent, 15 Nov 
1940) 
Mustafa al-Nahhas (Nahas) (Wafd, 6 Feb 
1942) 
Ahmad Mahir (Maher) (Saadist, 9 Oct 1944) 
Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi (Nokrashi) 
(Saadist, 25 Feb 1945) 
Ismail Sidqi (Sidky) (Independent, 7 Feb 
1946) 
Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi (Nokrashi) 
(Saadist, 10 Dec 1946) 
Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi (Abdel Hadi) 
(Saadist, 28 Dec 1948) 
Husain Sirri (Sirry) (Independent, 26 July 
1949) 
Mustafa al-Nahhas (Nahas) (Wafd, 12 Jan 
1950) 
Mustafa al-Nahhas (6 Feb 1942) 
Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi (Nokrashi) 
(9 Oct 1944) 
Abd al-Hamid Badawi (7 Mar 1945) 
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (17 Feb 1946) 
Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi (Abdel Hadi) 
(12 Sept 1946) 
Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi (Nokrashi) 
(10 Dec 1946) 
Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba (19 Nov 
1947) 
Ibrahim Dassuqi Abaza (28 Dec 1948) 
Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba (27 Feb 
1949) 
Husain Sirri (Sirry) (26 July 1949) 
Muhammad Salah al-Din (12 Jan 1950) 
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Ambassador to Britain 
2. British Embassy 
Ambassador 
Minister 
Oriental secretary 
Oriental counsellor 
Counsellor 
3. Sudan agent, Cairo 
Abd al-Fattah Amr Pasha (1945-1952) 
Lord Killearn (Sir Miles Lampson) 
(22 Dec 1936) 
Sir Ronald Campbell (12 Mar 1946) 
Sir Ralph Stevenson (10 June 1950) 
R J Bowker (Apr 1946) 
EA Chapman-Andrews (Nov 1947) 
W A Smart (Apr 1926-Jan 1948) 
T C Ravensdale (Jan 1948-Jan 1949) 
T C Ravensdale (Jan 1949) 
R J Bowker (Sept 1945) 
R L Speaight (Apr 1946) 
D D Maclean (Nov 1948) 
G ER Sandars (1941-1945) 
A M Hankin (acting 1945) 
E C Haselden (1945-1953) 
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Chronological Table of Principal Events: 
Parts I & 11 
1936 
Aug Anthony Eden, S of S for foreign affairs, and Mustafa al-Nahhas, Egyptian 
PM, conclude A-E Treaty covering the terms of the military alliance 
between Britain and Egypt and the continuation of the condominium 
administration in the Sudan. The treaty is to last for a period of twenty 
years, with the option for renegotiation after ten years 
1938 
Feb Graduates' General Congress established 
1940 
June Italy declares war on Great Britain 
July Hostilities begin between Italian forces in Ethiopia and the SDF 
Oct Maj-gen Sir Hubert Huddleston appointed gov-gen of the Sudan 
1941 
Jan Ethiopia is invaded from the Sudan 
May Italian forces in Ethiopia surrender 
Aug The Atlantic Charter 
Oct Egypt and Sudan put forward proposals for the construction of a dam at 
Lake Tsana 
1942 
April The Graduates' Congress presents its memo calling for self-
determination after the war to the Sudan government; Cripps advises 
Newbold to establish an advisory council in the Northern Sudan 
May Newbold rejects Congress memorandum 
1943 
June Robert Howe presents Lake Tsana proposals to Emperor Haile Selassie 
Sept Advisory Councils Ordinance promulgated 
1944 
May First session of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan 
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Oct Formation of Ashiqqa (Full Brothers), Ittihadiyin (Unionist) and Ahrar 
(Liberal) parties out of factions within the Graduates' Congress 
Nov Graduates' Congress elections 
Dec Huddleston states the Sudan's future Nile waters needs (24 Dec) 
1945 
Feb Umma Party founded 
Mar Newbold dies (23 Mar) and James Robertson is appointed civ sec 
May Allied defeat of Germany 
July General election in Britain (25 July), Labour Party victory under Clement 
Attlee; Ernest Bevin appointed S of S for foreign affairs 
Aug Allied defeat of Japan; Communist Party founded in Sudan 
Dec Egypt demands revision of 1936 A-E Treaty (20 Dec) 
Feb 
Mar 
Mar-Apr 
Apr 
Apr-Oct 
May 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1946 
Ismail Sidqi becomes Egyptian PM 
Lord Killearn is replaced by Sir Ronald Campbell as ambassador to Egypt 
United parties delegation to Cairo 
Huddleston's pledge to the Advisory Council on self-government and self-
determination; Sudan Administration Conference convened 
A-E negotiations 
Bevin's statement in the House pledging consultation with the Sudanese 
before any change in the constitutional status of the Sudan (15 May) 
Sidqi-Bevin protocol 
Riots in Khartoum (2 Nov) after Sidqi announces return of Sudan's 
sovereignty to Egypt; Huddleston flies to London (9 Nov) 
Huddleston returns to Khartoum (6 Dec); Sidqi resigns (9 Dec) and 
Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi becomes Egyptian PM 
'Southern Policy' is formally abandoned (Dec 16) 
1947 
Jan al-Nuqrashi breaks off negotiations (27 Jan); takes A-E dispute to the UN 
Apr Howe appointed gov-gen of the Sudan 
June Juba Conference 
Draft Constitutional Ordinance submitted to Co-domini 
July Railway strike, ends with recognition of the WAA as the representative of 
the railway workers 
1948 
Jan & Mar Sudan railways strike, leading to the first trade union legislation in the 
Sudan 
June Constitutional Ordinance promulgated 
Dec Executive Council established and LA opened (15 Dec) following 
elections 
al-Nuqrashi assassinated by the Muslim Brothers in Cairo (28 Dec); 
Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi becomes Egyptian PM 
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1949 
Feb Egyptian proposals concerning the construction of the Lake Tsana and 
Owen Falls dams 
Apr Marshall Report on local govt in the Sudan 
July Husain Sirri becomes Egyptian PM 
Aug Workers' Congress created 
Dec Informal conversations between Egyptian and Sudan irrigation depts 
produces agreement on technical memo to be presented to Ethiopia 
concerning Lake Tsana 
1950 
Jan Wafd election victory in Egypt (3 Jan), al-Nahhas becomes PM 
Feb General election in Britain (23 Feb), Labour returned to power 
June Anglo-Egyptian talks resume 
Nov Faruq's speech from the throne (16 Nov) announces intention of 
abrogating the 1936 A-E Treaty and 1899 Condominium Agreement; 
Workers' Congress reconstituted as the SWTUF 
Dec LA in Sudan passes a self-govt resolution by 1 vote 
1951 
Mar Herbert Morrison appointed S of S for foreign affairs 
Apr Constitutional Amendment Commission appointed 
June Police strike in the Three Towns 
Constitutional Amendment Commission issues its initial report 
Aug US govt begins more active involvement in negotiations between the UK 
and Egypt 
Oct Egyptian abrogation of the A-E Treaty and the Condominium Agreement 
(8 Oct); general election in Britain (26 Oct), Conservative Party victory 
under Winston Churchill; Eden becomes S of S for foreign affairs; twelve 
members of Constitutional Amendment Commission request UN 
trusteeship for the Sudan (28 Oct) 
Nov Eden reaffirms policy of self-govt in the Sudan, followed by self-
determination (15 Nov) 
Constitutional Amendment Commission dissolved (26 Nov) following the 
resignation of six of its members 
Socialist Republican Party founded 
1952 
Jan Report of the Constitutional Amendment Commission tabled (23 Jan) 
'Black Friday' riots in Cairo (27 Jan); al-Nahhas dismissed and Ali Mahir 
becomes Egyptian PM 
Mar Ahmad Najib al-Hilali becomes Egyptian PM (2 Mar) 
Apr SWTUF call for a general strike fails 
July Sirri becomes Egyptian PM (2 July); al-Hilali becomes PM (22 July); Free 
Officers coup in Egypt (23 July); King Faruq abdicates (26 July); 
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Muhammad Najib presides as chairman of the RCC and Ali Mahir 
becomes PM and foreign minister 
Sept Najib becomes PM (7 Sept); agreement between UK and Egypt over 
Equatorial Nile project (15 Sept) 
Oct NUP formed; Egypt obtains preliminary agreement with northern 
Sudanese parties over the terms of self-govt legislation in the Sudan 
Nov Egypt presents its note on self-government in the Sudan to HMG (2 Nov) 
Dec Mahmud Fawzi becomes foreign minister (8 Dec) 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May-June 
June 
Nov 
Dec 
1953 
Salah Salim's visit to the Sudan; All Parties Agreement signed between 
the Egyptian govt and the three Northern Sudanese parties (11 Jan) 
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement regulating self-govt and self-determination 
for the Sudan signed (12 Feb) 
Office of the UKTC established in Khartoum; Self-Govt Statute 
promulgated (21 Mar); Southern Liberal Party founded 
Election Commission appointed 
Robertson retires as civ sec 
Churchill stands in for Eden as S of S for foreign affairs 
Lord Salisbury acting S of S for foreign affairs; Najib becomes president 
of Egypt 
Sudanese elections; visit of NUP leaders and Salah Salim to Southern 
Sudan 
Results of elections announced, NUP majority in both the House and the 
Senate 
1954 
Jan Formation of the first Sudanese govt with Ismail al-Azhari as PM 
Governor-General's Commission appointed 
Feb Political struggle between Najib and Jamal Abd al-Nasir; Najib deposed 
but reinstated 
Mar Anti-Najib riots in Khartoum (1 Mar); Parliament opened (10 Mar); 
Sudanisation Committee begins 
Apr Nasir takes over as chairman of the RCC and PM of Egypt 
June Sudanisation Committee issues its report on the Sudanisation of the 
administration, police and army 
Oct All Southern conference at Juba (18-21 Oct) 
Nov Nasir takes over as president of Egypt 
Dec Cabinet crisis: al-Azhari dismisses Mirghani Hamza and two other 
Khatmi ministers 
1955 
Jan Mirghani Hamza forms the RIP 
Mar Sir Knox Helm appointed gov-gen of the Sudan 
al-Azhari speaks of NUP's desire for independence (16 Mar); NUP 
parliamentary party opts for full independence of the Sudan (31 Mar) 
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Apr Eden replaces Churchill as PM in UK (6 Apr); Harold Macmillan becomes 
S of S for foreign affairs 
NUP executive endorses parliamentary party's policy on independence 
(12 Apr) 
May Southern ministers resign from the NUP and join Liberal party; al-
Azhari's government publicly announces abandonment of policy of unity 
with Egypt; inconclusive talks between Salah Salim and al-Azhari over 
restarting Nile waters negotiations 
General election in Britain (26 May), Conservatives returned to power 
June Struggle between al-Azhari and Muhamad Nur al-Din for control of the 
NUP; Nur al-Din dismissed from cabinet. 
July Juba conference called by Southern Liberal Party (6-7 July) 
Aug Sudanisation is completed; mutiny in Torit and disturbances in many 
parts of Southern Sudan; parliament passes a motion calling for self-
determination decided by a plebiscite 
Oct Czech arms deal with Egypt 
HMG informs al-Azhari that it is willing to support a vote for 
independence in the Sudanese parliament 
Nov Withdrawal of British and Egyptian troops complete (10 Nov); al-Azhari 
loses vote of confidence in the House of Representatives (10 Nov) but is 
re-elected PM (14 Nov); Sudan rejects Egypt's proposal over the division 
of Nile waters to follow the construction of the Aswan High Dam (20 Nov) 
Dec Helm departs on leave (15 Dec); both houses of the Sudanese parliament 
pass independence resolutions (19 Dec); Selwyn Lloyd becomes S of S for 
foreign affairs (20 Dec); Egypt refuses to grant Sudan's requests on 
division of Nile waters (28 Dec) 
1956 
Jan Sudanese independence takes effect (1 Jan) 
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Introduction 
The Foreign Office and the Foreign Office documents 
This collection of documents illustrates an anomaly in decolonisation. Before Britain 
fully accepted the twin principles of self-government and self-determination for her 
own colonial empire, here she became the main international advocate for granting 
independence to the colony of another country, Egypt, then in the process of 
disentangling itself from Britain's informal empire in the Middle East. It was an 
anomaly stemming from the Sudan's unusual position as a territory administered by 
the Foreign Office, which was more directly exposed than the Colonial Office to the 
changing international order in the immediate post-war years. The Colonial Office 
did anticipate changes in the international order at the end of the war, and this was 
reflected in its thinking on such issues as colonial development and welfare and 
international accountability in colonial affairs.1 Yet it was the Foreign Office who 
first had to contend with the practical realities of anticipated post-war changes: the 
foreign secretary was confronted by Britain's shrinking role as a world power and the 
constraints of international opinion, and the Foreign Office was made constantly 
aware of the decreasing options empire had. Those involved in the daily affairs of 
administering other Mrican territories often took longer to realise just how the rules 
of the imperial game had changed. This difference in perception was evident as early 
as 1946 and was revealed, as we shall see, in the contest between Egyptian 
sovereignty and Sudanese self-determination. It became even more pronounced in 
the early 1950s when the Colonial Office, by now set on parallel courses for self-
government in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, repeatedly objected to the precedents 
being set in the Sudan. 
The criteria for selection of these documents follow the broad guidelines adopted 
by other volumes in this series, being confined to those documents produced by, or 
which came into government departments in London during the course of, official 
business. Given the limits of publishing space it has not been possible to represent all 
topics contained in the files (such as compensation schemes for retiring British 
officials, the technical aspects of grants-in-aid or development projects, local level 
administrative reports or Sudanese representation on international bodies). Nor has 
it been possible to cover in extended detail all of the major diplomatic, political, 
constitutional or administrative issues which do figure in this volume. Given the 
Sudan's chronological position in the history of the end of empire, the wide variety of 
its international relations even before independence, and the complexity of its 
internal politics, an attempt has been made to provide as wide a coverage as possible 
of topics illustrating not only the process of the transfer of power, but the Sudan's 
place in the broader trends of decolonisation and the state of the Sudanese nation at 
independence. 
Documents have been chosen to illustrate four broad areas: 1) international 
diplomacy concerning the Sudan, 2) constitutional and administrative developments 
within the Sudan, 3) internal Sudanese political developments and 4) inter-
xxxvi INTRODUCTION 
departmental matters in the British government. The first covers Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations over the future status of the Sudan, Anglo-American debates 
concerning the Sudan within a broader Middle Eastern policy, the Sudan's relations 
with its neighbours most affected by the Nile Waters (Egypt, Ethiopia and British 
East Africa), and the administration of sensitive border areas (Eritrea, Ethiopia and 
Kenya). The second includes the creation of institutions of self-government and the 
transition from self-government to independence. The third concerns the emergence 
of political parties and the entrenchment of sectarianism in the North, the 
development of a southern political consciousness, relations between Sudanese 
parties and the Egyptian and British governments, the development of trade unions 
and labour legislation, electoral and parliamentary politics, and the 1955 mutiny in 
the South. The fourth refers to policy discussions between Whitehall, the Cairo 
embassy and the Khartoum government, and debates between the Foreign, Colonial 
and Commonwealth Relations Offices about the precedents being set in the Sudan. 
The restrictions on the availability of sources which have affected most acutely the 
volume on Middle East defence2 apply to a lesser extent to this volume. The 
withholding of a number of files and an even greater number of individual jackets 
within released files has made it impossible to follow through on some issues and 
thus give a comprehensive account of policies decided and actions taken.3 It has not 
always been possible to gauge the true impact of back bench or extra-parliamentary 
pressure at crucial stages in the decisions concerning the Sudan's future. The 
internal deliberations of the governments of Egypt and the Sudan are only partially 
revealed by Foreign Office documents, though in the case of the latter researchers in 
the United Kingdom have the advantage of access to collections of the personal 
papers (including copies of official documents) of a number of British administrators 
in the Sudan during this time.4 These restrictions notwithstanding, the documents 
available in FO 371 come from a wide variety of sources within the Sudan, Egypt, the 
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth generally. They offer a very full, and at 
times surprisingly intimate record of the events leading to the Sudan's 
independence, and the attitudes and ideas which influenced policy. Thus we are able 
to include not only reports describing events and documents recording how policies 
were decided and implemented, but more reflective drafts and minutes exploring 
broader issues and options not taken. The types of documents range from diplomatic 
telegrams giving the first account of significant events, to minutes providing an 
overview of a series of documents covering a period of months. These latter are 
included especially as summaries for lengthy discussions and negotiations such as 
the Nile Waters, or for extended policy debates which came to nothing, such as the 
controversy over the recognition of the King of Egypt's title, unexpectedly resolved 
by the Free Officers' coup in 1952. 
As already noted by John Kent, matters concerning Egypt and Britain's informal 
empire in the Middle East were discussed in greater detail in Cabinet meetings than 
many other topics concerning the colonial empire.5 1t was through its attachment to 
Egypt that the internal affairs of the Sudan were brought into far greater prominence 
in Cabinet discussions than other African territories at this time. The Sudan fell 
under the responsibility of the foreign secretary, a much more significant political 
figure in post-war governments than the colonial secretary. The prime minister also 
frequently became centrally involved. Attlee's collection of Sudan papers was 
extensive (PREM 8); Churchill's and Eden's even more so (PREM 8, 11). Churchill's 
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copies of telegrams and reports are largely unannotated, aside from a few explosive 
interjections; Eden's many marginal notes show the continuity of his personal 
interest in directing Britain's Sudan policy from foreign secretary to prime minister. 
Other Cabinet members also became involved: Macmillan's first submission on the 
Sudan was made when he was still minister of housing and local government (308). 
Within the Foreign Office the Sudan originally came under the Egyptian 
Department, and communications from Khartoum were routed through HBM's 
representative in Cairo. The Egyptian Department became the African Department in 
October 1948, and Egypt and the Sudan continued to be dealt together by the same 
official. Only as Sudanese self-government approached in the early 1950s was the 
Sudan assigned its own 'desk'. The work of the department was supervised by a 
superintending under-secretary of state within the Foreign Office, and important 
matters of policy were further vetted by a deputy under-secretary of state or the 
permanent under-secretary of state. From time to time a minister of state also 
deputised for the foreign secretary (as McNeil did in London during Bevin's absence 
in 1946, and as Selwyn Lloyd did for Eden in 1953). The importance of the embassy 
in Cairo declined during the period covered by these documents. From 1946 on the 
ambassador's responsibility for the Sudan lapsed and the governor-general 
communicated directly to the Foreign Office and the foreign secretary; thus 
increasing the governor-general's importance in subsequent Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations, at the same time giving the secretary of state more direct oversight of 
Sudanese affairs. 6 
Within the Foreign Office there was considerable continuity of Egyptian expertise. 
Sir Eric Beckett, legal adviser throughout the crucial period of Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations in 1946-1953, had helped draft the 1936 treaty. Exchanges between, 
and the eventual amalgamation of, the foreign and diplomatic services meant that 
there were a number of officials who saw service in both Cairo and Whitehall 
(including Bowker, Chapman-Andrews, Riches, Scrivener and Shuckburgh, and two 
ambassadors, Campbell and Stevenson) . A few (Chapman-Andrews and Riches) had 
even served on diplomatic missions in the Sudan during the war. There was no 
reciprocal movement between the Sudan Political Service and the Foreign Office, 
despite the former being supervised by the latter. The Sudan government staffed 
agencies in Cairo and London, but the Sudan agents acted as liaison officers with the 
Cairo embassy and Whitehall on a number of largely technical matters and provided 
supplementary political information. Given the suspicions the Sudan government 
had of Foreign Office intentions, the Sudan agent also supplied informal 
'intelligence' on Whitehall to Khartoum.7 It was only when self-government and self-
determination for the Sudan became the dominant issues that the Foreign Office 
broke with established tradition and appointed two of its own men (Howe and Helm) 
as the last governors-general of the Sudan. The opening of the United Kingdom 
Trade Commissioner's Office in Khartoum in 1953 (set up for political, rather than 
commercial reasons) allowed the Foreign Office to send personnel with both 
Egyptian and Whitehall experience to Khartoum (Riches, Morris), leading finally to 
the appointment of Chapman-Andrews as the first ambassador to the Sudan. 
The consequence of all this was that the Foreign Office was not the remote and 
isolated bureaucracy of the Sudan administrators' imagination. Whitehall had to 
keep in focus the tripartite demands of Britain's broader strategic interests and its 
specific commitments to both Egypt and the Sudan. The Cairo embassy often argued 
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Egypt's case with considerable strength, while Howe, once installed in Khartoum, 
appeared just as intransigent in the Sudanese interest as his much-decorated 
predecessor, Major-General Sir Hubert Huddleston. Officials in Whitehall had to 
balance these competing interests in the increasingly hopeless task of squaring many 
circles, but collectively they exhibited a surprisingly detailed knowledge of 
conditions in the Sudan, and their individual comments often showed greater 
perspective and foresight than those of the Sudan administrators. Despite this most 
Sudan government officials had a lasting suspicion of and hostility towards the 
Foreign Office, a suspicion which pervades their private papers and memoirs, and 
which continues to colour historical writing about this period. 
All editing projects are collaborative efforts, but BDEEP has been more so than 
most. Overall guidance was provided in the early stages by the first two general 
editors, the late Michael Crowder and David Murray, but the hard task of editing the 
editors fell to Stephen Ashton, a job he performed (in my case) with tact and, at 
times, admirable diplomacy. It has been a privilege for me to work in tandem with 
the other editors of the project, but I have benefited most from the parallel research 
of and comments from Ronald Hyam, Richard Rathbone and John Kent. We all owe a 
debt of gratitude to the staff at the PRO for the processing of bulk orders and 
photocopying, but I owe my personal thanks to Jane Hogan and the special 
collections staff at the University of Durham Palace Green Library for their quick 
response to my urgent requests for supplementary material from the university's 
Sudan archive. I am also grateful to Catherine Lawrence, cartographer at the School 
of Oriental and Mrican Studies, for the general map of the Sudan reproduced in both 
parts of this volume. 
* * * * 
The Anglo-Egyptian condominium 
The evolution of the internal administration of the Sudan, and the relationship of its 
central government at Khartoum to the embassy in Cairo, the Egyptian government 
and the Foreign Office can be best described in a summary of the condominium from 
its inception in 1899 to 1946. Britain's occupation of Egypt in the 1880s coincided 
with the onset of the Mahdiya (1881-1898), the religious rising against 
Turco-Egyptian rule in the Sudan led by Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi ('the Rightly 
Guided One'). It was at Britain's insistence that Egypt abandoned its Mrican empire 
(which included the Sudan and parts of the Congo, Uganda, Abyssinia and the 
Eritrean and Somali coasts). The European scramble for Mrica followed immediately 
upon the collapse of the Egyptian empire, and as European powers began to push 
their claims into the interior, Britain resurrected the continuation of Egypt's former 
claim to the Nile valley. The reconquest of the Sudan (1896-1899) was undertaken 
for Egyptian strategic reasons, largely with Egyptian troops (under British 
command) and was paid for mainly by Egypt. Britain presented itself as assisting 
Egypt militarily to regain its territories 'in rebellion', and diplomatically to re-assert 
its rights to the Sudan against claims of the Abyssinian, French and Belgian empires, 
even flying the Egyptian, rather than the British flag in the confrontation with the 
French expedition at Fashoda in 1898 (86). This early symbolic assertion of Egyptian 
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sovereignty was to return to haunt Britain in subsequent negotiations with Egypt 
(91). 
The 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement (appendix, part I) established the eo-domina! 
nature of the administrative structure of the Sudan. Britain claimed the right, by 
virtue of participating in the reconquest, to administer the Sudan on behalf of Egypt. 
The governor-general of the Sudan was appointed by the viceroy (later king) of Egypt 
on the recommendation of the British government. He had the right to legislate by 
proclamation but was also subordinate to the British agent and consul-general in 
Cairo, then Lord Cromer.8 Sovereignty in 1899 was not the issue it later became as 
Egyptian sovereignty itself was qualified by British occupation. Ultimate sovereignty 
over the Sudan was left deliberately vague. Egypt (rather than Britain) paid a 
subvention to the Sudan government, and the administration of the Sudan grew out 
of the Egyptian army of occupation, with the sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the 
Egyptian army also serving as governor-general of the Sudan. This arrangement 
lasted until1924, nearly half the span of the condominium. 
The majority of the pre-1920 administrators of the Sudan were seconded from the 
Egyptian army, with British officers occupying the senior positions in civil 
administration, and Egyptian and Sudanese officers drawn from the Egyptian and 
Sudanese battalions of the Egyptian garrison serving in junior administrative 
capacities throughout the Sudan. This continued until the crisis of 1924, after which 
the Egyptian battalions and Egyptian officers were expelled and a new Sudan Defence 
Force was created independent of the Egyptian army. Being derived from the 
Egyptian army the SDF retained similar structures, especially in the granting of 
commissions to Sudanese native officers (unlike East and West Mrica). This was to 
have important implications in the period of decolonisation because it established a 
Sudanese officer corps: Abdallah Khalil, a leading member of the Umma Party before 
independence and subsequent prime minister, served in both the Egyptian army and 
SDF, retiring with the rank of brigadier. 
Egypt being a Foreign Office responsibility, the Sudan administration came under 
Foreign Office supervision, and remained so because of the Sudan's legal status as an 
Egyptian possession. Not only did the Foreign Office nominate the governor-general, 
but it recruited the civilian element of the Sudan administration - those on 
permanent service rather than on contract who were later referred to as the Sudan 
Political Service. Selection for the Sudan administration was organised on Foreign 
Office lines: with no entrance exam (unlike the Indian Civil and Colonial Services) 
much depended on recommendations and the viva voce. It was only in the 1920s that 
the civilian SPS began to outnumber the contract soldiers, and civilians occupied all 
the highest posts from province governors to the civil secretary. The first civilian 
governors-general were also appointed in the 1920s, and it was during the 1920s that 
the balance of power within the central government in Khartoum began to shift away 
from the governor-general towards the triumvirate of the civil, financial and legal 
secretaries. A Governor-General's Council had been in existence since 1910, but 
during the interwar years the council came into its own as more than a mere 
advisory body and the civil secretary, especially, took a leading role as head of the 
civil administration.9 
The crisis in relations between Egypt and Britain following World War One had a 
profound impact on the Sudan's relation to Egypt. The 1919 nationalist 
demonstrations in Egypt against the protectorate declared by Britain in 1914 were 
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suppressed (with Huddleston, a future governor-general of the Sudan, taking part in 
the suppression) (107). Leaders of the main nationalist party, the Wafd, then 
attempted to negotiate an end to the protectorate, but these negotiations faltered, in 
part because of the Wafd's insistence on asserting Egyptian sovereignty over the 
Sudan. In 1922 Britain unilaterally recognised Egypt's independence, subject to 
reservations over the security of imperial communications, the defence of Egypt, 
the protection of minorities and foreign interests, and the Sudan. This forced the 
Sudan's ambiguous position as an Egyptian colony governed by Britain into the 
forefront of Anglo-Egyptian relations. In 1923 Britain intervened in the drafting of 
the Egyptian constitution to remove any reference to the King of Egypt being the 
King of the Sudan. In 1924 talks resumed between the British and Egyptian 
governments to resolve the reserved points. Egypt, under the newly elected Wafd 
government of Zaghlul Pasha, hoped for a greater recognition of its rights over the 
Sudan, while the Sudan government hoped for complete political and military 
autonomy from Egypt, with the withdrawal of the Egyptian army and Egyptian 
officials (but not of Egyptian money). London and the high commissioner in Cairo, 
at different times, attempted to take positions somewhere between these two poles, 
hoping that Egypt might be persuaded to drop its claims to the Sudan, but continue 
its subvention, in return for a secure southern frontier and a guaranteed share of the 
Nile Waters. 
The crisis spread to the Sudan through a series of pro-Egyptian demonstrations 
among Sudanese army units. It came to a head with the assassination of Sir Lee 
Stack, governor-general of the Sudan, by Egyptian nationalists in Cairo in November 
1924. Lord Allenby, British high commissioner, issued an ultimatum to the Egyptian 
government to pay a fine of half a million pounds, withdraw all military personnel 
from the Sudan and accept an unlimited increase in the Sudan's share of the Nile 
Waters. Zaghlul was unable to accept these conditions and resigned. Allenby 
suspended the 1923 constitution, and the Sudan government began the evacuation 
of all Egyptian forces from the country, provoking some Sudanese troops to mutiny 
in their support. The mutiny was quickly put down by British troops in the streets of 
Khartoum (with Huddleston, once again, in command) . British officials in the Sudan 
hoped that the formal abolition of the condominium would follow, but this was 
opposed by the Foreign Office and Allenby, both of whom hoped for the creation of a 
friendlier government in Egypt, and both of whom recognised the continued 
importance of Egypt's annual subvention to the Sudan.10 
The expulsion of the Egyptians led to the Sudan being governed as a British colony 
in practice, but not in law. The Sudanese battalions of the Egyptian army were 
reorganised as a separate force, with Huddleston as the first kaid al-amm 
(commander-in-chief) and all Sudanese officers receiving their commissions from, 
and taking an oath of allegiance to the governor-general. Throughout the 1920s the 
Sudan government aggressively asserted the Sudan's rights to a share of the Nile 
Waters and increased cotton production. Water became the one regular point of 
diplomatic contact between the Sudan and Egypt: Egypt's most important presence 
in the Sudan being the Egyptian Irrigation Department. The completion of the 
Sennar Dam in 1926 to provide irrigation for the new Gezira scheme south qf 
Khartoum was eventually followed by a Nile Waters agreement negotiated by Britain 
and Egypt in 1929, allowing Egypt an 11 to 1 share in the Nile Waters, restricting the 
construction of further irrigation works inside the Sudan and allowing the EID 
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inspection rights. The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement gave the Sudan more than it had 
previously received, but it upheld 'the principle of the primacy of existing land usage 
and water needs versus potential use and needs', 11 and was not well received by 
politically-conscious Sudanese, who of course had not been consulted.12 
There was no agreement over the status of the Sudan. Four separate attempts 
between 1927 and 1930 to re-negotiate Anglo-Egyptian relations failed over the 
demand by successive Egyptian governments to return to the pre-1924 arrangement. 
Britain's position that Britain and Egypt exercised conjoint sovereignty over the 
Sudan was consistently rejected by the Wafd party, which was riven by internal splits 
and unable to form a stable government to press the issue. The Abyssinian crisis of 
the mid-1930s served as an incentive to both Egypt and Britain to conclude a treaty 
of alliance in 1936. The Wafd prime minister, Mustafa al-Nahhas, 13 secured a 
restoration of the 1923 constitution and led a united parties delegation into the 
negotiations with Anthony Eden, then British foreign secretary, seeking an alliance 
with Britain and a modification of the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement to give Egypt 
an effective share in the administration of the Sudan. 
The Sudan government's position in the negotiations was presented by the 
governor-general, Sir Stewart Symes, supported by the high commissioner, Sir Miles 
Lampson (later Lord Killearn). He urged Egypt's recognition of a de jure, as well as 
de facto autonomous government in the Sudan, exercising conjoint sovereignty 
under the condominium agreements in the form of a 'mandatory' administration for 
the welfare of the Sudanese, until such time as the Sudanese had reached 'a higher 
level of civilisation'. Symes countered the Egyptian proposal to direct involvement in 
Sudanese administration by announcing that junior public service posts already 
occupied by some 500 Egyptians would gradually be filled by qualified Sudanese. The 
Foreign Office accepted Symes' arguments, but qualified them with the 
acknowledgement that Egypt did have 'legal rights' in the Sudan, however much 
these were in conflict with 'moral and historical' considerations. In the end the 1936 
treaty did not modify the 1899 agreement but did restore something of the pre-1924 
position by readmitting a small Egyptian garrison to Khartoum. The principle of the 
governor-general's autonomy in legislating for Sudan was maintained, requiring him 
merely to inform both eo-domini of legislation after the fact; though in practice he 
continued to seek and receive HMG's approval through the ambassador before 
passing legislation (13) . The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement was appended to the treaty 
and remained unchanged. The Sudan's debt to Egypt was in effect written off (it 
would not be cancelled, nor would it be called in). The question of sovereignty was 
again left in abeyance (6) . The treaty had to be renegotiated at the end of twenty years 
(1956), but there was a provision for renegotiation after ten years (1946) at either 
party's requestY 
The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations between 1923 and 1936 had an impact on the 
internal administration of the Sudan, despite leaving the terms of the original 1899 
agreement unchanged. The Sudan government's attitude to the negotiations not 
only reflected, but sometimes altered their relationship with different classes and 
categories of Sudanese leaders. At the time of the re-conquest the newly established 
Sudan government sought allies among the tribal notables who had formerly allied 
with the old Turco-Egyptian regime, or who had suffered under the centralised 
theocratic state of the Mahdiya. Conscious of its position as an 'infidel' government 
among a Muslim population in the northern part of the country, it was especially 
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keen to build up a rural base of support, bolstered by an 'established' Islam, to guard 
against the resurgence of potentially anti-government Islamic reformers. 
Throughout the first two decades of the twentieth century tribal groups were 
reconstituted around notable families in a hierarchy of shaikhs (high notables), 
nazirs (leaders of tribes or large tribal sections) and omdas (headmen of towns or 
groups of villages). These were the men who, through government support, began to 
acquire rights to labour and land, and who after the adoption of the policy of 'native 
administration' in 1922, were given formal judicial powers as well. The advent of 
World War One and the Egyptian nationalist struggle brought about a modification 
of the government's religious policy. Previously it had favoured the Khatmiya 
religious order, whose leader, sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, had been a staunch supporter of 
Egypt throughout the Mahdiya (116 n 7), and had kept a close watch on the activities 
of the family of the late Mahdi, especially his son sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi15 
and his followers, the Ansar. But Mahdiism's anti-Turkish and anti-Egyptian ideology 
brought it into an alliance with the Sudan government first during the war against 
Turkey, and again in 1919, countering pro-Egyptian sentiment in the Sudan. The 
rehabilitation of sayyid Abd al-Rahman and his Ansar sect brought him a profitable 
livelihood as he secured government contracts for the provision of meat and fuel, and 
was soon able, along with many other notables and merchants, to invest in the new 
cotton-growing area of the Gezira scheme. By the end of the 1920s sayyid Abd al-
Rahman was financing his inherited mantle of sanctity with profits from big 
business.16 
This attempt to build up and rule through a 'gentry' was achieved at the expense of 
some of the government's earlier allies: the officer corps of the Sudanese battalions 
and the newly emerging 'effendia', the modern educated class in the lower ranks of 
the civil service. Both were employed in institutions derived from Egypt. The soldiers 
were products of the old slave battalions of the nineteenth-century army, families of 
professional soldiers of slave descent (what British administrators in the 1920s 
termed 'negroid but detribalised') who formed the nucleus of a new literate native 
officer class owing their commissions, and their loyalty, to the king of Egypt; but 
who, because of their servile origin, had few, if any ties with the emergent tribal 
gentry of the northern provinces. It was only those sons of the gentry and the 
merchant classes that also entered the civil service via modern education who came 
into contact with this class on equal terms, with a shared educational background 
and similar aspirations. In the immediate aftermath of World War One many of the 
Sudanese effendia looked to Egypt for political inspiration and sympathised with the 
Wafd's struggle for independence. By 1924 the most active Sudanese nationalist 
group was the White Flag League, advocating the contradictory platforms of 'Sudan 
for the Sudanese' and 'the unity of the Nile valley', and whose leader, Ali Abd al-Latif 
(116 n 9) was the son of former slaves, a graduate of Gordon Memorial College in 
Khartoum, an ex-officer, and a friend of such Egyptian officers stationed in the 
Sudan as Muhammad Najib, the future president of Egypt. 
The new 'Sudan Question' raised by the 1924 negotiations divided the effendia 
from the notables, and split the nationalists. Ali Abd al-Latifs slave descent and his 
strong opposition to the religious notables' collaboration with the British 
administration (particularly that of the 'two sayyids') alienated the notables and their 
adherents (even among the effendia) from the nationalist cause. When in 1924 
Britain raised, for the first time, the idea that the 'will of the Sudanese people' should 
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be given priority in solving the 'Sudan question', but that this will should be 
'delegated', the idea of 'delegation' of the Sudan's rights in the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations was widely accepted. The tribal and religious notables who were 
seeking, by investment in the Gezira, to become a landed gentry or an agricultural 
bourgeoisie, were allies of the Sudan government and delegated their rights to 
Britain. The White Flag League delegated their rights to Egypt (and in particular to 
the Wafd). But there was an essential conflict between the idea of 'delegation' of the 
Sudan's rights and the idea of the right of Sudanese to self-determination which was 
never fully resolved and was one of the causes of the League's ultimate failure. The 
conflict between the eo-domina! powers was played out between contesting groups in 
the Sudan. The Sudanese nationalists foundered on issues of race and class 
indigenous to the Sudan, and many repudiated Ali Abd al-Latif and others like him as 
men of no importance with no right to speak on matters of state politics. The defeat 
of the mutineers, the suppression of the White Flag League and its leaders, and the 
expulsion of the Egyptians meant that Sudanese 'nationalism' of the 1930s and 1940s 
developed along much more restricted lines than those proposed by Ali Abd al-LatifY 
The organisation of the rural administration of the Sudan around tribal leaders 
continued throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, with a further dilution of the 
influence of old Sudanese officers. In the reorganisation of the SDF the regular 
battalions of Sudanese were gradually disbanded and replaced by 'irregular' corps of 
largely locally-recruited territorial units. There was an increase in the number of 
'Arab' officers (169), and many non-commissioned officers as well were recruited 
from the families of tribal notables. Positions vacated by the expelled Egyptian 
officers were either abolished or filled by younger educated northern Sudanese. One 
motive for the reliance on native administration was certainly to support the more 
'loyal' gentry against the less reliable effendia, but even though educated Sudanese in 
the civil service felt that they were being marginalised during this period, their social 
and economic importance in the country was growing. The effendia's 
disillusionment with Egypt's own imperial attitudes toward the Sudan displayed in 
the 1929 Nile Waters and 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations certainly helped 
in the gradual rapprochement between the educated classes and the government in 
the late 1930s. Mter 1936 more minor administrative posts were created for educated 
Sudanese, and new structures of local government in the municipalities, townships 
and rural areas began to replace or supplement native administration (7) . Educated 
northern Sudanese organised themselves into the Graduates' Congress in 1938 (1), 
initially a non-political organisation of secondary school graduates which grew out of 
the Omdurman and Wad Medani graduates' clubs and literary societies of the post-
1924 era. The Graduates' Congress presented itself to the government as a semi-
public body interested in social reform and affairs of public interest, and received a 
sympathetic welcome from an administration which was even then toying with the 
idea of creating some form of advisory council.18 
The 'Southern Policy', first enunciated in 1930, was an extension of the principles 
of native administration to the three southern provinces, whereby tribal systems 
were massaged into the structures of local administration, each supported by (and 
supporting) their own forms of customary law. Beyond that there was also a fear of 
the political consequences of the spread of Islam into non-Muslim areas, the example 
of Ali Abd al-Latif (though born in Egypt) and other 'detribalised' officers of southern 
stock being taken as proof of this. There was a genuine concern about the destructive 
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legacy of the slave trade in the South and other slave-taking reservoirs such as the 
Nuba Mountains, which was reinforced by the discovery of a resurgence of slaving in 
the late 1920s. To the principles of native administration then universally applied 
throughout the Sudan were added further restrictions on movements of northern 
Sudanese into the South and other non-Muslim areas of the North through the 
Closed Districts Ordinance. Education, which had never received priority in the 
South, was left in the hands of Christian missionaries. Despite the over-enthusiastic 
application of these restrictions in the Western District, Bahr al-Ghazal, significant 
Muslim communities continued to live in the major towns of the South, select 
northern Sudanese merchants continued to receive permits to trade even in remote 
areas, and northern Sudanese and Muslim clerical staff, administrative officials and 
even some police and army officers continued to serve in the southern provinces 
(one, Ibrahim Badri, later became a prominent nationalist politician). The British 
'Bog Barons' of southern administration gained a reputation for eccentric insularity, 
but there was no separate administrative service for the southern provinces. The 
majority of British officials serving in the South between 1930 and 1946, including 
the provincial governors, also saw service in the North. The possibility of merging 
the Sudan's southern provinces into the administration of the East African colonies 
was an option which was raised, but it was never seriously pressed on the Colonial 
Office (11). Symes' modernising reforms served to entrench the social and economic 
differences between North and South as resources were directed away from the 
backward regions into the relatively few developed areas of the North.19 
The preceding summary suggests a number of similarities between the Sudan and 
Britain's African colonial territories, contrary to the often voiced assumption that the 
Sudan was governed according to the Foreign Office's 'Middle Eastern axioms' . 
Despite the Balliol-like image of 'effortless superiority' which the SPS cultivated, and 
the outward disdain for colonial ways it often expressed, the Sudan administration 
did look to the Indian and colonial empires for inspiration. The 1899 agreement 
deliberately excluded the mixed courts and Egyptian law from the Sudan, allowing 
the government to adapt the Indian civil and penal codes for use in a multi-religious 
context, just as the governments of the East African colonies did. Native 
administration as the basis for local government was derived from the principles of 
indirect rule as practised elsewhere in British Africa. Islamic (sharia) law was 
relegated mainly to realm of family law, and customary law was given a significant 
place, even in rural Muslim communities. 
Some political developments happened in the Sudan earlier than in West Africa, 
partly because the Sudan was not under the Colonial Office but was linked to Egypt. 
As early as 1925 civil posts vacated by Egyptians were filled by promoting Sudanese, 
and in 1936 the governor-general managed to get acceptance of the principle of 
Sudanising Egyptian posts. Yet there were similar problems and attitudes. The post-
1936 policy of bringing more educated Sudanese into the administration met with 
the same type of resistance among senior administrators in the Sudan20 that was 
provoked by Sir Alan Burns' later reforms in the Gold Coast. The arguments in the 
Gold Coast concerning the lack of a popular base for the 'small minority' of literate 
Africans21 had their antecedents in the Sudan as early as 1924 and were paralleled in 
1942 (1, 3). But in both 1936 and 1946 the Sudan government had to drop their 
reservations in order to build alliances with that 'small minority' to keep Egypt out. 
In each significant round of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations Britain progressively 
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redefined the rationale for its presence in the Sudan. In the 1920s it was to provide 
good government, with 'the will of the Sudanese people' being invoked in support of 
removing Egyptian influence. In 1936 it was as a 'mandatory' administration with 
the 'welfare' of the Sudanese in mind, and the claims of Sudanese effendia were 
advanced over Egyptian claims to greater administrative representation. By 1942 
self-government was being advocated as a way of obtaining Sudanese independence 
from Egypt (3). It was only in 1946, as we shall see, that the Sudan government 
explicitly declared that Sudanese self-government and self-determination were -and 
always had been - the objects of British administration, again as a counter to the 
Egyptian reassertion of its sovereignty over the Sudan. 
Anticipating the post-war settlement, May 1942-Dec 1945 
The events of World War Two had a direct impact on British relations with both the 
Sudan and Egypt. The Sudan won a reputation for loyalty to the British war effort 
through the contribution of its troops in Ethiopia and subsequently in Libya. In 
contrast Britain never took Egyptian loyalty for granted, and on 4 February 1942 
Lampson employed British troops to force King Faruq to invite the anti-monarchist 
Wafd Party (the eo-architects of the 1936 treaty of alliance) to form a government 
under Mustafa al-Nahhas. Faruq's antipathy towards the Wafd deepened and he 
would later show great reluctance to invite them to form any post-war government, 
preferring instead governments of unstable coalitions. The Wafd gained a reputation 
as a pro-British party, which it would try to shake off in opposition after the war. 
By early 1942 there were significant developments in the war which affected the 
Sudan both directly and indirectly: the removal of the immediate threat to the 
Sudan's security with the defeat of Italy in Ethiopia, the publication of the Atlantic 
. Charter, and the Cripps mission to India. The Graduates' Congress took the 
opportunity of Cripps' advertised stop-over in Khartoum on his way to India in April 
to present the government with a memorandum directly responding to the Atlantic 
Charter without specifically mentioning it, and calling upon the eo-domina! powers 
to guarantee the Sudan's right to self-determination after the war (1). In the 
memorandum Congress described itself as representing 'enlightened public opinion' 
and submitted its proposals as expressing 'faithfully the inclinations and aspirations 
of this country'. In addition to asking for guarantees for the exercise of the right of 
self-determination, the memorandum listed a number of specifically northern 
Sudanese concerns: measures for including Sudanese at all levels of government and 
for its eventual Sudanisation; removal of restrictions on indigenous economic 
activity; the establishment of a Sudanese nationality (as opposed to the extension of 
Egyptian nationality to the Sudan); a halt to immigration not covered by the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (a reference to West Mrican immigrants); and the reversal of 
the Southern Policy in regards to permits to trade and the missionary education 
system. 
The reaction of the Sudan government was ambivalent. Many points in the 
memorandum concerning greater Sudanese involvement in administration had been 
under consideration since 1936 and were in keeping with the trend of reforms 
initiated by Symes and enacted by his civil secretaries, Gillan and Newbold. But while 
the war may have receded from the Sudan's borders, British forces were still under 
threat in North Mrica, and Congress's timing appeared to some officials as nothing 
less than seditious.22 Newbold's brusque rejection of the memorandum, his 
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repudiation of Congress's claim to speak on national issues and his instructions to 
senior administrators not to discuss the memorandum with Sudanese won the 
approval of both the governor-general and the Foreign Office. Yet all seemed agreed 
that some form of inclusion of Sudanese in administration and central government 
was necessary (1, 3). Newbold had written nearly two months before receiving the 
memorandum: 'I think we must start now taking note of the Atlantic Charter' (2) . Sir 
Stafford Cripps subsequently advised him 'we must have a Sudanese Advisory 
Council and not wait on events'.23 One effect of the memorandum and subsequent 
discussions and correspondence with Congress (4, 5) was that it revealed 'the urgent 
need' for proceeding with plans to bring Sudanese into closer association with the 
government (7) which Newbold had begun drafting in February (2) . It also meant 
that despite repeated attempts to put Congress in its place over constitutional and 
political matters (4, 8) the government finally had to accept that it must find ways of 
engaging Congress and other politically-minded Sudanese in a constructive dialogue 
about self-government, lest 'the Paradise of the Sudan of the Golden Age may prove a 
Fool's Paradise' (7, 9). 
Historians of decolonisation have argued that the issue of Sudanese self-
determination was raised prematurely by external factors before it could arise 
naturally among the broader population within the Sudan, and even that the very 
idea of a Sudanese nation originated with British administrators. It could more 
accurately be said that northern Sudanese nationalist leaders seized on international 
events to their advantage earlier than Mrican nationalists elsewhere. Thus, at a time 
when Churchill himself was arguing against the application to India of the right of 
self-determination enshrined in the Charter, some Sudanese leaders already had 
grasped the significance of the language of the Charter to their own aspirations. By 
their actions in 1942 they placed not just a 'closer association' with government, but 
self-government and self-determination on the post-war agenda. 
Newbold redefined British 'trusteeship' as being 'that of a guardian for a ward who 
will eventually come of age' (7). This was given expression in his directive statement 
to British administrators (9) outlining the government's 'tutelary' role to lead 
Congress back from the error of its presumption and 'regain Government's sympathy 
and confidence' . For all of its recognition of the rising importance of the educated 
class, older ways of perceiving the Sudanese still governed the approach to Congress. 
In establishing guidelines for the involvement of civil servants in Congress, adminis-
trators were enjoined to seek ways of supporting the older and more moderate 
generation against the younger 'hot-heads' (7, 9), a common theme in native admin-
istration where the position of the shaikhs, chiefs and elders was constantly having to 
be reinforced against the challenges of the 'young bloods' below. In the plans for an 
advisory council Huddleston hoped that the 'vacuum' of Sudanese participation in 
central government would be filled, not by Congress, but by the government's 
traditional provincial allies routed through province councils (11). Legislation was 
proposed for new province councils and an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan 
in March 1943 and received British government approval (13). Internal criticism of 
the legislation by British and Sudanese alike was that it was overly cautious (14). The 
Colonial Office noted that this 'elaborate "pyramid of local Government"' would 
'remain extremely paternal', but remarked somewhat wistfully: 'One cannot escape 
the feeling that the Sudan Government is able to proceed by carefully considered steps 
without being hustled by pressure of public opinion in the United Kingdom or 
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neutrality on the future of the Sudan was doubted not only by the State Department, 
but by many in the Foreign Office (237, 238). But the SPS were not alone. It was also 
clear to the government that a substantial segment of British public opinion 
(certainly among the Conservative government's own back benchers) would not 
tolerate a betrayal of the Sudan either (243). 
With both the US and the UK insisting that the Sudanese must be consulted on 
their future Egypt's prime minister, al-Hilali, invited sayyid Abd al-Rahman to send a 
delegation from the Umma Party to Cairo in May 1952. Acheson appeared to hope 
that this unofficial delegation could be persuaded to accept the King's title (247). 
Various Sudanese in Khartoum feared that some personal deal might be struck on 
behalf of sayyid Abd al-Rahman (246).61 Eden was concerned that a wide-ranging 
agreement between Egypt and the Umma might accelerate constitutional 
developments 'so much that the Southerners felt that their interests were being 
prejudiced', necessitating UK intervention (248). In the end the delegation was 
unwilling to exchange sovereignty for self-determination and returned to Khartoum 
only days before the fall of al-Hilali's government and just weeks before the Free 
Officers' Coup of 23 July overthrew Faruq and changed the political landscape of 
Anglo-Egyptian relations (248, 249). 
The all parties agreement and the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, Sept 1952-Mar 1953 
It was not immediately apparent how Faruq's abdication might improve the 
atmosphere for negotiations. Khartoum was eager to get elections underway for a 
new parliament, but the change in Egyptian government had delayed the presen-
tation of the draft self-government statue to the two eo-domini. By September it 
appeared that the new government wished to reach an agreement on the Sudan 
before constitutional provisions were brought into force, and this seemed to open 
the way for disentangling the Sudan and defence issues. In September Eden 
instructed Stevenson to place before Najib, the chairman of the RCC, new pro-
posals for an international commission to supervise Sudanese elections (250). The 
Sudan sub-committee of the RCC, led by Major Salah Salim, indicated in its first 
meeting with the ambassador that Egypt was willing to concede the Sudan's right 
to self-determination (251).62 Najib further accepted the need to consult with 
· Sudanese political leaders and deferred responding to Eden's proposals before 
he had done so, leaving Eden to announce HMG's own consent to the self-
government statute on 22 October 1952, before having received Egypt's agreement 
(252, 253). 
The invitation to representatives from the main political parties to meet with Najib 
in Cairo in October at first sight looked like a significant advance on the position of 
previous Egyptian governments, but Khartoum warned that Britain might be 
outflanked by direct discussions between the parties (not fully representative of the 
whole Sudan) and the Egyptians (252). These worries proved well-founded when 
Najib announced an agreement with the Umma Party on 30 October, which accepted 
self-government and provided for a transitional period in which the dual 
administration of the condominium would be liquidated to create a 'free and neutral 
atmosphere' for self-determination (255, 256). There were parallel, if slightly 
different, agreements with other parties including the SRP and the newly formed 
NUP, a coalition of unionist parties brought together at Najib and Salah Salim's 
insistence. 
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applicable to the colonies.60 Yet even here the Colonial Office began to realise that a 
failure of the UK to deliver these pledges to the Sudanese could have a detrimental 
impact on trust in other territories, especially the Gold Coast and Nigeria (235). 
The prospect of early Sudanese self-determination now forced the departments of 
government to debate seriously the issue of expanding membership of the 
Commonwealth to non-settler African territories. Howe first proposed the idea of the 
Sudan entering the Commonwealth as a response to Egypt's abrogation of the treaty 
in November 1951 (222). The immediate reaction of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Relations Offices was that support for such a proposal would risk South Africa 
leaving the Commonwealth (226, 229). In suggesting the possibility of a two-tiered 
membership, with something short of dominion status for the less important 
territories, the Colonial Office tried to separate the developments in the Sudan from 
the rest of the empire (229). There were others in the government who wished to 
push the issue on behalf of the Sudan. Dodds-Parker, then a back bench MP (later to 
be parliamentary under-secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations 
Offices), put forward the case for Sudanese membership of the Commonwealth and, 
noting that many colonial territories were watching closely HMG's arrangements for 
the Sudan, urged an examination of the implications of such membership for the rest 
of the empire (230). It was an issue which received increasing attention throughout 
1952 and into 1953. 
In the meantime there were internal and external pressures to try to renew 
dialogue with Egypt. Late in 1951 Stevenson in Cairo touched on the need to secure 
the minimum co-operation from Egypt in order to operate the bases in the Canal 
Zone, and felt that some lip-service to the Sidqi-Bevin formula, acknowledging the 
legality of Egyptian claims to sovereignty over the Sudan, was needed (224). Howe 
argued against any such concessions, and the Foreign Office, with some regret, 
agreed (227). Egypt's very Anglophile ambassador in London, Amr Pasha, privately 
voiced his own pessimism about the growing militancy of Egypt's policy towards 
Britain (228). Early in 1952 Eden proposed that Britain might suggest that it would 
not oppose Faruq's title as King of Egypt and the Sudan in return for a defence 
agreement, the continuation of the administration in the Sudan, and Egypt's 
acceptance of self-determination for the Sudan. Realising that Egypt was unlikely to 
accept all this, his next (but equally unpalatable) proposal was that Egypt should 
agree to allow the future Sudanese parliament to decide the sovereignty issue (233, 
236). 
The US State Department now shifted out of its position of sympathetic non-
interference and began to press the Foreign Office to come up with a 'new idea' for 
Anglo--Egyptian rapprochement. Following the premise that without recognition of 
Faruq's title there would be no defence agreement US proposals, too, tried to 
combine qualified recognition of the King's titles with some form of international 
supervision of Sudanese self-government and self-determination, whereby the 
Sudanese would make the final decision over sovereignty either through a plebiscite 
or a constitutional assembly. The Foreign Office insisted that the Sudanese must be 
able to decide their final status before they decided on a constitution (232, 242, 243). 
A formula of recognition of the King's title in exchange for Egyptian recognition of 
the Sudan's right to self-determination was finally agreed in April 1952, which the 
US was to put directly to Faruq with their backing (244, 247). Any such recognition 
of the King's title, however, was vigorously opposed by members of the SPS, whose 
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The formation of the Socialist Republican Party as a non-sectarian alliance of 
mainly country members of the Legislative Assembly was widely heralded by the 
Sudan government as a positive development in articulating Sudanese nationalist 
opinion, freed from the Ansar-Khatmiya conflict (226). It was denounced as a 
government creation, especially by the Umma Party who stood to lose the most. The 
Foreign Office, too, suspected official encouragement.59 The party was initially 
promoted as a possible coalition of the rural North and the South, but solutions to 
the North-South divide were not to be so simple. 
Despite some progress in local government reforms, training schemes and the 
expansion of education in the South, economic progress had been slower and by 
early 1952 there was still a marked social and political gap between northerners and 
southerners (206, 207, 240). Throughout 1951 both the Foreign Office and the 
Sudan government were committed to maintaining some sort of constitutional 
safeguards for the South, allowing for the retention of British administrative staff 
later than elsewhere in the Sudan (218); this was one advantage that Howe foresaw of 
Commonwealth membership, as it might allow for the appointment of a British high 
commissioner as a trustee for the South while the rest of the country became self-
governing (222). But with abrogation spurring Khartoum to accelerate its pace 
towards self-government southern anxiety increased, especially after the northern 
majority in the Legislative Assembly voted down the proposal for a southern minister 
of southern affairs (241). The earlier prediction by the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal 
Province, that 'any rapid plunge' into self-government would provoke a crisis in the 
South (206) was about to be realised. 
Just as abrogation accelerated constitutional and political developments in the 
Sudan, so these, too, were to have wider international implications, affecting not 
only Britain's negotiating position with Egypt and its relations with the US over its 
Middle Eastern policy, but provoking a debate within the branches of the British 
government about future relations within the colonial . empire and the 
Commonwealth. 
The Sudan government committed itself to a rapid realisation of self-government 
with elections to be held in 1952, a schedule delayed by the constitutional 
requirements for notification of the eo-domini (241). The proposed speed towards 
self-government and the authority reserved by statute for Sudanese ministers within 
an all-Sudanese Cabinet far exceeded anything contemplated elsewhere in Britain's 
Mrican territories (231, 241). In its own response to the Sudan's constitutional 
proposals the Foreign Office was naturally concerned with such issues as the transfer 
of interim sovereignty to an international commission, the balance of authority 
between the governor-general and the Sudanese Cabinet, the schedule and exact 
means of self-determination, and the availability of 'enough suitable Sudanese' to fill 
the executive and legislative branches of government (239). The terms of the draft 
constitution alarmed the Colonial Office because of its implications for its West 
Mrican territories (234). In particular they were concerned about the precedent 
established by the proposed creation of an all-Sudanese Cabinet with no ex-officio 
British ministers and the affirmation of the right to self-determination. Discussions 
held between the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices in 1952 
attempted to find ways of limiting the potential impact of such precedents on the 
colonial empire by formulating the argument that such provisions were unique to 
the Sudanese by virtue of previous specific commitments, and not generally 
INTRODUCTION lxvii 
produce recommendations leading to a greatly expanded legislature (207) . The 
Commission's initial recommendations revealed a growing militancy among the 
Sudanese political class in that they proposed a decrease in the governor-general's 
responsibility for administration and a limitation of his legislative role (212). 
There were signs of increased militancy in the labour movement as well. The Trade 
Union Federation had mixed results in organising general strikes in April and May, 
but the most serious disturbance was that of the police strike, or mutiny, in the 
capital between 8 and 13 June 1951 (209-211). The Sudan government used the 
occasion of the mutiny to detain some communist pamphleteers, but it avoided a 
general witch-hunt within the trade unions, prefering to distinguish between 
ideological communists and a larger group of 'revolutionaries' found especially 
among those affected by the recent rise in the cost of living (214). The government 
attempted to address questions of wages and the cost of living through a cost of 
living sliding scale agreement and a commission on unclassified staff wages but faced 
renewed strikes over wages in February and March 1952. Strikes organised around 
political issues, however, attracted little support from the majority of union 
members (245). 
The pace of political and constitutional discussion was dramatically altered by 
Egypt's abrogation of both the 1936 treaty and the 1899 agreement on 8 October 
1951. Britain responded by reaffirming its adherence to both as the basis of 
administration in the Sudan (219). Sudanese reaction (other than the Ashiqqa) 
welcomed the abolition of the condominium as a prelude to immediate self-
government and an acceleration towards self-determination. The Constitutional 
Amendment Commission, then still in session, began discussing proposals for 
placing the Sudan under either a UN or an international commission, a suggestion 
which the Foreign Office first dismissed as 'obviously rubbish' (220-222). The 
Colonial Office was opposed to the idea of any such commission (235), but the 
Foreign Office subsequently drew a distinction between a UN commission, which 
gave Russia and its allies scope for interference, and an international commission 
answerable to both eo-domini (232). Howe responded to Sudanese expectations by 
attempting to commit both the Sudan and British governments to holding elections 
for a new assembly under a new constitution in 1952, even setting a date for self-
determination if possible (220, 222). 
By this time Britain itself had a new government, with the election of the 
Conservatives on 26 October. This was to have no appreciable impact on the 
direction of Britain's Sudan policy. Despite Churchill's attempt to slow down 
the pace towards self-government the Cabinet endorsed Eden's first statement on the 
Sudan,58 which broadly followed the outlines of Howe's suggestion and was 
immediately welcomed by Morrison as an endorsement of the previous Labour 
government's own policy (223). Eden's statement strengthened the position of those 
Sudanese members of the Legislative Assembly and the Constitutional Amendment 
Commission who opposed replacing the condominium with an international 
commission, and after this idea failed to be endorsed by the majority in either body 
the Constitutional Amendment Commission was dissolved (225). 
Two major problems continued to worry the Sudan government: the fact that the 
sectarian nature of the northern political parties was preventing the formulation of a 
national consensus on the country's future constitutional structure; and the 
continuing gulf between Northern and Southern Sudan. 
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for negotiation a set of general principles recognising the interdependence of Egypt 
and the Sudan (203). The Sudan government, concerned about the scale of Egyptian 
propaganda and the growing determination by the Sudanese political classes to take 
part in decisions affecting their future (202), rejected Cairo's formula not only 
because it overlooked the possibility of Sudanese independence, but because it 
continued to politicise the Nile Waters (204). Stevenson attempted to remind the 
Foreign Office of its responsibilities towards Egypt, but his arguments served only to 
remind the Foreign Office of Bevin's 1946 commitment to the Sudan's 'eventual 
independence' (205). 
Egypt's restatement in April 1951 of its insistence that Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations proceed upon the basis of the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the 
Egyptian crown convinced the Foreign Office that it would get agreement on neither 
the Sudan nor the defence questions but, since it could not sacrifice the interests of 
the Sudanese for the sake of a defence treaty, preferred to break over the Sudan 
issue.56 To this end it authorised Stevenson in June to present the Egyptian 
government with a re-drafted set of principles, in which neither Egyptian sovereignty 
nor Sudanese independence were mentioned, but the Sudanese right to self-
determination was implicit (208). Discussions between Stevenson and Salah al-Oin 
in July revealed just how far apart the two governments were on the Sudan, with 
Egypt disputing the very basis of British administration there (213). Britain, while 
willing to consider further concessions on defence, could see no room for similar 
flexibility over the Sudan, and began preparing for the breakdown of negotiations 
(215). 
It was at this point that the United States began to express concern about Britain's 
likely failure to secure a treaty of alliance with Egypt. At the time of the Sidqi-Bevin 
negotiations in 1946 Britain had assumed that US policy towards Egypt and the 
Sudan would be guided by anti-colonial principles, and this had been a factor in 
Bevin's early commitment to Sudanese self-determination (74). In fact the US 
government expressed no official opinion about the Sudan before 1951, by which 
time its policy was guided more by the geo-political considerations of the Middle East 
than by any principle of extending democracy to the colonial world. The State 
Department under both Acheson and Dulles exerted increasing pressure on the 
Foreign Office to secure a defence agreement with Egypt. 57 In 1951 the embassies of 
both countries in Egypt agreed that internal politics made it unlikely that a Wafd 
government would give way on the Sudan but hoped that they might be induced to 
do so if presented with more favourable terms for alliance (216). In talks between 
Morrison (Bevin's replacement as secretary of state) and Acheson in Washington a 
formula was drafted for neutralising the Sudan question by introducing international 
bodies to oversee specific aspects of constitutional progress and Nile Waters 
development; despite the Cairo embassy's scepticism of Egypt accepting the latter 
when it was first suggested by Howe earlier in the year (204, 205). In the end the 
State Department judged that these proposals, too, would not satisfy Egypt and 
reverted to their original stance that the US had no substantive position on the 
Sudan; an attitude which the Foreign Office characterised as a 'tendency to stick 
their heads in the sand' (217, 218) . 
A political breakthrough was achieved in the Sudan when the majority of the 
unionists were persuaded to participate in the Constitutional Amendment 
Commission, which both the Sudan government and the Foreign Office hoped would 
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Because Egypt had been largely preoccupied with the Palestine crisis, the 1948 
Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath, the treaty issue remained dormant until1950. The 
uncertainty over Britain's bases in the region generated by the Palestinian crisis in 
1947-1948 increased the Sudan's strategic value to Britain (albeit only temporarily), 
and strengthened Howe's hand in resisting embassy pressure to compromise on 
constitutional reform in the Sudan as an avenue for re-opening treaty negotiations 
generally (138, 146). Bevin, while anxious to secure an agreement over the defence 
clauses with Egypt before the expiration of the Palestine Mandate in May 1948, 
agreed that there was no question of returning to the formula of the Sidqi-Bevin 
protocol, or of delaying constitutional reforms in the Sudan in order to entice Egypt 
back to the treaty negotiations (150). Egypt's refusal to give assent to any of the 
drafts of the constitutional ordinance was not allowed to delay elections to the 
assembly or appointments to the Executive Council (167, 168, 182). The Sudan 
government and the embassy increasingly diverged on issues which the Sudan chose 
to regard as purely domestic matters, but which the embassy saw as affecting 
Anglo-Egyptian relations. By mid-1949 the obvious tension between the embassy 
and the Sudan government was causing the Foreign Office some alarm (167, 180). 
In 1950 the embassy saw what they hoped were signs of a more amenable attitude 
towards the Sudan in the Egyptian government. Britain's new ambassador, Sir Ralph 
Stevenson, discussed ways in which the condominium could be revived and made to 
work with Hamid Zaki, the Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs (190), but 
found that Muhammad Salah al-Din, the foreign minister, spoke only of bringing the 
condominium to an end (191). The divergence of opinion within the Egyptian 
government enabled Howe to argue against offering Egypt any concessions on the 
Sudan (193, 194), but even the embassy accepted that it was out of the question to 
imply recognition of Egyptian sovereignty or agree to either increasing Egyptian, or 
reducing British, involvement in Sudanese administration (190, 195). The glimmer 
of hope the embassy professed to see was snuffed out by Faruq's announcement of his 
intention to abrogate the 1936 treaty and 1899 Condominium agreement (196). The 
embassy's complaint that the Sudan government already tended to regard the 
condominium at an end, and that Howe was emphasising his responsibilities towards 
the Sudanese people at the expense of his duty to both eo-domini, received little 
sympathy at the Foreign Office (197). This was the context in which talks between 
the British and Egyptian foreign ministers resumed in December 1950, where the 
differences separating the two governments were restated. The crux of the 
disagreement was that Egypt claimed that all developments towards self-government 
since 1947 had been at the expense of Egypt's sovereign rights over the Sudan. 
Britain countered by stating that Egypt had, by its intransigence over the question of 
sovereignty, removed itself from having any positive role in those de~elopments. 
Both governments claimed, but could not yet prove, that they were supported by the 
majority opinion in the Sudan (199). Egypt, being unable to halt the progress 
towards self-government, was prepared to try to do so through abrogation. 
The abrogation crisis, fan 1951-July 1952 
The Foreign Office prepared its legal line of defence in anticipation of unilateral 
abrogation, claiming that it would regard the condominium as still in force up until 
1956 (201). The embassy saw no hope of a settlement on defence questions without a 
prior agreement on the Sudan and restated its 'Cairo doctrine', proposing as a basis 
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which struck the Colonial Office as 'a characteristic piece of F.O. nonsense' they 
vowed to kill off. 52 They need not have worried: by July 1949 Egypt made it plain that 
it wished to exclude both the Sudan and Britain from talks with Ethiopia over Lake 
Tsana, in an apparent bid to wring an admission of Egypt's sovereignty over the 
Sudan from Britain (181, 186, 189). But Egypt's needs were such that it was in no 
position to out-wait Britain over the Nile. By September 1950 Egypt was again 
indicating its desire to push ahead with the Lake Tsana project as well as the 
construction of a new dam at the fourth cataract (inside the Sudan), and raising the 
storage level of the Sennar dam (192) . 
The Nile Waters were not the only complex set of diplomatic negotiations involving 
the Sudan and Egypt's claims to territorial sovereignty. The Sudan's long eastern bor-
der with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya cut through the territory of many peoples, so 
that not only were there permanent settlements of the same people on either side of 
the border, but the borders were constantly being crossed by pastoralists in search of 
grazing and traders in pursuit of both legitimate and illegitimate trade. Throughout 
much of the first half of the condominium the Sudan government had put forward 
proposals to rationalise its borders and bring various remote territories under closer 
administration.53 The trading enclave at Gambela leased by the Sudan from Ethiopia 
at the beginning of the century did not extend the Sudan's control over Ethiopian 
Nuer and Anuak, but these peoples had been brought briefly under British military 
administration following the defeat of Italy in Ethiopia, and the Sudan government 
hoped that a post-war settlement could be arranged whereby the entire Baro salient 
could be ceded to the Sudan in exchange for some less desirable border territory fur-
ther south. The Kenyan government objected to allowing Ethiopia into that part of the 
Ilemi Triangle inside the south-eastern corner of the Sudan which was already under 
Kenyan administration, but in 1947 it was willing to strengthen its hold over the 
Triangle by co-operating in offering Ethiopia parcels of Sudanese and Kenyan terri-
tory in exchange for transferring the Baro salient to the Sudan; a series of exchanges 
which the Foreign Office doubted Egypt would sanction (143). 
The fate of Eritrea, then under British military administration, presented Britain 
and the Sudan with a different set of problems.54 Britain's main interest in the future 
of Italy's ex-colonies lay in securing its position in Cyrenaica and in avoiding 
jeopardising the Lake Tsana and Equatorial Nile schemes by antagonising Ethiopia. 
It was the US, not Britain or the Sudan government, who proposed in 1948 the 
partition of Eritrea and the transfer of its western province permanently to the 
Sudan. This was received very sceptically by the Foreign Office, British 
administrators in the Sudan and Sudanese members of the Executive Council. Not 
only did the Foreign Office fear that the proposal would give Egypt the opportunity of 
reviving the Sudan question in the UN, it raised the further constitutional question 
of whether the governor-general could annex a new province on his own authority. 
Campbell saw this (incorrectly, as it turned out) as another deplorable example of 
Khartoum exerting its autonomy from the embassy and objected to what he saw as 
the Sudan government's tendency to act like the government of an independent state 
in external affairs (175). The proposal to partition Eritrea never had strong support 
in the UN and was blocked in the General Assembly, but as late as 1953 it was 
reported that a bloc of Muslim Beja in Western Eritrea, opposed to incorporation into 
Ethiopia, were seriously considering forming a secessionist movement with the Beja 
of Kassala Province in the Sudan. 55 
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seen as critical for both Egypt and the Sudan's immediate needs it was now 
considered 'legally essential' for Britain to participate in talks with Ethiopia, but such 
talks were postponed because of al-Nuqrashi's policy of non-co-operation with 
Britain (142). Egyptian. and Sudanese technical discussions were successfully 
concluded in March 1948, but when Egypt delayed ratification Bevin suggested that 
Britain should deal unilaterally with Ethiopia. The Foreign Office was further 
concerned that, since they would ultimately have to disappoint Ethiopia on its post-
war territorial ambitions, it was best to secure the Lake Tsana agreement before 
Haile Selassie could use it as a bargaining counter. Howe objected that such an 
unilateral approach would breach earlier Nile Waters agreements, but Campbell 
argued that by offering Egypt a new guarantee on their future water supplies, this 
might improve the negotiating atmosphere over the Sudan question. Howe was 
appalled at any suggestion linking the Nile Waters with the constitutional ordinance, 
fearing that if 'water is brought into the political field I feel the Sudan may lose on 
both counts' .49 
The Ugandan government and the Colonial Office also began to fear that, with the 
double complications of the Egyptian attitude towards the Sudan and Ethiopia's use 
of the Lake Tsana project in its bargaining for ex-Italian colonies, final agreement 
over the Owen Falls dam would be delayed indefinitely. They argued for the 
separation of the Equatorial Nile projects from other Nile Waters issues. Since both 
the Sudan and the Foreign Office were convinced that the Sudan's position would be 
prejudiced unless all questions of the Nile Waters were treated together, a conflict of 
interests developed between the Sudan and Uganda. The Foreign Office argued that 
as Uganda could go ahead with any one of its three alternative plans for a dam 
whatever Egypt decided, it had nothing to lose if the Equatorial Nile scheme 
continued to be linked to that of Lake Tsana in preliminary negotiations (163, 166). 
The unanswered question was whether Egypt's self-interest would allow it to go 
ahead with negotiations over these projects regardless of the other Sudan issues, or 
whether political considerations would lead them to subordinate Nile development to 
the stalled Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations.50 The real obstacle to progress on 
both the Blue and White Nile plans was not the terms of the 1929 Nile Waters 
Agreement, but the Sudan question (166) . Bevin was lobbied by both Creech Jones, 
on behalf of Uganda, and Howe, on behalf of the Sudan, to push forward Nile talks 
with Egypt,51 but events surrounding the Arab-Israeli war, including the 
assassination of al-Nuqrashi, convinced Campbell that the time was not propitious to 
raising such matters (171). 
An approach on the Owen Falls dam was made in January 1949, and the Egyptian 
response at first seemed entirely in line with British thinking, not only in wishing to 
proceed with both the Equatorial Nile and Lake Tsana schemes, but in separating 
Nile Waters issues from other political and constitutional questions (172). This was 
not to last. In this favourable climate it was felt that Egypt should be informed of the 
Sudan's need to share in the water produced by the White and Blue Nile schemes, 
which raised the further question of the Sudan's representation in talks at either the 
technical or political level with Ethiopia (174, 177, 178). On 30-31 May 1949 Britain 
and Egypt exchanged notes agreeing to technical discussions between Egypt and the 
Sudan over all these projects (178, 181). Encouraged by this Bevin proposed to the 
Egyptian foreign minister on 1 June that all the territories of the Nile Valley should 
be joined in a co-ordinated plan for social and economic development; a proposal 
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but which also raised the spectre of communist infiltration (173). By May 1949 the 
government reached an agreement with a 'moderate' delegation of the WWA (179), 
and in early 1950 Donald McLean's reassurance that there were no Russian-trained 
agents being infiltrated via Egypt could be taken as conclusively settling that matter 
-either way (185). In November 1950 forty-eight trade unions organised themselves 
' into the new Federation of Sudanese Trade Unions, electing Muhammad al-Sayyid 
Salam and al-Shafi Ahmad al-Shaikh, both communist trade unionists, as its first 
president and secretary.48 
During the presentation of the Egyptian case at the UN in September-October 
1947 the Umma Party deferred to the Foreign Office and were on the whole satisfied 
with the outcome of the Security Council debate and the swift moves towards 
establishing the Legislative Assembly which followed (137, 140). In the Legislative 
Assembly, and in other matters concerning the Sudan's future, the Umma Party 
continued to align itself with the Sudan government and with Britain (176). 
Opposition leaders began to reconsider their alliance with Egypt, in light of Egypt's 
failure at the UN (140), but they found fruitful areas of collaboration in criticising the 
Sudan government's administrative performance concerning the welfare of the 
Sudanese people, as in the 1949 famine in the eastern Sudan (183). With no 
organised opposition in the assembly the Umma Party increased its pressure on the 
government in late 1949 and early 1950 to scrap the condominium and set a definite 
date for full self-government. Howe resisted this by pointing to the absence of 
Khatmiyya participation in the assembly as evidence that it was not fully 
representative of the Sudan; and he was able to rely on ministers and the country and 
southern MLAs to support the government against specific criticism (184, 187). This 
was to last only while Anglo-Egyptian negotiations remained dormant. When, on 
16 November 1950, Faruq announced to the Egyptian parliament in his speech from 
the throne the intention of his government to abrogate both the 1936 treaty and the 
1899 agreement, pro-independence sentiment in the assembly hardened (196). The 
Umma Party tabled a self-government motion for debate in December. Despite 
Egyptian objections that such a motion was outside the jurisdiction of the Sudan 
government, and despite the debate coinciding with resumed discussions between 
Bevin and the Egyptian foreign minister, Howe allowed it to proceed. There was 
intense lobbying of MLAs by sayyid Abd al-Rahman himself. A much milder 
amendment to the motion proposed by Robertson was voted down, but in the end the 
Umma motion itself was passed by only one vote, against country and southern 
member opposition. This narrow victory was interpreted by the government as 
evidence of the Umma Party's overall weakness, even in an assembly it was said to 
dominate. The motion was ignored, but the episode opened the way for further 
discussions between the government and the Umma Party about bringing the 
Khatmiya into the assembly, and establishing specific safeguards for the South 
during any future period of self-government (198, 200, 202). 
During this period, when treaty negotiations betWeen the UK and Egypt were 
either dormant or desultory, the Nile Waters negotiations became the main focus of 
Anglo-Egyptian discussions on the Sudan, though also complicated by the issue of 
sovereignty. Britain had attempted to reassure Egypt over the Sudan during the 
1946- 1947 negotiations by offering to guarantee Egypt's legitimate interests in the 
Nile Waters, but this was no simple matter, with other governments now involved in 
the complex set of technical and political discussions. The Lake Tsana dam being 
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trying not to alienate sayyid Abd al-Rahman himself. The Legislative Assembly which 
convened in December 1948, and the Executive Council which was drawn from it, 
was not solidly Umma. There was still room for non-sectarian formations, 
representing a range of social groups from the rural areas and towns. One, the 'Black 
Bloc', attempted to rally the old 'Sudanese' population of Omdurman and the Three 
Towns, who had been increasingly marginalised by the Arabisation of Sudanese 
nationalism since the 1920s, and it was still possible to speculate in 1948 that such a 
parliamentary formation might offer a political bridge between parts of the North 
and the South (169). 
It had been realised by early 1947 that something had to be done about the 
southern Sudan. Sayyid Abd al-Rahman's unguarded private comments about 
southerners had disturbed Stansgate (116, 129), but there were others in the Sudan 
lobby in Britain who, being aware of similar widespread prejudice in the North, 
expressed their own fears of the consequences of a forced amalgamation of the two 
regions. As late as April 1947 the Foreign Office was still willing to consider the 
prospect of a separate self-determination for the South (132), but this option was 
already being ruled out in the Sudan. The Sudan Administration Conference 
recommended in its first report that the southern provinces be fully incorporated 
into the new administrative and legislative structures of the country. No southern 
Sudanese had been included in the deliberations of the conference and Robertson 
convened a meeting in Juba with a few select southerners from the civil and tribal 
administrations, along with the British governors of the southern provinces and a 
few northern Sudanese to discuss the conference's recommendations. Given the 
importance to national unity retroactively attributed to the 1947 Juba conference 
one must note that it was Robertson alone who took the decision to adopt the 
Administration Conference's proposals for the SouthY No record of the Juba 
conference was forwarded to the Foreign Office, who were informed of this 
momentous decision only in the report of the civil secretary's own recommendations 
(134). 
Howe's first impressions of the South were very unfavourable and he expressed a 
determination to effect more rapid social and economic development (136). Despite 
the appointment of southern members to the Legislative Assembly, the creation of 
southern province councils, the expansion of education and the first attempts at 
internal economic development in the South which followed, by 1950 there had been 
little noticeable impact on southern and northern attitudes towards each other, and 
it was reported that northern acceptance of southerners on equal terms was still 
predicated on Arabisation (188). Howe's resistance to Umma Party calls for 
immediate self-government at the end of 1950 was based in a large part on his own 
anxiety over the fate of the South under a northern Sudanese government at that 
time (200). 
There were other organisational developments of political importance outside the 
arena of permitted electoral politics. The July-August 1947 railway workers' strike 
ended with the creation of what was in effect the first Sudanese trade union (the 
WM) and a recognition by the Sudan government of a need for labour legislation. 
Further strikes in 1948 and 1949 attracted support from workers in other sectors, 
though the general public was more ambivalent (152, 153). The Trades Union 
Ordinance passed by the Legislative Assembly was the object of a one-day protest on 
15 March 1949, which was linked to the Khatmiya extra-parliamentary opposition, 
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acceptable to King Faruq be appointed was not welcomed (129). The appointment of 
Howe, as a man with diplomatic and political skills, fully conversant in the subtleties 
of Anglo-Egyptian relations, to replace Huddleston in March 1947 was thus the 
culmination of a process which had begun, at Huddleston's initiation, over a year 
before. Nevertheless, the state of mind in Khartoum at the time was such that 
Howe's appointment was interpreted as a punishment to Huddleston for 'standing 
up' to Bevin.46 Howe's preliminary appreciation of the Sudan's place in 
Anglo-Egyptian relations prior to his departure for Cairo and Khartoum was an 
indication of the strength of his own commitment to Sudanese self-determination 
(131). 
Preparations for self-government, Apr 1947-Dec 1950 
Egypt made her complaint about the treaty to the Security Council in 1947, but the 
UN declined to become involved and referred the dispute back to the treaty partners 
for resolution (140). Blocked on the sovereignty issue Egypt pursued her aim of 
liquidating the condominium and asserting control over the Sudan through the 
issue of internal constitutional and administrative reforms. 
The adoption of the principle of Sudanisation of various levels of government, and 
even the acceleration of Sudanisation in order to limit Egyptian interference in 
administration, was confirmed with acceptance of the recommendations of the 
Administrative Conference in 1947 (133, 138). Egypt's unexpected and novel 
objection that the constitutional reforms did not go far enough in the direction of 
self-government camouflaged its more serious intent of transferring the legislative 
power from the governor-general to the eo-domini, and replacing the condominium 
with a self-governing Sudan under the Egyptian Crown (139, 141, 144, 155). The 
Sudan government and the Foreign Office attempted to meet specific criticisms by 
re-drafting its ordinances to make the forthcoming Legislative Assembly more truly 
representative and give it more than consultative powers, while safeguarding the 
governor-general's executive position (144, 145, 147-151, 153). Against Egyptian 
objections that the new ordinance enlarged the governor-general's powers, and gave 
him a power to make constitutional changes which were not his, the Foreign Office 
attempted to obtain Egyptian consent by offering them places on the new Executive 
Council (the 'Campbell-Khashaba agreement'). By now the Palestinian crisis 
intervened: al-Nuqrashi's personal opposition to compromise over the Sudan and the 
Egyptian foreign minister's preoccupation with the impending Arab-Israeli war 
meant that Britain received no reply to its concessions and finally gave permission to 
the governor-general to promulgate the constitutional ordinance on his own 
authority, an act of doubtful legality. The ordinance became law on 19 June 1948 
(154-157, 160-162). 
Elections for the Legislative Assembly began in September 1948, and the assembly 
opened on 23 December. Both before the enactment of the new legislation and after 
the first meeting of the assembly sayyid Abd al-Rahman sought to persuade the 
government to support Umma Party activities in the rural areas and sayyid Abd al-
Rahman himself nationally (135, 170). Sayyid Abd al-Rahman's very open alliance 
with the government was a qualified blessing. Not only had many Khatmiya 
boycotted the elections in protest (165, 176), but the government's apparent support 
for sayyid Abd al-Rahman only confirmed Egyptian suspicions (167). The Sudan 
government therefore continued to woo the extra-parliamentary opposition, while 
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Rahman and the town-based politicians (112), Stansgate had reason to raise these 
doubts. 
Sidqi was replaced by al-Nuqrashi in December 1946. The new prime minister 
immediately proclaimed his firm commitment to the permanent unity of Egypt and 
the Sudan and lodged protests about Huddleston's public statements and 
appointment of a new grand qadi (122-124). The actions agreed between the British 
and Sudan governments to reassure Sudanese pro-independence opinion helped to 
harden his attitude, but given the internal political opposition to Sidqi's treaty al-
Nuqrashi could scarcely retreat from Sidqi's line to be more accommodating to 
Britain. As al-Nuqrashi became more insistent about the permanent unity between 
the two countries, Bevin became more adamant that he and HMG could not defy the 
spirit of the UN Charter and deny the Sudanese a free choice (125, 127). On 3 March 
1947 al-Nuqrashi broke off negotiations and announced he would take his case to the 
Security Council of the UN (130). 
The breakdown in negotiations had been imminent since al-Nuqrashi's first 
statement, but before it came various departments were able to take stock of where 
Britain's position lay. Stansgate, now completely outside the negotiating process, 
persisted in the belief that al-Nuqrashi was really in favour of a treaty and rehearsed 
the arguments for a more conciliatory approach to Egyptian claims (129) . Campbell, 
however, took a much harder line on Egypt. The outcome of the negotiations had 
been such as to make Britain's commitment to Sudanese self-determination and 
possible independence - and not the defence of the Middle East- the main principle 
at stake. To yield on that 'is not only a question of our losing the Sudan as a military 
base or passage; but our position in other parts of the Orient and Africa might be 
greatly affected' (126). The controversy over the Sudan's future status also 
contributed to a restatement of British thinking about the future of colonial 
territories generally. Earlier in the year the Sudan government had been ambivalent 
about independence, arguing that this was not automatically implied by self-
government (71). Sidqi had argued the same (99), as had the UK in the drafting of 
the UN Charter. In the case of the Sudan, however, Britain accepted that self-
government and the political aspirations of the people would mean 'that the real 
meaning of the Charter' was that the Sudan 'should become independent' (128). 
Coinciding with the breakdown in negotiations came the appointment of a new 
governor-general, a change which had been under consideration since January 1946. 
Huddleston expressed his own views about the political qualities his successor would 
need, and already the Foreign Office contemplated someone, possibly from the 
Foreign Office itself, who could 'goad the Sudan Political Service to more rapid 
progress in Sudanisation' (59) . Huddleston originally stated a preference for leaving 
in July 1946, but in the context of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations then under way 
this did not appear to the Foreign Office, or to other members of the Sudan 
government, as an opportune time for a replacement, and Huddleston agreed to stay 
on until March 1947.45 In the aftermath of the Sidqi-Bevin protocol Huddleston 
appeared both to his subordinates in Khartoum and to his superiors in London on 
the verge of resignation and was persuaded to stay on (102, 105, 108). But 
Huddleston's behaviour convinced the Foreign Office that they needed 'a new type of 
British official whose job will be to advise and assist Sudanese in the administration 
of their own affairs', and that the process should begin with the appointment of 
Huddleston's successor in the spring (101). Stansgate's suggestions that a man 
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measures were necessary to reassure the Sudanese of this, at the same time that they 
rejected his more extreme demand to abandon the protocol altogether (108, 111, 
115) . There was still hope that the treaty would be ratified, but Sidqi faced opposition 
first within his own delegation and was attempting to win them over with an 
interpretation of the protocol which denied that the Sudan's right to determine its 
future status extended to full independence (99). Bevin and the Foreign Office were 
manoeuvring to commit Sidqi in public to language he had used in private, hoping 
that Britain's interpretation of the protocol would become a matter of public record 
once the treaty as a whole was ratified (111, 113, 118). Bevin refused to allow 
Huddleston to go beyond that language and insisted that the word 'independence' 
rather than 'secession' or 'separation' be used in any public statements (115). Mter 
quibbling over the value of a statement confirming a right to independence 
Huddleston returned to Khartoum and issued the agreed statement on 7 December 
(121). 
By this time it was clear that Sidqi was unable to get either his own delegation or 
the Senate to agree to the treaty. Ironically, given Huddleston's objections to the 
language of the protocol, the Egyptian opposition rejected it precisely because they 
placed the same interpretation on it as did the British government (113, 118). 
Bevin's insistence that independence be publicly acknowledged as an option, even if 
along with the other options of some form of union with Egypt, was seen by some 
(especially Stansgate) as the ultimate stumbling block to treaty ratification (118, 
120). Sidqi's resignation on 9 December was not immediately attributed to this, but 
rather to Faruq's decision that Sidqi was too compromised to be able to reach 
agreement with Britain over the treaty (119). 
Huddleston's visit did have an impact on the British and Sudan governments' 
relations with the pro-independence groups in the Sudan. Huddleston was moved to 
accelerate even faster plans for the Sudanisation of administrative and political 
institutions, having now completely cast off his earlier reluctance (109, 115). The 
first demonstration of this new resolve was to announce the appointment of a 
Sudanese grand qadi (canonical judge) to replace the Egyptian qadi, the most senior 
Egyptian then in post in the Sudan, on the expiry of his term (though this had, in 
fact, been agreed with the Umma Party prior to Huddleston's departure for London) 
(123, 124). More importantly, the British government agreed to a visit by sayyid Abd 
al-Rahman and the Independence Front (sayyid Ali declined a similar invitation). 
This allowed both the government and sayyid Abd al-Rahman to take the measure of 
each other, with mixed results. Attlee took the opportunity to emphasise that 'the 
reality' had not changed and that sayyid Abd al-Rahman and like-minded Sudanese 
could get both self-government and self-determination through close collaboration 
with the Sudan government (114). Sayyid Abd al-Rahman played his part alternating 
between declarations of loyalty to Britain and reassertions of Sudanese sovereignty. 
He pressed for a personal 'guarantee' which he could take back to the Sudan, and 
finally presented his demand for self-government now and independence in ten years 
(114, 117). He and his British supporters put forward exaggerated claims about 
sayyid Abd al-Rahman's popularity (116), but only Stansgate, now marginal to the 
negotiations, expressed open scepticism (120, 129). Given the Sudan government's 
inconsistency, at one time claiming that sayyid Abd al-Rahman and the independents 
represented the majority in the country (102), and then reporting that the majority 
of the rural population wished to be ruled by the British and not sayyid Abd al-
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affirming a Sudanese right to change their status. But 'unity under a common 
Crown' and the right 'to choose the future status' qualified each other almost to the 
point of nullification and opened the protocol to counter interpretations. 
Sidqi still had to get the treaty ratified in the face ofWafd opposition and uncertain 
coalition allies. For this reason the terms of the treaty, including the Sudan protocol, 
were not made public. Sidqi's own interpretation, reported in the Egyptian press, 
that he had secured sovereignty over the Sudan caused an immediate reaction in the 
pro-independence population of the Sudan, and made it impossible, as far as the 
government there were concerned, to explain the nuances of the protocol and stress 
its 'undoubted' long-term advantages. Huddleston feared an outbreak of violence, 
asked for and received a reinforcement to the British garrison in Khartoum, but the 
disorders were few and small and confined to the Three Towns. A new 'Independence 
Front' was formed, but political alignments within the Sudan remained the same. 
Convinced that a break-down of trust between the government and the effendia and 
widespread risings in the western provinces were likely, whatever the outcome of the 
treaty negotiations, Huddleston requested permission to return to London to explain 
the situation more fully (94-98). 
The confrontation which now developed between Huddleston and HMG (100-111) 
was the product, in part, of the Sudan administration's long-standing distrust of the 
Foreign Office, compounded by the isolation from contact with the wider empire 
which attachment to the Foreign Office had fostered. The near 'messianic' fervour 
with which Huddleston pursued his case, and the irritation which Bevin, Attlee, 
McNeil and Sargent all expressed in private can be traced to one grand 
misunderstanding. Members of the SPS were convinced that Whitehall was going to 
do a deal with Egypt and literally sell the Sudan down the river in exchange for a 
treaty.43 Huddleston therefore did not approach the members of the Labour 
government on the understanding of a shared commitment to self-determination 
within the empire, dating back to Labour's interpretation of the Atlantic Charter. 
Bevin and his colleagues in government and the Foreign Office resented accusations 
of betrayal and were frustrated at their inability either to persuade Huddleston of 
their commitment to self-determination for the Sudan, or convince him that 
changed world conditions had altered the way in which Britain could conduct its 
imperial relations (100, 101). The Sudan government's dire predictions of the 
imminent breakdown of law and order (102), which in the end were unfulfilled (112), 
did nothing to improve trust between London and Khartoum. Previous Sudan 
governments- perhaps genuinely nervous of the precedent of Cordon's fate - had 
played the security card before, most recently in 1924 when pressing London to 
detach the Sudan entirely from Egypt. The fact that persuasion ultimately did help to 
contain disturbances in the capital only reinforced Whitehall's suspicion that 
Khartoum was once again scare-mongering. 
Huddleston's desperation was evident in the tone of his communications with 
Attlee and McNeil, and was based in part on his consciousness of Wingate's fate as 
high commissioner in the aftermath of the Zaghlul riots in Egypt in 1919 (102, 
105-107, 109, 110). Bevin, being in the USA at the time, was not part of this direct 
confrontation, but he shared Attlee's view that sooner or later the Sudanese were 
bound to realise the importance of the commitment to self-determination enshrined 
in the protocol, whatever their immediate reaction to Sidqi's partial interpretation 
(103, 104).44 The Cabinet readily accepted Huddleston's argument that some further 
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'undoubted' but advised (in Machiavellian terms) that 'it is far better to give Egypt a 
status in the Sudan openly if we wish ourselves to retain our paramount interest 
there' (86). The attempt was resumed to produce a draft which would give qualified 
recognition to Egyptian sovereignty by making a distinction between sovereignty and 
administration (84), despite the Sudan government's fear that any admission of 
Egyptian sovereignty would swing the political balance in the Sudan away from 
Britain and towards Egypt (85). 
Sidqi came to London for personal meetings with Bevin between 18 and 25 
October. He failed to persuade coalition and opposition leaders to come as members 
of his delegation; thus casting doubts on his ability to ratify any resulting treaty, and 
restricting him to presenting his 'personal view' in what were later described as 
'conversations'. Sidqi's initial position was that sovereignty was 'an emblem of unity', 
that recognition of Egyptian sovereignty would not alter the 1899 agreement and 
would not give Egypt a greater share in administration. When Bevin pushed Sidqi to 
concede the Sudan's right to 'secede' Sidqi was evasive, agreeing only that 'nothing 
on paper could prejudice the right of independence', but suggesting that it was 
unnecessary to confirm this in the treaty as it was already enshrined in the UN 
charter. It was only in the third meeting that Sidqi shifted from the language of 
sovereignty to 'a legitimate union between Egypt and the Sudan' and conceded that 
the Sudanese could determine their own future (87-89). 
The British delegation included Stansgate and Campbell (from the original 
negotiating team), and Howe, then superintending under-secretary of state for the 
Egyptian Department. Both Huddleston and Robertson were present in London, 
arguing that the Sudan's status was altered by the very fact of HMG admitting 'what 
they had never admitted before' (85). During a break in the negotiations Bevin 
reported back to the Cabinet commending a draft protocol which would prejudice 
neither the current Sudan administration nor 'the ultimate freedom of the 
inhabitants', acknowledging at the same time the likelihood of political tension in 
the Sudan over any reference to Egyptian sovereignty in the treaty. By this time, 
however, the lord chancellor had given his advice on the weakness of the UK case in 
international law, asserting that all actions during and immediately after the 're-
conquest' of the Sudan in 1898 restored sovereignty to what it had been before the 
Egyptian evacuation in 1885. 'Juridical sovereignty' rested exclusively with one 
power (Egypt), even though the administration was shared by two. This left Britain 
with very little leeway.42 The alternative proposed by the chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, of partitioning the country and retaining the South under 
exclusive British rule was overruled by Attlee (90, 91). 
Britain's dilemma was that its insistence on a public acknowledgement that the 
present regime in the Sudan be left unchanged was countered by Egypt's that this 
also meant acknowledging Egypt's existing sovereignty. In the light of the lord 
chancellor's advice Britain had to agree. 1946 was not 1922 or 1924: Britain could no 
longer expect to act on its own unilateral understanding of international law with 
impunity. The final formula reached in the last two sessions between the delegations 
avoided the words 'sovereignty', 'self-determination' or 'independence'. Diplomatic 
circumlocutions were used instead, referring to both 'unity between the Sudan and 
Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt' and 'the right' of the Sudanese 'to choose 
the future status of the Sudan' (92, 93). Ostensibly it left the de jure state of the 
condominium and the de facto administration of the Sudan unchanged, while 
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determination than over the finer points of the defence treaty (67, 68, 70). Deadlock 
over the defence clauses in August provoked King Faruq's intervention and his 
official request for inclusion of a reference to the unity of the Nile valley under the 
Egyptian crown in the Sudan protocol (72).39 
The problem which Bevin and the UK government faced was one of a changed 
international climate of opinion, not a change in international law. Bevin had been 
adamant before negotiations began that 'the future of the Sudan belongs neither to 
this country nor to Egypt, but to the Sudanese themselves ... ' (47). When Sidqi 
asserted 'there could be no doubt whatever regarding the sovereignty of the Egyptian 
crown over the Sudan. . . . There could be no question whatever of asking the 
Sudanese their own opinion of sovereignty which was . .. already in the King's, i.e. 
King of Darfour Senaar and Kordofan . .. ', resurrecting the old titles of the 
conquered territories to which the Egyptian viceroy had been granted title by the 
Ottoman sultan, his sovereign overlord at the time, he was in fact pressing a claim 
which the British government had never formally disputed and was on record as 
having asserted.4° Confronted with the Egyptian position Bevin could only reiterate 
that 'in dealing with any Colonial or Quasi-Colonial problem' the attitudes of the US 
and the UN had to be taken into consideration, and that 'to recognise Egyptian 
sovereignty with the Sudan ... would be regarded as a retrograde step' (74). 
Warnings that a substantial section of Sudanese public opinion would be hostile to 
any acknowledgement of Egyptian sovereignty came from both Huddleston (in 
Britain) (73, 77) and the Umma Party (71, 82). A triangular correspondence between 
Stansgate in Egypt, the Foreign Office, and Bevin in Paris (73-80) began to push the 
question of sovereignty away from the old dispute about whether sovereignty resided 
solely in Egypt or was shared between Britain and Egypt (2, 6, 77) and toward a new 
position which qualified any reference to Egyptian sovereignty by a recognition of 
the Sudanese right to choose their own future from a variety of options. Bevin 
wanted to avoid recognising Egyptian sovereignty at all and wished to leave open a 
genuine choice between full independence for the Sudan and union with Egypt (75, 
76). It was at Bevin's insistence, against Stansgate's warnings about the likely 
Egyptian reaction, that the redrafted protocol presented to Egypt in September 
adopted a formula which did not prejudice claims to sovereignty, but made an 
explicit commitment to the Sudanese deciding their own future . The Egyptian 
rejection of this draft came on 28 September, much as Stansgate had warned, with 
Egypt conceding the right of the Sudanese to self-government, yet insisting not only 
that Egypt should take part in Sudanese administration, but that the UK must 
recognise Egyptian sovereignty (81). 
In October, after Stansgate's return to the UK, divisions were beginning to appear 
in the Egyptian coalition government, especially within its treaty delegation. Sidqi 
was eager to win some form of treaty and backtracked on his demand for a share in 
the administration of the Sudan, saying that he would concede that if Britain would 
concede 'symbolic' sovereignty (83, 87). It was not just the desire to get an 
agreement on article 2 which led Bevin to drop his insistence on avoiding all 
reference to Egyptian claims of sovereignty.41 By October both Stansgate and Bevin 
doubted the validity of Britain's former position of preventing Egypt from exercising 
sovereignty over the Sudan (84). In this they received unexpected support from Sir 
Reginald Wingate, former governor-general of the Sudan and high commissioner for 
Egypt, who was of the opinion that Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan was 
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form of union they might have with Egypt), went to Egypt under al-Azhari's 
chairmanship. Bevin's statement in March, followed by Huddleston's in April were 
contrasted uncomfortably with Egyptian government insistence that the delegation 
accept the principle of the unity of the Nile valley under the Egyptian Crown, and 
eventually the delegation dissolved itself in disagreement (60, 61).35 
Fear of the extension of Egyptian political control was also felt in the matter of 
Nile Waters, this time the Ugandan government objecting to Egyptian proposals for 
the Lake Albert reservoir on political, economic and environmental grounds (55). 
Reminded by the Foreign Office of existing obligations under the 1929 Nile Waters 
Agreement, Uganda adopted a line the Sudan took on the Jonglei Canal (29), and 
insisted on a full socio-economic and hydrological survey before any decision could 
be taken (62, 63). 
Despite the political instability and change of governments in Egypt some 
continuity in the Egyptian negotiating position was maintained, given an earlier all-
party declaration on the subject and the fact that so many leading members of the 
government and opposition had been members of the 1936 treaty delegation 
(including Sidqi, al-Nuqrashi and al-Nahhas, three of the prime ministers who would 
be involved in the negotiations of 1946-1952). Bevin's commitments as foreign 
secretary meant that he would not be directly involved in negotiations until the very 
end of 1946. Throughout 1946 his attention was taken up by the peace treaties being 
negotiated in Paris, defence matters in the Mediterranean and Middle East, the 
Palestine conference in London, and the Council of Ministers and UN, quite apart 
from the Labour government's domestic nationalisation programme. Bevin was in 
Paris in April to May, June to July, August to September and September to October. 
He left for the meetings of the Council of Ministers and the UN at Lake Success on 27 
October, immediately upon the conclusion of his talks with Ismail Sidqi, the 
Egyptian prime minister.36 It was Lord Stansgate, the secretary of state for air, who 
led the UK delegation to Egypt in April1946.37 
In keeping with previous Cabinet decisions, it was decided in June to deal with the 
Sudan under a separate protocol, with Britain proposing a formal commission 
structure to consult the Sudanese and decide their future . By July it was realised that 
there was considerable opposition to this in Egypt and that the entire treaty could be 
lost over the issue of the Sudan (64, 65). Stansgate felt that his own room for 
manoeuvre over the Sudan was prejudiced by the line the UK had adopted on defence 
issues (65), and on 1 August the Cabinet (minus Bevin, who was in Paris) agreed with 
Stansgate's proposal to compromise on some of the defence matters and reaffirmed 
their determination to resist any implication of recognising Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Sudan (66, 69). It was Bevin's refusal to accept the Egyptian draft of article 2 
of the defence treaty which prolonged negotiations at this stage (129).38 
By August it was becoming clear that Britain's refusal to recognise Egyptian 
claims to sovereignty over the Sudan was going to be difficult to sustain. It was 
already understood that unqualified recognition of Egyptian sovereignty would lead 
to trouble in the Sudan, but Egypt's historical and legal justification was strong and, 
since there was no internationally agreed definition of sovereignty, it could make an 
uncomfortable case if presented to the UN. Stansgate warned that there would be a 
need for a compromise formula, but that if negotiations were going to break down 
(as it appeared they would) it was far better for Britain's standing in world opinion 
for them to break down over an Egyptian denial of the Sudan's right to self-
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with Congress in the aftermath of their memorandum (2, 5), and expressly included 
the Advisory Council (11, 15, 40). Bevin incorporated it in his first memorandum on 
the treaty negotiations in January 1946, and hoped to use the necessity of 
consultation as a means of deferring the question of the Sudan's sovereignty 
altogether (47). Consultation requires some body to consult, and the establishment 
of the Advisory Council became only the first step in a new policy leading to 
Sudanisation. In a reversal of what might be the expected roles, it was the Foreign 
Office who began to urge upon the Sudan government a faster pace of administrative 
Sudanisation, while the Sudan government pressed the British government for a 
clear diplomatic commitment to consulting the Sudanese on their future 
constitutional status. 
Robertson's Sudanisation proposal envisaged merely a reduction of British 
political staff in the northern provinces by more than half over a twenty year period 
(49). Bowker at the embassy declared that such gradual dilution was out of the 
question 'in present world conditions'; Scrivener agreed, adding 'we cannot go on 
keeping Egyptians out of the Political Service unless we can put Sudanese in' (49, 
52). Campbell urged Khartoum to draft and publicise a 'bold plan' of Sudanisation, 
lest the Sudanese 'throw in their lot with the Egyptians simply in order to g~t rid of 
the British'; Bevin minuted, 'action is needed immediately' (57). Huddleston, 
however, expressed reservations about the possibility of an accelerated programme 
(60), but saw as a matter of greater urgency the establishment of a mechanism for 
internal consultation over the constitutional issues connected with the treaty (51). 
Bevin was inclined to agree with the Sudan government's desire (against embassy 
opposition) to hold such consultations before agreement had been reached on the 
defence sections of the treaty, but he also urged Huddleston to widen his intended 
consultations to include the Southern Sudan, a recommendation which came from 
the Sudan Agent in London, RC Mayall, a former DC in a southern province (56, 53). 
Huddleston responded by pressing the foreign secretary to make a categorical 
statement concerning British policy in the Sudan as a way of countering increased 
Egyptian propaganda, and provided the first draft of such a statement. Bevin thus 
announced in the House of Commons on 26 March 1946 HMG's support for the 
establishment of self-government 'as a first step towards eventual independence', and 
a commitment that no change to the status of the Sudan would be made without 
consulting the Sudanese (54). Next (within days of arguing with Campbell against 
accelerating Sudanisation) Huddleston made his own statement to the Advisory 
Council (approved by the Foreign Office) in which he linked the ultimate goal of 
independence for the Sudan to a new programme of rapid Sudanisation, announced 
the convening of a broadly representative committee to make recommendations for 
Sudanisation, and predicted a fully self-governing Sudan in twenty years (58, 60, 
61).34 
Egyptian-based propaganda in the Sudan during the early part of 1946 came from 
unofficial as well as official sectors and included the first appearance of the Muslim 
Brothers (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) (46, 50), an organisation which was to have little 
impact on the direction of the Sudanese independence movement, but was to 
become a major political force in the Northern Sudan by the end of the century. 
Emissaries of the Egyptian government encouraged a revival of the United Parties 
declaration (43), and in March and April a 'United Parties' delegation, having agreed 
on a modified formula (which reserved to the Sudanese the right to choose what 
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reservoir at Lake Albert, as part of the Jonglei Canal scheme (41). By now it was clear 
that Egypt was just as eager as the Sudan to push on with development schemes 
increasing the Nile discharge, and that it fully intended to retain control over these 
projects and the subsequent division of water shares as part of its own post-war 
settlement. Huddleston found Killearn's suggestion that Britain could use its 
physical control of the Nile Waters as a 'trump card' in coming negotiations over the 
Sudan's future unhelpful, not to mention unrealistic (25, 31). At the beginning of 
1946 Huddleston proposed a general review of the Nile Waters question as soon as 
possible, covering the allocation of water as well as the three proposed major 
engineering schemes of the Jonglei Canal and the dams at Lakes Albert and Tsana 
(45). 
The first warning that Egypt intended to renegotiate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 
1946, with the aim of getting British forces to withdraw from Egypt and extending its 
control over Sudan, came in January 1944,32 and al-Nahhas' personal attitude 
towards such renegotiations was confirmed in a meeting with al-Azhari (34). Some 
Sudanese feared that their future would be decided over their heads at the San 
Francisco meeting of the United Nations in 1945, prompting the Sudan government 
to ask for public assurances to be made concerning future consultations (30). A 
statement to the Advisory Council promising to consult that body about any future 
changes was approved in September, issued in November and explicitly defined to 
include 'other representative bodies' such as Congress (40, 44, 47). 
The Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations and the Sudan protocol, fan 1946-Mar 
1947 
Egypt gave official notice of its demand for the revision of the 1936 treaty on 20 
December 1945 (47). The Foreign Office, the embassy and the Sudan government 
had already formulated preliminary positions in anticipation of this demand. The 
Foreign Office saw developments both inside and outside the Sudan as leading to the 
Sudan's ultimate autonomy from Egypt. The embassy under Killearn viewed the 
Sudan more abstractly, as a 'trump card' in the game with Egypt, and Killearn 
continued to exclude Huddleston from matters 'of higher policy'. Bevin's 
replacement of Killearn with Campbell in March 1946, which led to the lapse of the 
ambassador's responsibilities over the Sudan, gave the governor-general a greater 
role in the forthcoming negotiations and direct access to the foreign secretary, even 
if at the expense of regular communication with the embassy.33 The embassy's pre-
occupation with 'higher policy' was not shared by the Sudan government. Newbold 
showed an awareness of how the changing global situation affected the internal 
relations of the empire (7), but his observation that many of his British colleagues in 
the Sudan did not yet realise how delicate the international situation was and 'how 
fast the outside world is moving in new political ideas' (15) was to be echoed by 
Foreign Office and embassy officials frequently throughout the ensuing decade. The 
Sudan government's commitment to a self-governing Sudan in the distant future did 
not yet extend to full independence (11, 36, 49). Within a year Britain's policy would 
explicitly foresee independence as the desired outcome of self-government, and this 
came about as the logical extension of the principle of consultation with the 
Sudanese during the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. 
There were two facets to this principle of consultation: administrative and 
diplomatic. The principle was established as a direct result of Newbold's discussions 
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apparent, in that the Sudan was not eligible for Colonial Development Fund grants 
(19, 22). Here Sudanese were able to compare themselves with other parts of British 
Africa, to their disadvantage. It was, however, eligible for Egyptian grants, and the 
Sudan -government felt keenly that this imbalance would have internal political 
ramifications. As Britain depended on US support for sterling the Treasury was 
doubly hesitant to 'play the Lady Bountiful with foreign currency', and it resisted the 
Sudan's request for a £1 million grant to endow Cordon College (then being raised to 
the status of a university college) (22). Huddleston's inept attempt to circumvent the 
Treasury through the 'Old Boy Network', by appealing directly to the chancellor, 
whom he had known in India, produced a curt refusal (28) (and also revealed to the 
Foreign Office Huddleston's lack of tactical finesse in political matters, having 
'enabled the Treasury to put a second refusal on record in advance of our own 
communication').30 A different line of attack was tried, arguing for a commitment 
from HMC to development for the Sudan similar to that made for the colonies, as 
being entirely consistent with US interest in 'the general welfare' (28). Huddleston, 
who had to do his pleading through Killearn, repeatedly argued for some public 
disclosure of HMC's intentions with a development-related gesture of goodwill to 
counter growing Egyptian propaganda (22, 32). Encouraged by the Foreign Office in 
September 1945 he presented his arguments (some of which followed the language 
of (28) very closely) for the political need for a £5 million development grant (37) . 
This general proposal was followed by a request to associate Cordon College with the 
Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies (48). 
Any long-term development would have to come from inside the Sudan, and any 
plans for expanded agricultural output to meet the post-war expectation for 
increased social services ultimately came back to the Nile (24). Sudan's share of the 
Nile Waters was governed by the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, but plans for 
increasing the discharge of the Nile had been under discussion in the EID since 
before World War One. The integrated system of proposed regulators at strategic 
points throughout the Nile valley which emerged from these discussions has become 
known as the Century Storage Scheme: in its final form it aimed to increase overyear 
storage using the East African lakes and Lake Tsana in Ethiopia as reservoirs, and to 
improve flow with a grand canal circumventing the sudd (central swamps) in the 
southern Sudan.31 An earlier agreement with the Ethiopian government to construct 
a dam on the Blue Nile at its source on Lake Tsana, mainly for the benefit of Egypt 
and the Sudan, was interrupted by the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, and both Egypt 
and the Sudan were eager for the reactivation of this proposal after Italy's defeat (27). 
Diplomatic obstacles posed by the Ethiopian government, however, meant that by 
the end of 1944 the Sudan had to consider reopening Nile Waters talks with Egypt in 
order to readjust its share of water (24, 27). Egypt, in the meantime, indicated its 
desire to resurrect the Jonglei Canal scheme (the sudd diversion canal) which, in its 
original proposal, benefited mainly Egypt (29). The Foreign Office subsequently 
advised the Sudan government in April1945 that its case for renegotiating the Nile 
Waters Agreement was doubtful, and in so far as this would lead to additional friction 
with Egypt (who were already preparing to renegotiate the 1936 treaty the following 
year), they should place their hopes on an agreement over Lake Tsana as the best way 
of meeting their needs (32). The Sudan hoped to do this in such a way as to gain 
control over the Lake Tsana dam and become the chief beneficiary of the project (27, 
39). Egypt then approached Uganda over the issue of constructing a barrage and 
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calculations of the Foreign Office, the Egyptian and Sudanese governments and 
northern politicians from the very start. Congress's proposal that the eo-domina! 
powers commit themselves to granting the Sudan self-determination within its 
present boundaries (1) was viewed with scepticism by the Foreign Office who were 
reluctant 'to perpetuate a union which in later times might be found impracticable' 
(6); reservations which were heartily endorsed by Huddleston (ll). Accelerated 
educational and economic development within the South were seen as necessary, 
whether or not the southern provinces remained in the Sudan or were separated off 
from it (ll, 15). Though the need for accelerated development to make up for years 
of neglect was acknowledged in 1942, there were no practical demonstrations of this 
realisation by 1944 (19). Northern Sudanese and Egyptians alike were sensitive to 
administrative measures that seemed to entrench the division between the two parts 
of the country, and this was a criticism levelled by northern Sudanese and the 
Egyptian government at the proposals for an Advisory Council for the Northern 
Sudan (14, 17, 38). The Sudan government adopted an evolutionary line of defence, 
leaving open the option for the South either to form an advisory council of its own or 
take part in the Advisory Council in Khartoum when it had reached an equivalent 
stage of development as the North (21, 38). 
The divergent views on the South were clearly stated at this early stage. To the 
British the division between Northern and Southern Sudan, being racial and 
historical, was natural (6, ll, 21, 38) . To the Egyptian government and many 
northern Sudanese the division was entirely artificial (17, 26, 38). But the version of 
Sudanese nationalism which ai-Azhari proclaimed, based as it was on 'bonds of 
religion, language, blood, education and the Nile' (35), while linking the North to 
Egypt contained within it an important contradiction, which was that the ties of 
religion, language and blood (as calculated by Arab patrilines) were absent between 
northern and southern Sudanese. It was the nationalist contention that a common 
religion, language, education (and eventually blood) were being spread to the South 
in the nineteenth century before being halted by the British. The nationalist version 
of a shared Sudanese past which ai-Azhari proclaimed, linking Arab and Mrican 
Sudanese since the time of the Funj Sultanate (38) was partly true, but it is 
unfortunate that the examples of common endeavour he listed were all based on the 
institution of slavery and evoked a very ambiguous legacy. Northern nationalists 
admitted they knew little about the South (38), and it is for this reason that they 
tended to exaggerate the influence of the Christian missionaries, whose schools 
taught in vernacular languages and English (both being used in administration), 28 
but whose efforts had produced very few converts; the importance of these converts 
being that they constituted the southern counterpart to the northern 'effendia'.29 
However much the motives of altruism and political calculation may have been 
mixed in northern attitudes towards the South at this time, ai-Azhari's address to 
Congress in January 1945 spoke to another important consideration, 'above all, the 
economic need of the North for the South' (26). Here, as in many of his early 
memoranda to the government, he criticised the administration for its record of 
uneven development throughout the country. 
Development, in all of its facets, became a political issue in the post-war agenda, 
not only between the Sudanese intelligentsia and the Sudan government, but 
between the Sudan and eo-domina! governments. It was in education that the 
disadvantage of the Sudan's position outside the Colonial Office became immediately 
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(33); in fact it is clear that he harboured royal hopes as late as 1953 (312). When 
the Umma Party was founded in January 1945 it suffered from too close an associa-
tion with sayyid Abd al-Rahman, his family and his daira (estate or business), as 
well as from a public perception that it was pro-government. This was to prove a 
lasting dilemma for the government. 'Our main difficulty', the civil secretary noted, 
'is that although we cannot openly say so, the Umma party, whatever its motive, is 
on our side, and . . . we do not want it discouraged' (30). At the same time the 
government found sayyid Ali taciturn and evasive, given to Delphic statements or 
no comment at all (18). The difficulty of engaging sayyid Ali directly in political 
negotiations was to be another of the government's lasting dilemmas. By the end of 
1945 the battle lines were clearly drawn between the Khatmiya and Ansar not only 
in the Congress, but in the province and local councils (46), sayyid Ali having 
declared unambiguously 'that the real issue in this struggle was S.A.R.'s ambitions 
and not union with Egypt'.27 
1945 saw changes in both the governments of the Sudan and Britain. Newbold 
suddenly and unexpectedly died in March, to be replaced by James Robertson as civil 
secretary. In Britain the general election of July brought in a new Labour 
government with Bevin as foreign secretary. Neither of these changes produced 
immediate alterations in policy. Robertson continued to follow Newbold's line on 
self-government and dealings with Congress (36, 44). 1945 was also the last year in 
which Congress acted as the main forum for political discussion among educated and 
northern Sudanese. The elections for the 1946 committees firmly established the 
grip of Ansar-Khatmiya sectarianism on northern Sudanese politics (42). The Umma 
and other pro-independence parties' boycott left Congress entirely under the control 
of the Khatmiya-backed Ashiqqa, with al-Azhari now referring to Congress as 'a 
party' (43). 
At the beginning of the year the other parties within Congress had been willing to 
oppose al-Azhari's growing closeness to Egypt (26), but with a strong Ashiqqa 
majority al-Azhari obtained Congress's endorsement for a resolution calling for an 
independent Sudanese government in union with Egypt under the Egyptian Crown 
(30, 34) . Al-Azhari attempted to broaden the base of this agreement through the 
formation of a special 'United Parties Committee', which issued a statement of 
common goals concerning the steps to be taken to establish a democratic and 
independent Sudanese government in union with Egypt and alliance with Britain. 
The form of union was deliberately left undefined, and outside Congress the parties 
reserved their positions concerning the degree of union they would accept (35, 36, 
42, 43). What did emerge was that despite the Ashiqqa's organisational strength over 
the Umma in Congress elections, the Umma's clearer position on independence 
commanded more solid support among its members than the vaguer terms of union 
with Egypt commanded among the disparate factions which constituted the Ashiqqa 
(42). What is of significance for events in the following year was that a proposal for 
union under the Egyptian Crown had been raised and debated within the northern 
Sudan, and some consensus reached. 
Up until now all political activity had been confined to the northern Sudan (mainly 
within the Three Towns and the larger provincial capitals), and revolved around 
northern Sudanese political concerns. But the structural weakness of the Sudan as a 
nation, the division between the northern, mainly Muslim provinces and the non-
Muslim southern provinces was never far beneath the surface and was a factor in the 
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leading Ashiqqa, such as al-Azhari, and leading Ansar, but the Committee of 60 was 
not fully consulted on the memorandum and not all agreed on its presentation.25 
Newbold's public rebuff of Congress, his more conciliatory private contact with 
lbrahim Ahmad which ended in yet another rebuff (1, 4, 5, 8) undermined the 
position of those in Congress who advocated continued dialogue with the 
government. The position of the Ashiqqa was strengthened in the executive, and it 
was they who voiced Congress's initial criticism of the proposed Advisory Council as 
restrictive and unrepresentative (14). A new alliance between the Ashiqqa and sayyid 
Ali's Khatmiya sect gave the Ashiqqa the electoral muscle it needed within the 
crucial Three Towns area (of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman) in the 
1944 Congress elections, returning al-Azhari as president, supported by a strong 
Ashiqqa-Khatmiya majority on both committees (23).26 
The 1942 memorandum had distanced Congress from Egypt by insisting on a 
separate Sudanese nationality and the right of the Sudanese to decide their 'natural' 
relationship to Egypt (1). But just as the internal politics of the Congress involved 
the patronage of the leaders of the two main rival religious sects in order to mobilise 
votes on a large scale, so the prickly response of the Sudan government encouraged 
the Ashiqqa to look for patronage from the rival eo-dominus, Egypt. A visit to Egypt 
on behalf of Congress by al-Azhari in 1943 led to a final rupture with sayyid Abd al-
Rahman, and by 1944 various factions (perhaps too small to be called parties) began 
to organise around platforms advocating degrees of autonomy or union with Egypt. 
Full union with Egypt was generally supported by the muwalladin (sing. muwallad), 
persons of mixed Egyptian and Sudanese descent, often with family or business ties 
with Egypt. The Ashiqqa opted for an undefined union, the Ittihadiyyin (Unionists) 
advocated an independent Sudan as a dominion of Egypt and the Ahrar (Liberals) 
advocated autonomy within a federation with Egypt (though it soon split between 
those wishing a closer form of union and those advocating secession). Others, like 
the Qawmiyyin (Populists) advocated full independence. The Ashiqqa-Khatimiya 
alliance proved by far the strongest in the 1944 Congress elections, and the other 
groups of necessity sought (and received) the patronage of sayyid Abd al-Rahman and 
the Ansar (23, 30). The Ashiqqa victory led to the formation of the pro-independence, 
'Sudan for the Sudanese' Umma (Nation) Party under sayyid Abd al-Rahman's 
patronage in January 1945 (30). This established the political pattern for the next few 
years: sayyid Abd al-Rahman and his Umma Party and other independents were 
virtually to concede Congress to the Ashiqqa and Khatmiya but took their places in 
the official bodies set up by government - the Advisory Council and later the 
Legislative Assembly- which the Ashiqqa and Khatmiya boycotted. 
Sudanese political positions at this time were marked by ambivalence. At the 
beginning of 1944 lbrahim Ahmad was taking a decidedly gradualist line towards 
independence, and clearly saw the advantages of the condominium in that the 
Sudanese needed both Egypt and Britain to serve as checks against each other (18). 
Sayyid Abd al-Rahman tried to exploit the Sudan's position under the Foreign 
Office by making the novel claim that this made the Sudan an ally, rather than a 
subject of Britain, an argument which would be repeated by the Umma Party 
shortly after is foundation (20, 30). But sayyid Abd al-Rahman's scarcely concealed 
monarchical ambitions were already proving a hindrance to the pro-independence 
cause, creating concern among some of his allies (18) and driving others into the 
Egyptian camp (26, 30). His tepid disclaimer in May 1945 failed to convince many 
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elsewhere as is the case in many parts of the Colonial Empire.'24 Pressure of opinion 
in Egypt and the Sudan was to prove them wrong. 
The Foreign Office was already considering the future of the Sudan's sovereignty 
in light of the Atlantic Charter when documents concerning the Congress 
memorandum arrived from Cairo. Earlier in May Lampson had advised that al-
Nahhas, the newly installed Egyptian prime minister, was under some pressure to 
raise the treaty issue. Scrivener, head of the Egyptian Department, minuted that the 
only logical solution to the deferred question of the Sudan's sovereignty in keeping 
with the spirit of the Charter was to vest sovereignty in the Sudanese themselves 
through the creation of an assembly of some kind (2), a proposition which his 
department, on further reflection, judged premature (6) . Yet Congress's 
memorandum, and the reported Egyptian suspicion that Congress was itself inspired 
by the Sudan government as a means of separating the Sudan from Egypt, suggested 
to the Egyptian Department that securing the independence of the Sudan from Egypt 
was a distinct possibility (3). A simple transfer of the Sudan to sole British 
sovereignty by swapping it for Cyrenaica with Egypt was eventually ruled out as not 
only counter to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, but outside the realm of practical 
politics given the importance of the Nile to Egypt (2, 6, 11, 12). The necessity of 
courting Sudanese nationalists, however few and unrepresentative, both to prevent 
them from seeking help from Egypt, and to strengthen Sudanese opposition to 
incorporation into Egypt, was not lost on Lampson in Cairo (10, 12, 16). 
Egypt, therefore, had some reason to see the creation of the Advisory Council of 
the Northern Sudan as a prelude to separating the Sudan from Egypt (13, 15). By the 
end of 1943 there were already indications that the Sudan was set to become a major 
issue in Anglo-Egyptian relations; and here it is interesting to note that it was 
Beckett at the Foreign Office who predicted the grounds on which the dispute would 
be raised more accurately than either Newbold in Khartoum or Lampson (now Lord 
Killearn) in Cairo (15, 16). Yet, for all the Foreign Office's attempt to anticipate the 
impact of the Atlantic Charter and US policy on the future of British colonial 
administration generally, and on the eo-domina! relations over the Sudan specifically 
(6, 16), Scrivener identified what would become Britain's weakness in any long-term 
confrontation with Egypt over the Sudan: 'Apart from the sentimental side of the 
question, & from the strategic angle, we have really very small interests in the Sudan 
- as opposed to responsibilities' (15). Once the strategic angle changed, as it did in 
the course of the defence negotiations, all Britain was left with in the Sudan were 
responsibilities. 
The drafting, presentation and rebuff of the 1942 memorandum had repercussions 
inside the Graduates' Congress, already subject to the strains of the sectarianism 
which dominated northern Sudanese political life. Disagreements on the form and 
extent of co-operation with the government over the war led to confrontations within 
the two-tiered ruling committees of Congress, the Committees of 60 and 15 (1). A 
more secular group, less conciliatory to the government, called the Ashiqqa (Blood 
Brothers), formed around the leadership of a mathematics teacher, Ismail al-Azhari. 
In the Congress elections of 1940 sayyid Abd al-Rahman became involved through 
his support of Ansar members, and an Ansar-Ashiqqa alliance dominated the 
Congress executive. A split among the Ansar about the al-Mahdi family's control of 
the sect became public in 1941 and the alliance began to weaken. It was still in place 
during the drafting of the 1942 memorandum, with the group of authors including 
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British reactions were mixed. All agreed that Egyptian acceptance of the Sudan's 
right of self-determination was a major breakthrough; they differed on the price to be 
paid to achieve this. Stevenson urged acceptance (256). Howe argued against the 
transfer of the governor-general's powers to a commission, and he pointed to the 
discrepancies between Egypt's agreements with each of the three parties to argue 
that the Sudanese remained unconsulted on this new change of status, and that only 
a newly elected Sudanese parliament would be competent to accept or amend the 
proposals (255, 257). In the discussions which followed between Stevenson and Najib 
these were the two most difficult points of contention. 
Both Najib and Salah Salim appeared to be sympathetic to a revision of the articles 
concerning the South, but claimed that these provisions had been forced on them at 
the insistence of the Umma Party and the NUP - but more particularly the Umma -
and they could not back down on them (257, 260, 268).63 The Foreign Office insisted 
that the governor-general's reserved powers in article 100 of the draft statute must 
not be completely subordinated to the commission, arguing that the removal of 
safeguards risked making the whole question of a united Sudan a 'burning issue' in 
the election (261, 264). 
By the end of 1952 Anglo-Egyptian discussions were once again deadlocked. At 
issue were the governor-general's reserved powers for the South, his subordination 
to his commission, the conditions for terminating the transitional self-governing 
period, and the Sudanese parliament's power to approve changes to the agreement 
prior to ratification. The Cairo embassy urged that Britain accept the restrictions on 
the governor-general's powers or risk the break down of negotiations with 'extremely 
serious consequences' in the Sudan and a 'disastrous effect' on the Middle East (263). 
In December Eden proposed to the Cabinet that the only issues on which Britain 
must stand firm, at the risk of breaking off negotiations, were adequate safeguards 
for the South and a flexible period for Sudanisation of the administration (271). 
Khartoum, the Cairo embassy and the Foreign Office struggled over a redrafted 
compromise article 102 on the governor-general's power to call a constitutional 
emergency, with Khartoum hoping to reinforce the governor-general's autonomy 
from the commission (275). The embassy objected to a further mention of the South 
in this article (as the main provisions were contained in article 100, where the 
governor-general was empowered to secure fair and equitable treatment for the 
peoples of the southern provinces) and warned that this aspect of Khartoum's draft 
would jeopardise the compromise already reached with Egypt (278). Howe was 
warned by the Foreign Office that a stand could be made over the explicit safeguards 
stated in article 100, but not over article 102. He gave his reluctant concurrence as 
long as article 100 was retained (280, 281). 
In the meantime an approach was made directly to sayyid Abd al-Rahman to try to 
persuade him to make a public declaration accepting the governor-general's reserved 
powers for the South, reminding him that it was only because of the inclusion of this 
guarantee in the draft self-government statute that southern members of the 
Legislative Assembly had agreed to co-operate in a unitary constitution for the 
country (265). The British found sayyid Abd al-Rahman evasive on the subject, and 
the Umma Party particularly adamant against any special status for the South (272, 
276). 
Southern opposition to the Egyptian agreements with the northern parties was 
becoming more vocal and organised. A political committee was formed in Juba to 
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denounce the northern parties' unilateral abandonment of the self-government 
statute agreed in the Legislative Assembly, and an underground organisation 
emerged to arrange protests and meetings in various towns (269, 274). One governor 
of a southern province drew direct comparisons with Britain's colonial experiences 
in Palestine and Ireland and warned of the long-term damage of coercing the South 
into an unsafeguarded union with the North. 'They will hate the North still. They will 
hate us the more' (267). Other expatriates in the South were also becoming anxious 
about the future. Fearing restrictions on church activity under a Muslim majority 
government the Catholic church petitioned for the removal of restrictions on 
proselytising in the South, which was refused by the Sudan government (266). The 
irony of Egyptian and northern Sudanese opposition to Britain's policy over 
the South was not lost on the Foreign Office. 'Far from tending to split the South off, 
the inclusion of such safeguards is probably the only hope of maintaining a united 
Sudan', minuted Alien, 'and the Egyptians want a united Sudan, so that the whole 
plum can eventually fall into their lap'.64 
Salah Salim came to the Sudan in December in order to shore up the agreements 
with the northern parties and to tour the South, ostensibly to consult southern 
opinion. His tour of the southern provinces caused considerable outrage among the 
British administrators and the majority of politically active southerners. Salah 
ignored significant groups of leaders assembled to voice their opposition to the 
agreement and collected signatures from chiefs and others to show support for the 
Egyptian government's position (277, 290).65 
The first hint of a new agreement between the Egyptian government and the two 
main northern parties, which contained a pledge by the Umma and NUP to boycott 
the elections should Britain insist on retaining safeguards for the South and 
extending Sudanisation until after self-determination, was published by a Sudanese 
journalist on the first day of 1953 (279). Salah Salim revealed a new agreement 
which included the SRP as well as the small Watan (National) Party on 10 January 
(283) . It was clear that Britain had been outbid by Egypt, and that an agreement on 
anything but Egypt's terms was now virtually out of the question (285). The Foreign 
Office, who already had entertained doubts of the political acumen of the SPS, were 
now convinced that the Sudan government had become dangerously out of touch 
with Sudanese politicians (285) .66 Churchill, then in Jamaica, grumbled: 'We seem to 
have been ill served by our agents in the Sudan' and offered to return early before a 
final decision was made, declaring 'what happens here will set the pace for us all over 
Mrica and the Middle East' .67 The Cabinet still hoped for some compromise with 
Egypt over the governor-general's special responsibilities for the South and 
appointed a committee including the foreign, Commonwealth and colonial 
secretaries to deal urgently with the question (286) . 
Whatever Egypt's real intentions towards the South, it soon became evident that it 
was in the North, among the government's former allies, that the greatest opposition 
lay. Howe complained that 'the South have been contemptuously overridden' and 
doubted that it was now possible to obtain any of the safeguards which would satisfy 
southern political opinion (284). Willie Morris, in charge of the Sudan desk in the 
Foreign Office, shrewdly observed that it was the northern politicians who wanted to 
get the British out of the South (285). This appeared confirmed by sayyid Abd al-
Rahman's belated response to the secretary of state's personal message to him when, 
shifting responsibility for the terms of the All Parties' Agreement to Egypt and the 
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other parties, he declared 'the Southerners would have to accept [it] in their best 
interests' (289). This lack of inclination to compromise with southern aspirations 
boded ill for the future, especially set against the warning of the Southern Sudan 
Political Emergency Committee that 'unless Northerners compromise with us, it will 
be very difficult to establish a government, which assures equality of treatment to 
all .. . ' (291). 
But pressure to accept the fait accompli over the South was growing. Stevenson 
argued that Britain's 'duty to keep faith with the country as a whole' meant that 
there was 'no question' but that they should 'accept a compromise on the South 
acceptable to Egypt and the Sudanese politicians . . . even at the risk of trouble in 
the South' (287). The Cabinet committee on the Sudan, while agreeing that a firm 
stance must be taken with Egypt in general, questioned whether it was worth risk-
ing a breakdown in negotiations if the Sudanese themselves were willing to com-
promise with Egypt. The only hope of getting the Sudanese politicians back on 
Britain's side lay in arguing that the Sudanese parliament should have the final 
word on the governor-general's powers and the pace of Sudanisation (292). With 
pressure mounting on the British base in the Canal Zone, and Howe urging an 
immediate break in Anglo-Egyptian talks, the Cabinet contemplated reinforcing 
the Sudan garrison (293). But Stevenson managed to negotiate a slight compro-
mise with Egypt over article 100 (deleting a specific reference to the South, but 
extending the governor-general's reserved powers to all provinces, 'subject to the 
advice of his Commission') , and giving the governor-general some power of delay 
over Sudanisation (294). Howe was pressed by the Foreign Office to agree, and 
gave his reluctant assent (295, 296). Having won over Howe, Eden next had to win 
over Churchill, who raised objections to the draft agreement in Cabinet. These 
objections were withdrawn only after Eden secured the support of an influential 
group of back benchers (297), 68 and on 12 February the Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement on self-government and self-determination for the Sudan was signed 
(appendix to part 2). 
Throughout all of this the Foreign Office had had to contend with reservations 
from the Colonial Office as well. The Colonial Office objected to Eden's statement to 
the House on October 1952 welcoming progress to 'government by an all-Sudanese 
Cabinet, responsible through an all-Sudanese parliament to the Sudanese People' 
(253). This 'was just about the most awkward imaginable' statement that could have 
been made from the Colonial Office's view, implying, as it did, that the forms of 
government applying to the Gold Coast and other colonial territories fell short of 
'self-government' (254). In discussing the terms of Egypt's note the Colonial Office 
objected strenuously to the possible inclusion of an Indian on the proposed 
international commission, as this would possibly encourage the Indian government 
in presenting themselves as the 'protectors of colonial peoples'. They objected 
equally to the notion of a fixed timetable for self-determination, and of Sudanisation 
as a requirement for self-determination (258, 282). These criticisms were reiterated 
during the course of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in December 1952 because, 
'however much we may disclaim the comparability of the Sudan with the more 
advanced Colonial territories, people in the latter, especially the African Ministers in 
the Gold Coast and Nigeria, will ask us why administrative machinery accepted in the 
Sudan cannot likewise be adopted in their territories' (270). The Foreign Office, 
while trying to accommodate some of the Colonial Office's objections to specific 
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terminology, could only fall back on the argument of the special nature of the 
Sudan's circumstances (270, 282, 288). 
Eden raised another potential problem when, addressing the Cabinet in December, 
he suggested that should the Sudan choose independence, it would be free to apply 
for membership of the Commonwealth (271). This went further than his comment 
the previous month when he was non-committal to an enquiry from the Sudan Party 
concerning eventual Commonwealth membership. 59 The issue being raised, it had to 
be considered. The Commonwealth Relations Office produced a paper which 
concluded that the question of the Sudan's admission to the Commonwealth be 
deferred until such time as a more detailed position paper concerning 
Commonwealth membership of more important colonial territories, the Gold Coast 
in particular, could be drafted (273).70 Having argued vigorously against the pace of 
the Sudan's progress towards self-government and self-determination, the Colonial 
Office appeared to be much more favourable to the idea of the Sudan joining the 
Commonwealth than either the Foreign or Commonwealth Relations Offices.71 
Ultimately the Foreign Office decided that any appearance of pressing for Sudanese 
membership would be misrepresented by Egypt, and possibly misunderstood in the 
Sudan as an attempt to maintain British control over the country; for this reason no 
active measures were taken to encourage the Sudanese to apply (298, 299, 304, 318). 
The Foreign Office was particularly anxious about the political mood in the Sudan 
in the aftermath of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. On visiting the Sudan Morris 
warned of the dangers of a mutiny among police in the South, or of a military coup 
eventually in the North (300). He also commented on the political naivete of British 
administrators in the Sudan who believed 'fervently rather than rationally' that HMG 
had sacrificed the Sudan's interests, but who also believed that British control of the 
civil administration could continue almost indefinitely beyond self-determination, 
showing 'a serious misjudgement of the way dependent peoples behave'. It was this 
misapprehension which had enabled the Egyptians to make effective propaganda that 
the British had no serious intention of transferring power. The question of the 
South, he warned, was still the one issue which had the potential to unite the 
independents with the unionists and Egyptians against Britain, and it was important 
to avoid any controversy until southern representatives could get into parliament 
and make their opinions heard (301). This was easier said than done. In the South 
there was reported to be widespread resentment at the unilateral action of the 
northern parties in making agreements without consulting the South's political 
leaders. The main anxiety about the new agreement was the Sudanisation clause; for 
it was well understood that 'Southernisation' of the South's administration would be 
impossible in three years. Demands were already being made for a pan-southern 
conference to be convened. One British assessment of the South's impact in the 
future parliament anticipated that the self-interest of individual politicians would 
undermine southern unity (302). 
Elections and self-government, Mar 1953-Feb 1954 
The politicians in the government and the mandarins in the Foreign Office emerged 
from the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in a far more combative mood than the 
administrators in the Sudan. Eden immediately drafted for Howe a broad outline of 
the propaganda measures which must be undertaken to counter Egypt's 
advantageous position in the new transition period leading to self-determination. It 
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was clear that the morale of the British civil servants in the Sudan had to be 
bolstered by addressing such practical matters as pensions and future employment in 
other government departments (such as the Foreign Office) following Sudanisation, 
and quite considerable efforts were expended over the next few months to offer 
convincing reassurances to prevent an exodus of British officials from the Sudan 
which would dilute British influence further (298, 299, 303, 306).72 But Howe was at 
first sceptical that British prestige and influence could be maintained: 'Our arms and 
armour have been struck from us' he lamented (303). Such despondency, coupled 
with what appeared to be political naivete, was frustrating to those who took the 
broader, if more distant view from London. The Foreign Office had already been 
disillusioned by Khartoum's maladroit handling of Salah Salim's visit (277). Sir 
Lawrence Grafftey-Smith, HMG's man on the governor-general's commission, was 
immediately struck by the SPS's neglect of basic politics.73 In March the minister of 
state for foreign affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, visited the Sudan and Egypt in order to take 
political soundings more directly, and to encourage both British officials and their 
allies to stand up to the Egyptians (307). 
Selwyn Lloyd returned from this visit with a much clearer picture of the political 
realities of the Sudan. It was still anticipated that no single party would obtain an 
overall majority in the future parliament, but it was also evident that the SRP was 
weaker than the Sudan government had presented it, and that a policy built around 
an expectation that the first Sudanese government would be formed from a pro-
independence Umma-SRP coalition was beginning to look unrealistic (306). It was 
also clear that the as far as the South was concerned there was a very great 
discrepancy between what the northern parties were willing to say to reassure the 
British and what they actually did to reassure southerners (305). Selwyn Lloyd 
defined British objectives in the Sudan as ensuring that the Sudan chose 
independence, that the South got 'a fair deal', and that the transfer of power 'should 
take place with dignity and goodwill' (306). 
The elections were the key to achieving these aims. Even before the final text of 
the 1953 treaty had been agreed the Foreign Office had turned its attention to 
the Electoral Commission, preferring an Indian commissioner to a Pakistani on the 
grounds that the complexity of Indian constituencies bore some comparison to the 
Sudan, and that Indian elections had been freer of corruption than in Pakistan (259). 
They also looked to the precedent of Libyan elections for ways in which the Electoral 
Commission could be set up to the advantage of the UK without relying on British 
officials (262). Selwyn Lloyd had personally encouraged the pro-independence 
parties during his March visit to the Sudan, even advising southern leaders to form 
their own party (305). But combating Egypt's vigorous propaganda campaign was the 
government's main concern, and the delay of elections until autumn 1953 appeared 
to give Egypt an advantage. Selwyn Lloyd's personal protest to Najib about 
propaganda having had no effect (304), he proposed the opening of a Trade 
Commission and Information Office in Khartoum with its own 'information' budget, 
as well as harnessing the services of the BBC and the British Council in the pursuit of 
British objectives (307). Macmillan, though only minister of housing and local 
government, took a personal interest in the elections, claiming they 'will, in effect, 
decide the future of the Sudan, and to a large extent of British prestige in Africa and 
the Middle East' (308). 
Churchill pressed Howe to take a more active role in countering Egyptian 
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propaganda, a role Howe resisted as inconsistent with his being an agent of both co-
domini.74 The mood of the SPS now appeared to be more buoyant than at first 
thought, but Derek Riches, the first UK trade commissioner, judged that they were 
effectively leaderless following the retirement of their most senior members, 
including Robertson (316). Decisions in the Electoral Commission were not going 
Britain's way, with the reduction of the number of indirect constituencies in both the 
North and South, where it was thought that tribal leaders would have greater 
influence on the voting of their people (310). More direct action was needed. 
Britain placed its hope in the strength of the pro-independence parties, but more 
particularly the Umma. Since the All Parties' Agreement it was no longer possible to 
take the tactical alliance with the Umma for granted (309). Egypt was also wooing 
the Umma over the Nile Waters. Salah Salim had already accepted the need for a 
revised Nile Waters agreement in the event of the Sudan opting for full independence 
(250), and in the summer of 1953 the Egyptian government and the Umma Party 
worked their way towards a 'gentleman's agreement' in which the Sudan would 
receive favourable terms in the new engineering schemes designed to increase the 
flow of water for both countries (314, 317). The opportunity for Britain to intervene 
more directly in the Umma electoral strategy came through sayyid Abd al-Rahman's 
perpetual need for money. 
Sayyid Abd al-Rahman was known to be in debt at a time when cotton prices had 
dropped. In May he approached Riches, as the conduit to the Foreign Office, with a 
proposal that the British government should arrange to buy his cotton above the 
market price to enable him to finance the pro-independence campaign. The Foreign 
Office was reluctant to subsidise sayyid Abd al-Rahman but entered into negotiations 
with him and his son, Siddiq, on the conditions to be met whereby some assistance 
could be given. The Foreign Office was at this point contemplating a 'grand 
remonstrance' to expose the extent of Egyptian propaganda, bribery and corruption 
in the Sudan, and it now looked possible to co-ordinate this with action from the 
Umma Party. The original terms proposed were that the Umma were to repudiate 
their earlier agreement with Egypt, form an independence front with the SRP, and 
commit themselves to maintaining British administrators in the southern Sudan 
beyond the three year transitional period (311). These points were put by Selwyn 
Lloyd in person to sayyid Abd al-Rahman on the latter's visit to London for the 
coronation of Elizabeth 11, in a meeting where the minister of state also expressed a 
personal (as opposed to official) preference for a monarchical form of government in 
the Sudan. The precise nature of the assistance which Britain offered in exchange has 
still not been revealed, as those passages concerned have been obliterated from the 
documents released (312). A written agreement was initialled by Siddiq on his 
cotton-selling visit to Britain in July, the main qualifications being that the Umma 
would make an effort to reach an understanding with the SRP, and that they would 
support the retention of British administrators in the South should the majority of 
southern MPs so desire (314). On 8 August the Umma Party denounced Egypt for 
breaching its own undertaking not to finance propaganda in the Sudan. Britain gave 
its 'practical assistance', but despite this the Umma and SRP were unable to agree on 
a common election strategy and spent most of the period preceding the elections in 
arguing with each other (319). 
There was some indication, however, that whatever the relative strengths of the 
Khatmiya and Ansar as political organisations, pro-independence opinion was 
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crossing the NUP-Umma divide. In an unusually frank interview before the elections, 
sayyid Ali al-Mirghani declared himself in favour of Sudanese independence and 
then, taking a leaf out of sayyid Abd al-Rahman's book, asked for a government 
subsidy to the Khatmiya (315). 
As elections were put back from October to November British officials in 
Khartoum admitted that they really had no idea of the likely outcome. It was only at 
the end of October that observers began to get a glimpse of the real strength of the 
NUP, and the negligible showing of the SRP (320). The surge in votes for the NUP 
which resulted in the party's majority in the House of Representatives followed the 
cementing of the NUP-Khatmiya alliance and a corresponding ambiguity of what was 
meant by 'unity' with Egypt (320, 321). 
In the post-mortem following the elections Britain identified the Umma's greatest 
weakness as its unwillingness to go beyond a sectarian line, in effect, failing to 
become a truly national party (323). The NUP, on the other hand, had been moving 
to a more nationalist, i.e. a more independent stand throughout the election and it 
looked set to seek greater autonomy from Egypt during the period of self-
government. Recognising that the one point on which Egypt and the NUP fully 
agreed was rapid Sudanisation and the swift departure of the British, HMG now saw 
the best strategy for securing Sudanese independence lay in a quick endorsement of 
the election and support to the NUP government (324-326). 
A subtle shift in UK policy towards the Sudan was necessitated by the NUP victory, 
but even when anticipating a pro-independence majority before the elections the 
Foreign Office had recognised the likely need to accelerate the transition period to 
achieve self-determination in less than three years (318). Riches, in a rapid and 
partial pre-election tour of the South, also cast doubt on the predictions of disorder 
coming from the 'old hands' in a report which laid the foundations for the argument 
to abandon 'a sort of "Polish" unimplementable guarantee to the Southerners' (313) . 
The Foreign Office was thus already willing to accept accelerated Sudanisation under 
an NUP government, though in its instructions to Howe it also emphasised the 
importance of retaining the friendship of the Umma while trying to influence the 
NUP government through official advice (327). Howe was altogether more sceptical 
about being able to exert influence without power, but he expressed a strong 
commitment to working with the NUP government even at the expense of alienating 
the Umma, who were already blaming Britain for their misfortunes (331). 
Early discussions between the new prime minister, al-Azhari, and Luce as 
constitutional affairs adviser, indicated areas of concern as well as hope for British 
policy. Al-Azhari expressed a strong view that the political attitudes of tribal leaders, 
especially in the West and South, were influenced by British administrators, and that 
political differences between Sudanese would decrease once the British left. Rapid 
Sudanisation was clearly going to be a high priority. But he also showed an 
unwillingness to allow 'union' with Egypt to become domination. He referred to the 
alliance with Egypt as tactical in order to remove the British: 'the old idea of unity 
was dead as a political force', he reassured Luce (332). 
Sudanisation, mutiny and independence, Mar 1954--0ct 1956 
The year 1953 had brought irreversible changes to the Sudan. 'When it opened', 
Riches wrote in his annual review, 'the Sudan was governed, as it had been for 
decades, by an oligarchy of officials of British nationality in contact with, rather than 
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under the control of, Her Majesty's Government. . .. When it ended, a Senate and 
House of Representatives composed solely of Sudanese had been constituted .. . it is 
the passing of the direct power of the British oligarchy rather than the particular 
politics of the Sudanese who are for the time being inheriting it that marks the end 
of an era . . . . The Sudanese will remember with gratitude that there used to be a 
well-meaning and even benevolent British Administration. But they will only do this 
if we get out gracefully as and when the Sudanese want us to go'.75 
The establishment of a Sudanese government had immediate consequences on the 
administration of the Sudan's borders. The Governor-General's Office informed 
Kenya in January that it could not bind any future Sudan government to the 
agreements concerning the Ilemi Triangle, and that it would be up to the Kenyan 
government to make what arrangements it could with the Sudanese after the 
transfer of power (328). Later that year the government of Ethiopia announced its 
intention to terminate the lease on the Gambela enclave after British officials had 
been Sudanised. They proclaimed their intention to do this in 'a decent and orderly 
manner', but they categorically refused to negotiate with the Sudanese ministers on 
the subject (371). 
The first test of the ability of the Governor-General's Office to work with the new 
Sudanese government came with the dispute over the composition of the Governor-
General's Commission, which prior to the elections had one Umma and one NUP 
member, but whose membership could be varied by parliament. In January it 
appeared that the NUP was planning to replace Ibrahim Ahmad, the Umma member, 
with one of their own; thus producing a pro-Egyptian majority on the commission 
(329). HMG contemplated a variety of measures to forestall this, and the Cabinet 
authorised instructions to Howe to threaten al-Azhari with a constitutional 
emergency should the balance of the commission be disturbed. Plans were begun to 
reinforce the governor-general's authority with troops flown from the Canal Zone 
(335, 340). Howe disagreed sharply with the Cabinet over strategy. He argued that a 
constitutional emergency could be called only to avert the imminent breakdown of 
public order, and he was not convinced that the threatened alteration to the 
commission was sufficient provocation (341). 
On the likely threat to order there was some disagreement. Najib's arrival in 
Khartoum on 1 March 1954 for the official opening of the Sudanese parliament 
provoked a serious riot around the palace by Umma supporters, in which several 
persons (including police) were killed, and which was subsequently described as a 
battle between the Ansar and the predominantly Khatmi police. Selwyn Lloyd, who 
was also visiting Khartoum at the time, was a witness to this disturbance. Both the 
NUP government and the Umma Party, in their own ways, tried to place the blame 
for the riots on the British. In the aftermath of the disturbances sayyid Abd al-
Rahman urged the British to abandon the 1953 agreement and declare the Sudan 
independent. Britain risked sharpening of the sectarian divide within the northern 
Sudan by imposing a constitutional emergency (333, 334,336, 338). 
Howe seemed to have reached an understanding with al-Azhari to defer the 
question of membership of the commission when the Umma insisted on pressing the 
issue in parliament. Al-Azhari split the opposition by nominating a failed southern 
NUP candidate, Siricio Iro, obtaining southern support in this vote (347). The 
Sudan's first consitutional crisis was averted rather than resolved. 
The Umma Party, having seen what political confusion could be caused by extra-
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parliamentary means, continued to press the British government on several 
occasions to renounce the 1953 agreement, re-establish direct control, and declare 
Sudanese independence (335, 353). Sayyid Abd al-Rahman renewed his requests for 
money, which were all refused (330, 355). The Foreign Office and HMG were now 
even more convinced that the only hope of achieving Sudanese independence was 
through loyal co-operation with the NUP government and rapid Sudanisation as a 
means of reducing anti-British feeling among Egypt's Sudanese allies (338, 353, 
357). Finding Al-Azhari more approachable in the aftermath of the constitutional 
crisis than before it, and the Umma opposition inept in parliament (351), the 
Governor-General's Office made the conscious decision to switch their hopes from 
the Umma to the NUP (358). The Umma Party's requests for assistance were met with 
repeated advice to broaden their own political base to include non-Ansar, to commit 
themselves to opposition through constitutional means and try to improve their 
parliamentary performance (348, 353, 357). 
The Governor-General's Office argued for financial aid to the Sudan as one 
element of its more positive approach to the NUP government (358), but in this the 
Sudan's position outside the Commonwealth told against it. With the Sudan's 
relatively healthy sterling reserve (of £12 million), and the UK government's decision 
to confine as much as possible of its overseas investment to the Commonwealth, 
Howe's request for a £5 million development loan was rejected (322) . Britain was 
more supportive of the idea of the Sudan becoming a full member of the sterling 
area, making formal what was an informal arrangement, and also giving support to 
the eventual separation of the Sudanese from the Egyptian currency (388). 
Sudanisation became the real testing ground of whether Britain's tactics would 
succeed. The British member of the Sudanisation Committee, R R Burnett, was 
instructed by Selwyn Lloyd to ensure that Sudanisation was 'as expeditious and 
orderly as possible', that British officials be treated fairly, and that he resist any 
attempt by the committee to expand its remit to include posts unrelated to self-
determination (344). Burnett found himself outvoted by the Egyptian and three 
Sudanese members of the commission (two of the latter being NUP appointees) . 
Sudanisation of the senior ranks of the police was agreed without controversy (337), 
but the committee recommended a far more rapid and comprehensive Sudanisation 
of the army and the administration than Britain found comfortable (339, 342, 343). 
The committee's decision to Sudanise the judiciary was contested by both Britain 
and the governor-general and led to the temporary withdrawal of the British 
member. Howe proposed to delay implementation of the committee's 
recommendation by referring it to the eo-domini (345, 346, 349, 350). The 
committee continued to recommend the Sudanisation of other departments, 
including education (360). Relations between British officials and the Sudan 
government deteriorated throughout much of 1954, as those whose posts were first 
Sudanised left, and by the time the committee was contemplating Sudanising the 
technical departments Burnett had already concluded that for the sake of Britain's 
future relations with the Sudan the sooner Sudanisation was completed the better 
(359). 
When the Sudanisation Committee completed its recommendations by the 
beginning of 1955 it was expected that it would take a full year to implement them. 
The voluntary retirement of non-Sudanised British staff, taking advantage of the 
generous compensation scheme Howe had negotiated with al-Azhari's government, 
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meant that far more replacements had to be found than originally anticipated. The 
pace of departure of officials accelerated, so that by August 1955, when the 
committee reported that its task was completed, only 200 British staff out of a 
previous total of 1200 remained in the country (375, 391). 
There was some indication that Britain's acquiescence on accelerated 
Sudanisation, along with the Anglo-Egyptian defence agreement in October 1954, 
was helping to moderate the anti-British attitude of many within the NUP (365, 370). 
There was also evidence that Egypt was becoming worried about the solidifying of 
the pro-independence feeling within the Sudan. In October 1954 both Nasir and 
Salah Salim openly voiced their concern about political instability in the Sudan to 
British officials in Cairo, urging support for a policy of 'co-ordination' (rather than 
full union) between Egypt and the Sudan (364, 366). At the time the pro-Egyptian 
wing of the NUP appeared to be on the ascendant within the Sudanese Cabinet (365, 
367), but there were cracks opening in the NUP coalition. Nasir's dismissal of Najib 
provoked vocal anti-Egyptian protests within the NUP itself, forcing a confrontation 
in the Cabinet which ended with the dismissal of Mirghani Hamza and two other 
non-Ashiqqa Khatmi ministers in December 1954 (374). Howe argued forcefully 
against any diplomatic re-examination of British objectives in the Sudan, whatever 
the improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations, lest this strengthen the pro-Egyptian 
faction in the government. The Sudan's best hope for the future lay in full 
independence, he stated, and that independence would be more secure if it could be 
achieved under an NUP government (372). The Foreign Office agreed (373). 
One further consequence of accelerated Sudanisation was that it brought forward 
Howe's own resignation. Howe felt that the departure of the British governor-general 
would remove the last focus of Egyptian and Sudanese anti-British sentiment and 
help increase the momentum towards full independence (352). The Foreign Office 
came out against the idea of a neutral replacement, arguing that the governor-
general still had the right to be informed, to 'guide, encourage and warn' and could 
influence events 'even if only to a minor degree' (354). By November 1954 it was still 
anticipated that the full process of self-determination might not be concluded until 
spring 1957. Given that time-table, and Howe's eagerness to leave, it was decided that 
a British successor should be installed as soon as possible (368). The improvement in 
Anglo-Egyptian relations following the October 1954 agreement enabled Britain to 
obtain Egyptian approval for the appointment of the last British governor-general of 
the Sudan, Sir Knox Helm, a career diplomat with extensive Middle Eastern 
experience who had been Britain's minister to Tel Aviv after the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
war and more recently Britain's ambassador to Turkey. His views were decidedly 
anti-Egyptian. Instructed not to upset the political balance in the Sudan by 
becoming a focus for overt anti-Egyptian feeling, he took up his appointment in 
Khartoum in March 1955 (377). 
The political climate in the Sudan had changed between Howe's resignation in 
November 1954 and his departure in March 1955. The scheduled withdrawal of 
British officials and Howe's own resignation helped to persuade many in the NUP 
that the British really were willing to quit the Sudan, and there were many in the 
party openly advocating complete independence (381, 391). In his valedictory 
message to Churchill, Howe noted that pro-independence sentiment now crossed 
party lines, and he urged a public policy supporting a free choice in self-
determination, which he now saw as coming earlier rather than later (378). 
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Relations with the NUP government continued to improve. The Sudanese minister 
of social affairs showed himself amenable to advice from both the home government 
and the TUC against introducing repressive anti-communist legislation as part of the 
government's labour policy (376). Finally on 31 March 1955 the NUP parliamentary 
party came out publicly for total independence for a Sudanese republic, a policy 
which was formally endorsed by the party executive on 12 April (381). 
These developments were not welcomed by Egypt, and Salah Salim had tried to 
convince Helm on his way to Khartoum of the inherent political instability of the 
Sudan (379). One of Egypt's particular concerns was getting the Sudan to agree to 
the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The first issue on which al-Azhari 
expressed a marked independence from Egypt was the Sudan's share of Nile Waters 
(332). The advent of self-government in the Sudan had altered Ethiopia's attitude 
towards negotiations over the Lake Tsana scheme, and by mid-1954 it was clear that 
Ethiopia would not consent to any project designed for the sole benefit of Egypt and 
the Sudan (356). The removal of the Lake Tsana option increased the importance of 
joint Egyptian-Sudanese projects. The points of contention over the Aswan dam 
were the calculation of evaporation at the dam in the division of shares of extra water 
and the compensation for those Sudanese living along the Nile near the international 
border who would be displaced by the construction of the dam. Egypt was offering 
the Sudan a very much smaller share of water than the Sudanese thought fair (372). 
Talks between the Egyptians and Sudanese were suspended early in 1955, and Britain 
was putting discrete pressure on the International Bank to withhold a loan to Egypt 
for the construction of the dam until a satisfactory agreement had been reached 
between Egypt and the Sudan.76 Egypt attempted to enlist Helm's assistance to 
persuade the Sudanese government to moderate their demands, giving a Nile Waters 
agreement a higher priority than union between the two countries (379). But the 
politics of self-determination were never fully disentangled from the politics of 
the Nile. Egypt's offer of a 50-50 share of new water in May 1955 was interpreted 
in the Sudan as a quid-pro-quo for a pro-union vote in self-determination (385). 
Al-Azhari's reported intention in July to reject this offer was seen by the embassy in 
Cairo as a fresh provocation to Egypt. 'There is little doubt in my mind', wrote 
F RH Murray, minister and charge d'affaires, 'that this news, when and if it reaches 
the Egyptians, must increase their propensity to consider wild and dangerous 
policies in regard to the Sudan and to render them more impenetrable to the 
counsels of moderation and good behaviour' . 77 
An increase in Egyptian political activity in the Sudan was reported as a direct 
result of the suspension of Nile Waters talks and the NUP's support for an 
independent republic. There was still a sizeable pro-Egyptian 'fifth column' in the 
NUP, headed by the party's vice-president, Muhammad Nur al-Din, which was 
inhibiting al-Azhari from pushing ahead with independence. Of more serious 
concern was new Egyptian support for southern Sudanese separatism (382). 
The political crisis in the South had been growing since the announcement of the 
Sudanisation plans in 1954. The NUP maintained a majority in parliament in part by 
winning some southern members to their side. Southerners voting as a bloc had the 
potential to make the difference between a government majority and a government 
defeat. The NUP (and Salah Salim) had made a number of promises of preferential 
treatment for southerners in Sudanisation which were now clearly not going to be 
fulfilled, and even southern ministers in the NUP government began complaining of 
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a northern invasion of the South as newly-appointed officials arrived in their posts 
(362). In the autumn of 1954 Buth Diu, the most influential leader of the southern 
Liberal Party, organised a pan-southern conference in Juba (361). Al-Azhari's 
response was to announce minor alterations in southern pay scales and promotions 
(363). The conference took place in October and included representatives from 
throughout the three southern provinces, southern members of the NUP and 
southerners living in Khartoum, making it the first truly representative meeting of 
southern political opinion ever held. It resolved to support Sudanese independence 
under a presidential (as opposed to monarchical) government, but it also supported 
proposals for a federal system. The conference proclaimed the South's right to its 
own self-determination, and stated that complete independence of the South was the 
only acceptable alternative to federation with the North (369). 
Southerners became even more vocal in April 1955, when several southern 
members of the NUP, prior to leaving the party, denounced their own government's 
southern policy and came out in favour of federation (380). In the same month it was 
reported that the Egyptians were now bribing southern MPs to support a 
constitutional link with Egypt. Even Siricio Iro, who had been placed on the 
Governor-General's Commission as an NUP man, left the party and was identified as 
Egypt's main agent in the Sudan (381, 382). 
Helm's one visit to the South was made in May. He was impressed by the northern 
Sudanese administrators he found there, thought the southerners on the whole were 
lazy and educated Southerners 'cut off from their environment'. Already suspicious 
of Egypt he was alarmed by the evidence presented to him by the three provincial 
governors of the extent of Egyptian bribery and propaganda through the EID, and 
predicted that the South would 'go the way of the Egyptians' unless something was 
done (383). 
Throughout the early summer more reports came from northern officials in the 
South of widespread Egyptian political propaganda. Al-Azhari and other members of 
the NUP did not see it as their responsibility to curb such activities, and the 
governor-general came under pressure to invoke a constitutional emergency in order 
to crackdown on Egyptian agents. 'It is a reflection of the basic political immaturity 
of these people', Grafftey-Smith reported, 'that their hopes are always set on some 
miraculous intervention from outside' (384, 385). Talk of federalism was on the 
increase, and another all-southern conference was held in Juba in July (385, 396). 
The attention of politicians in Khartoum was focused elsewhere. With the 
conversion of the NUP to the cause of independence there were moves in parliament 
'to eliminate self-determination' (381). The Umma Party, which had been willing to 
tear up the 1953 agreement after failing in the elections, now proposed to dispense 
with the self-determination process 'on the ground that the whole country is agreed 
upon independence'. Failing that, they wished to replace elections to a constituent 
assembly with a plebiscite on independence (382). The idea for a plebiscite had been 
floated before and at different times had been advocated by the Umma, al-Azhari and 
the Egyptians (191, 213). Al-Azhari was at first resistant to the idea of a plebiscite 
(384), but in July sayyid Ali al-Mirghani lent his support to the idea, even if it meant 
asking the Egyptians to agree to an amendment of the Self-Government Statute 
(387). 
The process for self-determination began when the Sudanisation Committee 
reported on 2 August 1955 that its task was completed (391). A self-determination 
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motion was debated in the House of Representatives on 16 August, in which the 
possibility of a plebiscite was mentioned (390), and both houses of parliament passed 
the resolution unanimously. The two sayyids now publicly supported the call for a 
plebiscite and Britain's new ambassador to Cairo, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, was 
authorised to inform Salah Salim that Britain would accept a plebiscite if the 
majority of Sudanese so wished.78 
By this time events in the South were forcing themselves on the attention of 
Khartoum, Cairo and London, nearly derailing the whole process of Sudanese 
independence. The British diplomatic team now responsible for keeping self-
determination on track were mainly new to their positions. Macmillan had been 
foreign secretary since only April, Trevelyan had just taken up his post earlier that 
August, and Helm, who had been governor-general since March, was in Britain on 
leave. It fell to William Luce, constitutional affairs adviser, acting governor-general, 
and a former deputy governor of Equatoria Province, to make the first assessments of 
the disturbances and authorise the initial response. 
Civil unrest in western Equatoria, centred at Yambio and the small industrial 
complex of Nzara, had occurred in July and was being publicised in Cairo by 
southern Sudanese politicians and Salah Salim. What was more serious was that on 6 
August evidence was uncovered of a plot to mutiny among southern soldiers based at 
Torit, the headquarters of the Equatorial Corps (389). Despite this advance warning a 
mutiny did break out in Torit on 18 August, and the first information was sent to 
London and Cairo by Luce (392). Luce did not declare a constitutional emergency, 
but proclaimed instead a state of emergency in the three southern provinces under 
the Defence of the Sudan Ordinance; thus allowing al-Azhari's government to deal 
with the emergency without reference to the Governor-General's Commission or the 
eo-domini. He urged the immediate transfer of northern Sudanese troops south via 
RAF transport planes to prevent the Egyptians from sending their own troops 
ostensibly to protect their irrigation personnel (393). 
The first meeting between Trevelyan and Salah Salim concerning the mutiny took 
place on 21 August, three days after the first official news of events in Torit reached 
either the Foreign Office or the embassy.79 Over the next two days Salah pressed for 
joint Anglo-Egyptian military intervention to restore order in the South, proposals 
which Trevelyan resisted (394, 395).80 Helm, on his way back to Khartoum, was given 
clear instructions by the Foreign Office to avoid the use of eo-domina! troops in 
restoring order (397, 402). 
Reports came in of the containment of further disturbances in Upper Nile and 
Bahr al-Ghazal, but of general support for the rising among civilians throughout 
Equatoria. Opinions differed about the instigation and extent of the revolt. Northern 
Sudanese generally attributed the mutiny solely to Egyptian agitation (396). This was 
a view initially shared by Helm, who accused Egypt of being the principal immediate 
cause of the trouble in the South either with the intention of deliberately breaking 
up the Sudan, or (more likely) having started something which then got out of hand 
(400). Luce, one of the few British administrators to have held senior positions in 
both the North and the South, was of a different opinion. The mutiny was 
'symptomatic of the major internal political problem of the Sudan i.e. the 
relationship between the North and the South', which could be settled only by the 
Sudanese themselves and would require a fundamental reappraisal by the North of 
its attitude towards the South (396). The immediate problem in Khartoum was 'to 
lxxxiv INTRODUCTION 
get Azhari and his Ministers to understand that this is anything more than a mutiny 
of troops'. Given the obvious pro-British sentiment of so many in the South, British 
advice, even if based on a more intimate knowledge of the region, was suspect to the 
new Sudan government (398). Helm modified his own view once he returned to 
Khartoum. There was no doubt, he now concluded, that the entire South had been 
behind the revolt. The Egyptians had worked upon southern dread of the North, 'but 
it is probably doubtful whether even without Egyptian injections the South would 
have remained quiet indefinitely' (405). 
Together Luce, Helm and al-Azhari worked for the surrender of the mutineers, 
and Luce went to Torit to negotiate and observe the surrender. In the end very few 
mutineers came in, the majority fleeing to the bush or crossing into Uganda (405, 
406). The influx of refugees into Uganda now brought Uganda and the Colonial Office 
directly into discussions about the Sudan's immediate future. 
With fugitive mutineers, civilian refugees, missionaries and even fleeing northern 
Sudanese officers of the SDF crossing the border, Uganda was in a unique position to 
accumulate information about the situation inside Equatoria Province, which it 
forwarded to the Colonial Office for transmission to Khartoum, via the Foreign 
Office. Cohen, the governor of Uganda, recognised the undesirability of re-deploying 
eo-domina! troops in the South and argued for Belgian observers, administrators and 
even troops to be sent to the South as neutrals best equipped to restore 
administration (401). One CMS missionary coming from western Equatoria 
expressed concern that should northern Sudanese troops see the extent of the 
popular participation in the rising, reprisals would be inevitable. He pressed for the 
renewal of British or Anglo-Egyptian administration in the South (409). The Foreign 
Office rejected all such proposals: Macmillan minuted that Cohen 'must be rather 
lacking in judgment', and the Foreign Office dismissed the missionary proposal as 
really 'dreadful stuff (409). Neither the Foreign Office nor Helm dissented to any 
significant degree from the Ugandan government's appreciation of the causes of the 
rising, but they did disagree (Helm in particular) over the role of Egyptian 
instigation (418) and the prospect of restoring settled administration without 
external intervention (427). The Colonial Office did not press the point, but kept in 
reserve the possibility that they might, at some future point, press the prime 
minister to re-establish direct British control over the South (411). 
The size of the influx into Uganda of mutineers and civilians created new long-
term problems between Uganda and the Sudan. Given the close relations that existed 
across the border between many Sudanese and Ugandan peoples, and the political 
nature of the refugee influx, Cohen did not feel that he could automatically extradite 
the mutineers and refugees back to the Sudan under previous colonial legislation 
regarding fugitives. New legislation was drafted to meet with the new situation- the 
precursor of many similar refugee movements in post-independence Eastern Africa 
(399, 403). 
Uganda's response to the refugee crisis, fully endorsed by the Colonial Office, 
caused considerable strain between Khartoum, London and Entebbe (404, 426, 427). 
The Governor-General's Office was particularly concerned that Uganda's actions 
were being interpreted by the Sudanese as a British plot to side with the mutineers 
(426, 427). While the instinct of many in the Foreign Office was to give full support 
to Khartoum's demands for extradition, there were others who saw broader 
international implications in the politics between two incipient independent African 
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states. Sir Harold Caccia, pointing to possible asylum claims from potential risings in 
Eastern Europe (particularly Poland) asked 'what would be the effect of this in Africa 
now? And elsewhere as a precedent in the future?' From general principles he argued 
that Britain could not force wholesale extraditions. Added to that were the specific 
facts of Britain's own role in the current political set up in the Sudan. 'Is it, indeed, 
justice to look at this revolt in isolation and approach the problem with the idea that 
we must "try to find some method of returning these men to the Sudanese 
authorities"?' Macmillan recorded that he was 'shaken' by Caccia's arguments (417). 
Despite his robust defence of the Sudanese government against Uganda's doubts, 
Helm was far from optimistic in his dealings with al-Azhari in the immediate 
aftermath of the mutiny. He found al-Azhari uncommunicative, complacent and 
detached from the details of reasserting administrative control in the South, despite 
his direct responsibility as minister of the interior (412, 416, 419). 
The immediate effect of the Torit mutiny was to accelerate the process towards 
independence, leading eventually to a circumvention of the self-determination 
procedures agreed in the 1953 Self-Government Statute. The question to be resolved 
was whether this could best be done through a plebiscite or a direct declaration of 
independence. 
Helm was one of the first to argue against a plebiscite as too difficult to implement 
in the wake of the Torit mutiny (400). At the same time that the mutiny was being 
suppressed the Foreign Office and the Egyptian government agreed in advance to 
accept a plebiscite should the Sudanese parliament vote in favour of one, which they 
did at the end of August (408). But support for a declaration of independence for the 
Sudan came from a variety of corners. Nasir was reported to be contemplating 
unilateral recognition of Sudanese independence as a means of salvaging some of 
Egypt's influence in view of the backlash against its Sudan policy after the Torit 
mutiny (410, 413). The Colonial Office, for its part, supported a unilateral declaration 
of independence by Britain for the opposite reason: to forestall the advance of 
Egyptian influence towards East Africa (411). Helm urged the Foreign Office to 
persuade Egypt to participate in a joint recognition of independence and the drafting 
of a new constitution by parliament, to be accomplished 'while the south is still 
quiet' (414).81 On this last point Helm was at odds with the Foreign Office, who were 
then of the view that the parliament had no mandate to settle constitutional issues 
(408). But the real pressure for rapid British withdrawal continued to come from 
Helm. 'For me the moral is crystal clear', he stated in September, 'namely that the 
sooner we can get out of these almost unlimited commitments, without 
accompanying powers, the better' (416). 
Nasir now began to resist British pressure to accelerate self-determination, in 
September arguing against altering the self-determination procedures (415) and in 
October accepting a plebiscite but not a declaration of independence (420). The 
Czech arms deal of October removed Britain's last inhibition against offending Egypt 
over the Sudan, and Macmillan instructed Helm to inform al-Azhari that Britain was 
willing immediately to recognise Sudanese independence (421). 
Helm was already on record claiming that 'from every point of view I can see 
nothing but advantages in H.M. Government divesting themselves of . their 
Condominium responsibilities and liabilities at the earliest possible moment. If they 
cannot do so in agreement with Egypt then I suggest that other means should be 
found' (421). Predictably, the embassy in Cairo argued against unilateral action, 
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citing the possible repudiation of the Suez Canal base agreement in retaliation, but 
the Foreign Office on the whole, and Macmillan in particular, saw the initiative over 
the Sudan as a way of showing Nasir that Britain would not 'accept tamely a defeat of 
the kind he has administered us' with the Czech arms deal (422). The only 
concession to Cairo was the instruction to Helm to inform al-Azhari that HMG would 
respond to an initiative from the Sudanese parliament (423, 424). Britain's desire to 
extract itself from the Sudan in the aftermath of the southern disturbances now 
appeared to override earlier commitments to constitutional procedures. The Foreign 
Office had apparently forgotten its own warning back in 1953 that a declaration of 
independence, even by a large majority of both houses of parliament, would be likely 
to create discontent among minorities and pave the way for civil war (318). 
Al-Azhari was informed on 12 October 1955 of the United Kingdom's willingness 
to agree to an independence resolution passed by parliament (425). He at first saw no 
need for a hurried resolution, and it was Helm who had to press him. His hesitation 
seemed to stem from disagreements within his own party and the demand by the 
opposition that a coalition 'national' government should supervise the drafting of the 
constitution (428, 429). When the southern representatives of the Liberal Party 
declared that it was not prepared to discuss the Sudan's future in parliament, the 
Foreign Office was dismayed that this boycott would undermine their justification 
for cutting short self-determination (432). 
By now Nasir had been informed by his own sources in Khartoum of the 
manoeuvres towards a declaration of independence. His main fear seemed to be that 
independence would still leave a British governor-general in office until a 
constitution had been adopted, and that independence under the present parliament 
would leave al-Azhari in power for some time to come (430, 431).82 
Al-Azhari's position was not so secure as it looked from Cairo. In November sayyid 
Ali al-Mirghani agreed to withdraw his support from al-Azhari, which led to a no-
confidence motion being passed in parliament. But sayyid Ali changed his mind, the 
vote was reversed, and al-Azhari just survived (434).83 
In the midst of parliamentary deadlock in the Sudan, renewed concern for a fair 
deal for the South was expressed in both houses of parliament in Britain. Luce 
reassured the Foreign Office that the question of the South could not be settled 
independently of the constitutional questions for the entire country. Since a 
plebiscite would address only the issue of independence from Egypt, whose outcome 
was now considered a foregone conclusion, and not the internal constitutional 
structure of the Sudan, it was far better, he declared, to get past the formula for 
independence and on to the real issues confronting the country. A national 
government, which he felt likely to replace the NUP government, would be bound to 
treat the South generously (435). 
It was precisely to avoid the creation of a national government that al-Azhari 
finally tabled the independence motions, and then only after Helm had returned to 
Britain on Christmas leave (439). The wording of the resolutions agreed between 
government, opposition and the Governor-General's Office requested the governor-
general to ask the eo-domini to recognise Sudanese independence forthwith. A 
constituent assembly would be set up after independence and, in response the 
demands from the Liberal Party, federation for the South would be given 'serious 
consideration'.84 Al-Azhari sent a personal emissary to Cairo who obtained Nasir's 
agreement. The motions were passed by the House on 19 December and the Senate 
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of 22 December, but a date for independence (1 January 1956) was not decided until 
27 December. Helm was requested not to return to the Sudan for the independence 
ceremonies (436, 437, 439). 'Thus the way was opened for the Sudan to become 
independent without bloodshed or disaster but with a haste which might well cause 
legal and administrative chaos', reported the UK trade commissioner, and 'the Sudan 
will need friends and friendly advice' (439). 
Friends were needed not least on the outstanding dispute with Egypt over the Nile 
Waters. The Sudan insisted that Egypt bear the cost of the evaporation loss at Aswan 
and the Sudan be given a larger share of the balance of the unused Nile flow. Egypt 
was pressing Britain to mediate, but the Sudanese showed no signs of wanting 
mediation (433) and on 20 November officially rejected Egypt's formula. Before al-
Azhari announced his intention to table the independence motions Egypt had already 
indicated that they would not approach the Sudanese further as they did not think 
they could get anything from al-Azhari .85 An Anglo-American offer to finance the 
construction of the dam in December was made conditional on a resolution to the 
Egyptian-Sudanese dispute.86 On 28 December, the day after a decision was reached 
on the date of the Sudan's independence, Egypt informed the Sudan that it would 
grant none of their requests for a revised share of the Nile Waters, rescind all its 
previous offers and hold strictly to the provisions of the 1929 agreement (438). 
An epilogue of sorts to the transfer of power in the Sudan was offered in October 
1956 with the publication of the Cotran Commission report on the previous year's 
disturbances. There was an ironic reversal of roles in the Foreign Office commentary. 
Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews had played a minor role in setting Britain's policy 
towards Sudanese independence from posts in Cairo and Whitehall in the 1940s (59, 
146, 148, 156, 160, 172, 176). He was now in Khartoum, as Britain's first ambassador 
to Khartoum. Writing just as the Suez crisis was beginning he reviewed Britain's 
administrative record in the Sudan and accepted as justified some of the criticisms of 
that administration the report contained. In Whitehall now, commenting on this 
report 'from the field' was J S R Duncan, a former DC from a southern province and 
assistant constitutional affairs adviser in Khartoum at the time of the mutiny. A vocal 
critic himself of the 'zoo' mentality of the old Southern Policy, but also a publicist of 
the condominium's achievements,87 here his defence of the administration's record 
is restrained. 'At bedrock', he concluded, 'it is an unhappy accident which placed two 
such deeply different peoples within a common frontier and, in my view, trouble was 
inevitable . . . the gap could only have been narrowed. It could never have been 
closed' (440). 
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influence which members of the Commonwealth can exercise on a country's behaviour . . . '. See David 
Goldsworthy, op cif, part II, 259 n 4. 
72 Details of compensation schemes for British officials then serving in the Sudan can be found in FO 
371/102767- 71. 
73 FO 3711102757 no 417, Grafftey Smith to Alien, 15 Mar 1953. 
74 PREM 11/544, FO tels no 513 & 533, 10 & 16 April1953. 
75 FO 371/108311, no 2, Riches despatch no 10 to Eden, 22 Jan 1954, 'Sudan: Annual Review for 1953'. 
76 FO 371/113730, nos 14 & 15, R W Bailey to T E Bromley, 16 Feb 1955 and Bromley, 'Brief for Lord 
Reading. Nile Waters', 18 Feb 1955. 
77 FO 3711113735, no 121, F RH Murray to CA E Shuckburgh, 29 July 1955. 
78 FO 3711113783, nos 23-25, Adams tels no 139 & 140, 16 Aug 1955, and Luce tel no 202, 16 Aug 1955. 
FO 3711113784, no 27, FO tels no 1676 & 1685, 18 & 19 Aug 1955. 
79 Compare this with Trevelyan's later account that Salah Salim came to him with news before the 
governor-general had received it. Trevelyan's memoirs refer to the meeting on 22 August reported in 395. 
Helm had still not returned to Khartoum by this time. H Trevelyan, The Middle East in revolution 
(London, 1970), p 18. 
80 Nutting claims that Salah Salim's proposal horrified Nasir as 'it would strike at the very fundamentals 
of his policy to invite Britain to prolong her military presence in the Sudan by so much as twenty-four 
xcii NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
hours' . Salah was made the scapegoat for the failure of Egypt's policy in the Sudan and dismissed. A 
Nutting, Nassser (London & NY, 1972), p 113. 
81 The anti-colonialist Labour MP Fenner Brockway also argued that the Sudanese parliament be 
allowed to reach 'a decision on the issue of the Sudan's future international status without the cost and 
delay of a plebiscite or further general election'. FO 371/113617, no 186, 'Text of parliamentary question 
by Mr. Fenner Brockway for reply on Oct 31 [1955]' . 
82 According to Nutting's account of these events (which, on the whole, is better corroborated by the 
official record than many other published memoirs of this period), 'the net result of this unfortunate piece 
of double-dealing by Whitehall was to deepen still further Nasser's inherent distrust of British policies and 
methods'. Nutting, op cit, pp 114-115. 
83 Nasir commented that during this crisis £6000 was the going rate for buying a Sudanese MP's 
allegience, and that al-Azhari still had at his disposal the remains of earlier Egyptian disbursements. FO 
371/113626, no 410, Trevelyan to Schuckburgh, 15 Dec 1955 (to which Schuckburgh added his own 
marginal note, 'Nasser has a sense of humour-it is partly this which endears him to so many visitors'). In 
later years Nasser told both Trevelyan and Nutting that his Sudan experience 'taught him that bribery was 
a bad method of conducting policy because the people who took bribes were interested in the money and 
not in the policy'. Nutting, op cit, p 113. 
84 A number of southern MPs were then under investigation for their possible role in the disturbances 
(Woodward, op cif, p 155). It was later alleged that for this reason they voted with the government and the 
northern Sudanese majority for independence without pressing for greater constitutional guarantees for 
the South. 0 Albino, The Sudan: a southern viewpoint (London, 1970), pp 38- 39. 
85 FO 371/113740, no 327, Trevelyan tel no 1918, 14 Dec 1955. 
86 FO 371/ll3741, no 346, FO tel no 480, 20 Dec 1955; and FO 371/119059, no 2, FO tel no 540, 30 Dec 
1955. 
87 J S R Duncan, The Sudan: a record of achievement (Edinburgh, 1952). 
[1-11] xciii 
Summary of Documents: Part I 
Chapter 1 
Anticipating the post-war settlement, May 1942-Jan 1946 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1942 
1 Sir M Lampson (Cairo) 22May Despatch no 536 on Sudanese 1 
to Mr Eden Graduates' Congress, +Enclosures: 
despatches from gov-gen 
2 PS Scrivener (FO) 26May Minute, 'The Sudan' on the A-E treaty 9 
to Sir M Peterson 
3 D S Laskey & 12-13 Minutes on Sudanese self-government 11 
PS Scrivener (FO) June 
4 D Newbold (Khtm) 17 July Letter from civ sec to pres GC recording 11 
to Ibrahim Ahmad outcome of talk concerning the future 
(Khtm) role of the educated classes in the Sudan 
5 lbrahim Ahmad (Khtm) 23 July Letter from Congress pres to civ sec 12 
to D Newbold (Khtm) (reply to 4) on plans to increase the 
Sudanese share of responsibility in 
administration 
6 Egyptian Dept, FO 1 Sept Memo, 'The Sudan' on the A-E treaty 13 
7 D Newbold (Khtm) 10 Sept 'Note on further association of 16 
to Gov-Gen's Council Sudanese with local and central 
government in the Sudan' 
8 D Newbold (Khtm) 19 Sept Letter (reply to 5) repeating govt 21 
to lbrahim Ahmad (Khtm) criticisms of Congress's activities 
9 D Newbold (Khtm) 21 Sept 'The Graduate's [sic] Congress directive 22 
to all govs & statement': instructions on how to deal 
heads of depts with members of Congress 
10 Sir M Lampson (Cairo) 11 Oct Letter forwarding 4, 5, 7-9; commenting 26 
to Sir A Cadogan (FO) on Congress and development of 
Sudanese political activity 
11 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 18 Nov Letter on the creation of an Advisory 27 
to Sir M Lampson Council and the Sudan's future 
(Cairo) 
xciv SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [12-25] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1942 
12 Sir H Lampson (Cairo) 1 Dec Letter forwarding 11 and commenting 29 
to Sir A Cadogan (FO) on the Sudan's future in A-E relations 
1943 
13 Sir M Lampson (Cairo) 10 Apr Despatch no 343 reporting legislation 30 
to Mr Eden for the creation of an Advisory Council 
for the Northern Sudan, + Enclosure: 
despatch from gov-gen 
14 F D Rugman (Khtm) 8Nov Letter from acting gov-gen reporting 34 
toT A Shone (FO) reaction of public opinion in the Sudan 
to the Advisory Council legislation 
15 D Newbold (Khtm) 24 Nov Letter on Egypt and the status of the 35 
to G ER Sandars (SA) Sudan, +Minutes by W E Beckett & P 
S Scrivener (FO) 
16 Lord Killearn (Cairo) 29 Dec Letter forwarding 15 and commenting 37 
to Sir A Cadogan (FO) on Egypt's future claims to the Sudan 
and Sudanese aspirations 
1944 
17 Mustafa al-Nahhas (EG) 1 Jan Letter accusing SG of attempting to 39 
to Sir H Huddleston divide the Sudan in two [Extract] 
(Khtm) 
18 E S Atiyah (Khtm) 12 Jan Note on a talk with lbrahim Ahmad 39 
[Extract] 
19 P S Scrivener (FO) Mar Note on tour of the Sudan [Extract] 41 
20 E S Atiyah (Khtm) 5 Mar Note on talks between Scrivener & SAR 42 
&SAM [Extract] 
21 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 18May Letter (reply to 17) refuting accusations 44 
to Mustafa al-Nahhas of an attempt to divide the Sudan 
(EG) [Extract] 
22 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 7 Dec Despatch no 128 requesting grant to 45 
to Lord Killearn Cordon Memorial College 
(Cairo) 
23 SPIS, no 44 12 Dec Report on Congress elections 48 
24 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 24 Dec Despatch no 132 on the Sudan's future 50 
to Lord Killearn Nile Waters requirements 
(Cairo) 
1945 
25 Lord Killearn (Cairo) 7 Feb Letter on the Sudan's future place in 54 
to Sir H Huddleston A-E relations [Extract] 
(Khtm) 
[26--40] ANTICIPATING THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT XCV 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1945 
26 SPIS, no 46 12 Feb Congress's platform [Extract] 55 
27 Research Dept, FO 13 Feb Memo summarising present position of 58 
Lake Tsana negotiations 
28 P S Scrivener, 5-16 Minutes on the case for a development 62 
P M Broadmead & Mar grant to the Sudan and the consequences 
R J Campbell (FO) of the Treasury's refusal to support it 
29 Secretariat (Khtm) 27 Mar Letter on the Jonglei canal, + 67 
to Chancery (Cairo) Enclosure: despatch by F D Rugman 
(FS), 'Jonglei canal scheme' 
30 J W Robertson (Khtm) 8Apr Letter on the foundation of the Umma 70 
to C E Fouracres (SA) party, +Enclosures: communications 
from the Umma party to the SG 
31 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 12Apr Despatch no 55 (reply to 26) on the 76 
to Lord Killearn Sudan's future place in A-E relations 
(Cairo) 
32 Sir R Campbell (FO) 23 Apr Letter on the Nile Waters 77 
to Lord Killearn (Cairo) 
33 SPIS, no 48 May Report of SAR's disclaimer of 79 
monarchical ambitions [Extract] 
34 AM Hankin (SA) 8 June Letter reporting al-Azhari's meeting 79 
to J W Robertson with al-Nahhas 
(Khtm) 
35 Ismail al-Azhari (Khtm) 23Aug Letter relaying Congress's demand for 80 
to the British & independence of the Sudan and union 
Egyptian PMs with Egypt 
36 J W Robertson (Khtm) 25Aug Letter on the United Parties Committee, 83 
to E C Haselden (SA) +Enclosure: United Parties Committee 
dft report to Congress 
37 Sir H Huddleston 12 Sept Memo, 'The future of the Sudan',+ 88 
(Khtm) Annex: 'Financial aid for the Sudan' 
38 R L Speaight (Cairo) 15 Sept Letter giving reasons why a statement 95 
to P S Scrivener (FO) on the Southern Sudan would be 
undesirable, +Enclosures: supporting 
documents on the Southern Sudan 
[Extract] 
39 W N Allan (London) 18 Sept Minutes of a meeting on the Nile Waters 100 
held in London 
40 W H Luce (Khtm) 24 Sept Dft statement to the Advisory Council 101 
to P S Scrivener (FO) for the Northern Sudan on consultation 
prior to any change in the Sudan's 
constitutional status 
xcvi SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [41-53] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1945 
41 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 17Nov Despatch no 129 on the Sudan's 101 
to Lord Killearn position on the Jonglei canal 
(Cairo) 
42 J C Penney (Khtm) 26 Nov Letter on Congress elections 103 
to E C Haselden (SA) 
43 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 8 Dec Despatch no 134 on Congress, +Annex: 108 
to Lord Killearn letter (reply) from al-Azhari to gov-gen 
(Cairo) 
44 J W Robertson (Khtm) 23 Dec Letter (reply to 43) concerning the 114 
to Ismail ai-Azhari United Parties agreement 
(Khtm) 
45 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 3 Jan Despatch no 2 on Sudan's Nile Waters 115 
to Lord Killearn needs 
(Cairo) 
46 SPIS, no 55 17 Jan Report on SAM and SAR [Extract] 119 
Chapter 2 
The Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations and the Sudan protocol, 
Jan 1946-Mar 1947 
1946 
47 Mr Bevin 18 Jan Cabinet memo, 'Revision of the 120 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1946', + 
Annexes [Extract] 
48 R C Mayall (SA) 29 Jan Letter on Cordon Memorial College and 122 
toPS Scrivener (FO) the Inter-University Council [Extract] 
49 R J Bowker (Cairo) 18 Feb Despatch no 241 on Sudanisation, + 124 
to Mr Bevin Enclosure: J W Robertson's note on 
Sudanisation 
so J W Robertson (Khtm) 20 Feb Circular letter on Muslim Brothers, + 127 
to all govs Enclosure: confidential report on 'el 
ikhwan el muslimin' 
51 R J Bowker (Cairo) 11 Mar Despatch no 354 on method of 131 
to Mr Bevin consultation of Sudanese, + Enclosure: 
despatch and Annex from gov-gen 
52 P S Scrivener (FO) 18Mar Letter (reply to 49) commenting on 135 
toR J Bowker (Cairo) Sudanisation proposals 
53 RC Mayall (SA) 25 Mar Letter (response to 51) on need for 135 
toPS Scrivener (FO) ascertaining opinion in Southern Sudan 
[Extract] 
[54-66] THE ANGL0-EGYPTIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SUDAN PROTOCOL xcvii 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
54 HofCDebs 26Mar Bevin's statement on the Sudan 137 
55 Sir J Hall (Uganda) 27Mar Tel objecting to plans for the 138 
to Mr Hall (CO) construction of a dam at Lake Albert 
56 Mr Bevin 28Mar Tel (reply to 51) on consultation of 139 
toR J Bowker (Cairo) Sudanese 
57 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 13Apr Tel commenting on J W Robertson's 140 
to Sir H Huddleston principles for Sudanisation (49) 
(Khtm) 
58 Sir H Huddleston 17 Apr Address delivered at the opening session 141 
(Khtm) of the Advisory Council for the Northern 
Sudan [Extract] 
59 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 12-27 Letter on the qualities needed in the 142 
toR G Howe (FO) Apr next gov-gen of Sudan, +Minutes by P 
S Scrivener & E A Chapman Andrews 
(FO) 
60 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 22 Apr Despatch no 546 reporting gov-gen's 144 
to Mr Bevin views on the treaty revision, consultation 
with Sudanese and Sudanisation 
61 J W Robertson (Khtm) 23Apr Circular letter to all govs and heads of 147 
depts on the political situation in the 
Sudan 
62 P S Scrivener (FO) 30 Apr Letter (reply to 55) concerning 148 
to AB Cohen (CO) international treaty obligations 
regarding possible construction of a 
dam in Uganda 
63 AB Cohen (CO) 15 May Letter (reply to 62) on the need to 149 
to P S Scrivener (FO) obtain further data on area under 
consideration for the proposed dam at 
LakeAlbert 
64 Lord Stansgate 4July Note, 'Anglo-Egyptian treaty 150 
to Mr Attlee negotiations, position on 4th July 1946', 
+Minutes by T L Rowan & Attlee 
[Extract] 
65 Lord Stansgate 23 July Tel reporting Sidqi Pasha's initial 152 
to Mr Attlee reaction to the British dft of the Sudan 
protocol [Extract) 
66 Cabinet meeting lAug Conclusions on resistance to Egyptian 153 
CM 76(46) claims to sovereignty over the Sudan 
[Extract) 
xcviii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [67-81] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
67 Lord Stansgate 1 Aug Tellisting options for resolving the 154 
to Mr Attlee issue of Egyptian claims to sovereignty 
over the Sudan 
68 Lord Stansgate 2Aug Tel on Egyptian counter-proposals 156 
to Mr Attlee concerning the Sudan 
69 Mr Attlee 4Aug Tel (reply to 65), refusal to admit 157 
to Lord Stansgate Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan 
[Extract] 
70 Mr Attlee 10Aug Tel (reply to 68), on the legal issue of 157 
to Lord Stansgate sovereignty 
71 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 10Aug Despatch no 927 reporting Umma Party 159 
toMr Bevin demand for independence of the Sudan, 
+Annex: letter from sec, Umma Party 
to PMs of Britain and Egypt [Extract] 
72 Lord Stansgate (Alex) 27 Aug Tel reporting Sidqi's arguments for 162 
to Mr Bevin recognising Egyptian sovereignty over 
the Sudan [Extract] 
73 Sir 0 Sargent (FO) 27 Aug Minute proposing alternative dfts of the 163 
to Mr Bevin Sudan protocol 
74 Mr Bevin (Paris) 29Aug Memo on the Sudan, sovereignty and 164 
self-determination 
75 Mr Bevin (Paris) 29Aug Tel (reply to 73), on possible 165 
to Sir 0 Sargent (FO) consequences of recognising Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Sudan 
76 Mr Bevin (Paris) 29Aug Tel forwarding redraft of Sudan 166 
to Sir 0 Sargent (FO) protocol 
77 Sir 0 Sargent (FO) 30Aug Tel (reply to 76), relaying FO and gov- 167 
to Mr Bevin (Paris) gen's comments on proposed redraft of 
Sudan protocol 
78 Mr Bevin (Paris) 31 Aug Tel explaining principles behind redraft 168 
to Lord Stansgate of protocol 
(Alex) 
79 Mr Bevin (Paris) 31 Aug Tel forwarding text of redrafted Sudan 169 
to Lord Stansgate protocol [Extract] 
(Alex) 
80 Mr Bevin (Paris) 5 Sept Tel on redraft of Sudan protocol 170 
to Lord Stansgate [Extract] 
(Alex) 
81 Lord Stansgate (Alex) 28 Sept Tel conveying text of Egyptian reply to 171 
to Mr Bevin British dft protocol [Extract] 
[82-96] THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SUDAN PROTOCOL xcix 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
82 SPIS, no 59 Oct Report on Umma Party statements 172 
about treaty negotiations [Extract] 
83 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 3 Oct Tel reporting Sidqi's interpretation of 173 
to FO sovereignty 
84 FO 50ct Minutes of meeting between Bevin and 173 
British treaty delegation in Paris 
[Extract] 
85 J W Robertson (London) 90ct Letter relaying gov-gen's and civ sec's 174 
to G E Hancock reactions to dft Sudan protocol 
(Khtm) 
86 Sir R Wingate 11 Oct Letter from former gov-gen of Sudan 177 
to Mr Bevin explaining origins of Egyptian 
sovereignty over Sudan 
87 FO 18 Oct Minutes of first meeting between Bevin 177 
and Egyptian PM in London [Extract] 
88 FO 19 Oct Minutes of second meeting between 180 
Bevin and Egyptian PM in Lolldon, + 
Annex [Extract] 
89 FO 23 Oct Minutes of third meeting between Bevin 184 
and Egyptian PM in London [Extract] 
90 Mr Bevin 23 Oct Memo on the A-E treaty negotiations 187 
for Cabinet Defence [Extract] 
Committee 
91 Cabinet Defence 24 Oct Minutes on treaty negotiations, + 187 
Committee meeting Annex: minute by Lord Jowitt (lord 
chancellor) on sovereignty [Extract] 
92 FO 24 Oct Minutes of fourth meeting between 192 
Bevin and Egyptian PM in London, + 
Annexes [Extract] 
93 FO 25 Oct Minutes of final meeting between Bevin 195 
and Egyptian PM in London [Extract] 
94 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 31 Oct Tel transmitting text of public 195 
toFO statement on Sudan protocol 
95 J W Robertson (Khtm) 31 Oct Circular letter explaining state of treaty 196 
to all govs & heads negotiations 
of depts 
96 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 3Nov Tel reporting Sudanese reaction to 198 
to Mr Attlee & Mr Sudan protocol 
Bevin 
c SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [97-114] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
97 Mr Attlee 5 Nov Tel (reply to 96) commenting on 199 
to Sir H Huddleston Sudanese reaction 
(Khtm) 
98 J W Robertson (Khtm) 5Nov Aide memoire on Sudanese political 200 
reaction to treaty negotiations 
99 FO 7Nov Note (translation): Sidqi's 206 
interpretation of the Sudan protocol to 
the Egyptian treaty delegation 
100 Mr Bevin (NY) 8Nov Tel critical of attitude of Sudan govt 209 
to Mr Attlee officials 
101 Sir 0 Sargent (FO) 9Nov Minute on changed political 210 
to Mr Attlee circumstances for Sudan administrators 
102 Sir H Huddleston (Khtm) 9Nov Letter reporting political situation in 211 
to Mr Attlee the Sudan, + Enclosure 
103 Mr Attlee 11 Nov Tel conveying and commenting upon 213 
to Mr Bevin (NY) contents of 102 [Extract] 
104 Mr Bevin (NY) 12 Nov Tel (reply to 103) commenting on 215 
to Mr Attlee political situation in the Sudan 
105 Sir H Huddleston 12 Nov Notes for meeting with M of S on 216 
to Mr McNeil (FO) political situation in the Sudan 
106 Sir H Huddleston 13 Nov Letter on political situation in the 217 
to Mr McNeil (FO) Sudan 
107 Sir H Huddleston 13 Nov Letter proposing visit of SAR to London 217 
to Mr McNeil (FO) 
108 Cabinet meeting 14Nov Conclusions on the Sudan protocol 218 
CM 96(46)1 
109 Sir H Huddleston 15 Nov Note on measures to be taken to regain 219 
Sudanese confidence 
110 Sir H Huddleston 18Nov Note on propaganda to be undertaken 220 
in the Sudan 
111 Mr Attlee 18Nov Memo on the A-E treaty negotiations 220 
intended for Cabinet, +Annexes 
[Extract] 
112 J W Robertson (Khtm) 21 Nov Circular letter on the presentation of 225 
to all govs & the treaty negotiations in the Sudan 
heads of depts 
113 R J Bowker (Cairo) 21 Nov Letter on major crisis in treaty 226 
to P S Scrivener (FO) negotiations 
114 FO 29 Nov Record of an interview of SAR with Mr 227 
Attlee 
[115-129) THE ANGLO-EGYPT!AN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SUDAN PROTOCOL ci 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
115 Mr Attlee 30 Nov Letter reaffirming right of the Sudanese 232 
to Sir H Huddleston to independence 
116 Lord Stansgate 2 Dec Record of a meeting with SAR and 233 
advisers 
117 FO 5 Dec Record of a conversation between Mr 236 
McNeil and SAR 
118 Sir 0 Sargent (FO) 6 Dec Aide-memoire on the interpretation of 238 
to Amr Pasha (EEL) the Sudan protocol, +Annex [Extract) 
119 R J Bowker (Cairo) 10 Dec Tel giving details of Sidqi's resignation 240 
to FO 
120 Lord Stansgate 10 Dec Note on the prospect of successfully 241 
to Mr Attlee concluding treaty negotiations 
121 R J Bowker (Cairo) 14 Dec Tel relaying text of gov-gen's statement 242 
toFO to the Sudanese 
122 R J Bowker (Cairo) 17 Dec Tel reporting al-Nuqrashi's statement 243 
to FO on the unity of the Nile Valley to the 
Egyptian Chamber of Deputies 
123 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 23 Dec Tel reporting al-Nuqrashi 's objection to 244 
to Mr Bevin the gov-gen's appointment of a 
Sudanese to the post of Grand Qadi of 
the Sudan 
124 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 24 Dec Tel reporting al-Nuqrashi's position on 246 
toMr Bevin the Sudan 
125 MrBevin 28 Dec Tel (reply to 124) restating HMG's 249 
to Sir R Campbell position on the Sudan 
(Cairo) 
1947 
126 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 2 Jan Tel on necessity of making a firm stand 250 
to Mr Bevin on the right of Sudanese self-
determination [Extract) 
127 Cabinet meeting 6 Jan Conclusion to risk a breakdown in 251 
cc 2(47)8 treaty negotiations over the Sudan's 
right to self-determination [Extract) 
128 Sir R Howe (FO) 15 Jan Letter on the distinction between 'self- 252 
to Sir R Campbell government' and 'independence' in 
(Cairo) HMG's colonial policy [Extract] 
129 Lord Stansgate 8-28 Letter and memo on current state of 253 
to Mr Bevin Feb treaty negotiations, +Minutes by D M H 
Riches, D S Fox and WE Beckett (FO) 
[Extract] 
cii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [130-141] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1947 
130 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 3 Mar Tel reporting text of Nuqrashi's 257 
to MrBevin statement breaking off treaty 
negotiations 
131 Sir R Howe (FO) 30Mar Minute on Bevin's instructions for an 258 
approach to King Faruq 
Chapter 3 
Preparations for self-government, Apr 1947-Dec 1950 
1947 
132 D M H Riches & 27 Apr- Minutes on the Southern Sudan 260 
D W Lascelles (FO) 28May 
133 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 20May Despatch no 440 on the dilemma of 262 
to Mr Bevin excluding Egypt from administration of 
the Sudan while admitting sovereignty 
134 J W Robertson (Khtm) 29 July Civ sec's recommendations on the first 264 
report of the Sudan Administration 
Conference, +Annex: resolution of 
Gov-Gen's Council [Extract] 
135 Gov-Gen's Office (Khtm) 30 July Minutes of meeting between gov-gen 266 
to FO and SAR, +Annexes: translation of 
letter from Independence Front to SAR 
& memo by sayyid Siddiq, +Minutes by 
C Howson and D M H Riches (FO) 
136 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 8Aug Letter relaying first impressions of the 273 
to Sir 0 Sargent (FO) Sudan [Extract] 
137 D W Lascelles (FO) 16Aug Minutes of meeting with Umma 276 
delegation to the Security Council 
138 Sir 0 Sargent (FO) 2 Sept Dft Cabinet paper recommending action 277 
in the Sudan to follow Security Council 
decision on A-E dispute 
139 D M H Riches (FO) 29-30 Minutes on Egyptian rejection of 279 
Oct proposed changes to Sudan's 
constitution [Extract] 
140 SPIS, no 5 24Nov Report on Sudanese reaction to 280 
Anglo-Egyptian dispute in the UN 
[Extract] 
141 Amr Pasha (EEL) 25Nov 'Note on the recommendations of the 283 
to Mr Bevin Sudan Administration Conference 
embodying the results of the study made 
by the Royal Egyptian Government' 
[Extract] 
[142-155] PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT ciii 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1947 
142 D W Lascelles (FO) 28Nov Despatch no 818 on the importance to 288 
to Sir R Campbell the Sudan of HMG's participation in the 
(Cairo) Lake Tsana negotiations 
143 J W Robertson (Khtm) 9 Dec Letter to chief secretary, Kenya on 290 
to J D Rankine administration of the Ilemi Triangle 
(Kenya) 
144 D W Lascelles (FO) 9 Dec Minute, 'Egyptian reaction to 293 
to Mr Bevin Sudanization programme' [Extract] 
145 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 14 Dec Letter (reply to 140) criticising Egyptian 295 
to Sir 0 Sargent (FO) rejection of Sudan constitutional reforms 
1948 
146 E A Chapman Andrews 6 Jan Tel reporting gov-gen's stance on 297 
(Cairo) further negotiations with Egypt 
to Sir R Campbell 
(FO) 
147 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 6 Jan Letter (reply to 141) responding 298 
to Nuqrashi Pasha informally to Egyptian note on Sudan 
(EG) Administration Conference, + 'aide 
memo ire' 
148 EA Chapman-Andrews 7 Jan Tel reporting on gov-gen's meeting with 301 
(Cairo) Egyptian PM 
to Sir R Campbell (FO) 
149 G L McDermott (FO) 8 Jan Notes on a meeting discussing position 303 
of Sudan in treaty negotiations [Extract] 
150 FO 10 Jan Minutes of discussion with Bevin on 306 
Sudan constitutional reform [Extract] 
151 D W Lascelles (FO) 15 Jan Letter (reply to 140), responding to 308 
to Amr Pasha (EEL) Egyptian criticisms of the Sudan 
Administration Conference 
152 Secretariat (Khtm) 5 Feb 'Note on Sudan railways strike' 309 
153 Secretariat (Khtm) 17 Feb 'Executive Council and Legislative 312 
Assembly ordinance. Explanatory note', 
+Minute by G L McDermott (FO) 
154 G G Fitzmaurice (FO) 11 Mar Letter asking advice on introduction of 314 
to Sir H Shawcross constitutional reforms, +Minute by W 
(atty-gen) E Beckett (FO) [Extract] 
155 A Shawqi (EEL) 11 Mar Letter from Egyptian charge d'affairs 316 
toMr Bevin (reply to 151) rejecting Sudan 
government ordinance (153) [Extract] 
civ SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [156-171] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1948 
156 FO 12 Mar Minutes of meeting between Mr Bevin 318 
and Sir R Howe 
157 Sir H Shawcross 17 Mar Letter (reply to 154) concerning 322 
(atty-gen) restrictions on gov-gen's ability to 
toW E Beckett (FO) institute constitutional reforms 
158 SPIS, no 2 21 Mar Report on the railway strike [Extract] 324 
159 SPIS, no 3 19 Apr Report on the railway strike [Extract] 325 
160 Amr Pasha (EEL) 19Apr Tel relaying text of proposal for Egyptian 326 
to EA Chapman- participation in constitutional reforms 
Andrews (FO) 
161 Mr Bevin 1 May Letter (reply to 160) welcoming 328 
to Amr Pasha (EEL) Egyptian participation in Sudanese 
constitutional reforms 
162 G L Clutton (FO) 2 June Minute, 'Anglo-Egyptian conversations 329 
on the Sudan' 
163 FO 22 June Minutes of departmental meeting on 331 
Nile Waters 
164 FO 17 Sept Minutes of inter-departmental meeting 333 
on Nile Waters with Sir J Hall & Sir R 
Camp bell 
165 SPIS, no 8 20 Oct Report on elections to the first 337 
Legislative Assembly 
166 G L Clutton, 3 Nov Minutes on Nile Waters and the Sudan 338 
M RWright& question 
Mr Bevin (FO) 
167 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 30 Nov Letter accusing Sudan government of 340 
to M R Wright (FO) creating obstacles towards an 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement 
168 G L Clutton, 14 Dec Minutes on Sudanese Executive Council 344 
MRWright& 
Mr Bevin (FO) 
169 Secretariat (Khtm) 15 Dec Note on Dr Muhammed Adam Adham 346 
and the Black Bloc 
1949 
170 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 4 Jan Letter on the political views of SAR, + 348 
to Sir 0 Sargent (FO) Annex: note on SAR's interview with the 
gov-gen, +Minute by G L Clutton (FO) 
171 G L Clutton & 3-4 Minutes on Nile Waters 352 
Sir 0 Sargent (FO) Feb 
[172-188] PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT CV 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1949 
172 E A Chapman-Andrews 9 Feb Despatch no 89 on Egyptian proposals 354 
(Cairo) concerning Nile Waters, +Annex: 
to Mr Bevin Egyptian aide memoire 
173 G L Clutton & 15 Mar Minutes on trades union legislation in 356 
Mr Bevin (FO) the Sudan 
174 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 9 Apr Savingram no 76 on the participation of 358 
to FO the Sudan in Nile Waters projects 
175 M N F Stewart & 23Apr Minutes on proposal to incorporate 360 
SirE Beckett (FO) Western Eritrea into the Sudan 
176 E A Chapman-Andrews 4May Memo on recent visit to the Sudan 362 
(Cairo) [Extract] 
177 A L Chick (Khtm) 7May Note on an Executive Council 368 
discussion of Nile Waters 
178 D Maitland (FO) 16 May Minute on the Owen Falls dam and 369 
to Mr Bevin Equatorial Nile projects 
179 Sir J Robertson (Khtm) 16 May Letter reporting on conference 371 
to M N F Stew art (FO) discussing trade union ordinances 
180 G L Clutton (FO) 24 June Minute on the strained relations between 372 
the embassy in Cairo and the Sudan govt 
181 G L Clutton (FO) 19 July Minute, 'Lake Tana negotiations' 374 
182 FO 9Aug Minutes of departmental meeting to 376 
discuss the Sudan [Extract] 
183 Secretariat (Khtm) 31Aug Letter on famine in the Sudan 376 
to Africa Dept, FO 
184 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 1 Dec Letter evaluating political scene in the 379 
to Sir W Stang (FO) Sudan, +Minute by R H G Edmonds 
1950 
185 D M cLean (Cairo) 15 Jan Letter on lack of evidence of communist 382 
to Sir J Robertson infiltration in Sudan 
(Khtm) 
186 RAllen (FO) 2 Mar Minute on Egyptian obstruction of Nile 383 
Waters negotiations with Ethiopia 
187 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 8Mar Letter on Umma party proposals to 384 
to Sir W Strang (FO) accelerate self-govt and govt plans to 
expand election rules, +Minute by R H 
G Edmonds (FO) 
188 Secretariat (Khtm) 11 Mar 'Report on the Southern provinces' 387 
toFO 
cvi SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [189-200] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1950 
189 Sir R Campbell (Cairo) 22May Letter on Egyptian strategy of 391 
to M R Wright (FO) obstructing Lake Tsana scheme to obtain 
recognition of sovereignty over Sudan 
190 Sir R Stevenson (Cairo) 25Aug Despatch no 349 on Egyptian M of S's 391 
to Mr Bevin proposals for a transitional form of self-
govt 
191 Sir R Stevenson (Cairo) 31Aug Tel on discussions with Egyptian 396 
to FO foreign minister on Sudanese self-govt 
192 RAllen (FO) 21 Sept Minute on Egyptian willingness to 399 
to M R Wright (FO) proceed with Nile Waters negotiations 
193 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 28 Sept Letter (reply) commenting on proposals 400 
to Sir W Strang (FO) in 190 and 191 
194 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 5 Oct Letter replying to proposals in 191 404 
to MrBevin 
195 M N F Stewart (FO) 60ct Minutes of discussion with Sir R Howe 406 
on future of Sudan 
196 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 17Nov Tel asking for instructions should EG 408 
to Sir W Strang (FO) act on King's instructions to end the 
condominium 
197 Sir R Stevenson (Cairo) 21 Nov Letter commenting on 193, +Minute by 409 
to Sir W Strang (FO) RH G Edmonds 
198 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 14 Dec Tels on Egyptian protest about self-govt 412 
to FO debate in Legislative Assembly and SG's 
reply 
199 FO 15 Dec Note of statement made by Mr Bevin at 413 
his meeting with Salah al-Oin [Extract] 
200 Sir R Howe (Khtm) 17 Dec Letter on self-govt debate in Legislative 416 
to Sir W Strang (FO) Assembly, +Enclosures: memo by 
Abdallah Khalil, petition by tribal chiefs 
and notables, memo by gov-gen on self-
govt debate 
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The Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899 
[1] 1 
1 FO 371131587, no 2664 22 May 1942 
[Sudanese Graduates' Congress]: despatch no 536 from Sir M 
Lampson to Mr Eden. Enclosures: despatches from Sir H Huddleston 
I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from the Governor-
General of the Sudan, together with its enclosures, regarding the Sudan Graduates' 
Congress. 
2. The oriental counsellor1 has informed Nahas Pasha verbally through Amin 
Pasha Osman of the contents of item (1) of the memorandum submitted by the 
Sudanese Graduates' Congress and of the sense of the first paragraph of the reply 
sent to them by the civil secretary. At the same time, he mentioned to Amin Pasha 
the appointment by the congress of the Cairo Committee, to which reference is made 
in paragraph 2 of the despatch, and warned him that it would be advisable that the 
Egyptian Government Departments should refuse to have any official contacts with 
the members of the committee. He suggested that these irresponsible activities of 
the congress might prove as embarrassing to the Egyptians as to ourselves. 
3. It is of interest to observe that leading Egyptians in the Sudan regarded the 
memorandum as a document drawn up under British inspiration with a view to 
eliminating Egypt's connexion with the Sudan. This view is also held in political 
circles in Egypt. 
Enclosure 1 to 1: despatch from Sir H Huddleston to Sir M Lampson, 12 May 1942 
I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information copies of a letter 
addressed to me by the president of the Sudanese Graduates' Congress on the 3rd 
April last and of a reply which has been sent to him by my civil secretary. The genesis 
of the Sudan Graduates' Congress was described in our despatch No. 98 of the 5th 
July, 1938. 
2. To assist your Excellency in obtaining a correct appreciation of the position of 
this congress as the first conscious expression of a nascent Sudanese nationalism, I 
am also enclosing a short memorandum on its past history and that of the movement 
it claims to represent. 
It will be seen that on more than one occasion the saner and more balanced 
members have allowed themselves to be rushed by younger extremists into an act 
which they had subsequent reason to regret. The letter enclosed is the greatest and, 
save for the appointment of the Cairo Committee mentioned in the memorandum, 
the latest of these errors. 
3. The passage of Sir Stafford Cripps through the Sudan on his way to India and 
the possibility of his casting a benevolent eye upon Sudanese aspirations on his 
return journey were the acknowledged reasons for the decision to "put the Sudan's 
case before the Government." The vigorous and successful part played by the Sudan 
Defence Force and Sudanese ancillary services, both military and civil, in the 
campaign against Italian East Africa and the subsequent further expansion of the 
Sudan Defence Force in Imperial interests, e.g., the garrisoning of Eritrea and other 
1 Sir W Smart, oriental secretary (later counsellor) at the embassy in Cairo, 1926- 1945. 
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projected uses, have also accelerated the already growing speculations of the 
educated Sudanese about the Sudan's share in the promises of the Atlantic Charter. 
4. The drafters of the letter ignore the long years of India's painful progress to 
her present status; nor can they claim to represent the whole of the educated class, 
itself a small, if powerful, because the only self-conscious, section of general public 
opinion. From information so far at my disposal it is clear that many sections even of 
the educated class, whether members of the congress or not, have been alarmed and 
indignant at the tone and content of the letter. There can be little doubt that were 
there any effective method of mobilising the general opinion of the backbone of the 
country-the tribal leaders and their people, the merchant class and the older and 
more stable executive officials-it would be found to be in robust condemnation of 
the document. It is also noteworthy that the letter was viewed unfavourably by the 
leading Egyptians in the Sudan, who regarded it as further proof of their suspicion 
that the congress was a Government-inspired movement designed to counteract 
Egyptian plans for the ultimate fusion of the Sudan with Egypt. To allay these 
suspicions the congress felt it necessary on their own volition to call upon the 
Egyptian Grand Kadi and Inspector-General of Irrigation2 and to give a reassuring 
explanation of the contents and purpose of their letter. The drafters have been scared 
by their own boldness and it is to be hoped that a period of sanity will supervene. Yet 
the letter is itself evidence of the evolution of a genuine Sudanese nationalist feeling 
which must be taken more and more into consideration by the Sudan Government in 
its domestic policy (even though the Government does not accept this particular 
body as the legitimate mouthpiece of Sudanese nationalism) and which must be 
recognised by His Majesty's Government as the preponderating factor under the 
treaty in post-war negotiations with Egypt. 
5. As for the immediate future, I enclose a copy of a directive which my civil 
secretary has addressed to all Governors and heads of departments. In brief, my 
attitude is that the onus is now on the congress to show evidence of its good faith by 
taking practical steps to put its house in order; and that, in such an event, the Sudan 
Government would not, if approached, withhold its advice. 
6. I may perhaps not unsuitably close this despatch by quoting a recent remark 
of the Sudan's leading personality, El Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman-el-Mahdi Pasha-
"Mter this war Egypt will claim the reward of her loyalty and her services. The loyalty 
of the Sudan has been greater than Egypt's, her services more direct. Do not again 
therefore reward Egypt at our expense, and do not forget that we also will claim our 
recompense." 
Enclosure 2 to 1: letter from Ibrahim Ahmad to Sir H Huddleston, 3 Apr 1942 
The Graduates' Congress has the honour to submit to your Excellency, in your 
capacity of representative of both the Government of His Majesty King George VI and 
of the Government of His Majesty King Farouk I, the following memorandum which 
expresses the desire of the Sudanese people at the present time:-
2 Sheikh Hasan Mamun, grand qadi of the Sudan, 1941- 1947; Abd al-Razik abd al-Qadir Bey, inspector-
general of the Egyptian Irrigation Department in the Sudan, 1941- 1943. 
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The world developments and the events of the present war have inspired the 
nations with a strong desire to assure humanitarian justice and the freedom of 
peoples; this has been expressed in the statements of British politicians and recorded 
in the agreements of democratic leaders. 
The Sudanese people, as one of the peoples who have co-operated with the British 
Empire since the outbreak of the war, is fully cognisant of its rights as a nation 
seeking life, after years spent under an orderly Government. The congress, which 
represents enlightened public opinion, and which is itself one of the "ripe fruits" of 
the condominium, feels its great responsibilities towards its country and all its 
countrymen. 
The congress, therefore, submits this memorandum, hoping that it will meet with 
the consideration it deserves and expecting that it will be welcome. The congress is 
confident that this memorandum expresses faithfully the inclinations and aspirations 
of this country:-
(1) The issue, on the first possible opportunity, by the British and Egyptian 
Governments, of a joint declaration, granting the Sudan, in its geographical 
boundaries, the right of self-determination, directly after this war; this right to be 
safeguarded by guarantees assuring full liberty of expression in connexion 
therewith; as well as guarantees assuring the Sudanese the right of determining 
their natural rights with Egypt in a special agreement between the Egyptian and 
Sudanese nations. 
(2) The formation of a representative body of Sudanese to approve the budget and 
the ordinances. 
(3) The formation of a Higher Educational Council, composed of a Sudanese 
majority, and the devoting of a minimum of 12 per cent. of the budget for 
education. 
(4) The separation of the judiciary from the Executive. 
(5) The abolition of ordinances on closed areas, and the lifting of restrictions 
placed on trade and on the movements of the Sudanese within the Sudan. 
(6) The promulgation of legislation defining Sudanese nationality. 
(7) The stopping of immigration, except within the limits agreed upon in the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. 
(8) The termination of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate contract at its expiration. 
(9) The carrying out of the principle of the welfare of the Sudanese and their 
priority to Government posts as follows:-
( a) By giving the Sudanese an opportunity to share effectively in ruling the 
country; this is to be attained by the appointment of Sudanese in posts of 
political responsibility, in all the main branches of the Government. 
(b) By limiting the appointments to Government posts to Sudanese. 
As regards posts for which it is necessary to appoint non-Sudanese, they shall be 
filled with persons serving on definite term contracts; in the meantime Sudanese 
to be trained to fill the posts at the expiration of the contract. 
(10) The Sudanese to be enabled to exploit the commercial, agricultural and 
industrial resources of the country. 
(11) The promulgation of an ordinance imposing on companies and commercial 
firms the obligation of reserving a reasonable proportion of their posts for the 
Sudanese. 
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(12) The cancellation of subventions to missionary schools and the unification of 
syllabus in the Northern and Southern Sudan. 
These are the requests which, if answered, we consider will satisfy the desires of 
the Sudanese at the present time. The congress looks forward to your help and hope 
to be fortunate enough to receive a reply indicating that these requests have been 
approved of and are being carried out. 
Enclosure 3 to 1: letter from D Newbold to Ibrahim Ahmad, 29 Apr 1942 
I am directed by his Excellency the Governor-General to inform you that he has read 
your memorandum dated the 3rd April, 1942. He observes that many of your 
requests directly concern the status and Constitution of the Sudan. This 
Constitution, based on the Condominium Agreement of 1899 and the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and implemented by the appropriate legislation, 
cannot be altered save by a joint act of the Condominium Powers. The Sudan 
Government is not prepared to discuss its revision with any body of persons. If, 
however, the Condominium Powers at any time decide to review the agreement or 
treaty, the Sudan Government would hope to consult responsible Sudanese opinion. 
The Government, however, can make no promises to any body of persons in the 
name of the Condominium Powers or in its own. 
You will further recollect that Sir A. Gillan,3 in his letter dated the 22nd May, 
1938, to the president of the Graduates' Congress stated that he would be prepared to 
receive communications from the congress on such matters as came within its 
purview, and he noted that the congress did not claim to represent the views of any 
but its own members. I must also ask you to re-read my letter to you dated the 30th 
October, 1940, and particularly paragraph 11,4 in which I stated that in claiming to 
represent all the Sudanese and in attempting to turn itself into a political national 
body, the Graduates' Congress not only could not retain the co-operation of 
Government but could not hope for continuance of recognition. By the very act of 
submitting the memorandum which is the subject of this letter, and by its wording, 
the congress has fallen into both these errors against which I warned it and has 
accordingly forfeited the confidence of Government. There can be no restoration of 
that confidence until the congress has so reorganised the direction of its affairs that 
the Government can rely on having its wishes respected and its warnings observed. 
For the above reasons his Excellency finds himself unable to accept your 
memorandum, which is therefore returned to you herewith. 
His Excellency desires me to add that he and his advisers are fully aware of the 
needs of the Sudan and of the natural and legitimate desire of the enlightened 
Sudanese for an increasing participation in the Government and development of 
their country. To this end the Sudan Government is constantly studying and 
carrying out plans for the closer association of the Sudanese with the direction of 
their affairs and for the general welfare and orderly development of this country and 
its people. 
3 Sir Angus Gillan, civil secretary, 1934-1939. For civil secretary to honorary secretary, Graduates' 
Congress, 22 May 1938 see National Records Office, Khartoum, Mise 1/98/1540, quoted in A A M Abu 
Hasabu, Factional conflict in the Sudanese nationalist movement 1918- 1948 (Khartoum, 1985) pp 86-87. 
4 Sir K D D Henderson, The making of the modem Sudan: the life and letters of Sir Douglas Newbold, 
KBE (London, 1953) p 538. 
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The congress, however, must realise that it is the duty and business of the Sudan 
Government alone, having paramount regard to is tutelary obligations to the people 
of the Sudan, and in consultation if need be with the Governments of the two 
partners in the condominium, to decide the pace at which this association and this 
development shall proceed. It is the earnest wish of the Government that the 
educated classes of the country should show themselves fitted and able to take their 
proper share in the administration of internal affairs, but any advance to such a 
position must be most seriously embarrassed and delayed unless the congress realise 
clearly once and for all that the Government must and will insist that the congress 
confine itself to the internal and domestic affairs of the Sudan and renounce any 
claim, real or implied, to be the mouthpiece of the whole country. 
In conclusion his Excellency desires me to say that he deeply regrets that you 
should have seen fit to take so hasty a step as the submission of this memorandum. 
Enclosure 4 to 1: memorandum on Sudanese nationalism and the Graduates' Congress 
The first expression of Sudanese nationalism was the violent Egyptian-inspired 
movement of 1919-24. The failure of this movement led to a re-orientation of 
national feeling under the slogan-"The Sudan for the Sudanese." 
The new nationalism aimed at autonomous development by peaceful means and in 
co-operation with the Sudan Government. The Graduates' Congress is its first 
organised expression. 
2. The growing political consciousness of the educated Sudanese was sharply 
stimulated by the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936. Sudanese 
Nationalists, while accepting the treaty, resented the fact that it had been concluded 
without any reference to the Sudanese themselves. They also resented the 
appearance of the Egyptians in the new guise of equal partners with the British, 
demanding not independence for Egypt and the Sudan as one entity, but equal rights 
with the British over the Sudan. They felt that it was up to them to show the 
condominium partners that the Sudan was no longer a passive body whose destiny 
could be shaped without reference to its own wishes. It was necessary to establish the 
existence of a corporate Sudanese national consciousness before the treaty came up 
for re-consideration after a period of twenty-five years and to form an organisation to 
be the focus and expression of this national feeling within the framework of the 
treaty and under the aegis of the Sudan Government. 
Since the welfare of the Sudanese was declared in the treaty to be the principal aim 
of the Condominium Government, the educated Sudanese felt they were entitled to 
share in its implementation. 
3. The first concrete idea of calling a general meeting of graduates of schools 
above elementary standard in order to elect a representative body was mooted in the 
summer of 1937 and the first meeting of congress, on the 12th February, 1938, was 
attended by just over 1,000 graduates (roughly one-fifth of the entire educated class). 
These elected a body of sixty to form a sort of parliament, and the sixty in turn 
elected an executive committee of fifteen. The aims of the congress as defined at its 
first meeting were:-
(i) To formulate and express a collective point of view representing graduate 
opinion. 
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(ii) To promote a national consciousness by combating partisanship and 
tribalism. 
(iii) To lay the foundation of sound national life by carrying out a programme of 
social reform. 
The first act of the new congress was to send a copy of its constitution to the 
Governor of Khartoum. The second, after lengthy deliberations and not without 
some trepidation, was the despatch of a letter to the civil secretary, on the 2nd May, 
1938, in which it was stated that the graduates were prompted by a sense of duty 
towards their country and by a desire to co-operate with the Government, "in such 
ways as may be opened to them" in furthering its welfare. 
They defined their duties as being concerned with:-
(i) Social reform and other internal matters lying outside the orbit of official 
Government concern. 
(ii) Matters of public interest lying within the scope of Government policy. 
They promised friendly co-operation and obedience to the law in the former 
sphere and expressed the hope that the Government would give consideration to 
their views and suggestions in the latter. They denied any claim to a position 
"prejudicial to that of important elements in the country," but claimed a peculiar 
position "as its only educated element." They expressed the hope that the 
Government would abandon its habit of taking the advice of individual educated 
Sudanese and instead consult them as a separate body. 
The civil secretary, in reply, noted their desires with sympathy, and promised 
careful consideration of any communications which he might receive from congress, 
on the definite understanding that "the congress was neither seeking formal 
recognition as a political body nor claiming to represent the views of any but its own 
members, but wished to be regarded as a semi-public organisation interested in 
philanthropic and public affairs." He also pointed out that the inclusion in its 
membership of a number of Government officials must preclude participation in any 
line of action likely to bring it into conflict with Government policy or with 
constitutional authority. 
4. The first public act of the new congress was to prove typical of future 
mistakes. It became involved, by pressure of extremist opinion amongst the younger 
Sudanese officials, in a controversy which arose in the summer of 1938 over the issue 
of revised regulations governing leave and Government cadres. Notes were submitted 
to the civil secretary, who replied that "in no circumstances could the Government 
allow such matters (i.e., the contractual relationship between itself and its officials) 
to be the subject of negotiation or discussion with the Graduates' Congress." At the 
same time measures were being taken, through the proper channels, to investigate 
the causes of complaint. This reply had a markedly depressing effect on the 
Committee of Fifteen, who took the view that the position of Sudanese in 
Government service was a matter of public interest, and not merely of contractual 
relationship, and that if this was to be the Government's attitude towards their 
submissions, congress might as well disband. However, the agitation died down and 
congress busied itself for some time with its own internal organisation. 
5. The annual general meeting of 1939 showed a considerable drop in attendance 
and subscribing membership, and the younger extremists began to agitate for bolder 
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action and younger representation on the committee. They were successful only in 
persuading it to send a stupid telegram to the Governor-General over a personal 
incident between the Sheikh of the Ulema and a British official in Omdurman. 
In April of that year the Committee of Fifteen submitted to the civil secretary a 
well-worded and reasonable memorandum containing recommendations for the 
reform of the Omdurman Maahad. Although this action was marred by the 
simultaneous publication of the memorandum in the vernacular press, it was 
generally regarded as the most concrete and useful thing congress had achieved to 
date, and the Government indicated its appreciation. 
A second memorandum, on education in the Sudan, was presented later in the 
year and was acknowledged by the civil secretary as "a constructive contribution to a 
problem vitally affecting the Sudan." 
Shortly afterwards the Committee of Fifteen accepted an informal Government 
invitation to nominate four persons to co-operate with nominated British officials in 
the foundation of the Sudan Cultural Centre. 
6. On the outbreak of war with Germany congress addressed a message of loyalty 
to the Governor-General and issued an appeal to the Sudanese people urging support 
of the Government and of the Allied cause. 
The extremists, however, were still restive at the Government's refusal to 
acknowledge the principle of collective consultation. They tried again, still 
unsuccessfully, to secure the election of an extremist committee in 1940, and the 
general feeling of lack of achievement to date caused a further drop in membership. 
The annual general meeting rejected proposals that:-
(i) Congress members should ask for the substitution of the word "Sudanese" for 
the tribal designation in their service dossiers; and 
(ii) Individual consultation of congress members should be banned. 
7. The visit of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ali Maher Pasha, in February 1940 
was made an opportunity for demonstrating congress solidarity at a tea-party in the 
Sudan Schools Club. The president delivered a carefully worded speech, in which he 
made it clear that the Sudanese did not regard themselves as Egyptians, but as a 
separate and autonomous entity that wished to develop along its own lines in co-
operation and friendship with Egypt. 
This meeting won congress a renewed prestige in the Sudan and convinced 
Egyptian opinion that it was the embryo of a genuine Sudanese Nationalist 
movement in which Egypt must take a sympathetic interest. 
It had the further effect of encouraging congress to use its Egyptian relations as a 
useful tactical means of obtaining great recognition from the Sudan Government. A 
request for financial assistance for various social projects addressed to "The Egyptian 
People through Ali Maher Pasha," and handed to Ali Maher before his departure, 
earned a severe reprimand from the civil secretary, who intimated that if congress 
continued to listen to its extremist element the Government might have to demand 
the withdrawal of its serving officials from membership and possibly dissolve 
congress altogether. In spite of this the congress maintained contact with Ali Maher 
by an exchange of telegrams on various occasions, suitable and otherwise. 
8. This rebuff was followed by an improvement in relations, and when Italy 
declared war on the Allies three senior members of the Committee of Fifteen were 
included in the assembly of notables and leaders summoned to hear the Governor-
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General read his proclamation on the 11th June. Elated by this recognition, the 
congress asked permission to broadcast a message from Omdurman, addressed to 
"The People of the Sudan." Permission was granted on condition that it should be 
addressed, not to The People of the Sudan, but to "Members and Friends of 
Congress." This was received badly; and as an indirect result the extremists later 
secured the defeat of the Committee of Fifteen for having agreed to co-operate with 
the Broadcasting Service in preparing its cultural programmes without specific 
recognition of the corporate entity of the congress. The new committee tried to 
impose a ban on any congress member broadcasting in his private capacity. It 
sponsored a suggestion in the press that no congress member should volunteer for 
national service without congress permission. It urged the inclusion of other classes 
of the community in order to make the congress truly national, and the adoption of a 
National Anthem and a National Flag. These activities culminated in the sending of a 
farewell telegram to Sir Stewart Symes5 "in the name of the whole country." 
In a letter dated the 30th October, 1940, the civil secretary drew attention to these 
breaches of the understanding on which Congress had been founded and announced 
the withdrawal of Government sympathy. This resulted in apologies, protestations of 
goodwill and promises of future good behaviour. Nevertheless, at the annual meeting 
in January 1941 the president6 boasted of having removed the grievances of certain 
students, settled a labour dispute and intervened with the Government on behalf of 
dismissed railway workers-on all of which issues he had, in fact, been severely 
reprimanded. He further added that he and the committee had succeeded in 
removing the "misapprehensions" apparent in the civil secretary's letter of the 30th 
October, 1940-a statement far removed from the truth. 
Fortunately, the new committee contained a fair proportion of senior and 
moderate graduates, who soon gave earnest of a desire to improve relations with the 
Government. It abandoned the obstructive attitude of its predecessor over 
broadcasting and launched an education day scheme, by which it hoped to win pubic 
approval without incurring Government hostility. It continued, however, to flirt with 
Egypt. 
9. During 1941 the number of subscribing members rose to the record figure of 1,390. 
The new president for 1942, Ibrahim Ahmed, was, however, a better and abler man that 
[sic] his predecessor and showed a welcome readiness to co-operate and to take advice. 
The programme for the New Year ranged over a wide field from education, village 
reform and co-operative societies, to the problem of the Southern Sudan and the 
question of Sudanese nationality. 
The education day scheme has been a considerable success and is regarded by the 
Sudan Government as the kind of effort into which congress energies should most 
desirably be canalised. All possible assistance has been given. 
10. It was therefore the more disturbing that this comparatively moderate 
committee with its enlightened president should have been stampeded into 
addressing to the Governor-General a letter containing extravagant and ill-
considered claims for immediate Sudanese autonomy after the war. Although as is 
usual, considerable fear of the consequences has supervened since the letter had 
been sent, and at least one of the drafters was prompt with verbal assurances that it 
did not mean what it said, nevertheless, in the interval between the receipt of the 
5 Sir Stewart Symes, governor-general of the Sudan, 1934-1940. 6 Ismail al-Azhari . 
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letter and the issue of a reply congress has again blundered by instituting a branch 
committee in Cairo without previous consultation with the Sudan Government. A 
warning letter on this subject has been addressed to the president and a copy is 
attached to this memorandum. 
Extract from circular note by D Newbold to all governors and all heads of 
department, 2 May 19427 
. . . 3. The following is for your guidance should your Mamurs, Sheikhs, 
Notables, Effendia (whether members of Congress or not) and others refer either to 
the Memorandum or to the future of the Congress: 
(i) You should decline to discuss the contents of the Memorandum in any way 
whatever. Even those of the 12 points which by themselves might have been 
unobjectionable are contaminated so long as they are associated with the 
Memorandum and as such are not for discussion. His Excellency has given his 
reply, the Memorandum has been returned and the matter is closed. 
(ii) The Government's attitude towards Congress is that they have deliberately and 
after due warning forfeited its confidence. The onus is now on them to show their good 
faith by so amending their Constitution and reorganising their machinery that the 
repetition of such an incident will be impossible. To do this in such a way as to restore 
the confidence of the Government they would have to convince the Government 
(a) that they are dropping any claim to be the mouthpiece of the whole country; 
(b) that they are ensuring that their future communications to the Government 
will represent the considered views of the majority of their members, and not 
merely of a caucus or Committee; 
(c) that they intend to confine themselves in their representations to the 
Government to internal administrative and social issues, except where those 
issues have been the subject of specific agreements with other Governments; 
(iii) Should they show a genuine desire to put their house in order on these lines 
the Government would not refuse to give them reasonable help and advice during 
the process. 
7 This document was included in those forwarded by Lampson, but was not printed and circulated along 
with the preceding set of enclosures. 
2 FO 371131587, no 2664 26 May 1942 
'The Sudan': minute by P S Scrivener to Sir M Peterson on the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty1 
The treaty consecrates present arrangements for administering the Sudan while 
reserving the question of sovereignty for the future. This shelving of the essential 
question has clearly been necessary heretofore, since we were not prepared to 
recognise Egyptian sovereignty, and they were not prepared to recognise ours, while 
the Sudanese were in an entirely "pre-national" stage. When negotiations were first 
1 This minute, originally drafted in the anticipation that the newly installed Wafd government would 
shortly raise the treaty issue, was copied from FO 371/31571, no 2192 and added to the other documents 
on the Sudanese Graduates' Congress in jacket 2664 (see Scrivener's minute, 3). 
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mooted the Sudan had been recovered for little more than a quarter of a century. It 
has now been under civilised administration for nearer half a century, and, though 
the growth is slow, the beginnings of national feeling are clearly perceptible. A 
possible solution would be to exchange Egyptian sovereignty over Cyrenaica for 
exclusive British sovereignty over the Sudan, but if we are to live up to the spirit of 
the Atlantic Charter, this would be a retrograde step. It would equally be a retrograde 
step for Egypt to claim sole sovereignty over the Sudan and it would be very 
unwelcome to the Sudanese. In fact we can adopt the Egyptians' slogan as our own 
for the future "complete independence for Egypt and the Sudan" (which in Egyptian 
eyes meant Egyptian domination of the Sudan). The logical solution of the problem 
is to vest sovereignty in the Sudanese themselves. For the time being (probably for 
another generation at least) they will be unable to exercise it, and must therefore 
continue to rely on British (and Egyptian) guidance, while Egyptian rights in the 
Nile must continue to be guaranteed. 
The obvious practical difficulty in the way of such a solution is to discover some 
person or body in whom Sudanese sovereignty can be vested. At present there would 
appear to be none. There are two "Popes" (the Mahdi and Sayid Ali Morghani) but no 
lay potentate and no body or assembly of any kind. It does not, however, follow that 
none could be found or created. 
The Sudan Government have at present a very progressive Civil Secretary,2 who on 
February 9th wrote as follows:-
"I think we must start now taking note of the Atlantic Charter. Intelligentsia 
here and elsewhere will naturally want to cash in on it and the vernacular 
press in Khartoum and W. Africa is already doing so. So is India. We must 
start now clarifying and intensifying our plans for (I) local government in 
towns, which is far behind tribal local government (2) Sudanese dilution of 
the British cadre which means the proper use and after-care of Higher School 
graduates and (3) Sudanese association with central government. I am 
preparing a note on all this and will send you a copy. I'm sure its [sic] wrong 
to retard education or self-government in colonies, because of the war. Its 
[sic] the worst kind of propaganda: rather we should accelerate it. Plain acts 
and facts carry the day with the educated classes who distrust vague post-
dated pledges. We are still in the Golden Age in the Sudan with no communal 
problems (as India) no racial problems (as Palestine) no settlers (as Kenya) no 
poor whites (as S. Africa) no slums or trades unions (as W. Indies). Our only 
distraction is external, i.e. Egypt, and as Sudanese self-government grows, the 
danger of Egyptian penetration should recede. So we should act while we still 
have time and not wait for internal or external pressures."3 
If we took the initiative in asking for the revision of the Sudanese clauses of the 
treaty, I think we should frighten Nahas off pretty effectively, but it is a big step and 
calls for very mature consideration. 
I should like to go into the matter with Mr. Mayall (Sudan Government Office) 
who is a member of the Political Service of many years' standing and a former 
Governor of the Gezira. 
20 New bold. 
3D Newbold to R C Mayall, 9 Feb 1942, in K D D Henderson, The making of the modem Sudan: the life and 
letters of Sir Douglas Newbold, KBE (London, 1953) p 233. See also 7. 
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3 FO 371131587, no 2664 12- 13 June 1942 
[Sudanese self-government]: minutes by D S Laskey1 and PS 
Scrivener [Extract] 
Self-government for the Sudan must be our long-term aim, though it will probably 
not be attainable for one or more generations. Congress, for all its shortcomings, 
does more or less represent the class from which the country's future rulers will have 
to be drawn, but it is clear that they are as yet quite unqualified for such 
responsibility. It is of course true that people cannot be taught a sense of 
responsibility unless they are first given responsibility, but the Sudan Gov. are well 
aware of this and have never shrunk from delegating authority and entrusting 
powers to the Sudanese, if necessary on an experimental basis, as soon as they think 
is justified. 
One of the biggest steps towards self-government will be to obtain independence 
for the Sudan from Egypt and this need not wait until the Sudanese are ready for 
autonomy. The possibility of including it in the post-war settlement is already under 
consideration but no detailed plans can be made until the end of the war and the 
circumstances that will then exist are more clearly in sight. .. . 2 
D.S.L. 
12.6.42 
This is a very interesting development. I heard of it first of all from Mr Mayall, with 
whom I have discussed (privately) a recent minute I wrote on the Sudan question 
(copy at back).3 When I wrote that minute I was unaware of these developments. 
It seems to me that the Sudan Govt have handled the Congress very wisely. They 
have, on occasions, given them proper encouragement; they have been studiously 
polite: but have reacted with uncompromising firmness to attempts to arrogate to 
Congress a position to which it has no right to pretend. 
The attitude of Egyptian political circles is very significant. ... 
1Then second secretary in the FO. 
P.S. 
13.6.42 
2Marginal note by Scrivener: 'No: but we can start thinking about it-& are doing so.' 3See 2. 
4 FO 371131587, no 4288 17 July 1942 
[Sudanese Graduates' Congress]: letter from D Newbold to Ibrahim 
Ahmad 
I should like to record that we had a conversation yesterday about the subject matter 
of the letters exchanged between the Government and the Graduates' Congress. I 
hope that the present position is now clear to you and that you will be able to make it 
equally clear to your Committee. 
I explained to you why the Government wrote these two letters and that it meant 
what it said, and that these letters stand. At the same time, besides explaining the 
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reasons for the Government's attitude, I took the opportunity to emphasise that the 
Government is not actuated by any hostility to the educated classes, and I write you 
this letter to reassure you and your Committee of this. The increase of the Sudanese 
share in Government and the giving of greater responsibilities to Sudanese are still 
fundamental points of Government policy. Active steps are in fact being taken for 
their further application, but I wish to record that, while announcements of 
Government policy are and will continue to be made from time to time, it is 
obviously right that they should be made to the public of the Sudan rather than to a 
particular section. I have also said that the Government is always anxious to 
maintain constant contact with responsible Sudanese opinion, whether it be through 
the administrative or religious leaders of the people, or senior Sudanese Government 
officials, or the Executive Committee of the Graduates' Congress (which, I know, 
represents a considerable body of educated opinion), or other representative bodies. 
The contact is in fact kept by a combination of all of these. 
At the same time, I have explained to you the Government's objections to 
Government servants indulging in public political controversy, and the reasons why 
Congress cannot be recognised as a political body. Until such time as adequate 
machinery exists for the official representation of Sudanese opinion in matters of 
policy, there is no objection, as I have said, to Sudanese leaders of opinion and 
responsible Government officials, whether members of Congress or not, making 
known to Government their views on matters of policy by personal approach or 
private delegation. But it is essential for the efficiency and reputation of Government 
that such communication should be strictly private and confidential. I have also 
reminded you that the private and reasonable discussion of political matters by 
Government servants is not and never has been prohibited in this country, provided 
it does not impair or prejudice their capacity loyally to carry out approved 
Government policy. 
5 FO 371131587, no 4388 23 July 1942 
[Sudanese Graduates' Congress]: letter (reply) Ibrahim Ahmad to 
D Newbold 
I thank you for your letter of 17th July, 1942,1 and the Congress is glad to express its 
satisfaction at the friendly spirit that characterised your conversation with its 
representatives on the 16th July, 1942, in which you assured them that the 
Government was sympathetic to the hopes and aspirations of Congress. 
We are also glad to refer to what was said in your conversation and in the 
conversations that took place between the Deputy Civil Secretary, Mr. Penney,2 and 
the President of the Congress, to the effect that the tendencies and wishes of the 
Government were not in conflict with the hopes of the Congress for the progress of 
the Sudan and its future. This was suggested in those conversations by the 
following:-
1 See 4. 
21 C Penney, Sudan government service 1925-1945; director of public security and commissioner of 
prisons, civi l secretary's office, 1937-1942; commissioner of police and prisons, civil secretary's office, 
1942-1945. 
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The consultation of the Sudanese when the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is 
reconsidered. 
Increasing the Sudanese share of responsibility in the administration of their 
country's public affairs by endeavouring to set up a representative advisory 
Sudanese body, and by increasing the number of responsible Sudanese posts in the 
Government. 
Since the realisation of the demands embodied in its Memorandum was one of the 
aspirations of the Congress, the Congress has pleasure in expressing its gratification, 
since it sees from the aggregate of conversations and letters that followed it-
although they were not free from certain differences of opinion-that the 
Government is concerned to realise some of our wishes. We shall therefore await 
with interest such practical steps as will accompany the Government's good 
intentions in the execution of the policy which the Government affirmed that it was 
pursuing. 
The Congress hopes, however-seeing that you have expressed the Government's 
sincere wish that contact should continue between it and the Congress-that this 
contact will lead to complete understanding on all its demands, as it also hopes that 
it will be given the opportunity, at the proper time and before the details have been 
settled, to express its opinion on the important matters which we learned from our 
conversations were now under consideration. 
In conclusion we hope that future steps by the Government and the Congress will 
help to build up and strengthen a spirit of real understanding based on a sound 
realisation of the intentions of the Government and the wishes of the Sudanese. 
6 FO 371131587, no 3736 1 Sept 1942 
'The Sudan': memorandum by the Egyptian Department, FO, on the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
1. The position of the Sudan under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of the 26th August, 
1936, is regulated by Article 11, which runs as follows:-
Article 11 
1. While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future, modifying 
the agreements of the 19th January and the lOth July, 1899, the High Contracting 
Parties agree that the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be that 
resulting from the said agreements. The Governor-General shall continue to 
exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred 
upon him by the said agreements. 
The High Contracting Parties agree that the primary aim of their administration 
in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese. 
Nothing in this article prejudices the question of sovereignty over the Sudan. 
2. Appointments and promotions of officials in the Sudan will in consequence 
remain vested in the Governor-General, who, in making new appointments to 
posts for which qualified Sudanese are not available, will select suitable candidates 
of British and Egyptian nationality. 
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3. In addition to Sudanese troops, both British and Egyptian troops shall be 
placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the defence of the Sudan. 
4. Egyptian immigration into the Sudan shall be unrestricted except for 
reasons of public order and health. 
5. There shall be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and 
Egyptian nationals in matters of commerce, immigration or the possession of 
property. 
6. The High Contracting Parties are agreed on the provisions set out in the 
Annex to this Article as regards the method by which international conventions 
are to be made applicable to the Sudan. 
2. The Department have been considering, in consequence of a rather diffident 
attempt by Nahas Pasha to raise the Sudan question, whether any advance on the 
state of affairs consecrated by this article is likely to be possible at the end of the war, 
and it may be worth while to place on record the conclusions which they have 
reached. 
3. In the analysis of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty contained in the "British Year 
Book of International Law" 1937, the following footnote appears on the question of 
Sovereignty over the Sudan:-
"This has been a subject of dispute, Egypt contending that sovereignty over 
the Sudan remained vested wholly in Egypt, whose territory it originally was 
and in whose name it was recovered, and that the condominium agreements 
only provided for a method of administration leaving the sovereignty 
untouched. The United Kingdom contends that sovereignty cannot be 
divorced from administration in this way but lies where the responsibility for 
administration is situated, and that since this was shared, so was the 
sovereignty. The question is largely academic when the method of 
administration is agreed, and turns as much upon differences of view as to the 
criteria for sovereignty under international law as upon divergencies as to the 
position with regard to the Sudan itself." 
4. The only method of dealing, hitherto, with this intractable question of 
sovereignty over the Sudan has been the unconstructive one of shelving it. But in 
fact no other solution was possible. His Majesty's Government were not prepared to 
recognise Egyptian sovereignty since, to quote Lord Cromer, it is "essential that 
British influence should in practice be paramount in the Sudan, in order that the 
Egyptians should not have conferred on them a 'bastard freedom' to repeat the 
misgovernment of the past". Moreover, any such admission of Egyptian sovereignty 
would tend to prejudice a policy of ultimate Sudanese independence (see paragraph 9 
below). Equally, the Egyptians, with their cry of "complete independence for Egypt 
and the Sudan" (as a combined entity) were not prepared to recognise British 
sovereignty. The Sudanese themselves were (and are) in an entirely "pre-national" 
stage and quite incapable of exercising sovereignty, in any modern sense, on their 
own account. 
5. Our conclusion is that although the intentions of His Majesty's Government 
and the Egyptian Government as regards the future can be restated with greater 
precision and in a more satisfactory fashion, it will not be possible for many years to 
establish a new regime. 
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6. One suggestion which has been put forward is that Egypt should be given 
sovereignty over Cyrenaica in return for the recognition of exclusive British 
sovereignty over the Sudan. This is at first sight an attractive arrangement, and it 
would be welcomed by almost the entire tribal Sudan (insofar as it conveyed any 
sense of change at all beyond the removal from the picture of a rather shadowy King 
of Egypt) and by a considerable proportion of the intelligentsia. But whether such a 
bargain could be struck or not depends-apart from Egypt's willingness to accept 
it-on the future colonial policy which will ultimately be worked out by the United 
Nations-and more particularly H.M. Govt. and the U.S. Govt.-in the light of the 
Atlantic Charter. And it would be calculated to focus, and to give an undesirable 
impetus to, more extreme national movements within the Sudan itself. The 
formation of one such movement is, and has been for some years, an accomplished 
fact. The so-called "Graduates Congress" recently summoned the authorities 
concerned to grant the Sudan "self-determination" at the end of the war, (and was 
snubbed by the Sudan Government who very properly decline to recognise any 
generally representative status in a body which only represents a fraction of the 
urban intelligentsia). This event is a portent, the meaning of which is perfectly 
plain.1 
7. The handing over of the Sudan to Egypt remains as inacceptable as ever, and 
we are therefore left (assuming the rejection of the idea of sole British sovereignty) 
with the possibilities of the Sudan as an independent country. 
8. There are two decisive reasons why the Sudan cannot be left to its own devices 
at present:-
( a) It is not yet sufficiently advanced in political development or education to 
stand alone in the modern world. It is still necessary to find a synthesis between 
the intelligentsia and the tribal leaders, to create a national consciousness, and to 
associate the best elements thus thrown up more closely with the Government of 
the country. To these tasks the Sudan Government is very much alive, and it is 
addressing itself to them in a thoroughly progressive spirit, but their completion 
cannot be expected in any immediate future. 
(b) The cleavage (which is bound to become more and more marked) between the 
Northern and Southern Sudan. To the profound racial difference between the two 
parts of the country has now been added as deep a cleavage in religion and lines of 
development. In the southern (pagan) areas, the inhabitants are being educated by 
1 J E Coulson (then acting first secretary in the FO) minuted on 3 Sept: 'The suggestion that we might 
hand over Cyrenaica to Egypt in return for exclusive rights in the Sudan has something to commend it, 
but I rather fear that the woolly idealists, who will be our chief critics whatever post-war settlement is 
reached, would be very disturbed by this sort of political barter which might appear purely opportunist.' 
Scrivener replied on 5 Sept: 'I think that the immediate dangers foreseen by Mr Coulson are rather more 
apparent than real. It would be useful at some stage to have an opinion whether the "idealists" are likely to 
prevail, or not .. .' Sir M Peterson (superintending under-secretary of state for the Egyptian Dept) minuted 
on 6 Sept, ' ... I don't altogether like your para. 6. So far as we've got in consideration of post-war 
arrangements, in the Pacific, and elsewhere, is that we are all agreed that the object to work for-the 
lowest common denominator as it were between U.S. policy and our own- is to secure independent 
British administration of our colonial territories subject to international supervision (but not 
international control). From this point of view I don't think that undivided British sovereignty over the 
Sudan would be a breach of the Atlantic Charter. Or do you mean that the taking over of Cyrenaica by 
Egy-would be a breach? If so, haven't we got to find some solution for Cyrenaica?'. Scrivener replied: 'No. 
I think this is the solution for Cyrenaica in any case' (FO 371/31587, no 3736). 
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missionary bodies and are thus being Christianised, while in the northern areas 
the population has been and will be Moslem, with a Moslem system of education. 
In the north, Arabic is and will remain the lingua franca; in the south, it will be 
English. Were the Sudan now to be established as an independent country, the 
primitive south would be overwhelmed-and indeed more or less enslaved-by 
the more sophisticated Arab north whose predatory instincts, if held completely in 
check by the present regime, are by no means yet dead. Clearly such a 
development could not be contemplated by His Majesty's Government. In the 
realm of speculation it seems likely that in the fullness of time the Sudan will split 
in two. The north may well become an independent Arab state, and the south may 
join the British East Mrican system, certain parts of which it will shortly begin to 
resemble. 
9. The only concrete suggestion which we can put forward at the moment is 
that, if and when the Anglo-Egyptian treaty comes under review, a provision on 
the following lines should be inserted after sub-paragraph 1 of the present Article 
11:-
"The High Contracting Parties declare that it is their common intention that, 
as soon as circumstances permit, the Sudan shall become a fully independent 
state, exercising full rights of sovereignty; and that the administration of the 
Sudan, exercised as provided in the preceding paragraph, shall be directed 
towards the fulfilment of this aim."2 
10. The Egyptians may profoundly dislike this suggestion. In the recent past they 
have blocked proposals tending to treat the Sudan as a kind of state so that, in 
connexion with the representation of the Sudan at international conferences (Article 
11 (6)) it became necessary to consider treating the Sudan as a joint colony for the 
purpose of carrying out the Annex to this article. But it is difficult to see what really 
convincing long-term arguments the Egyptians can adduce against the new clause 
suggested above. 
2Coulson minuted on 3 Sept: 'Unless we are pressed very hard, it might be somewhat dangerous to 
volunteer the declaration suggested in paragraph 9, in view of the linguistic and religious split between 
the two halves of the Sudan. Such a declaration might unnecessarily tend to perpetuate a union which in 
later times might be found impracticable' (FO 371/31587, no 3736). 
7 FO 371131587, no 4388 10 Sept 1942 
'Note on further association of Sudanese with local and central 
government in the Sudan': note by D Newbold on devolution to the 
Governor-General's Council 
[In his response to Lampson Sir A Cadogan commented that the following note reached 
broadly the same conclusions as the FO and he 'unhesitatingly' accepted the civil 
secretary's proposals for Sudanisation (Cadogan to Lampson, 2 Nov 1942). Newbold's 
note was passed on to the CO for their information. Scrivener minuted, 29 Oct: '. . . the 
Civil Secretary's note on Sudanisation . . . contains an acute-indeed a brilliant-
appreciation of the whole situation. I should like to see this document printed & placed in 
the hands of the C.O. and the Americans, but it would require a little preliminary 
editing-not that that need present any difficulty. I would further observe that the 
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cleavage between the Northern & Southern Sudan to which attention is drawn in J37361 
emerges clearly in these papers, & not least from the fact that most of Mr. Newbold's 
recommendations are, in terms, only applicable to the northern provinces-but this by 
the way'. It was decided, however, not to include any mention of developments in the 
Sudan in the statement by the secretary of state for colonies on the Empire, 'since the 
Sudan is not an integral part of the Empire (but a dominion of ourselves & Egypt jointly) 
and a terrible commotion would ensue in Cairo if such a thing happened. But it is a pity 
that we can't!' (minute by Scrivener, 28 Nov 1942, FO 371/31587, no 4388).] 
1. During the five years immediately before the present war the Northern Sudan 
was moving out of what may be called the "Arcadian Period" of comparatively simple 
administration into a period of accelerated economic and educational development, 
accompanied by social and political problems of greater complexity. Factors 
contributing to this were:-
(i) the rising prosperity of the country after the economic depression of 1931. 
(ii) the adoption of the Substitution Grade for Sudanese in 1935, designed for 
posts where Sudanese replace British staff of Division I, and rising to a salary 
maximum of £E.800. (N.B. Nearly 40 Sudanese have been promoted to S. grades 
to-date.) 
(iii) the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 with its emphasis on the 
Welfare of the Sudanese and on the prior claims of Sudanese to fill any posts in the 
Sudan Government for which they may be qualified. 
(iv) the passing of the three Local Government Ordinances in 1937, covering 
Rural Areas, Townships and Municipalities. 
(v) the publication in 1937 of the educational proposals of the de la Warr 
Commission.2 
(vi) the formation of the Sudan Graduates' Congress in 1938. 
2. During the first two years of war, the distractions of threatened and actual 
invasion, and the mobilisation of the Sudan's manpower and resources, followed by 
the Sudan's vigorous partnership in the Imperial conquest of the Italian East African 
Empire, diverted the minds of nearly all British officials and of most of the educated 
Sudanese from the political development of the Sudan. The Graduates' Congress, it is 
true, founded originally as a sort of Union of Educated Sudanese, with a programme 
ostensibly social and cultural, took on a stronger nationalist and political colour 
during 1940, but did not, until recently, embark on any definite political agitation or 
submit formally any wide political demands. · 
In the Provinces Local Government, rural and urban, moved along its statutory 
paths, at a reasonably fast tempo in the case of what is called 'Native Administration' 
(tribal federations, native courts, N.A. Budgets etc.) and at a regrettably slower pace 
in towns and municipalities. In early 1940 I tried to hasten the latter in a circular to 
Governors of the 6 Northern Provinces (CS/SCR/l.D.9 of 22/3/40) but the entry of 
Italy into the war shortly afterwards, and the depletion of political staff through war 
releases, prevented any substantial results. Moreover replies to the circular showed 
that it was by no means realised in several provinces that urban local government 
was in a sadly backward state. 
1 See 6, para S(b) . 
2Higher Education in East Africa: Report of the Commission appointed by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, September 1937 (Col No 142, 1937) [De La Warr Commission]. 
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3. A strong stimulus, however, to political thinking in the Sudan was applied, in 
the winter of 1941 and spring of 1942, by, 
(i) the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 with the consequent 
commentaries in the world's press and broadcasts, and the adherence to the 
Charter by the 26 Allied Nations proclaimed in January 1942. 
(ii) Sir Stafford Cripps' spectacular mission to India, the effect of which was 
heightened by his passage through the Sudan, both going and returning, and the 
brief interview given by him on 15.4.42 to the two Editors of the Vernacular Press 
in which he said:-"We are all looking to the future. The Sudan is playing its part 
in the war effort very well, and this will gain it a place in the new era which we all 
hope to see in the world when we have finished with the evil forces. There are a lot 
of things to be done: and we must perhaps do them more quickly than we have in 
the past". 
4. It was obvious that the Sudan, like other African dependencies, could not be 
oblivious to progressive trends of thought and declarations in Great Britain and the 
United States, and in February 1942 I began to study further lines of advance in 
associating the Sudanese (and especially the educated Sudanese) with local and 
central Government, and had begun to draft proposals when three things intervened 
to delay them:-
(i) large increases in the establishment and commitments of the Sudan Defence 
Force, and in the Sudan's obligations to develop still further our Lines of 
Communications to Middle East by air, river, road, and rail, threw more urgent 
war work on my office, and I had little spare time for political problems. 
(ii) the fall of Malaya and Burma engendered a number of articles in the British, 
American, and Dominion Press, which were highly critical of British colonial 
administration in those areas and in general. These articles led to others, which, 
after the first reaction from defeat, became more objective in analysis of past, and 
proposals for future, policy, and also to a series of valuable debates in the Houses 
of Lords and Commons. I thought it right to secure these documents (Hansard, 
press-cuttings etc.) by air-bag through the London Office, and to sift and 
summarise them, before completing this memorandum. 
(iii) the Graduates' Congress suddenly submitted on April 3rd 1942 their 
manifesto with its 12 demands, headed by a claim for the Sudanese to exercise self-
determination after the war. This led to a rebuff by the Government, a second 
memorandum by the Congress, a further formal reply by Government, and several 
interviews and subsidiary letters.3 A certain political agitation in Khartoum and 
some ill-advised speeches and "electioneering" in the Provinces accompanied this 
sequence of events, and raised, in an acute form, not only the undesirability of 
public servants (who form the great majority of the Graduates' Congress) actively 
participating in political controversy, but the whole question of relations between 
Government and the educated classes. It was manifestly impossible to study 
administrative and political reforms calmly, or to obtain objective British and 
Sudanese advice, while this Congress sandstorm was blowing and fogging the 
basic issue, which still lies before us, of how to meet adequately the legitimate and 
3 See 1, 4, 5, 8. 
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reasonable aspirations of the enlightened Sudanese, both in the towns and in the 
countryside, and including the more progressive tribal leaders and merchants as 
well as the mainly official class known as "effendia". 
5. The six months' delay, however, in presenting the proposals outlined below, 
has actually been valuable not only because we now have a mass of evidence of the 
future trend of British colonial policy from trusteeship to partnership, but also 
because the episode of the Congress manifesto and succeeding exchanges has thrown 
into clearer relief the urgent need to get a closer relationship between British and 
Sudanese officials, to give clearer proofs of our devolutionary aims, and to conceive 
our trusteeship as that of a guardian for a ward who will eventually come of age. This 
need is genuine and should not be denied or obscured by the extravagant and ill-
considered demands of a section of the educated Sudanese. Individual Sudanese 
officials or groups who overstep the political mark can be dealt with disciplinarily. 
The Congress itself has received a damaging rebuff. The Administrative Regulations 
limiting political activities of public servants ·have been reaffirmed (they are by no 
means ungenerous). The Vernacular Press has been warned that, while objective 
criticism is welcomed, and censorship is sparingly exercised, liberty does not mean 
licence. But any general policy of repression or even of slowing down of partnership, 
causing the educated classes as a whole to suffer for the follies or vanities of young 
hot-heads, would indeed be visiting the sins of sons upon their fathers; the Sudan 
Government is a powerful autocracy, independent of the Colonial Office, 
untrammelled by an electorate, or by any unofficial representation on its Council, or 
by an influential Press, but no colonial Government can conduct for long a 
progressive or happy administration without the co-operation of the educated 
classes; to deny or delay their effective participation in the various branches of 
government means that disgruntlement turns into despair, and despair into revolt, of 
which the end is Amritsar. It therefore behoves the Government to study closely and 
keep well abreast of progressive opinion both in responsible circles in England and in 
enlightened Sudanese society here. Recent events in India, Syria, and Iraq do not 
pass unnoticed by the Sudanese. 
6. The articles and debates referred to in paragraph 4 (ii) are numerous and 
impressive. I have listed and summarised the most relevant in the Appendix to this 
Note.4 
The main thread running through these articles and debates is the aim of 
converting 'trusteeship' into 'partnership', and a noticeable point is that these 
progressive sentiments are not put forward by people or newspapers normally 
described as 'left-wing idealists' or 'humanitarian cranks'. They come from Colonial 
Ministers and ex-Ministers, ex-Governors, and the leading journals, general and 
professional. They all agree that more concrete plans must be made for association of 
Africans with the administration, education and solvency of their countries, that 
Englishmen must get on more even terms with educated Africans, that colour bar 
policies, explicit or implicit, are anachronistic and dangerous, that Indirect Rule 
must not become frozen, and that good government is no lasting substitute for self-
government. This consensus of opinion to examine our colonial conscience is 
4 Not printed. 
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something more than what Macaulay termed "The British Public in one of its 
periodical fits of morality". 
7. It may be argued that, granted all this, the Sudan is at War, has been invaded 
once and may be invaded again: and that War-time is no time for far-reaching 
schemes of political or administrative development and we should await the piping 
times of peace. 
But, firstly, the times of peace will not be so piping. There will be a psychological 
malaise among British officials, a reaction from war-effort, an exodus on long leave, a 
spate of retirements with consequent changes in higher posts, an influx of raw 
recruits, a restlessness among Sudanese for the removal of economic restrictions 
(which may well have to be kept on awhile) and a probable distraction of the Central 
Government on to external affairs (future of Eritrea, Lake Tsana, increased attention 
from Egypt, pan-Arabism, winding up of Imperial finance questions). We should 
begin now to lay the foundations of a full Sudanese share in the Government not 
only to honour local and Imperial pledges, but also to present a united front to the 
outside world. Internal trouble will only weaken our ability to deal with external 
affairs. 
Secondly, it is surely wise to take time (and budgets) by the forelock and plan 
'dilution' and other progressive reforms on the Government's initiative, as matters of 
pre-declared policy rather than be pushed, or appear to be pushed, into them by 
pressure from without or blackmail from below. The examples of India, Burma, and 
Ireland are always before us. In spite of Congress and periodic Egyptian claims there 
is probably no other dependency which is in so favourable a position to go ahead with 
a liberal policy of "Sudanisation". We have not the distractions of white settlers 
(Kenya) racial and community feuds (Palestine and India) poor whites (South Africa) 
industrial problems (Rhodesia and W. Indies) and so we should lay our foundations 
while the going is good. Our very immunity from these distractions is a snare: the 
temptation to linger in what the author of the Forsyte Saga wistfully called "the gilt-
edged period" is almost overwhelming, especially to those of us, who have served in 
the contented countryside. But it is a temptation which must be resisted or The 
Paradise of the Sudan of the Golden Age may prove a Fool's Paradise. 
8. The submissions that I wish to put before Council are not, at the moment, 
detailed: they are, simply, a request that Council should agree with the need for 
closer association of the Sudanese with Government, as argued above, and set the 
ball rolling, as far as war conditions allow, by the following resolutions: 
(i) that the system of executive Town Councils, already begun, be extended, and 
that financial devolution be an integral part of the system. 
(ii) that a system of advisory Province Councils for the northern Provinces of Blue 
Nile, Darfur, Kassala, Kordofan, and Northern be considered. N.B. Khartoum 
Province already has a joint Municipal Council for the Three Towns. 
(iii) that a small Special Committee be instructed to investigate the expediency of 
forming a central Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, and, if found feasible, 
to make recommendations about its composition, terms of reference, and 
approximate date of creation. 
(iv) that Heads of Departments be asked to consider and report on the greater use 
of Sudanese as members of departmental and inter-departmental committees. 
(v) that the Establishments Committee be instructed to review the progress of 
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'dilution' since the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and to make specific 
recommendations, where desirable, for its acceleration. 
(vi) that a special senior Political Officer be temporarily appointed attached to but 
not an integral part of the Civil Secretary's Office, as special officer in charge of 
Sudanese relations with terms of reference to be approved by the Governor-
General. 
8 FO 371/31587, no 4388 19 Sept 1942 
[Sudanese Graduates' Congress]: letter (reply) from D Newbold to 
Ibrahim Ahmad 
I acknowledge receipt of your personal letter to me dated July 23rd1 but not received 
till August 24th. I regret delay in reply which has been due to press of work. 
The renewed reference in your letter to the "demands" embodied in your 
Memorandum of April 3rd2 to His Excellency the Governor-General seems to show a 
misunderstanding of the position which my letters of April29th3 and June 16th made 
clear and which I explained fully in my subsequent interview with you and your two 
colleagues, an interview which I felt to be of great advantage to us both. 
In that interview I gave you an assurance, which I repeated in my letter of July 
17th, 4 that Government has no hostility towards the educated Sudanese and that it 
has under continual and active consideration measures designed to increase the 
association of Sudanese with Government. But I also gave you some advice about 
the attitude and activities of the Graduates' Congress. I referred especially to the 
apparently indiscriminate canvassing for new members, without due regard to their 
educational qualifications, which the Government considers to be contrary to the 
rules of the Graduates' Congress, and to the unjustified claim of the Graduates' 
Congress to represent the whole Sudan, a claim which is not accepted by the 
Government and denied by very many Sudanese, educated and uneducated. 
I am sorry to see in your letter nothing to indicate any intention on the part of the 
Graduates' Congress to examine those aspects of its activities and organisation to 
which I referred in my conversation and which I consider contrary to the expressed 
desire of the Graduates' Congress "to co-operate with the Government in such ways 
as may be opened to them, in furthering the country's welfare". I hope however that 
this omission does not mean that the Graduates' Congress intends to refuse all 
advice or criticism, although your letter, while stressing the obligations of 
Government, omits all mention of the obligations of the Graduates' Congress and of 
public servants, on which I laid emphasis in my interview. 
Proofs of the Government's intention to associate the Sudanese in an ever-
increasing degree in the Government of the country have been given and are being 
given:-
(a) by the recent advances in local self-government 
(b) by the continued appointment of Sudanese to fill posts held by British, 
Egyptian, and Syrian officials. 
1 See 5. 
3 See ibid, enclosure 3. 
2 See 1, enclosure 2. 
4 See 4. 
22 ANTICIPATING POST-WAR SETTLEMENT [9] 
(c) by the appointment of a British official of considerable experience and 
seniority, whose special duty it will be to make and maintain contact with 
responsible Sudanese opinion in all sections of the community. 
I am confident that all enlightened Sudanese will see in the above measures 
tangible proofs of the earnest intention of the Government to execute its policy and I 
hope that the Graduates' Congress will realise its own responsibility and make a 
serious effort to co-operate both in the restoration of good relations and in the 
execution of Government policy. 
As the Government is fully aware of the aspirations of the educated classes and has 
made its own policy and attitude clear, there is no need for further letters, but rather 
for closer personal relations, and I therefore consider this correspondence closed. 
9 FO 371/315887, no 4388 21 Sept 1942 
'The Graduate's [sic] Congress directive statement': note by 
D Newbold 
[In a circular letter to all governors and heads of department, dated 22 Sept 1942 
(included in the same folder) , Newbold wrote: 'The Government is steadily pursuing its 
plans for increased dilution and consultation .... In the civil as in the military sphere it is 
of the first importance to maintain contact with friend and foe, whether actual or 
potential. We do not yet know whether we shall get co-operation or opposition from the 
Graduates' Congress; but in either case contact must be maintained. The choice lies with 
them. It is for us to help them to choose aright.' The following directive statement was 
issued as a guideline to all British officials on how to deal with the Congress and its 
members. E A Chapman-Andrews1 of the FO minuted, 27 Oct: ' ... The educated 
Sudanese, the "Effendia" have in the past been looked at rather askance by the British 
administrative officers, country folk and tribesmen alike. This is to stop so far as British 
officers are concerned' (FO 371/315887, no 4388) .] 
I. Introduction 
(i) From the recent correspondence between this office and the Graduates' 
Congress, copies of which have been circulated to Governors and Heads of 
Departments, it is clear that the Congress has made a deliberate attempt to assume a 
definitely political role. 
(ii) The fact must be faced that the Congress, so long as it exists, will inevitably 
interest itself in public affairs or "politics". To expect it to confine itself to matters of 
purely social interest is to refuse to face realities. The dividing line between public 
affairs and social activities is always difficult to define. 
(iii) To admit that the Congress is certain to interest itself in public affairs is not 
to admit that it may be allowed to become a political body in the sense of an 
opposition party. 
(iv) We must therefore clarify our attitude towards it in our own minds and at the 
same time convince the Congress that we mean what we say. 
(v) Our task is to guide the Congress so that it may become a useful focus for the 
constitutional expansion of thought of a particular class-what form it would take is 
1 Then consul in the FO, having recently returned from the Sudan where he had served as political liaison 
officer to the Emperor Haile Selassie, 1941- 1942. 
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as yet undefined and is not for discussion with the Sudanese at this stage. Unless we 
do this we may find ourselves faced by the alternatives of a policy of appeasement on 
the one hand, or of suppression on the other, neither of which does the Government 
intend to adopt unless forced to do so. Appeasement means a sequence of blackmail 
and premature concessions, and would bewilder the non-Congress body of 
enlightened Sudanese: suppression would create a sense of frustration, clashes, and 
probably "martyrs", and might drive the movement underground and into the arms 
of Egypt. 
(vi) The point has been reached when it is for Congress to prove by their actions 
whether they wish to regain and retain Government's sympathy and confidence or 
not. If they honestly wish to do so and to co-operate with the Government, they will 
need help and advice, and we must be ready and willing to give it. 
II. Directive 
In furtherance of these aims, the following directive is issued:-
(i) Constitutional expression of views 
Members of Congress should be made to understand that Government has no 
objection to their presenting their considered views on public affairs, subject to 
certain provisos:-
( a) that if they have any doubt about the propriety of the subject or the method of 
presentation, they seek advice from a responsible British official; 
(b) that, having presented their views or recommendations, they are prepared to 
abide by the result and not to oppose declared policy by agitation or other 
means; 
(c) that they eschew exhibitionism and their present publicity methods of press 
propaganda; 
(d) that they do not arrogate to themselves the Government's function of 
redressing wrongs through its petition system and courts of justice by 
championing isolated personal causes. 
(ii) Co-operation with the more responsible elements 
(a) The recent deplorable actions of Congress (due largely to pressure from the 
less responsible members of the Committee of LX), the extravagant demands of 
their ill-timed manifesto, their self-advertisement in the Vernacular Press and the 
general tone of the latter due largely to Congress influence, their unwarranted 
claim to represent the country as a whole and their efforts to increase 
indiscriminately the membership of Congress-contrary to their constitution-
with the object of making it a more representative body, have no doubt alienated 
the sympathy of many British officials. It must, however, be remembered that a 
very large proportion of the members are genuinely anxious to co-operate with 
Government. 
(b) It is important to make contact with them and to strengthen their hands 
against the more vocal but less responsible hot-heads. 
(c) They must be persuaded of the need to rehabilitate Congress as a respectable 
movement in the eyes of the Government and of the more responsible members of 
the community. 
(d) We must make them realise that we are interested in them and their views, 
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that we want to understand and appreciate their outlook and that we are prepared 
to tell them frankly when and why we disagree with them. They will take almost 
anything individually, if they know the motive is sincere. If every British official 
made himself a safety-valve, the total pressure harmlessly released would be 
enormous. 
(iii) Attitude towards the less responsible elements 
(a) It is desirable that we should maintain contact with the less responsible 
elements, but it is undesirable to increase their self-importance by granting 
indiscriminate personal interviews. Personal interest in them and occasional 
sympathetic discussion of their more reasonable aspirations are more likely to 
prove efficacious than simply to disregard them or to treat them as a mere 
nuisance. 
(b) Efforts should be made to win the cooperation and loyalty which the Sudanese 
are usually more ready to give to the individual than to such impersonal entities as 
"the Service" or "the Government". 
(c) If mutual confidence can be established, there is at least a prospect that they 
may adopt a more friendly and co-operative attitude towards the Government's 
efforts for the advancement of the Sudanese. 
(iv) Government officials and politics 
(a) Most of the members of Congress are Government officials and, since we admit 
that Congress will inevitably continue to interest itself in politics, we have to face 
the danger of a political Civil Service. 
(b) It is a choice of evils. We must either allow them to continue to be members of 
Congress and do all we can to keep them on the rails, or forbid them to be 
members and face the awkwardness at this juncture of a large number of 
resignations and the consequent dangers of secret societies and sedition. (A small 
number of resignations from Government of the more irreconcilable 
Congressmen might be a good thing and have a salutary effect). 
(c) The Government has in fact recognised by implication that Sudanese officials 
are by nature prone to interest themselves in public affairs. Ti)e 1938 amendment 
to Chapter IV of Administrative Regulations and Explanatory Note (attached) 
define the extent to which they may do so. 
(d) His Excellency has directed that at present these Administrative Regulations 
shall be applied as follows:-
(1) Any Government official may be a member of Congress. 
(2) Judges and Registrars of the Civil Courts and Kadis and Legal Assistants of 
the Sharia Courts, Sub-Inspectors (Administrative), Mamurs, Sub-Mamurs and 
Police Officers may not become, nor continue to be, members of the Committee 
of XV or the Committee of LX of the Graduates' Congress, or of standing 
executive branch committees in the Provinces. There is no objection to their 
being members of a Committee whose sole function is to deal with educational 
or cultural matters. 
(e) Other Government officials may continue to act as members of Congress 
Committees, provided such activities do not interfere with their duties or impair 
their position as public servants. 
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(v) Closer association of the Sudanese in the work of government 
Much of the intelligentsia's distrust of Government's motives and intentions is due 
to the fact that they see so little of the work done in committee and conference. They 
have to carry out decisions affecting the welfare of their country with no idea of the 
work that has gone to their making. Suitable senior Sudanese should be admitted to 
committees and conferences at every possible opportunity. (A special circular is 
being issued to Governors and Heads of Departments on this) . Their closer 
association with the mills of policy should go far to dispel the atmosphere of mystery 
with which we are apt to surround ourselves. 
(vi) Congress and local government leaders 
(a) If tribal or local government leaders want advice as to whether to join the 
Congress, your line should be that the Government would view with disfavour 
their joining any organisation likely to distract them from their local duties and 
interests or to impair their impartiality. Their hands are full with the important 
job of laying the foundations of sound local Government and they should stick to 
realities and the job in hand. 
(b) To those who are already members and want your advice you should again 
emphasise the importance of their duties as an integral part of the Government 
and add that they should maintain an attitude of impartial aloofness, decline for 
the present to serve on any local Congress Committee or join in any public 
meetings, and discourage indiscriminate canvassing of members. 
(vii) Non-Congress elements 
The majority of the educated classes are not members of the Congress, and among 
this majority is a large and important body of reputable and loyal officials and 
notables. The interests and opinions of these men, who are not always vocal, are apt 
to be obscured or neglected (especially in the Three Towns, less so in the Provinces) 
by our preoccupation with the Congress. In our efforts to secure a better 
understanding with the Congress, it is most important that we should not make the 
mistake of letting this large body of non-Congress elements feel neglected-
particularly the Sub-Inspectors, Mamurs, Police Officers, senior Departmental 
officials, Sheikhs, Notables and merchants. A right balance must be struck between 
them and members of Congress in representation on Committees, in consultations 
and informal contacts. They should be told that the Government's letters to Congress 
stand as a clear statement of its attitude towards them, and you can tell them 
candidly the line which Government has adopted towards Congress. They are an 
unorganised body and the Government must rely mainly on provincial and 
departmental authorities to keep in touch with them and make them feel that they 
and their views are of concern to Government. We have no intention whatever of 
throwing our friends to the wolves, nor of failing to apply proper disciplinary 
measures to any official where necessary. 
Ill. Conclusion 
(i) In order to carry out successfully the above directives, we must rid our minds 
by deliberate effort of any feeling of hostility towards Congress or the intelligentsia in 
general. 
(ii) The response to the directive from this office calling for a sympathetic attitude 
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of mind to the Congress Education Day scheme was admirable. It was instantly 
recognised and appreciated by Congress. If it can succeed on the minor issue, it can 
succeed also on the major. 
(iii) One or two members of the Government cannot hope to achieve all this 
alone: the effort must be universal and as consistent as possible. 
10 FO 371131587, no 4388 11 Oct 1942 
[Sudanese Graduates' Congress]: letter from Sir M Lampson to Sir A 
Cadogan1 [Extract] 
... The position as it emerges from all this is briefly that the Graduates' Congress is 
beginning to emphasize even more than hitherto its claim to represent in the 
political sphere educated Sudanese opinion, and that the Sudan Government, while 
frowning on any improper exercise of the Congress's functions, are fully conscious 
from this and other symptoms that something is stirring and that they must make 
up their minds how to deal with it and begin to set on foot certain preliminary 
measures almost at once. 
My first reaction to all this is that it is, by and large, wholesome. Our bogey until 
recently has been an attempt to Egyptianise the Sudan. We have had to counter this 
by various means, some of them rather devious, during the last few years. The 
present Government have not shown any very special inclination to extend Egyptian 
influence in the Sudan (except perhaps for Nahas' rather indefinite statement 
recorded in my telegram No. 1543 of 11th June and some ill-judged newspaper 
reports about activities connected with the Sudan alleged, without any foundation, to 
have been undertaken by various Ministries here), but it is likely that when they have 
exhausted the possibilities of gaining popular support by xenophobic legislation here, 
they may easily turn to penetration into the Sudan as a further vote-catching device. 
In many ways our best answer to this is an increase in Sudanese popular feeling. I 
remember with some glee having made Makram2 admit to me at the time of the 
Treaty negotiations that "The Sudan for the Sudanese" was a thesis impossible to 
attack. This somewhat unwilling but inevitable admission on his part subsequently 
took definite shape in the Treaty. The Egyptians, though clearly believing it was a 
mere phrase, really did not like seeing it enshrined in the Treaty, but I put it there all 
right! 
Now it is becoming a live issue and a very normal and natural one, but I am sure 
the Egyptians will not at all like it. There is, however, always the possibility that in 
their usual way of finding any stick good enough to beat us with they might come to 
make use of it if we give them the chance. It seems to me that we should be giving 
them this chance if we disappointed Sudanese aspirations to such an extent as to lead 
the Sudanese to apply for help to the more extreme elements in Egypt. That is a 
definite danger but it is one of which the Sudan Government appear to be fully aware 
and which they are evidently trying to avert. As I see it we must encourage this effort 
1 Lampson forwarded documents 4, 5, 7-9 with this letter to Cadogan. 
2 Makram Ubayd, Wafdist politician, ally of Mustafa al-Nahhas, minister of finance and member of the 
Egyptian delegation in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations. 
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of the Sudan Government to get on terms with the Sudanese national movement and 
try to guide it and keep it on sound lines. Up to date they seem to be handling the 
matter liberally and wisely. 
I may have given the impression in these comments that I am looking at the 
matter from a rather parochial angle. I would emphasize that, as I have said, these 
are my first reactions and are intended to deal with the immediate problems likely to 
arise here. I fully realise that the wider issues of Sudanese nationalism are of greater 
ultimate importance and interest. Fortunately they seem to require the same 
treatment as I have advocated from the local point of view. The way in which 
nationalist movements have gone wrong on us in so many places which we control 
has surely been largely due to the fact that at a given moment the Government-
sometimes of course with very good reason-became impatient of the nationalist 
movement and lost or abandoned all day-to-day control over it. It is far more difficult 
and laborious to maintain continual contact with inept and undisciplined politicians 
of the kind which come to the surface in the early days of these movements and to 
guide them as it were from within, rather than to alternate between repression and 
concessions given against one's better judgment and merely because one has not the 
force or the will to carry repression to its logical conclusion. 
Both the Sudan Authorities and we ourselves would naturally welcome any 
preliminary comments of yours on this. I am expecting a visit from Huddleston 
towards the end of next month and no doubt we shall have talks about it. I shall 
naturally keep you informed of any developments of interest. 
11 FO 371131587, no 5145 18 Nov 1942 
[Future of the Sudan]: letter from Sir H Huddleston to Sir M 
Lamp son 
Rugman has shown me the papers attached to your letter to him, No.1275/4/42 of 
12th October, 1942. To begin with I agree generally with the appreciation of the 
situation here given in your letter of October 11th to Sir Alexander Cadogan.1 
However troublesome an "increase in Sudanese popular feeling" may become, it is 
certainly preferable to increased Egyptian penetration and, indeed, is the only 
legitimate counter thereto. 
I am also grateful for your commendation of the way we are trying to handle the 
Sudanese national movement and keep it under some sort of unrepressive control. 
Our immediate difficulty in this respect is to tide over the interim period which 
may be a year, or two or three, before we can get some respectable Sudanese Advisory 
Council in the saddle. Town, District and Province Councils are comparatively easy 
to set up and they are a proof of our good intentions as regards Anglo-Sudanese 
partnership, but the eyes of the intelligentsia are naturally glued on the Central 
Government, where there is admittedly a Sudanese vacuum. Nature abhors a 
vacuum, and into it the Graduates' Congress has rashly stepped. We have pushed 
them out politely, but the vacuum must be filled and until it is filled by a 
representative body of enlightened Sudanese, fed probably by delegates from the 
1 See 10. 
28 ANTICIPATING POST-WAR SETTLEMENT [11] 
Province Councils and a few nominated notables from the capital, we can only say 
'Trespassers will be prosecuted', and get on with c<:rtain cognate measures, e.g. (i) 
accelerated dilution of British posts in Departments by Sudanese (ii) development of 
our Post-Secondary Schools, (which are going through various teething troubles) 
and (iii) the greater use of Sudanese on the various Central Government Committees 
and Boards which are almost entirely composed of .British officials. Active steps are 
actually being taken in these three directions which l can explain to you in Cairo, and 
which Shone can discuss with my Secretaries here. 
So much for our immediate internal policy. As re~ards the status of the Sudan and 
its future, this, of course, bristles with difficultiE:s, of which the main are the 
inherent anomalies of the Condominium, and the cleavage between the Northern 
and Southern Sudan. 
As regards the former the suggestion that Egy ot should receive Cyrenaica in 
exchange for her 'rights' in the Sudan is ingenious and attractive, and, if Egypt could 
be induced to accept the exchange, we should be on!:; too glad. But I fear the historic 
connexion with the Sudan and the dependence of Egypt on the Nile waters make 
their agreement most unlikely.2 
Incidentally, prior to an agreement being reached on this issue between the eo-
Domini, responsible Sudanese opinion should be consulted, as a qualified pledge was 
made, with my authority, in the Civil Secretary's reply of April 29th, 1942 to the 
manifesto of April 3rd, 1942 submitted by the Gr< duates' Congress. The relevant 
sentence reads:-"If the Condominium Powers at any time decide to review the 
Agreement or Treaty, the Sudan Government would hope to consult responsible 
Sudanese opinion. The Government, however, can make no promises to any body of 
persons in the name of the Condominium Powers or in its own".3 
Although this was only a qualified pledge, I think we should be bound to consult 
leading Sudanese (and this is where we need a Sudar1ese Advisory Council) over any 
alteration in the status of the Sudan.4 There was a good deal of feeling among the 
educated Sudanese at the time of the 1936 Treaty that they should have an 
opportunity to express their views, and world events and the growth of 'nationalism' 
have since intensified that feeling. What their views "'vould be on a complete political 
separation from Egypt, I cannot precisely say, except that the majority of the country 
would probably welcome it, while the educated minority would want safeguards for 
future independence and possibly some sort of cultural and commercial Treaty with 
Egypt. They are ready to see the Sudan as a sister to Egypt, but not as a daughter. 
They would distrust a purely Colonial status under British rule, unless some sort of 
Colonial charter on partnership lines had by that time been evolved. 
The second problem, that of the Southern Sudan, is a separate and real difficulty, 
and I am glad that the Foreign Office Memorandum5 has stated it so realistically. Our 
obvious duty to the Southern Sudanese is to push ahead with their development, 
especially in the sphere of education, as fast as we C<tn, so that if they are ultimately 
left under the control of a Government largely or wh)lly recruited from the Arab and 
Moslem North, they can at least stand up for themselves as a large progressive and 
cohesive minority. Similarly, if they are to be absorbed into East Mrica, we must 
push on their development, both educational and economic, so that their degree of 
2 See discussion in 1, 2 and 6. 
4Marginal note by Cadogan: 'I agree ' 
3See 2. 
5See 6. 
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civilisation and self-sufficiency comes somewhat nearer to that of Uganda. It is at 
present far behind and we cannot ask Uganda to take over a white elephant. 
The only gleam in the Southern darkness, therefore, is that a policy of faster 
development is equally suitable, whether the Southern Provinces remain linked to 
Khartoum or are hived off to East Africa. I may say that this development will still be 
a very slow business especially in the big Nilotic Dinka-Nuer belt. 
As regards the suggested declaration in paragraph 9 of the Foreign Office 
Memorandum, there is no doubt that this would please the educated Sudanese 
enormously, although it might well raise qualms in the minds of the older sheikhs 
and merchants, and the village elders. Moreover, it is in accord with recent 
statements about the future of the Colonies in the British Houses of Parliament and 
Lord Hailey's remarks in the Colonial debate in the House of Lords, which I attach,6 
are very apposite. Nevertheless, I think it goes too far. We do not know what the 
attitude towards small nations will be after the war, and even if the Sudan could find, 
within a measurable period, sufficient capable Sudanese to run a harmonious 
popular and fairly efficient Government, which would also continue to be solvent, 
there are the questions of defence and foreign relations. The trend of world opinion 
seems to be away from small and weak sovereign nations and towards some form of 
confederation. 
These declarations, if not carefully worded, are apt to come home to roost, and 
even if carefully worded, frequently lead to accelerated and exaggerated demands. I 
do not see how the Sudan can become "a fully independent state exercising full 
rights of sovereignty" for many years (I hesitate to name a term) and its future may 
well lie either in Dominion status in the British Commonwealth or in autonomous 
membership (with or without its Southern Provinces) of a Near Eastern Federation 
(Egypt, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq). My present opinion is that an early 
declaration would be inopportune. 
6 Not printed. 
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[Future of the Sudan]: letter from Sir M Lampson to Sir A Cadogan 
With reference to my letter 1275/3/42 of 11th October and Scrivener's letter to 
Shone J 3736/1528/16 of lOth September, I enclose a copy of a letter from 
Huddleston about the future administration and status of the Sudan.1 I discussed the 
question with Huddleston during his recent visit here and he has since seen this 
letter in draft and agrees with it. 
I agree generally with Huddleston's letter. The exchange of Cyrenaica for the 
Sudan is, in our joint view, quite outside the sphere of practical politics. The 
Egyptians would no doubt like to have Cyrenaica or at least a part of it up to Bardia to 
which they sometimes advance a claim based on proposals alleged to have been made 
in Kitchener's time, but they are not seriously interested in it and would certainly 
not regard it as in any sense comparable to the loss of their interest in the Sudan. 
The Sudan has for Egypt practical, historical and sentimental associations which will 
1 See 11. 
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I surmise never be eradicated. Their share in the control of the Sudan is regarded as 
an important guarantee for the safety of their supply of Nile water. These general 
considerations are reinforced by the present ideas of increasing the supply of water 
eventually by the Lake Tsana scheme and by the proposed canal through the sudd.2 I 
do not believe any Egyptian Government could ever agree to give up its claim to 
share in the control of the Sudan in return for any territorial concession however 
large. 
If this exchange is excluded, what are we left with? At present, during the war, I feel 
fairly confident that we can, without too much difficulty, damp down any Egyptian 
movement towards greater control over the Sudan or towards raising questions of sov-
ereignty with regard to it. I would have no hesitation in refusing point blank to listen 
to any agitation of this kind. If we make our position clear in this way in the face of 
any talk or agitation, it will be in the Government's interest to damp it down, as they 
can perfectly well do with their powers of censorship and etat de siege. 
After the war we ought to be in a position to continue to take a strong line if we 
wish to do so. There will inevitably be a period of ebullition on the part of the 
"young" nations of the Middle East which, in Egypt, is likely to include a certain 
amount of irredentist feeling with regard to the Sudan. After the last war we did not 
use our military position to deal with movements of this kind with a strong hand. 
This time we shall have even greater preoccupations elsewhere than we had last time, 
but I sincerely hope that we shall not lose our grip in the same way. 
It will be much easier to avoid making concessions to Egyptian agitation about the 
Sudan against our better judgment, particularly with the state of feeling likely to be 
prevailing at home, if we have a Sudanese national movement to oppose to Egyptian 
pressure. Huddleston's letter shows that the Sudan [Government] are fully conscious 
of the importance of not repressing the beginnings of a Sudanese national movement 
however tiresome this may be to the administration, and I am sure that he will take 
every opportunity of moving towards the vitally important next stage of associating 
Sudanese with the administration at the centre. This being so the longer we can put 
off a show-down with the Egyptians the stronger will be our position. The question in 
so far as Egypt is concerned is at present dormant and I trust we can keep it so at least 
until the end of the war. The position which will arise then must for the present remain 
a question mark, both as regards the feeling of British public opinion and as regards 
the progress which will by then have been made in "Sudanisation". In these circum-
stances I do not feel able to comment usefully at the moment on any detailed proposal 
for a new statement of the relationships of Great Britain, Egypt and the Sudan. 
2For a summary of Nile Waters proposals at this date, see 27. 
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[Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan]: despatch no 343 from Sir 
M Lampson to Mr Eden. Enclosure: despatch from Sir H Huddleston 
(21 Mar 1943) 
With reference to my despatch No. 185 of the 18th February, I have the honour to 
transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from the Governor-General of the Sudan 
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containing his Excellency's proposals for the creation of a General Advisory Council 
for the Northern Sudan and of Province Councils. 
2. The draft legislation enclosed in Sir H. Huddleston's despatch marks a most 
important step forward in the political development of the Sudan. A Central Advisory 
Council for the Northern Sudan would meet the need which has for some time now 
been felt for the creation of a central organ of Sudanese opinion which would enable 
the Administration to be informed more authoritatively of the needs and feelings of 
the population and would gradually train the Sudanese up to the level at which they 
can themselves contribute to the central administration of their country. Many 
recent signs of awakening political consciousness, such as the activities of the 
Sudanese Graduates' Congress, have shown that a demand for greater Sudanese 
participation in the administration is beginning to arise. The remarkable success of 
the various forms of local government which have been entrusted to Sudanese in 
different parts of the country shows equally clearly that the Sudanese are capable of 
assuming a fuller measure of political responsibility. It is certainly wise to introduce 
measures of the kind proposed before the demand grows too insistent and before 
political agitation has begun to make it more difficult for enlightened Sudanese to 
co-operate with the Government. 
3. The moment seems also to be well chosen, having regard to more general 
considerations. The disturbing effects of the war have to a considerable extent 
receded from the Sudan, and the political ferment which is thought by some 
observers to be likely to follow the general cessation of hostilities, and of which 
certain incipient signs are perhaps visible in other Middle East and Arab coun-
tries, has not yet begun to spread into the Sudan. The Sudan will be in a much 
better condition to meet it if measures of the kind now proposed are passed 
now. 
4. The proposed council is confined at present to the Northern Sudan because 
this area is so much more advanced in every way than the south. The racial and other 
differences between the two areas make it perfectly feasible to deal with the north as 
a separate unit for this purpose. 
5. I strongly recommend that I may be authorised to inform Sir H. Huddleston 
that His Majesty's Government approve the draft legislation enclosed in his despatch 
and the immediate implementation of his proposals. 
6. On the assumption that my recommendation is approved, it remains to 
consider Egyptian reactions to the action proposed. There is always a tendency 
among those of extreme opinion in Egypt to suggest that measures tending to give 
greater autonomy to the Sudanese are inspired by us mainly with a view to detaching 
the Sudan from Egypt and keeping it under our own influence. The enemy 
propaganda mentioned in the last paragraph of Sir H. Huddleston's despatch might 
perhaps render it more likely that suspicions of this kind will be entertained with 
regard to the measures now proposed, even though those Egyptians who can regard 
the question with any objectivity must approve proposals which represent so 
important a step in the path of political development which they themselves have 
followed. But in fact these considerations are not altogether relevant. Whatever the 
feelings of the Egyptians who consider these proposals, it would not be possible for 
them in practice to voice objections to any measures giving greater political 
responsibility to the Sudanese, as this would inevitably alienate Sudanese opinion 
from them. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Egyptian Government and 
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Egyptian opinion will have to acquiesce in these measures, quite apart from any 
pressure which we might put on them. I have carefully considered whether as a 
matter of tactics it is better to treat this legislation in regard to the Egyptian 
Government in exactly the same way as ordinary legislation passed from time to time 
in the Sudan, or whether some special arrangement should be made to associate the 
Egyptian Government with it, and I have come to the conclusion that the first of 
these courses is definitely right. The first Condominium Agreement of 1899 gives the 
Governor-General power to make by proclamation any laws, orders and regulations 
"for the good government of the Sudan." There is nothing to show that he must 
obtain the consent of either of the Condominium Powers before making any such 
laws. Indeed, on the contrary it is only laid down that he should notify them to the 
British and Egyptian authorities. The practice is that the approval of His Majesty's 
Ambassador at Cairo and High Commissioner for the Sudan is obtained by the 
Governor-General before ordinances are passed into law. But this is a private 
arrangement of which the Egyptian Government are not, so far as I know, aware. The 
Egyptian Government are never consulted before an ordinance is passed, but are 
informed of it by the Sudan Government immediately after it is passed. I am sure it is 
far best in the present case to follow this normal routine procedure, and I therefore 
propose that, as soon as you inform me that His Majesty's Government approve the 
proposed legislation, the relative ordinances and regulations should be issued by the 
Governor-General, and notification be sent to the Egyptian Government in the usual 
way. 
7. The Sudan Government are most anxious not to lose any time in putting 
these proposals into effect and I fully share their feelings on this point. I therefore 
request that you will be good enough to inform me by telegram of the instruc-
tions of His Majesty's Government both as regards the Sudan Government's 
proposals and as regards the manner of presenting them to the Egyptian 
Government. 
8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir H. Huddleston and the Minister of 
State. 
Enclosure to 13: despatch from Sir H Huddleston to Sir M Lampson, 21 Mar 1943 
I have the honour to refer to the correspondence between your Excellency and Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, and between your Excellency and myself, which arose out of my 
despatch No. 82 dated the 7th October, 1942, forwarding a note by my civil secretary 
dated the lOth September, 1942, on the closer association of the Sudanese with the 
local and central Government of the Sudan. 
From this correspondence I was encouraged to think that the implementation of 
the specific measures recommended in paragraph 8 of the note of the lOth 
September, 1942, was likely to enjoy the support both of your Excellency and His 
Majesty's Government. 
2. Acting upon this, I approved the formation of the Special Committee 
recommended in paragraph 8 (iii) of the note and charged them with the task of 
investigating the expediency of forming an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, 
and, if found feasible, to make recommendation as to its composition, terms of 
reference and approximate date of creation. The committee, a strong one which 
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included five members of my Council and the Governors of the two largest provinces, 
duly presented their report. Their recommendations, which I accepted in principle, 
were on my instructions embodied by my legal secretary in preliminary draft 
legislation. 
3. This draft legislation consists of three documents, viz.: The Advisory Councils 
Ordinance, 1943; the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan Order, 1943; and the 
Local Government (Province Councils) Ordinance, 1943. Copies of all three 
documents are attached. e) 
The draft Local Government (Province Councils) Ordinance, though local and 
provincial in character, should be regarded as an integral part of the whole since its 
provisions are closely interlocked with and complementary to those of the Advisory 
Councils Ordinance. Furthermore, it completes the pyramid based on the many rural 
and urban local Government bodies existing or coming to birth throughout the 
Northern Sudan and leading up through the Province Councils by a direct and 
logical sequence to the Advisory Council. 
4. Being aware that this provisional body of legislation represents a political 
development of far-reaching import which may well ultimately affect the 
Constitution of the Sudan, I considered it proper and convenient to invite my 
Council in the first instance to consider it purely in draft legislative form and then, if 
agreed, to forward it in the same form for consideration and approval in principle by 
your Excellency and His Majesty's Gover~ment. 
My Council accordingly took note of the draft legislation at their 508th Meeting 
and approved its submission to your Excellency in its present form. 
5. I should therefore be glad of an assurance that this draft legislation is not 
inconsistent with the general policy of His Majesty's Government in relation to the 
wide trends of political development both within the British Commonwealth of 
Nations and elsewhere. On the receipt of such an assurance my Council would at 
once proceed to pass the legislation subject to such amendments in detail as it may 
consider desirable. This would be followed by the preparation and approval of 
suitable regulations governing the proceedings of the Advisory Council for the 
Northern Sudan and by the promulgation of orders setting up Province Councils in 
such provinces as are ready for them. 
6. I think it right to inform your Excellency that, as was inevitable, rumours 
have begun to circulate in the Sudan regarding the establishment of some form of 
Central Advisory Council and it can only be a matter of time before these rumours 
reach Egypt. Furthermore, as your Excellency is no doubt aware, the Axis 
Propaganda Service has already launched a campaign misrepresenting and exagger-
ating the functions of a newly-formed departmental Advisory Committee on purely 
local government affairs and affecting to see in the establishment of this depart-
mental committee a perfidious step towards the severance of the connexion 
between Egypt and the Sudan. I suggest, therefore, to your Excellency that it has 
become necessary to consider whether and, if so, to what extent and in what 
manner the Egyptian Government should be informed at this stage of the present 
proposal. 
e) Not printed. 
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14 FO 371135576, no 4998 8 Nov 1943 
[Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan]: letter from F D Rugman 
(acting governor-general) to T A Shone1 
I am now in a position to inform you of the first reactions of Sudan public opinion, 
British as well as Sudanese, to the Advisory Council Legislation which was submitted 
under cover of my despatch No.61 dated the 17th August 1943. It was perhaps 
regrettably inevitable that public interest should concentrate on the Central Advisory 
Council to the exclusion of the equally important institution of partly executive 
province councils, the coping stones of the whole local government system. 
2. The most universal criticism voiced by some British as well as most Sudanese 
is against the large number of safeguards which are regarded as redundant and 
uncalled for in a council which is purely advisory and are interpreted as being 
intended to stifle all criticism and the free discussion of any important or 
controversial subject. Similarly the seemingly cumbersome machinery by which 
private members may ask for a matter of policy to be explained is regarded as being 
an effective barrier against the introduction of any burning problem of the day. 
These criticisms are regarded as being of a genuinely constructive nature and the 
possibility of taking measures to meet them at least in part and after the formation of 
the Council is under consideration. 
3. Less responsible criticism has followed the expected lines, suspecting and 
condemning an implied intention of separating the Northern from the Southern 
Sudan, reflecting the refusal of the educated class to recognise the right of "rural 
elements" from the provinces to a majority or even an equality of representation, and 
resenting the lack of legislative powers. I am enclosing a copy of a summary of press 
criticism made at the end of September. 
4. Since then the Graduates' Congress has submitted a Memorandum arguing 
first in general terms that a Council with even partial executive or legislative powers 
has been proved in practice to be more efficient and effective than a purely advisory 
body, and condemning the whole Southern policy of the Sudan Government as 
apparently reflected in the legislation. It goes on to complain that the number of 
members is far too small in proportion to the population, and that representatives 
are nominated and not elected by popular vote. It attacks the restrictive provisions 
which are to be found in Clauses 9, 10, 15, 20, 21(2) and 22 of the Order setting up an 
Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, and it concludes that the Council in view 
of these safeguards cannot be expected even to carry out the advisory duties for 
which it was instituted. 
The Congress Committee later passed by a small majority a resolution boycotting 
the Council and forbidding its members to accept nomination on pain of expulsion, 
but I have reason to believe that this was the work of a clique which has not the 
support of the majority of members and that it is likely to be repealed. I consider it 
unlikely that any Sudanese who is invited to accept nomination will decline to do so. 
5. Informed and moderate opinion throughout the country may be said to 
welcome the Council as a substantial step forward but to be disappointed at the 
safeguards and to share in greater or less degree the criticisms set out in paragraph 2 
1 Counsellor with the local rank of minister plenipotentiary at the embassy in Cairo, 1940- 1944. 
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above. This section of opinion is prepared to admit that the success of the Council 
will largely depend upon the selection of suitable members and the manner in which 
it will in practice be called upon to work. Moderate reaction may in fact be better 
described as apprehension rather than criticism, and I have every reason to suppose 
that if the necessary action is taken to remove this apprehension either by partial 
amendment or by liberal interpretation or both, public opinion will be prepared to 
await with benevolent interest the practical results of the legislation. 
15 FO 371135576, no 4986 24 Nov 1943 
[Sudanese political development]: letter from D Newbold to G ER 
Sandars on Egypt and the status of the Sudan.1 Minutes by W E 
Beckett and P S Scrivener 
As you are only too well aware, there are indications that we may be moving towards 
another crisis with Egypt over the Sudan, a crisis which looks like developing as soon 
as the war is over (probably as an offshoot of the peace settlement tussle), and which 
may prove to be the final show-down. On the one hand, we keep hearing reports from 
Egypt that Nahas intends to raise the whole Sudan question after the war, and 
personally I think there are very strong reasons for believing that he (or indeed any 
Egyptian Government that finds itself in office at the end of the war) will do so. The 
Egyptians are now convinced that, under the protection of the Treaty, the Sudan 
Government is encouraging a separatist Sudanese movement inimical to Egypt's 
interests, and that unless they do something about it quickly they may lose the 
Sudan for good. The moment for them to act will naturally be immediately after the 
war, and the grounds on which they will raise the Sudan question, will, I imagine be 
that (i) the Treaty is not working satisfactorily and (ii) that the time has come to offer 
the Sudanese a clearer and more secure basis for their development than an unreal 
and thorny partnership between two ill-assorted mandatories vaguely guaranteeing 
their welfare but unable to co-operate effectively to that end. On the other hand, the 
Sudanese, conscious of having made a notable contribution in men and material to 
the British war effort, and established their identity and name in the Empire and the 
world as a recognisable semi-autonomous entity, are staking a claim to a higher 
political status after the war than they have hitherto enjoyed under the 
Condominium, and they definitely expect to get 'something' out of H.M.G. and the 
Atlantic Charter as a reward for what they have done. These aspirations, which are 
not unreasonable under modern conditions, may have to be met in some way or 
another, but it is almost certain that anything we here or H.M.G. may propose to that 
end (e.g. a Sudanese Nationality law, some Sudanese seats on H.E. 's Council, a 
conversion of the Advisory Council into a Legislative Council) will be considered by 
the Egyptians as prejudicial to their position in the Sudan. 
The most salient feature in this situation, as I see it, is that the wishes of the 
Sudanese themselves will, for the first time in the history of the Anglo--Egyptian tug-
of-war over the Sudan, be one of the decisive factors. Sudanese political 
consciousness has developed considerably since the conclusion of the 
1 This copy was forwarded to the FO on 28 Nov 1943 by RC Mayall. 
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Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and with an Advisory Council in being and the Atlantic 
Charter in the background, it will be impossible for the Condominium partners, 
separately or jointly, to modify the status of the Sudan or make any new decisions 
about its future without some formal consultation of the wishes of its people. A 
promise has in fact been given that responsible opinion would be consulted in this 
eventuality. The Egyptians are doubtless aware of this, and may be clever enough to 
stake their whole case on a direct appeal to the Sudanese. They have come to know 
the Sudanese much better since 1936 than they had ever known them before. They 
now know that any Egyptian claim of sovereignty over the Sudan deriving from 
rights of conquest is highly offensive to the Sudanese. Some of them have even come 
to realise, at last, that Sudanese nationalism is not a British invention, and that the 
Sudanese really wish to preserve and develop an autonomous identity. It is certain 
therefore that the Sudan question this time will not be raised merely in the form of a 
bilateral argument with the British Government about Egyptian rights in the Sudan, 
but rather in the form of proposals to be put to the Sudanese. Nor are indications 
lacking as to what line these proposals will follow. Nahas's recent speech gives a clear 
pointer. His declaration that in the eyes of Egypt the Sudanese and Egyptians are the 
sons of one nation having equal rights and obligations is in fact tantamount to an 
implied offer of equal citizenship. Again when Ali El Bereir2 was here last winter, he 
gave it out that if the Sudan was united to Egypt, the Egyptians would respect the 
Sudanese desire to preserve their own identity and would allow them a large measure 
of autonomy; and the same idea, I am told, was expressed by Prince Omar Toussoun3 
to Mohammed Khalifa Sherif,4 the Prince suggesting that there would be no 
objection to the Sudan having its own local government under a Sudanese 'Wali' 
representing the Egyptian Crown. 
I may have slightly exaggerated the danger, but this is how matters look to me at 
this end, and some sort of infiltration, propaganda, etc. is the least that we can 
expect. I should be very grateful for any views you may have to offer from your 
angle, and for any indication that may come your way, now or later, as to the 
intentions of the Egyptian Government, or how and when they are likely to make a 
move in this direction. We must have some warning. 5 
I don't think it is realised by the majority of British officials here (a) how delicate 
the situation may become, (b) how fast the outside world is moving in new political 
ideas, (c) how difficult it will be to adopt a non-possumus attitude over political 
advance after the war to the Sudanese, when Egypt may be dangling a deed of 
partnership like a yellow carrot in front of their nose, when the British have 
exercised pressure on the French to unloose their grip in Syria, and when new 
constitutions may be visible in Libya, W. Mrica, Ceylon, Philippines and perhaps 
Malaya. We must be ready to regard the Advisory Council, not as the end of a series of 
devolutionary measures, but as the first of a series of real steps towards self-
2 Ali Birair, a Sudanese living in Egypt was a strong advocate of Egyptian claims to the Sudan. He later 
attempted to stand for the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies in December 1944, but withdrew his candidacy 
following British protests to the Egyptian government. 
3 Prince Umar Tusun (1872-1944) , a great-grandson of Muhammad Ali, was an advocate of the 
retrocession of the Sudan to Egypt, and the author of several historical studies of Egypt's involvement in 
the Sudan (seeR H Hill, A biographical dictionary of the Sudan (London, 1967), p 365) . 
4 Muhammed Khalifa Sharif, nephew and business partner of SAR. 
5 Underlined by FO. 
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government, and the pace of those steps will be dictated not by the Sudan 
Government or even, probably the British Government, but by world opinion and 
world events and especially events in Egypt and the Arab States of the Middle East, 
and that pace certainly will be faster than most people here realise. 
Minutes on 15 
Most of what is said in these letters seems to me to be very sound. I should have 
thought we could take it as very nearly certain that the future of the Sudan will 
become a burning issue before long. I must say I do not think that the grounds on 
which the Egyptian Government will raise the Sudan question will be the grounds 
specified in (1) and (ii) in the first paragraph of Mr. Newbold's letter. These grounds 
seem to me far too measured and judicial and not sufficiently popular for the 
Egyptian Government. I should have thought the Egyptian Government would put 
their case on the grounds (a) Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan (which they 
always assert, though we say that it is only half sovereignty), (b) that the Sudanese 
are Arab and Moslem brothers (conveniently forgetting of course all the southern 
part of the Sudan which is neither of these things). Further, I cannot resist a feeling 
that the Arab and Moslem brotherhood line will have some appeal in the Sudan 
especially if it is combined with offers of local autonomy as well as having a 
tremendous appeal to the Arab world in general. So far as I can see the practical 
alternatives before us would seem to be a continuation of the con-Dominium [sic] 
with increased Sudanese self-government, and to divide the Sudan so that the 
southern and non-Arab part becomes a purely British responsibility and the northern 
and Arab part goes to Egypt with some guarantees of local autonomy, etc. (I don't 
suppose that we should like this course). Anyway, if the Advisory Council is to come 
into being before the future of the Sudan is settled, it will obviously be important 
that it is constituted in such a manner as to be purely representative of the Sudan 
and not merely of the Arab and Moslem part of it. ... 
W.E.B. 
17.12.43 
As regards Mr. Beckett's second alternative, I agree that it is distasteful-but if such 
are the wishes of the Sudanese Arabs, freely expressed, it will be difficult to avoid it. 
Apart from the sentimental side of the question, & from the strategic angle, we have 
really very small interests in the Sudan-as opposed to responsibilities. 
P.S. 
17.12.43 
16 FO 371141363, no 264 29 Dec 1943 
[Sudanese political development]: letter from Lord Killearn to Sir A 
Cadogan 
I enclose a copy of a private letter from Newbold in Khartoum to the Sudan Agent 
here about the future of relations between Egypt and the Sudan.1 Newbold has 
1 See 15. 
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agreed to my sending you a copy of this letter provided that its private and unofficial 
character is fully understood. 
My general impression is that Newbold credits the Egyptian Government with 
more definite ideas on policy than they in fact yet have. It is worth recalling that the 
Opposition representatives, in their recent communication to the "Big Three", talked 
in the traditional Egyptian style of Egyptian rights in the Sudan but said nothing 
about Sudanese rights. Newbold appears to attribute too precise a sense to Nahas' 
declaration that in the eyes of Egypt the Sudanese and the Egyptians are the sons of 
one nation, having equal rights of citizenship. This is the sort of thing that Egyptian 
politicians have been saying for decades. 
When the time comes for Egypt to formulate her claims in the Sudan, she will 
have to make her action conform to the Atlantic Charter in theory at any rate, and 
this would involve asking the Sudanese what they think about it. It seems, therefore, 
that our policy must be to offer the Sudanese a more hopeful prospect than Egypt 
can do, in other words, that we should endeavour to associate the Sudanese more 
and more in the administration of the Sudan and at the same time endeavour to 
promote Anglo-Sudanese economic development. If in this way numerous educated 
elements are absorbed into administrative and economic jobs and they see that they 
are making a good thing out of the British connection, there is less chance that the 
"yellow carrot" of the Egyptians will prove much of an attraction. 
With reference to the penultimate paragraph of New bold's letter, one of the Sudan 
Agent's informants claims to have learnt from Abdel Hakk, the present Minister of 
Wakfs,2 that a Wafdist committee is to examine the whole question of Egypt's post-
war claims, including that of the Sudan. It may, however, be difficult for us to get 
early information of the intentions of the Egyptian Government as regards the 
Sudan. They are likely to keep pretty quiet about it, particularly as they are afraid of 
offending us at a moment when their continuance in office depends on our support. 
If the Egyptians come to shaping their policy to take account of Sudanese 
aspirations, it seems that their support for these aspirations can only be dangerous to 
us, (as Egyptian support was dangerous to the French in the Lebanon), if Sudanese 
aspirations are being blocked by us. If we keep reasonable pace with genuine 
Sudanese political feeling or do not apply too great a retarding influence, any 
Egyptian campaign in favour of greater Sudanese independence would be tilting at 
windmills. In so far as Egyptian action was effective in the Lebanon, this was so only 
because the French had flagrantly repressed a spontaneous Lebanese movement 
towards greater independence. I surmise it will be a long time yet before any such 
movement in the Sudan can be said to exist and the Egyptians have the further 
difficulty in this case that it is dangerous for them to propagate among the Sudanese 
ideas of independence as such, as this may easily lead to a desire for greater 
independence from Egypt as well as from Great Britain. 
It is perhaps worth noticing that so far as I know no attempts have been made by 
the Egyptian Government to consult the Sudanese about Arab unity, though I think 
there was just a reference to it in one of Nahas' earlier conversations-! think with 
Nuri? This may be because the Egyptian Government regard themselves as speaking 
for both Egypt and the Sudan in this matter, but it suggests that the Egyptian 
2 Waqf, Islamic endowment. The ministry of Waqfs (or Awqaf) disbursed funds in support of religious 
projects, and regulated Islamic trusts. 
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Government do not yet wish to cash in on the new Sudanese autonomous aspirations 
and probably are still thinking in terms of a return of the Sudan into an Egyptian state. 
In spite of the fact that Newbold is perhaps crediting the Egyptians with a too 
definite line of policy, it seems most desirable that the Sudan Government should 
continue to pursue the policy which he advocates, namely, that they should not sit 
back now and think they can leave Sudanese political development to look after itself 
for another period, but that they should continually look for new means of 
associating the Sudanese with the Government of the country and giving them 
opportunities for developing a healthy sense of standing on their own feet. In short 
should lead rather than be led. 
You will remember we specifically included the phrase about the Sudan in the 
Treaty to forestall any Egyptian attempt to "Egyptianise" it. It looks as though the 
phrase was likely to prove helpful and useful. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to Huddleston. 
17 FO 371141363, no 2121 1 Jan 1944 
[Unity of the Sudan]: despatch from Mustafa al-Nahhas to Sir H 
Huddleston [Extract] 
. .. 2. The division of the Sudan 
The Sudan Government has carried out a very vital change in the administration. 
Some of its proceedings lead one to believe that it is intended to divide the Sudan into 
two parts: a Northern and a Southern one. You have appointed an Advisory Council to 
the Northern Division. At the same time you have given extensive authority in 
Administrative and Legal matters to the Tribal Chiefs. You should not have undertaken 
these steps at all without the previous knowledge and agreement of the two 
Governments-the Egyptian and British-and in particular of the Egyptian 
Government. This action may be interpreted to mean that the object is to divide the 
Sudan into two parts, keeping the Southern Division isolated to be a pasture land for 
the Christian Missionary Societies. Your Excellency is well aware of the nervous 
tension of Mohammedans throughout the Nile Valley which will result from such a 
step-since it will raise religious problems, the raising of which is neither wise nor to 
any one's interest. What lends colour to the above interpretation is the information 
which has reached me that you prevent the people from the North to enter the 
Southern Zone, and vice versa. This is very odd arrangement in the Administration . . .. 
18 FO 371/41363, no 713 12 Jan 1944 
[Future of the Sudan]: note by ES Atiyah1 of a conversation with 
Ibrahim Ahmad on 7 Jan 1944 [Extract] 
. .. 3. He then opened the subject of the future of the Sudan and expressed concern 
over the intensification of Egyptian propaganda and the new line it was taking. I 
1 Edward S Atiyah, Lebanese employed in the intelligence and public security departments of the civil 
secretary's office, 1930-1941; public relations officer, press and publicity section, civil secretary's office, 
1942- 1945. 
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asked him what his own opinion was on the future of the Sudan and what he thought 
were the views of the majority of the educated Sudanese. His reply was extremely 
candid and interesting; indeed, I was quite surprised at his frankness. He said there 
was, as yet, no clear homogeneous opinion in the Sudan concerning the future but 
many conflicting desires and views. The most conspicuous feature in the Sudan was 
Sayed Abd el Rahman el Mahdi's policy and personal ambitions. The Sayed, 
supported and encouraged by Mohammed Khalifa Sherif, was pursuing too 
impetuous and blatant a line. His separatist attitude towards Egypt gave the 
impression that he hoped to become King of an independent Sudan. Ibrahim went on 
to say that he did not approve of this policy of the Sayed's and that he had advised 
him very frankly against it. Kingship without real independence would be, in his 
opinion, a bad thing for the Sudan as for any other country, because the King, in 
such a situation, would be, or at least appear to be, as a mere tool in the hands of the 
ruling power, a facade behind which the real rulers would exercise their power 
without responsibility. The Sudan at the present stage of its development could not 
possibly become really independent. Any independence granted to it would be a 
sham. Therefore, Ibrahim did not want either independence or a King for his country 
for the time being, and he believed that this would be the attitude of the majority of 
the educated Sudanese. 
4. The Sudan, he went on, was still in need of guidance and training for self-gov-
ernment. He was convinced that it was only from England that the Sudan could have 
the help she needed. The British were good administrators and he wished them to 
remain here for a considerable time to come to train the Sudanese in administration 
and gradually hand over the government to them. But, on the other hand, he did not 
wish to see the British remain in the Sudan without the Egyptians. He did not wish to 
see the Condominium dissolved and the Egyptian share in it completely abolished, 
because, much as he admired the British as administrators and desired their help, he 
did not trust them sufficiently to be willing to place the Sudan entirely at their mercy. 
The Sudan was a small and weak country and if Great Britain obtained exclusive con-
trol over it, the Sudanese would have no safeguards against exploitation. The 
Egyptians were very bad administrators, their morals were corrupt and the Sudan 
could not benefit directly from their presence, but their partnership in the 
Condominium constituted a check on the British, and, he believed, this check was very 
beneficial to the Sudan. Besides, the Sudanese had many things in common with the 
Egyptians and it was to their advantage to maintain friendly mutual relations with 
Egypt. In his opinion it was undesirable that the Sudan should prejudice these good 
relations by demanding the dissolution of the Condominium in favour of Great 
Britain. If they did that, they would make an enemy of Egypt and that would certainly 
be to their disadvantage. Ibrahim therefore believed that the best thing for the Sudan 
for the time being was to remain under the Condominium as at present working, i.e. 
a Condominium in which Egypt's share was nominal and real control and adminis-
tration in the hands of the British. Within this frame-work the Sudanese should press 
for quicker training in the arts of self-government and a steadily increasing share in 
the management of their own affairs until, at some day in the future, they were ready 
to stand entirely alone and have complete self-government. Then they could choose 
what external connection to have with Britain, Egypt and the Arab world . .. . 
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19 FO 371141363, no 1099 [Mar 1944] 
[Condition of the country]: note by P S Scrivener on his tour of the 
Sudan (23 Feb-1 Mar 1944) [Extract] 
To anyone who has not visited the Sudan recently the proofs of awakened national 
consciousness are impressive. The ambitions of Sudanese nationalism may be 
expressed crudely and with a doctrinaire disregard for inconvenient facts (we1 heard 
examples of this) but, hitherto at any rate, the Sudanese concerned seem to have suc-
ceeded (thanks no doubt to the way in which they have been handled) in preserving a 
certain sense of humour which enables discussion to proceed without rancour. What 
interested us more particularly was the vigorous questioning by the Sudanese of the 
tangible advantages of condominium status. The Sudanese have clearly made them-
selves thoroughly familiar with the different funds etc., which are in existence for pro-
moting various aspects of Colonial development, more particularly in the field of 
education; and they regard themselves as being at a serious disadvantage in that, 
despite their efforts in the war, the Foreign Office has no equivalent sources of bounty 
at its disposal. Indeed they did not hesitate to ask what we proposed to do about it. The 
political implications, or possible implications, of being assimilated to British 
Colonies for charitable purposes (if one may so describe it) did not appear to worry the 
Sudanese in the least: and whatever complications may be present in the situation, 
confidence in the ultimate virtue of our intentions towards them does not seem to be 
lacking. But they all want us to force the pace, as witness the view expressed recently 
by the Civil Secretary that it must continue to be His Majesty's Government and not 
Egypt who hold and exercise the initiative in the matter of Sudanese political progress. 
(The Sudanese would love a five year plan all worked out in advance.) 
The foregoing remarks lead directly to the main difficulty which, as explained to us 
personally by the Governor-General, confronts the execution of a forward political 
policy, viz., the dearth of fully educated Sudanese to take over technical and 
administrative posts, and the virtual impossibility under present conditions of 
producing an educated class in sufficient numbers. 
The Sudan started with nothing in the nature of an upper or cultured class 
anywhere. In the early days of the condominium educational progress was bound to 
be slow, but when it became desirable-on account of the development of an 
indigenous nationalist movement-to give a marked extension to higher education, 
the whole programme was restricted and thrown out of gear by the war with its crop 
of administrative and man-power difficulties, and the virtual interruption which it 
imposed on the technical training and higher education of Sudanese abroad. 
However, despite these handicaps the Sudanese (on the authority of a private 
report, which I was allowed to see, by Mr. Cox2 on his recent visit there) are in the 
van of Colonial educational progress, and it is hoped that the forthcoming visit of the 
Asquith Commission3 will enable them to develop plans for the future. Under these 
1 Scrivener was accompanied by C H Johnston, 2nd secretary at the embassy in Cairo. 
2 C W M Cox, fellow of New College, Oxford, seconded to Sudan as director of education, 1937-1939; 
member of governor-general's council, 1938-1939. 
3 Sir Cyril Asquith's commission on higher education in the colonies, set up by the CO in 1943, was 
instructed to take into account evidence from the Sudan. The Asquith Commission Report was published 
in 1945 (Cmd 6647, June 1945). 
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conditions it seems very desirable that His Majesty's Government should consider 
what assistance (apart from the advice of the Asquith Committee) can be given to the 
Sudan Government to enable them to recover lost ground in the educational field. 
The question is of future political importance and I propose shortly to put forward 
proposals (which would, however, unduly lengthen this report) . 
The second point which struck us was the feeling that too little was known in the 
outside world about what the Sudan had done and was doing, not only as regards 
active campaigning but also as regards cotton production, economy in consumption 
of supplies, anti-inflation measures and so forth. This feeling was coupled with the 
hope that some concession in the matter of the supply of consumer goods would now 
be made to the Sudan in recognition of the sacrifices willingly accepted in the more 
critical years. Criticisms on this score were voiced by such varied elements as the 
Head of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and a member of Congress (who, I should 
imagine, were not accustomed to seeing eye to eye on any conceivable subject 
whatever) .. .. 
A third point which Sir D. Newbold was good enough to discuss with us at some 
length is the Southern Sudan, the alleged neglect of which by the Sudan 
Government has been a subject of criticism both by the Egyptians and also by 
Congress. Broadly speaking the intentions of the Sudan Government (which have 
not yet, I think, been crystallised into a definite policy) are to re-divide the present 
Equatorial Province into its two former components, Mongalla and Bahr-el-Ghazal,4 
and to launch as soon as possible a major educational drive with the object of placing 
the inhabitants on a footing where progress on the lines of that recently initiated in 
the north will become possible. This plan does not embrace the Upper Nile Province 
where the nature of the country and the racial peculiarities of its inhabitants are sui 
generis and call for special and less ambitious measures. It may be observed in 
parenthesis that the policy hitherto followed by the Sudan Government of making 
the missionary societies the agents of their educational policy in the south is 
beginning to prove unsatisfactory owing to the inability of the societies to deliver the 
goods above a certain standard. It looks as though sooner or later the societies may 
be relegated to a purely secondary position; and a certain amount of friction may be 
generated in the process. 
4 Mongalla and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces were amalgamated in 1936 to form Equatoria Province as part of 
Symes' drive for economy in administration. They were redivided in 1948, with Equatoria retaining the 
western-most districts along the Congolese and French Equatorial borders, previously administered by 
Bahr al-Ghazal. 
20 FO 371141363, no 1418 5 Mar 1944 
[SAR and SAM]: note byES Atiyah of PS Scrivener's interviews with 
Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani [Extract] 
Mr. Scrivener called on S.A.R. at his Abbasia house in Omdurman at 9.15 a.m. on 
Saturday, 26th February. 
Mter the usual courtesies, the Sayed passed on to the subject of the war, 
expressing his great admiration of the heroism displayed by the British people in 
1940 and 1941, and his gratification at the now sure prospect of an Allied victory. 
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This prospect, he said, was naturally beginning to focus people's attention all over 
the world on what was going to happen after the war. The Sudanese, like every other 
people who had fought on the Allied side, had their aspirations and hoped to see 
them realised through the victory of Britain and the United Nations. The Sudanese 
could have taken the view, which indeed was held by Sir Stewart Symes the then 
Governor-General, that the defence of the Sudan was the concern of the British and 
Condominium Governments, and that no obligation rested on them to participate 
actively in it, but they did not. They elected to regard the war as their war and to 
engage in it actively side by side with British, first in the defence of their country 
against the common enemy, and then further afield. They did this in the conviction 
that they would be able to realise their national aspirations through a British victory 
and at the hands of the British people and Government, in whose fairness and justice 
the experience of 45 years encouraged them to put their trust. The Sayed thought 
that the British people would be pleased to know that he, the son of Mahdi who was 
their enemy sixty years ago, was now, as the result of the just and beneficial 
administration of the British in the Sudan, their staunchest friend and ally, and 
believed that only through co-operation with Britain could the Sudan realise its 
destiny. 
The Sayed went on to say that the fact that the Sudan was not a colony, but a 
territory coming under the Foreign Office and enjoying the status of a special 
connection with Britain, had been one of the factors that made the Sudanese decide 
to regard the war as theirs and to engage actively in it. They felt that in doing so they 
would be acting rather as the "allies" than as the subjects of Britain. 
The British and the Sudan Governments, the Sayed continued, had for a long time 
adopted the principle of 'the Sudan for the Sudanese' as the basis of the present 
regime in the Sudan. By proclaiming this principle the British repudiated any 
intention on their part of annexing the Sudan as a colony, a repudiation which was 
very reassuring to the Sudanese. Unfortunately, however, there was another quarter 
from which the Sudanese felt threatened and they wanted the principle of the 'Sudan 
for the Sudanese' to apply vis-a-vis that quarter too. The Sudan Government had 
recently taken several propitious and well-timed steps in the direction of self-
government for the Sudanese. The Sudanese wished this policy to continue and 
hoped through it to rise after the war to a higher status than that accorded to them 
in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. When that Treaty was concluded the 
Condominium partners considered that the Sudanese people were not politically 
mature enough to be consulted about the future of their country, and therefore 
contented themselves with including in the Treaty a unilateral declaration affirming 
that the object of the Condominium Government must be the welfare of the 
Sudanese. This declaration was accepted by the Sudanese at the time as a pledge of 
good faith on the part of the Condominium partners, but the world had moved 
forward considerably since the conclusion of the Treaty and the Sudanese felt today, 
particularly in view of the part they had played in the war, that that welfare clause 
had ceased to be an adequate recognition of their rights and status. Despite the 
Condominium Agreement and the Zaafaran Treaty, 1 the Egyptians had refused to 
take any part in the defence of the Sudan. The Sudanese could not help feeling that 
this refusal made a difference to the Egyptian position in the Sudan. 
1 i.e. the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (negotiations for which began in the Zaafaran palace in Cairo). 
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Mr. Scrivener replied that while he had no authority to discuss such important and 
far-reaching questions, he was greatly interested to hear the Sayed's views on them 
and very grateful to the Sayed for expressing these views to him. At the same time he 
pointed out that the Treaty of 1936 covered other questions than the Sudan and had 
been of great benefit to Britain in the war, in that it ensured her a military base in 
Egypt of the utmost importance for the defence of the whole Middle East, including 
the Sudan. He added that the Egyptians had carried out their obligations under the 
Treaty to the full. The Sayed agreed, but countered by saying that Egypt had 
benefited from the Treaty as much as Britain, and that in any case it would be unjust 
to reward one party at the expense of the other. If the British felt that they owed 
Egypt something for the help she had given them in the war, the Sudanese had 
nothing to say to that, provided they were not made to pay the price. They had helped 
Britain in a more positive way than Egypt and expected Britain to reward them by a 
greater recognition of their national aspirations ... . 
The interview with Sayed Ali took place at 12.30 p.m. I had warned Mr. Scrivener 
not to expect any expression of interesting views from him, predicting that the Sayed 
would only talk about the weather and the war. In the event I was only 50% right. 
The Sayed talked only about the weather dealing with the subject, as Mr. Scrivener 
commented on leaving, "pretty thoroughly". 
21 FO 371141363, no 2121 18 May 1944 
[Unity of the Sudan]: despatch (reply) 1 from Sir H Huddleston to 
Mustafa al-Nahhas [Extract] 
... The division of the Sudan 
(i) Any division of the Sudan which exists does not arise from the Advisory 
Council or from any other administrative arrangement carried out by the Sudan 
Government, but from the natural, historic and tribal composition of the country. 
The six northern provinces are predominantly Arab in origin and culture, and the 
two southern provinces are inhabited by peoples akin racially to the tribes of central 
Africa and largely pagan. 
The people of the two Southern Provinces have not yet reached a stage of 
development in which they can usefully take part in the Advisory Council which I 
have recently set up, but nothing has been done which will prevent them doing so 
when they reach that stage. 
(ii) I cannot agree that the steps taken to establish local self-government in the 
Sudan or to set up an Advisory Council should have been submitted for the prior 
approval of the Government of Egypt. Article IV of the 1899 Agreement contains no 
such provision. 
This development is merely the most recent step in a series of legislative 
enactments which have become law since 1922, when an Ordinance giving judicial 
powers to Nomad Sheikhs was first introduced.2 This was followed by several other 
ordinances:-a Village Courts Ordinance in 1925, Powers of Sheikhs Ordinances in 
1 Reply to 17. 2 The Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, 1922. 
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1927 and 1928, a Chiefs Courts Ordinance in 1931, a Native Courts Ordinance in 
1932 and finally a corpus of three Local Government Ordinances passed in 1937 
covering Municipalities, Townships and Rural Areas. 
All these ordinances were, in accordance with the Condominium Agreement, 
notified to the British and Egyptian Governments at the time and have excited no 
previous comment. 
Local Government progress is normal in civilised countries and the steps so far 
taken to associate the Sudanese with the local administration of rural and urban 
areas, and more recently with the central government of their country have been 
welcomed by the Sudanese, and are, in my opinion, fully in accordance with the 
intention of the High Contracting Parties in the Treaty of 1936, where it was agreed 
by them that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the 
welfare of the Sudanese. 
(iii) There have been Christian Missionary Societies in the Southern Sudan for 
over a century and they were first admitted there by the former Egyptian 
Government. Since the reoccupation of the Sudan the Sudan Government has seen 
no reason to reject their generous and devoted efforts in the humanitarian aim of 
improving the education and health of the primitive tribes of Upper Nile and 
Equatoria Provinces. The missionary societies have no monopoly of education as is 
implied in Your Excellency's memorandum. Government education of a secular type 
is being introduced and will increase especially in the higher branches as funds and 
staff become available. Government hospitals and dispensaries are already 
widespread. Moreover such Moslem communities as exist in the South have their 
own mosques and undisturbed facilities for Arabic and Islamic teaching. 
(iv) There is no legislation to prevent people from the Northern Sudan going to 
the South, or southerners coming to the North. There are at the present time 
hundreds of Southern Sudanese in the north, where they come in search of work, 
and even enlist in northern units of the Sudan Defence Force. The Closed Districts 
Order of 1942 [sic, 1924] (Amended in 1925) reads:-"The districts set forth ... shall 
be closed districts to the extent that no person other than a native of the Sudan shall 
enter or remain therein unless he is the holder of a permit." This order, which has 
been applied to large areas in the Northern and western Sudan as well as to the two 
southern provinces, is designed to prevent unscrupulous foreigners from exploiting 
the simple inhabitants of these regions; and all traders entering such "closed" 
districts are compelled to obtain a special permit to trade therein .... 
22 FO 371/45973, no 99 7 Dec 1944 
[Education grant]: despatch no 128 from Sir H Huddleston to Lord 
Killearn on the proposed gift to the Gordon Memorial College 
[In July 1944 the FO forwarded to the Treasury a request from the Sudan government for 
£1,000,000 to endow Gordon College. This was rejected by the Treasury secretary on the 
grounds of 'our extremely difficult position as regards external finance', and 'the difficulty 
of convincing the Americans of the gravity of our problem if we continued to spend 
abroad as freely as we had in the past.' He went on to say: 'The essence of the present 
proposal, as I understand it, is that, for political reasons, we should make a spectacular 
gesture of munificence. I am afraid that .. . we are no longer in a position in which we can 
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play the Lady Bountiful with foreign currency, and, while I have no criticism of your 
objective, I fear that the Treasury view of your present proposal must be that on general 
financial grounds the suggested grant would be most inopportune' (Hopkins to Cadogan, 
10 Aug 1944, FO 371/45973, no 1318). In renewing the request and forwarding 
Huddleston's despatch to the FO, Killearn (22 Dec 1944) argued that the Sudan's claim to 
financial assistance for higher education from HMG was equal to those of the colonies, 
and 'the responsibility of His Majesty's Government no less real'. In addition to this there 
was competition from Egypt which was aimed at increasing Egyptian interest and 
intervention in Sudanese affairs. Sir 0 Sargent's minute to the Treasury of 3 Feb 1945, 
urging Huddleston's claim for an education grant, further noted that the grant would be 
spent within the sterling area, ' ... if the Sudan is not a British Colony still less is it a 
foreign country' (FO 371/45973, no 99).] 
I have the honour to refer to correspondence received under cover of Embassy 
Despatch No.238 dated August 3rd 1944, and to our conversation regarding the 
attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government to the proposed gift of £.1,000,000 to 
the Cordon Memorial College. 
2. I fully realise the difficulties which lie in the way of His Majesty's Government 
making such a gift, the vast expenditure which has occurred during the war and 
which still continues, the commitments which are obligatory on the British taxpayer, 
and the necessity for avoiding all non-productive external expenditure. 
The Sudan's plea is prompted by an urgent political need for some such gesture, 
and justified by the country's contribution to the British War Effort. These 
arguments have already been advanced at some length in my Despatch No. 77 dated 
the lOth June, 1944, but in the circumstances I feel it is necessary to restate and 
amplify them. 
3. The Egyptian Government has recently opened a Secondary School in 
Khartoum at an estimated capital cost of £E.250,000, and has asked for permission to 
build a hospital on a similar scale. There is evidence that Egyptian funds have been, 
and are being, freely expended in the Sudan on propaganda. Sudanese wishing for 
higher education in Cairo are normally admitted to schools and universities free and 
it is estimated that in 1943 there were 158 students being educated there in this way 
at the expense of the Egyptian Government. 
The Sudanese as a whole do not wish to be administered by Egypt, and remember 
earlier Egyptian rule with distaste, but an increasing minority of the educated class is 
attracted by the glitter of Egypt's gold, and there can be little doubt that a few have 
already been dazzled by it. 
4. As I explained in my previous Despatch, the benefits of the British connection 
are less tangible, and, although the middle and lower classes are apparently content 
with the present administration, numbers of well-disposed persons are disappointed 
by the failure of the British Government to interest itself in the Sudan except where 
its own security or profit is concerned. They are fully aware of the existence and 
purpose of the Colonial Development fund, and there have also been frequent 
references in the Vernacular Press to the Sudan's ineligibility to benefit from the 
British people's determination to assist their colonies on the way to progress. 
The following extract from a News Letter produced by a leading local journalist is 
quoted as a recent example of such comment:-
"Condominium Development Fund. The British have their four years' plan, 
and the Egyptian have a five years' one. Both governments have shown their 
willingness to spend as much as they can for Post-War reconstruction and 
social reforms. The British have gone further and founded a special Colonial 
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Development Fund, of which the Sudan, which fought with them, shall have 
no share! The principal aim of the High Contracting powers is our welfare. 
Can I say they are bound to find a Condominium Development Fund? To 
achieve that welfare means waging a vigorous campaign against ignorance, 
hunger and disease. The Sudan Budget, standing at about £E.6,000,000 more 
than half of which goes in salaries, pensions and gratuities, cannot withstand 
financing that campaign. It becomes necessary that the two Governments 
should find the necessary money. Is that too much for these 'so few' who have 
rarely been owed so much by so many? We do not think it is." 
This attitude was remarked on by Mr. Scrivener when commenting on his visit to 
the Sudan last winter.1 While stressing "the vigorous advantages of condominium 
status" he also remarked:-
"The Sudanese have clearly made themselves thoroughly familiar with the 
different funds etc., which are in existence for promoting various aspects of 
Colonial development, more particularly in the field of education; and they 
regard themselves as being at a serious disadvantage in that, despite their 
efforts in the war, the Foreign Office has no equivalent sources of bounty at 
its disposal. Indeed they did not hesitate to ask what we proposed to do about 
it." 
5. Should the British interest in the Sudan prove in the eyes of the Sudanese to 
be so weak that His Majesty's Government will not grant them assistance similar to 
that given to British Colonial territories it seems likely that the Sudanese will be 
driven against their wiser counsels to look to Egypt for the capital required for their 
future progress. The British attitude is to them impossible to understand, in that 
while they read daily of grants to Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and other African 
territories, they are told that the Sudan is ineligible, and that the British cannot 
afford to give to them what they give to others. 
They point out that the Sudan was considered eligible to send its young men to 
fight the Italians in East Africa and the Germans in North Africa and to garrison the 
Italian Colonies of Eritrea, Libya and Tripoli on behalf of His Majesty's Government 
and that within the past war years its products have been sold to the British Army 
and to the British Ministry of Supply at Sudan prices, which are well known to be the 
lowest in the Middle East and therefore must represent a most substantial saving to 
the British taxpayer. 
6. There exists now a great opportunity to win the sympathy and co-operation of 
the Sudanese by a gesture of this kind, and an equal danger that if it is not made in 
the near future the chance will be lost, possibly never to return, and Egyptian 
influence will have freer scope to spread than ever before. Egypt is prepared to spend 
money for this purpose and her pressure is growing. 
7. To assess British strategic interests in the Sudan vis-a-vis the Middle East and 
the route to the Far East is not within my competence, but should not be lost sight of 
in considering this proposal. A greater factor in my mind is the moral obligation laid 
upon us to maintain the present predominantly British regime in the Sudan with its 
willing co-operation between the Government and the governed, until the Sudanese 
1 See 19. 
48 ANTICIPATING POST-WAR SETTLEMENT [23] 
have reached a stage of political development in which they will be able to decide 
their own future. Failure to retain their confidence may result in jeopardising the 
patient and successful work of 45 years, and the surrender of a virile and friendly 
people to a corrupt and inefficient Government before they can stand upon their own 
feet. 
23 FO 371145972, no 97 12 Dec 1944 
[Sudan Graduates' Congress elections]: report from SPIS no 44 for 
November [Extract] 
[The Graduates' Congress elections in November 1944 marked the emergence of 
sectarian involvement in nationalist politics. Shortly after the elections, in which a 
Mirghanist (Khatmiya)-sponsored majority was elected, SAM openly declared that his 
intervention was necessary to prevent SAR from capturing the Congress, as he had 
already captured the Advisory Council, and that the real issue was SAR's monarchical 
ambitions, not union with Egypt (see SPIS no 45, para 358 in FO 371/45972, no 552).] 
Local affairs 
356. The Congress elections 
The Congress Annual General Meeting was held on 27.11.44 at the Graduates' Club, 
Omdurman. As expected, it dwarfed all previous meetings in size and its quality was 
in the necessary inverse proportion. The number of registered members stood at 
9,400 (cf. 1,300 in 1943 and 1,800 in 1942) on the day of the elections. Admission 
cards had been issued for 5,864 of them, but the number of members who actually 
attended and voted was 4,667 (cf. 966 in 1943 and 1,230 in 1942). 
In spite of its size, the excitement that had prevailed during the election campaign 
and the importance of the ostensible issues over which the election was being 
contested, the meeting itself was not only quiet but extremely perfunctory and lasted 
barely an hour, the reason being that everything had been decided beforehand and 
that the purpose of the meeting was not to discuss any controversial views but 
merely to record the results of bloc party voting. By election day the whole campaign 
had clearly resolved itself into a struggle on the old sectarian basis between Mahdists 
and Mirghanists, and practically all the groups that had formed themselves as 
professedly independent bodies were definitely ranged under the Ansar or Khatmy 
banner. This result had become inevitable from the moment that the two sects 
decided to throw their numerical weight into the elections, for no independent group 
could, in these circumstances, hope for any success if it did not enjoy the backing of 
the one side or the other. The Mirghanists had been supporting the Ashigga 
throughout the year, and when members of the rival groups (Qawam'yia, Ahrar and a 
section of the Ittihadiyin) realised how effective this support was going to be they had 
no choice but to ally themselves openly with the Ansar and depend on the Mahdist 
bloc vote. 
The only thing worthy of note in the proceedings that preceded the voting was the 
President's annual speech-an admirable pronouncement by Ibrahim Ahmed-
which for courage, wisdom and moral tone would have done credit to any statesman 
in any country, and in which he particularly warned his hearers of the danger of 
misapplying democratic procedure in a backward country like the Sudan. 
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This danger was only too apparent in the elections that followed, for the majority 
of the voters certainly did not belong to the educated class (they were mostly 
ignorant Tariqa followers, workers, artisans and small tradesmen, cultivators from 
the Khartoum Deims1 and the Khartoum North rural areas) and it was obvious that 
the various safeguards devised to prevent cheating had failed and that effective 
checking at the gate was impossible. 
The results were a sweeping victory for the Ashigga and the Mirghanists who 
obtained 36 seats out of the 60 and secured the election of their leader Azhari by a 
majority of nearly 1,500 votes over Ibrahim Ahmed, the top scorer on the other 
side .... 
The Ashigga won (a) because the Mirghanists are a majority in the Three Towns, 
particularly in the Deims of Khartoum and the rural areas of Khartoum North, (b) 
because the Ansar did not enter the field in earnest till a short time before the 
elections and until the end were in a divided mind as to whether they should ally 
themselves with any of the existing groups or not, whereas the Mirghanists had been 
solidly supporting the Ashigga throughout the year, (c) because, quite apart from 
sectarian support, they were a better organised and more united party than any of 
their opponents and had behind them the bulk of the younger graduates. 
The result has a multiple significance. On the face of it it is a verdict in favour of 
Egypt and this is how the local Egyptians have interpreted it and how it will be 
represented by the Egyptian papers and politicians. More concretely it is a slap in the 
face to Sayed Abdel Rahman and his suspected monarchical ambitions. Lastly it is an 
indication of an anti-British and anti-Government spirit among the majority of the 
younger effendia, for in so far as the results are the expression of a political opinion 
independent of sectarian motives they are more anti-British than positively pro-
Egyptian. What binds the Ashigga together is their emotional hostility to the Sudan 
Government and not any unanimous love for Egypt, and they are certainly not 
agreed among themselves on the degree of 'Union' they want with Egypt. 
The older and more responsible graduates are genuinely and profoundly alarmed 
at what has happened and at the prospect of the results likely to follow from it if 
nothing is done to prevent them in time. They see that they are losing control over 
Congress, that the body they formed to represent educated opinion on a non-
sectarian basis has now fallen into the hands of irresponsible persons and become a 
battleground for the two religious parties. The more sensible graduates, whether 
they incline to S.A.R. or S.A.M., deplore this development which means the 
submergence of Corporate graduate identity in the old struggle between the sects, 
and that political leadership by the religious heads will again dominate the country 
and divest the Graduates of any independence they may have acquired in recent 
years. 
So much for the general and long-range dangers-implied in these election 
results. There is as well an immediate and specific danger-that the Ashigga may 
decide to pass a resolution in favour of Union with Egypt. Opinions on the likelihood 
of their taking some such step differ widely. Some believe that they intend and will 
try to do it; that the Egyptians expect it of them and will press for it in order that they 
1 The 'deims' were working class quarters or shanty-towns on the outskirts of Omdurman and Khartoum. 
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should have a counter-blast in advance to any expression of Sudanese national 
aspirations that might come from the Advisory Council, a verdict which they could 
present at the Peace Conference. An article that appeared recently in El-Musawar 
lends colour to this opinion. On the other hand, others do not believe that there is 
any real danger of their doing this. Their reasons are: (a) that they are not sufficiently 
agreed on the form of association they wish to have with Egypt, and that, in their 
opinion, many of them do not desire union at all, (b) that even if they were agreed on 
Union they would not dare to proclaim their desire in a formal resolution, from fear 
both of the Government and the Sudanese public at large, (c) that Sayed Ali whose 
responsibility for the victory of the Ashigga was now a matter of common knowledge, 
however much he might deny it if taxed with it to his face, would probably decline to 
sanction such a step . ... 
24 FO 371146081, no 643 24 Dec 1944 
[Nile Waters]: despatch no 132 from Sir H Huddleston to Lord 
Kill earn 
I have the honour to address Your Excellency on the amount of Nile water at present 
available to the Sudan for irrigation and storage and of the need to secure, with the 
agreement of the Egyptian Government, additional quantities. 
2. The need for these additional supplies is no new or unforeseen development. It 
was stated in Sir Stewart Symes' despatch No. 79 of the 6th May, 1939. It was pointed 
out in my own despatch No.39 of the 22nd June, 1941 when the question of the 
project at Lake Tsana was reopened for the first time since the war: and again in 
despatch No.32 of the 25th May 1943 on the same subject. But the march of events 
and the requirements of post -war planning now make the need for a settlement more 
urgent. 
3. The immediate post-war period will be marked in the Sudan by an urgent 
demand for expansion of the social services; for more schools and teachers: for more 
hospitals, clinics and dispensaries; and for a general raising of the standard of 
sanitation and health measures and for their expansion. To meet these reasonable 
and in many cases essential claims, and at the same time maintain financial 
equilibrium, additional revenue must be found by a widening of the productive 
capacity of the country. To raise the existing level of taxation would not of itself be 
sufficient and is in any case in my view impractical. Nor would such a course satisfy 
the need to find a livelihood for men, who by their experience in war have learned a 
higher standard of living than can be maintained by pastorals with occasional rain 
cultivation. An expansion of productive capacity in the Sudan must largely be 
agricultural and from the physical circumstances of the country must mainly depend 
on perennial irrigation. Time is running short for the execution of the works, 
necessary to such expansion, but before they are begun it is essential to know that 
water will be available at the proper time. 
4. In 1939 the balance of unallotted water (including the January allowance) in 
the Sennar reservoir was 165 million cubic metres out of a total of 922 millions. To-
day this balance has shrunk to some 50 million, a margin which will be readily and 
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rapidly absorbed. The question that follows [is] of how and from where further 
storage supplies are to be found. 
5. The project at Lake Tsana on the Blue Nile, constructed and operated on the 
terms envisaged by the Sudan-Egyptian agreement of 1935, constitutes both 
technically and financially the best and easiest [source?] of the Sudan's needs. But 
recent despatches indicate little prospect of immediate or fruitful negotiations with 
the Ethiopian Government.1 Moreover the Egyptian Government's attitude is 
presumably still that expressed in its Aide-Memoire of November 1938 as follows:-
"The Royal Egyptian Government do not consider that so far as their own 
interests are concerned the immediate construction of such a work (i.e. Tsana 
regulator) is in any way necessary to their programme of agricultural 
expansion for the next fifteen years." 
Therefore it seems that the Sudan can no more look for an early achievement of 
this project than in 1939, when any chances of its fulfilment had been set back by 
Italy's invasion and occupation of Ethiopia. 
6. At that time Sir Stewart Symes deemed it necessary to seek an alternative but 
temporary satisfaction of the Sudan's needs by putting forward a claim for the type of 
review of the relative storage positions of the two countries which had been 
contemplated in paragraph 83 of the Nile Waters Agreement (1929). It was argued by 
Mr. Robertson,2 the then Irrigation Adviser of the Sudan Government, that any Jag 
in irrigational development in the Sudan, resulting from delay in the execution of 
the Lake Tsana project, should and could be made good by Egypt from the surplus 
storage which had accumulated as a result of works executed by her since the 
conclusion of the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929, and of which that Agreement had 
taken no account. Thus the Nile Waters Agreement had envisaged the Sennar and 
Jebel Auliya reservoirs as parallel schemes forming the first stage in the development 
of Nile storage for both the Sudan and Egypt. 
Expressed in volumes these stages represented 
781 million cubic metres at Sennar as the Sudan's share, and 
2000 million cubic metres from Jebel Auliya at Aswan as Egypt's share. 
The second raising of Aswan together with Jebel Auliya has given to Egypt 4400 
million cubic metres (or 4800 million if the Aswan reservoir is raised from R.L. 121 
to R.L. 122 as the present structure permits). 
The technical arguments and data supporting this claim were contained in two 
papers by Mr. Robertson entitled "The respective shares of Egypt and the Sudan in 
the Waters of the Nile" dated 16th March, 1939, and "Review of the Tsana 1935 
Agreement" dated 26th March 1939. Copies of these papers were annexed to Sir 
Stewart Symes' despatch No.79 of the 6th May, 1939. 
7. With the consent of His Britannic Majesty's Government Sir Stewart Symes 
made a direct approach to the Egyptian Government. I attach as annex to this 
despatch copies of the notes of his conversations with the Egyptian Ministers and of 
the Aide-Memoire left by him in the hands of the Prime Minister. I would draw Your 
1 For a summary of negotiations with Ethiopia up to this date, see 27. 
2 AN M Robertson, director of irrigation (Sudan government), 1934-1937; irrigation adviser, 1937-1940. 
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Excellency's attention to the Prime Minister's remarks as reported therein, that as a 
result of his visit to the Sudan he might be able to make a formal announcement on 
the water question which would be reassuring to the Sudanese. In the event no such 
pronouncement was in fact made and owing to the course of the war no further 
progress has been made in the matter. But at the time of that visit the then Minister 
of Works in discussion expressed the view that Egypt could not be expected to give up 
part of her storage water merely on the ground that Lake Tsana was not yet available 
for the Sudan.3 
8. It is unlikely that Egypt's response to any renewal of such a claim will be 
favourable or prompt. Evidence of their probable attitude can be found in their 
constant refusal since 1939 to consider any advancement of the date on which the 
Gezira canal may begin to draw on the natural flow of the river, and in their rejection 
in 1942 of a request to permit a temporary lift of 30 centimetres at Sennar during 
September. Further evidence of this lack of regard for Sudan interests may be seen in 
the withdrawal of Aswan water in 1943 and 1944 to such extent as completely to 
interrupt communications on the Shellal reach. Expansion of agricultural areas to 
meet temporary war-time needs is likely to be claimed as a permanent peace-time 
necessity. Lastly I need not remind Your Excellency of the way in which the Egyptian 
press always reacts to any issue on Nile Waters. 
9. On the other hand the Sudan's claim is no new one nor one of which Egypt 
has not been well aware. Egypt must know full well that her present position rela-
tive to that of the Sudan is out of line with the Nile Waters Agreement. That a revi-
sion of that agreement would be necessary was foreseen by its creators and was 
admitted by the Egyptian Prime Minister when accepting the recommendations in 
these words: 
"It is realised that the development of the Sudan requires a quantity of the 
Nile water greater than that which has been so far utilised by the Sudan. As 
Your Excellency is aware the Egyptian Government has always been anxious 
to encourage such development and will therefore continue that policy and 
be willing to agree with His Majesty's Government upon such increase of the 
quantity as does not infringe Egypt's natural and historical rights in the 
waters of the Nile and its requirements of agricultural extension". 
10. The Sudanese are now conscious, as they never formerly were, that the 
present restrictions to their agricultural expansion lie in the terms of the Nile Waters 
Agreement and will continue only if Egypt is unwilling to recognise their legitimate 
claims. The need for a revision of the Agreement has now been twice spontaneously 
raised during this year by members of the Advisory Council of the Northern Sudan, 
besides previous allusions in the vernacular press, and Sudanese restiveness over this 
question is likely to increase. 
3 Not printed. 'Notes of conversation on 23rd November 1939 with Hussein Pasha Sirri (minister of 
finance) and Abdel Kawi Bey Ahmed (minister of works)'; 'Note of conversation with Ali Pasha Maher 
(prime minister), Hussein Pasha Sirry (minister of finance) and Abdel Kawi Ahmed (minister of public 
works) on 28th November 1939'; 'A note on Nile water questions at issue between Egypt and the 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (November 1939)'; and 'Aide memoir, November 1939'. 
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11. In all these circumstances I consider that the question can no longer be held 
in abeyance, and that the position should now be fully examined. 
12. The Sudan objective during such examination would as in 1939 be to 
secure, for use until the full supply of water from Lake Tsana can be made 
available, the lesser supply which would result from agreement that the Sudan 
should:-
( a) Advance the July water date as provided in paragraph 13 of the Lake Tsana 
Agreement. 
(b) Raise the reservoir level at Sennar to provide the extra volume of 150 million 
cubic metres approximately which was agreed upon in paragraph 15 of the Lake 
Tsana Agreement. 
(c) Withdraw an extra 500 million cubic metres from the Blue Nile during the 
period January to April as an alternative to the arrangement contemplated in 
paragraph 9 of the Lake Tsana Agreement. 
13. I am advised that the first and second of these three steps could be taken 
without harmful effect on the supply of water to Egypt. This is not so as regards the 
third step, but it may alternatively be possible to negotiate for the allotment of 500 
million cubic metres to the Sudan from the first additional storage made available, 
the Sudan of course paying a proportional share of the cost. Agreement by Egypt to 
this allotment could reasonably be balanced by the Sudan's consent to the inception 
of any further Egyptian projects on the White Nile or on the main Nile. This 
negotiation might also focus Egyptian attention on the desirability of giving the Lake 
Tsana scheme priority over other developments. 
14. The extra supplies of water which would be obtained by the first two of the 
steps proposed would allow for as much development by the Sudan as is likely to be 
practicable during the next ten years by increase of gravity irrigation in the Gezira 
area and of pumping on the White Nile. It is worth noting that these increases are 
needed to ensure the livelihood of people whose lands are now flooded by water 
stored for Egypt in the Jebel Auliya reservoir. The larger supply to be obtained from 
the third step is necessary, if development, especially in the Gezira, is to proceed 
along the lines of the second stage contemplated when the 1929 Nile Waters 
Agreement was made. Agreement to the third step should therefore, I consider, be 
included in the immediate objective, but it will not be necessary to press that it 
should be acted upon so immediately as the first two. 
15. I therefore request that the Egyptian Government-who recently both in 
respect of Lake Tsana, and of the river Baro, have shown their interest in 
safeguarding their own rights in the Nile Waters should, subject to Your Excellency's 
views, now be reminded of the claim made by the Sudan Government in 1939, and 
should formally be asked to consent to an early examination of the present water 
storage position in detail and by technical experts authorized by each Government 
for the purpose. 
16. If the consent of the Egyptian Government is secured, I shall seek again to 
employ Mr. MacGregor to negotiate on behalf of the Sudan Government, as his 
intimate knowledge of the problem is unrivalled and as he is experienced in 
negotiation with the Egyptians. 
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25 FO 141/1013, no 22 7 Feb 1945 
[Anglo-Egyptian relations]: despatch no 44 from Lord Killearn to Sir 
H Huddleston on British interests in the Sudan and the possibility of 
using the Nile Waters as a means of resisting Egyptian pressure1 
[Extract] 
The recent series of minor crises in Anglo-Egyptian relations relative to the Sudan 
question . . . suggests that the present moment may be opportune for an attempt to 
clarify our ideas and intentions in regard to the future of the Sudan .... 
3. I take it that our objectives in the Sudan are, primarily, to maintain our 
predominant position in a strategically important area, and, secondarily, to carry out 
in the Sudan our traditiomil policy of guiding a backward people by gradual stages 
towards self-government, with the definite intention that when they reach that stage 
they will be willing to maintain particularly close relations with us; and to ensure for 
them a good administration meanwhile. All the objectives seem to me, in the light of 
experience, to postulate that Egyptian influence in the Sudan should be kept at a 
minimum. Egyptian influence competing with ours might well be inconsistent with 
our strategic interests and interfere with the orderly movement towards a self-
governing Sudan bound by close ties to us. It can hardly be questioned that effective 
Egyptian participation in the administration would seriously lower its efficiency. If 
this is, as I believe, a correct estimate, it follows logically that we have every ground, 
strategic, sociological and administrative, for resisting Egyptian political claims in 
regard to the Sudan. Our record in the Sudan, contrasted with the state of the 
country before the Mahdi's rebellion and with the probable performance of any even 
partly Egyptian administration there, should give us a strong case before world 
opinion in resisting Egyptian claims. 
4. The Sudan question and the present tendency in Egypt to force the issue for 
internal political reasons thus contain the elements of a serious clash between 
British and Egyptian policy at no distant date. It is presumably in our interest to do 
all we reasonably can to avoid such a clash. To that end I submit that generally 
speaking we should, while resisting strongly any serious Egyptian attempt to 
intervene in Sudan affairs, continue to do our best to avoid provoking Egyptian 
interest or anxiety regarding the Sudan. For example we should maintain the 
condominium facade by consulting the Egyptian Government as and when possible 
keeping them informed in formal questions, and avoid giving the impression that we 
intend to use our position in the Sudan to the detriment of Egypt. 
5. Should the Sudan issue nevertheless come to a head, it has always seemed to 
me that we hold in our hands the trump card of our physical control of the Nile 
waters. Perhaps it may even be opportune to consider now what use could be made of 
this instrument if driven to it. 
6. The terms of Lord Lloyd's2 letter of 7th May, 1929 to the then Egyptian Prime 
Minister are unequivocal. Writing in confirmation of the Nile Waters Agreement, 
Lord Lloyd stated therein that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
regarded the safeguarding of the natural and historical rights of Egypt in the waters 
1 A copy of this letter was forwarded to the FO and is also found in FO 371/45984, no 722. 
2 High commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, 1925-1929. 
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of the Nile as a fundamental principle of British policy, and he conveyed to Mohamed 
Mahmoud Pasha the most positive assurances that this principle and the detailed 
provisions of the Nile Waters Agreement would be observed at all times and under 
any conditions that might arise. It is clear that His Majesty's Government are thus 
committed to safeguarding Egyptian rights in the Nile under any conditions, that is 
to say no matter how great may be the desire and need of the Sudan for extra water at 
any given time. As I pointed out in my despatch No.699 of 31st July, 1941, the water 
of the Nile is such an integral part of the life of every Egyptian that any suspicion that 
we or any outside influence were trying to get undue control of it would most 
effectively be used as propaganda to rally feeling against us in almost all classes of the 
population. We must naturally make every reasonable effort to avoid giving grounds 
for such agitation by disposing of Nile water without the agreement of the Egyptian 
Government or, even more, contrary to their interests. These considerations still 
apply, and in normal circumstances they should continue to guide our policy. Any 
disregard of Egypt's vital interest in the Nile waters would increase Egyptian 
opposition to our semi-exclusive control of the Sudan, and any British interference 
in the Sudan with Egypt's water supply would greatly strengthen the movement here 
for the reunion of Egypt and the Sudan. I understand that our inclusion of the Nile 
waters in the demands presented to the Egyptian Government by Lord Allenby after 
the murder of the Sirdar created a feeling of uneasiness in Egypt which eventually we 
felt it in our interest to allay by the signature of the Nile Waters Agreement. 
7. The present despatch is not meant to challenge the validity of our existing pol-
icy so long as Anglo-Egyptian relations continue normal. What I have rather in mind 
is the consideration in advance of a potential situation where for some reason it might 
be necessary to bring heavy pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government, and of the 
possibility that in such a case, the restriction, real or threatened, of Egypt's water sup-
ply could in fact be used as a decisive sanction. It would, for instance, be a sovereign 
act by His Majesty's Government of a less drastic nature than a resort to war. Such a 
sovereign act would not be precluded by the contractual obligations referred to above, 
any more than our treaty obligations with Italy prevented the application of sanctions 
against her in 1933-1936. Similarly I am advised that a treaty of perpetual friendship 
has seldom prevented two nations from going to war. The suspension of the water sup-
ply would create violent hostility to Egypt, but ex hypothesi such hostility would have 
existed before it had been necessary to proceed to such a drastic sanction. 
8. We have in fact the whip hand over Egypt, should we ever be forced to use it. 
9. I should be glad to learn Your Excellency's reactions to the ideas discussed in 
this despatch, of which a copy is being forwarded to the Foreign Office. 
26 FO 371145972, no 837 12 Feb 1945 
[Sudan Graduates' Congress programme]: report from SPIS no 46 for 
January [Extract] 
... Local affairs 
365. Congress 
The Committee of Sixty met on 12.1.45 to consider the programme for the year 
drawn up by the XV. The programme, which was presented by the President, Ismail 
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El Azhari in a speech which lasted one hour, consisted of the following items:-
National Affairs. 
1. Congress Memorandum. 
2. Explaining the ultimate position of the Sudan. 
3. Southern Sudan. 
4. Definition of the Sudan war effort. 
5. Study of post-war schemes. 
Education. 
Education Fund. 
(a) Revenue. 
(b) Expenditure. 
1. Establishment of schools and religious institutions. 
2. Aids for the establishment of schools and religious institutions. 
3. Grants-in-aid for existing schools and institutions. 
4. Scholarships for students:-
(a) Beit Es Sudan (Sudan House) in Cairo. 
(b) Educational missions outside the Sudan. 
(c) Teachers' training. 
5. Industrial development through the Piastre Orphanage. 
6. Anti-illiteracy measures through grants-in-aid for night schools. 
7. Public Library. 
8. Establishment of a high council to supervise national education. 
Economic Affairs. 
1. Gezira Scheme. 
2. Endeavours to establish commercial corporations. 
3. Exhibitions of local industries. 
4. Study of the proposal for a Sudan Bank. 
Social Affairs. 
1. Taking steps to establish a maternity hospital. 
2. Care and encouragement of sports. 
3. Labour Day. 
4. Visits to the villages. 
Culture. 
1. Support for the preservation of the Koran. 
2. Encouragement of authorship and publication. 
3. Study of the history of the Sudan. 
4. Prizes for students. 
5. Encouragement of Literary Festival. 
6. Support of Literary Societies and giving lectures. 
Propaganda. 
1. The Congress paper, and the question of purchasing a printing press. 
2. Furthering relations with the Arab countries. 
3. Propaganda for the Sudan abroad. 
4. Contact with distinguished visitors to the Sudan. 
5. "Congress hymn." 
[26] 
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On paper it looks a very ambitious programme, as comprehensive and far-reaching 
as any put forward by a new Government in the speech from the Throne. The first 
three items imply political issues of the first importance. In introducing the item 
dealing with the future status of the Sudan, the President after quoting the Atlantic 
Charter and emphasising the right of small nations to determine their fate and shape 
their own form of government, went on to say that the Committee intended to make 
careful study of this vital matter and that it was hoped that "by the grace of God it 
may be able to arrive at a resolution suitably expressing the hopes and aspirations of 
the country". 
With regard to the item dealing with the Sudan's war effort, the President after 
affirming that the Sudan had made its contribution to the war effort voluntarily and 
from conviction and belief in the justice of the Democratic cause went on to explain 
that the object behind the proposal to draw up an exact account of what the Sudan 
had done in the war was that "like other nations we should share in the fruits of 
victory to the extent that we have contributed towards it". 
On the question of the South, the President harped on the usual theme-the 
essential unity of the Sudan, the regrettable isolation of the South, the need for co-
ordinated development in both parts of the country and, above all, the economic 
need of the North for the South. 
An outstanding feature of the debate that took place on the programme was that 
the 24 opposition members were able to make their presence felt to a much greater 
degree than had been expected. With the support of a number of Ashigga they suc-
ceeded in introducing an important amendment into the programme, viz: the 
inclusion, right at the beginning, of the Congress Memorandum of 1942. The 
Memorandum, it will be remembered, contained a demand for Sudanese national-
ity, and the object of the opposition in pressing for its inclusion in the programme 
was to tie down Azhari and his party to this demand and so make it impossible for 
them to pursue a policy of fusion with Egypt. Azhari resisted the amendment on 
the grounds that since the substance of the Memorandum was contained in the var-
ious items of the programme its inclusion as an item by itself would be superflu-
ous, but enough of the Ashigga sided with the opposition to carry the motion for its 
inclusion. 
The result of the debate, favourably commented on in the press as showing 
that the opposition can effectively voice its views, has increased the already evi-
dent willingness of the Moderates to acquiesce for the time being in the results 
at this year's elections; and the general tendency to condemn and challenge the 
present Congress, which was noticeable for a few days after the elections, has 
died down. 
The Ashigga are now reported to be negotiating with the Ittihadiyin and Ahrar for 
a formula acceptable to all of them concerning relations with Egypt. They are said to 
repudiate fusion and profess their willingness to accept the Ittihadiyin's Dominion 
status conception. If agreement is reached (which is doubtful) the formula will be 
put up to the Sixty in the form of a resolution expressing Congress' attitude towards 
Egypt-and there will be a large majority behind it. ... 
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27 FO 371146081, no 709 13 Feb 1945 
'Lake Tsana: the present position': memorandum by Research 
Department, FO, on the Nile Waters 
Formal engagements still in force 
The rights in relation to Lake Tsana which His Majesty's Government enjoy by Treaty 
are defined in Article 3 of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902, by the terms of which 
the Emperor undertook:-
"not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue Nile, 
Lake Tsana or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their waters into the 
Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the 
Government of the Sudan." 
2. The interest of Egypt in all plans for regulating the flow of the Nile was given 
formal recognition by His Majesty's Government in the exchange of letters which 
constituted the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. Lord Lloyd's letter to the Egyptian 
Prime Minister on that occasion contained the following assurance:-
"In conclusion, I would remind your Excellency that His Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom have already acknowledged the natural 
and historical rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile. I am to state that His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard the safeguarding of 
those rights as a fundamental principle of British policy, and to convey to 
your Excellency the most positive assurances that this principle . . . . will be 
observed at all times and under any conditions that may arise." 
Abortive Negotiations, 1902-35 
3. The two texts quoted above appear to be the only formal undertakings 
conferring rights or imposing obligations on His Majesty's Government at the 
present time. Agreements with Italy, both before and after the Italian occupation of 
Ethiopia, will be ignored in this paper as irrelevant to the existing situation. But the 
long history of discussions with the Ethiopian Government before 1935 cannot be 
entirely omitted, since reference will no doubt be made to it during future 
negotiations. 
4. It is possible, for instance, that the last has not been heard of Ethiopian claims 
based upon an offer made in 1907 to the Emperor Menelik, "in consideration ... . of 
Article 3 of the Treaty," of £10,000 annually so long as friendly relations continued. 
This arrangement, though accepted in principle, was never signed owing to 
difficulties raised by Menelik over the form of our note. His Majesty's Government 
therefore consider this offer to have lapsed, and a demand put forward by the 
Ethiopian Government in 1930 for payment of arrears amounting to £230,000 was 
rejected. But the Ethiopian Government have not at any time admitted the invalidity 
of their claim, which they again raised in 1933. 
5. The Treaty of 1902 conferred on His Majesty's Government and the 
Government of the Sudan no more than a veto on the construction of works to 
control the outflow from Lake Tsana. Later, between 1914 and 1927, attempts were 
made to secure an agreement by which His Majesty's Government would themselves 
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construct and operate a regulator across the head waters of the Blue Nile at their 
outlet from the Lake. It proved impossible to reach agreement on these lines, and we 
gradually acquiesced in the Ethiopian demand for a larger degree of control over the 
projected enterprise. In an exchange of letters with the present Emperor of Ethiopia 
in 1924, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald agreed to the building of the dam by engineers 
responsible to the Ethiopian Government, provided that His Majesty's Government 
were satisfied of the competence of the engineer chosen for the work. In 1928 His 
Majesty's Government again agreed that the construction of the dam should be 
arranged for by the Ethiopians themselves, subject both to the condition laid down 
four years earlier and to guarantees that the dam would be constructed and operated 
in such a way as to secure the full benefit of the waters of Lake Tsana to Egypt and 
the Sudan. 
6. Meanwhile, in 1927, an approach had been made by the Ethiopian 
Government to the J. G. White Engineering Corporation of New York. In December 
1928 the present Emperor was informed that His Majesty's Government would raise 
no objection to negotiations between the Ethiopian Government and the J. G. White 
Corporation, on the understanding that they would be given an opportunity of 
satisfying themselves that the project would be executed with due regard for 
economy as well as on sound engineering lines, and also that the plans for operating 
the dam were in accordance with their requirements. 
7. After the completion of surveys carried out by the J. G. White Corporation in 
1930-34, the Ethiopian Government issued invitations to the Governments of Egypt 
and the Sudan to send representatives to a conference at Addis Ababa in April1935. 
This conference was postponed, and, as a result of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, 
never met. The last development before the Italo-Ethiopian war was a preliminary 
conference in Cairo between representatives of Egypt and the Sudan, who on the 
20th May signed an agreement providing for both the distribution of the water and 
the allocation of the cost. They also drafted joint instructions to the delegates who 
were to represent the two countries at the proposed conference in Addis Ababa. 
8. It was agreed at the Cairo Conference that the designs of the J. G. White 
Engineering Corporation were "generally satisfactory," and that the execution of the 
work should be undertaken "as soon as possible." The expenditure, both for 
construction and for operation, would be borne in the first instance by Egypt, the 
Sudan's share being recovered in accordance with an agreed procedure. The Sudan, 
participating initially to the extent of 10 per cent., would have the option of gradually 
increasing her share, by virtue of an escalator clause, up to a maximum of 50 per 
cent. 
9. The joint instructions drafted for the delegates who were to conduct the 
anticipated negotiations with the Ethiopian Government were based upon the 
assumption that it would probably be necessary to adopt the more expensive of the 
alternative plans offered by the J. G. White Corporation. The cheaper alternative 
would involve raising the level of the Lake, and it was expected that, although the 
central Government might find this acceptable, it would be opposed by the local 
chiefs and ecclesiastical authorities. The offer to be made to the Ethiopian 
Government in return for the adoption of the low-level scheme was to consist of: (1) 
the construction and maintenance, at the expense of Egypt and the Sudan, of an all-
weather road from Addis Ababa to the Lake; (2) a cash payment of £30,000 on 
signature of the agreement; and (3) a rental of £10,000 annually from the year in 
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which the works were completed. On the question of operation and maintenance, the 
delegates were to be instructed that "an arrangement which might prove satisfactory 
to all parties would be for the J. G. White Engineering Corporation to take control of 
the works after completion for a period of, say, ten years. By that time .. .. it should 
be possible .. .. to make some new arrangement if desired." It was noted, however, 
that the Ethiopian Government would probably desire to have at least a partial 
control, or the appearance of it, over the works. (The Ethiopians had, in fact, insisted 
on this during the discussions which took place in 1930-31.) 
Attitude of the interested parties after the liberation of Ethiopia 
10, Etlliopia,-Before 1930 the Ethiopian Government viewed proposals for the 
Tsana reservoir with suspicion, and countered them by procrastination. In this year 
their attitude changed as a result of acute financial embarrassment, and in 1935 they 
again pressed for an early agreement, this time with the additional motive of 
providing His Majesty's Government with a material interest in the independence 
and integrity of Ethiopia. A further attraction to the central Government in Addis 
Ababa was the prospect of strengthening its authority in the troublesome regions of 
Gojjam and Begemdir by means of the projected road from the capital to the Lake. 
Since the liberation of Ethiopia in 1941, the second and third of these motives have 
no longer operated: the Italian menace has, it may be assumed, been finally removed; 
and the Italians constructed a good motor road between Addis Ababa and the Lake, by 
way of Debra Markos, which, though its condition has deteriorated, could doubtless 
be put in good order at a comparatively small cost. The Emperor is still short of 
money, but, if he has hopes of a substantial loan from the United States, this 
consideration may not affect his attitude to the Tsana project in the immediate 
future. A new factor in the situation is the control by British military authorities of 
ex-ltalian territories-in particular the Tigrinia-speaking region of Eritrea and the 
harbours of Massawa and Assab-to which the Ethiopian Government lay claim. The 
Emperor may well consider that, in any discussion of the future of these territories, 
Lake Tsana might be his most useful bargaining counter. 
11. The Sudan.-The Government of the Sudan, whose interest in the project 
had waned in the years 1931-35 owing to the effects of the economic crisis, are now 
more anxious than at any previous time to press on with the control of the Blue Nile. 
They point out that, whereas in 1935 the balance of unused storage water in the 
Sennar reservoir was 236 million cubic metres, it has now shrunk to 70 million, so 
that the Sudan is likely to need its half-share of the Tsana water at an earlier date 
than was supposed at the Cairo Conference in 1935. Egypt, on the other hand, 
already has enough water to permit of considerable agricultural expansion. (The 
Egyptian Government estimated in 1938 that the Tsana regulator would not be 
essential to their programme of development for the next fifteen years.) The 
Government of the Sudan are therefore apprehensive lest the primary responsibility 
of Egypt for financing the project, as provided in the 1935 agreement, should lead to 
delay in its execution. The Governor-General has therefore suggested, in a despatch 
of the 23rd November, 1943, to Lord Killearn, that "the Sudan Government .. . . 
might reasonably stipulate that the Tsana works, if financed by Egypt, should be 
completed within a definite period from the date of the grant of the concession." 
They would prefer, indeed, to invert the 1935 agreement, "assuming primary 
responsibility themselves and selling water to Egypt instead of buying it from her; 
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but the Governor-General, in the despatch already quoted, conceded that there 
seemed to be little prospect of securing this advantage. 
12. Egypt.- The Egyptian attitude appears to have undergone less change since 
1935. The Prime Minister (Nahas Pasha), writing to Lord Killearn on the subject on 
the 26th September, 1943, took the 1935 agreement as his starting point, and 
affirmed the desire of his Government to resume the interrupted negotiations 
without delay. It appeared, however, from one phrase in this communication-
"L'Egypte est disposee a construire et a diriger ce reservoir"-that the Egyptian 
Government might be contemplating an extension of the rights conferred on them 
by the 1935 agreement. 
13. The 1. G. White Engineering Corporation.-The President of the Corporation 
has informed Viscount Halifax, in a letter of the 29th February, 1944, that "we are 
still interested in the fortunes of the Lake Tsana project, which at some future time 
may be revived by your Government; and we desire to report to you that to this effect 
we have so advised his Excellency the Ethiopian Minister" in Washington. Mr. Dunn 
added that he was reporting this resumption of contact in accordance with the policy 
adopted by the Corporation since the beginning of their interest in Lake Tsana, when 
they had committed themselves "to taking no step without prior consultation with 
and approval of the British authorities." 
Developments since 1941 
14. Shortly after the liberation of Ethiopia, the Governments of Egypt and the 
Sudan each put forward suggestions for a fresh approach to the Emperor on 
the question of Lake Tsana. The former wished to participate in negotiations, and the 
latter proposed that the concession should be granted directly to the Sudan. 
15. On the 30th October, 1941, a plan of action was drawn up at a meeting in the 
Foreign Office attended by the Financial Secretary to the Sudan Government and Mr. 
McGregor. It was agreed that the best procedure would be for His Majesty's 
Government to conduct the negotiations with the Emperor, assisted by Sudanese 
and Egyptian consultants. They would propose as a basis for negotiations that the 
Sudan Government should construct the dam, providing the finance in the first 
instance, and should operate it (with Egyptian observers present). The water would 
be shared equally by Egypt and the Sudan, who would settle by direct negotiation the 
final division of the costs between them. In addition to the considerations mentioned 
in paragraph 11 above, it was argued on behalf of Sudanese administration of the 
concession that the Egyptian Government, with an eye to political penetration in the 
Sudan, might at some future time seek to extend such rights as Egypt obtained at 
Tsana over the Sennar dam and the Gezira Irrigation Scheme. 
16. The next question to be considered was that of the quid pro quo to be offered 
to the Emperor when the request for a concession was made. The alternatives 
seemed to be: (a) financial payments, including rent in perpetuity, not for the water 
itself but for the land on which the works were constructed and for the exercise of 
the various rights necessary to their operation; or (b) territorial compensation, 
which could probably not be offered until such time as the fate of the ex-Italian 
colonies was determined by the United Nations. The Government of the Sudan wish 
to avoid a continuing financial obligation, though this would have at least the 
advantage of providing the Ethiopian Government with a permanent profit from the 
existence of the concession and so diminishing the possibility of agitation for its 
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abrogation. A third possibility was that compensation might be held to have been 
paid already in the shape of British and Sudanese assistance in the restoration of the 
Emperor to his throne. It was eventually decided that the initial approach should be 
made on this basis, by His Majesty's Minister in Addis Ababa. If, as seems probable, 
the Emperor was unresponsive, the ground would at least have been cleared for an 
offer of territorial compensation in place of the financial inducements which had 
figured in all earlier negotiations. 
17. Mr. Howe accordingly introduced the subject at an audience with the 
Emperor on the l Oth June, 1943, and left with him a memorandum containing 
suggestions for an agreement in principle on the following lines: (1) the grant of an 
area in the region of Lake Tsana on which His Majesty's Government would be free to 
construct and operate hydraulic works, together with the free use of roads to the 
Lake from the Sudan and from the interior of Ethiopia, and right of access to the area 
by air (an airfield and a marine landing place being constructed at the expense of His 
Majesty's Government); (2) "His Majesty's Government and the Sudan Government 
would regard the free grant of the facilities required at Lake Tsana as a fitting and 
practical expression of gratitude for the restoration of the Ethiopian Empire to His 
Imperial Majesty by British and Sudanese troops." 
18. Four days after this audience the Egyptian Prime Minister was informed that, 
as part of a general settlement between His Majesty's Government and the Ethiopian 
Government, the Emperor was being asked "to give his approval in principle to the 
construction of works at the outlet of Lake Tsana." Amin Osman Pasha, through 
whom this communication was made, "presumed that the Egyptian Government 
would be brought in at some stage." In the Egyptian Prime Minister's subsequent 
letter to Lord Kill earn, referred to in paragraph 12 above, there was a reference to the 
necessity of renewing negotiations "between the British and Egyptian Governments 
on the one hand, and the Ethiopian Government on the other." (It has been pointed 
out that the Egyptian Government's desire to be a party to any agreement on Lake 
Tsana may be due in part to the fact that otherwise we should be in a position to 
modify it without their consent.) 
19. Reverting on the 12th August to the memorandum which Mr. Howe had 
handed to him two months earlier, the Emperor observed that "there were certain 
things Great Britain required from Ethiopia while Ethiopia needed certain things 
from us." There were difficulties in the way of a firm and lasting agreement between 
the two countries and His Majesty proposed to go to London himself "to clear away 
these misunderstandings." The Emperor was dissuaded, however, from pursuing this 
suggestion, and the issue of Lake Tsana has not since been raised on either side. 
28 FO 371145973, no 1318 5-16 Mar 1945 
'Sudan': minutes by PS Scrivener, PM Broadmead1 and Sir RI 
Camp bell on the failure of the Treasury to support the education 
grant to the Sudan 
[Shortly before the FO forwarded his request for an education grant for the Sudan to the 
Treasury (see 22), Huddleston had written directly to the chancellor, on the grounds that 
1 Head of North American Dept, 1944-1945. 
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they had known each other in India when Sir J Anderson was governor of Bengal. 
Huddleston advanced the argument that the Sudan was 'practically' a part of the British 
Empire, but had Egypt to turn to if Britain failed it. Anderson replied that aside from 
'adequate Treasury reasons' for refusing, the grant would be misinterpreted by the USA 
(Huddleston to Anderson, 10 Dec 1944 and Anderson to Huddleston, 22 Jan 1945, FO 
371/45973, nos 651 & 890). B A B Burrows,2 writing from the embassy in Cairo, 
forwarded copies of the exchange to the FO, and suggested applying for a general 
development grant, rather than confining the request to education: 'The suggestion 
would be that a grant for development purposes might lead either to a demand for 
imports of plant and machinery from the United Kingdom or to a general rise in the 
standard of living in the Sudan which would in turn increase the importance of the Sudan 
as a general market for British goods. Education would no doubt be included in any such 
development scheme, but the difference would be that it would no longer form the 
primary or sole object of the grant. The needs of the Sudan for development and help are 
as great as those of the Colonies and as the Sudan is in the sterling area the foreign 
exchange problem is the same' (Burrows to Scrivener, 24 Feb 1945, FO 371145973, no 
890). In commenting on the correspondence from Cairo and forwarding the following 
minute, Scrivener noted on 10 Mar 1945: 'This is all right as far as it goes, but I don't 
think it goes far enough; and in any event it is in my opinion useless to go on arguing 
with The Treasury at the "official level" any more. They will simply go on saying "No." 
Rather different tactics (having in fact much the same objective) are suggested in the 
minute attached' (FO 371/45973, no 890).] 
The attitude adopted by the Treasury on the question dealt with in this file makes it, 
in my opinion, essential to consider the policy to be followed by His Majesty's 
Government in regard to the whole question of future development in the Sudan. 
Since the time of the negotiation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Sudanese 
nationalism has, for the first time since the reconquest, become a factor with which 
the Sudan Government have had to reckon. It owes its existence to the policy of 
devolution practised by the Sudan Government, and to the emergence of an 
intelligensia [sic] in the few large centres of population. This intelligensia [sic] is still 
very small, and is by no means representative of the country as a whole; but it is 
politically minded and highly articulate. What it says today the tribal Sudan (in the 
north at any rate) will probably say tomorrow. The development of the nationalist 
movement coupled with the fostering of native institutions by the Sudan 
Government in recent years have led to the establishment of the Advisory Council for 
the Northern Sudan, which marks the beginning of representative government in 
the Sudan. 
Sudanese nationalism has shown itself in its relations with the Sudan Government 
to be of an extremely enquiring turn of mind; and one of the questions which it asks 
most frequently is "What are His Majesty's Government going to do for the Sudan on 
the lines of what they are doing for their Colonial Empire?" The colonial policy of His 
Majesty's Government has been very closely studied, and no part of it more closely 
than the Colonial Development Acts, for the benefit of which the Sudan is not, of 
course, eligible and for which it could not be made eligible except by declaring it to 
be a British colony, and thus tearing up the agreements of 1899 and the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty. It should also be mentioned by way of a conclusion to this 
general preface that the Sudanese intelligensia [sic] have become the main 
conductor along which Egyptian influence flows into the Sudan. That influence is 
not as yet considerable, but it is being actively fostered and could in certain 
circumstances become powerful. 
2 Acting first secretary at the embassy in Cairo. 
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With these considerations in mind the Sudan Government decided a year ago to 
ask His Majesty's Government to give-as a symbolic gesture-a sum of £1,000,000 
to endow the new Cordon College, that foundation having been raised from the 
status of a secondary school to that of a University College, the ostensible object of 
the gift being the recognition of the services rendered by the Sudah in the present 
war. It has never been pretended that the Sudan in its present financial situation 
could not provide the money itself; the objective of the proposal was exclusively 
political, viz. to mark the continued interests of His Majesty's Government in the 
Sudan no less than in the territories directly eligible for British bounty, and to 
answer the reproach that the Sudan, in British eyes, was no longer an object of 
British interest and solicitude. The purpose of the proposed gift was extremely well 
chosen, since the first act of this country after the reconquest in 1898 was to raise a 
fund to endow the original Cordon College; and a similar gesture at the present time 
could have been impressed on Sudanese minds with overwhelming effect. 
The proposal was accordingly put to the Treasury officially and semi-officially 
(Annexes A and B)3 on the general lines of the foregoing. The result is shown in the 
document which forms Annex C. The Treasury rejected the proposal as 
"inopportune" since "we are no longer in a position in which we can play the Lady 
Bountiful with foreign currency." 
Since in fact the Treasury were at that moment in the process of going violently 
into reverse, we left the matter alone for the time being, until the movement had 
been completed and the road (ahead or astern) had become clearer. 
Early this year the Governor-General and Lord Killearn returned to the charge. In 
writing to the Treasury again (Annex D) we contested the economic justification of 
the Treasury's earlier attitude; and emphasised, in the light of further developments 
in our colonial policy-such as the voting of £120,000,000 over the next ten years for 
development and research-the sheer impossibility of explaining to the Sudanese, as 
things were, our lack of visible interest in their country. 
The result of this was even worse than before. The Treasury this time pleaded (a) 
American opinion and (b) penury (Annexes E and F). I do not propose in this paper to 
contest the Treasury's arguments because when they said "I can't" they obviously 
meant "I won't, whatever you may say or however sound your case is". (The effect of 
their letter on the Sudan Government has been to give the impression-so 
tendencious [sic] is it-that Egypt is about to leave the sterling area and to drag the 
Sudan along with her.) 
In putting to the Treasury the Cordon College proposal we had intended to rest 
content with it, and not to raise for the time being the broad question of future 
development in the Sudan. But I submit that we must now face this issue in its 
entirety. In essence it is simple:-"Are we to accept in respect of the Sudan a 
responsibility analogous to that which we accept in respect of a British colony-
although it is not one-or are we not?" If we are, then what is right for the colonial 
Empire becomes right for the Sudan, and since it has been recognised by the Cabinet 
and by Parliament that to fulfil our imperial responsibilities we must make, over a 
period of years, substantial financial grants to the dependent Empire, the Treasury 
must withdraw their veto on similar grants to the Sudan and consider ways and 
3 Annexes not printed. 
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means of implementing a policy of financial backing for that country. If we are not, 
we proclaim that we regard the Sudan as a foreign country (which incidentally, we 
are apparently not prepared to treat as favourably as Abyssinia). 
On the first hypothesis what is our justification, vis-a-vis Egyptian and world 
opinion, of our assimilation of the Sudan to the colonial Empire? The key, I think, 
can be found in Article 11 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which states that "The High 
Contracting Parties agree that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan 
must be the welfare of the Sudanese." If the Governor-General of the Sudan, who 
exercises "on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred 
on him by the (1899) agreements", decides to apply, in the interests of the welfare of 
the Sudanese, for financial assistance to the Party which has just initiated a large 
development scheme to promote the welfare of its own colonial territories, surely the 
action is perfectly defensible? Theoretically the Governor-General is equally entitled 
to appeal to Egypt, and should Egypt spontaneously offer assistance to the Sudanese 
it would be difficult if not impossible to stop her. But, in any case, there is no need to 
publicise the matter. All that we require is an undertaking that the Treasury will give 
sympathetic consideration to any requests that may be received from the Sudan 
Government through His Majesty's Ambassador in Egypt and the Foreign Office for 
assistance which shall not exceed £X over the next ten years (the sum to be fixed as a 
result of detailed discussion), in the development of the Sudan on the lines approved 
in the case of the Colonial Empire. Everything should then be plain sailing. We shall 
continue our task of leading the Sudan to self-government; and of preventing Egypt 
from pre-judging, by agitation or intrigue, the decision which the Sudan will one day 
be equipped to take regarding her future destiny. And it should here be remarked 
that the financial assistance required may be relatively unsubstantial. The financial 
position of the Sudan is satisfactory. It is the principle that is important. 
On the second hypothesis, a very different prospect appears. If we decline to give 
the Sudan that support which, by our acts, we have recognised as essential to the 
development of colonial territory, can we any longer seek to dissuade the Sudanese 
from turning to Egypt, and can we raise any objection if Egypt takes over our 
responsibilities? The answer, it seems to me, is in the negative. That being so, we 
must recognise that we should be turning our backs on the last half-century (very 
nearly) of great achievement in the Sudan, and should be committing something 
uncommonly like a breach of trust. No doubt we can continue to administer the 
country efficiently but, [it may be questioned whether the Sudan Government 
Service would have, to an Englishman, the same meaning as it used to have; and 
whether any Englishman of the necessary calibre would accept appointment as 
Governor General under such humiliating conditions.]4 nowadays, just and efficient 
administration is evidently not by itself enough-the recent evolution of our colonial 
policy is there to prove it. [His Majesty's Government should surely reflect very 
earnestly before finding themselves placed in this position by a wave of defeatism in 
the Treasury. And I should mention that The King himself might not be indifferent 
to this issue having regard to the keen interest which his father took in Sudanese 
affairs. It is also perhaps relevant to remark that the Delegation of M.P.'s which 
recently visited Africa did not fail to note Sudanese inquisitiveness on this subject.] 
4 The two sections in brackets in this para were written and then crossed out. 
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Fortunately, there is, so far as one can estimate at present, no very great urgency 
about this matter. We have missed a magnificent opportunity both of emphasising 
the value of the British connexion, and of marking our appreciation of the Sudan 
war effort, but Sudanese disillusionment is not yet in a dangerous phase. The 
Governor General is due to come home on leave this summer and I think our next 
step, if this minute be generally approved, is to send a copy of it to Lord Killearn 
and to ask him, if he concurs, to suggest that Sir H. Huddleston be invited to re-
examine the matter with his Council in the light of the foregoing considerations 
and to prepare a restatement of the whole case on the broadest basis for discussion 
with the Secretary of State on his arrival and for submission to the Cabinet if 
necessary. 
P.S.S. 
5.3.45 
As regards American public opinion I should rather doubt whether they make much 
distinction in their minds between the status of the Sudan & of the Colonies. In any 
case, however, educational projects are the sort of thing that appeal to the American 
mind .... 
Sir A. Cadogan 
P.M.B. 
15.3.45 
It seems clear to me that H.M.G. can in their own minds assimilate the Sudan to a 
British colony to the extent of our share in the condominium, and of the 
responsibility for which we claim, in the interests of the Sudanese people . . .. 
As for the Treasury's fear of American disapproval, which presumably is based on 
consciousness of the aid which we are getting from the United States Government in 
'Stage II' and which we expect from them in 'Stage III',5 I very much doubt whether 
there is great danger in this, for the reasons which Mr. Broadmead gives in his 
minute of March 15th. American interest in the work of the Anglo-Arnerican 
Caribbean Commission can be cited in support of his opinion. Moreover, American 
assistance to us is grounded in self-interest and the effect which the general welfare 
can have on that interest, and their view that an economically revived United 
Kingdom is necessary for both the general and (therefore) United States welfare. It is 
not based on generosity to the United Kingdom for its own sake. Hence expenditure 
on promoting the welfare of the dependent people of the Sudan and not on some 
purely United Kingdom object which could be regarded as a luxury, would not, I 
think, affect in a manner dangerous to us the United States Government's estimate of 
where the American interest lies, and would not, I should have thought, be ill 
received by them, especially since we have apparently been able to 'get away with' the 
expenditure entailed by the Colonial Development Act. 
R.I.C. 
16.3.45 
5 US aid to the UK during the war was divided into stages: Stage II represented the period until Japan's 
defeat, and Stage III was the post-war reconstruction period. 
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39 FO 371/46081, no 3317 18 Sept 1945 
'Nile waters and the Sudan': minutes by W N Allan1 of a meeting held 
at Wellington House, London. 
[While Huddleston was in London a meeting was also arranged between Sudan 
government personnel to discuss the Sudan's future Nile waters projects. In addition to 
the governor general the meeting included the J W E Miller (financial secretary), R M 
MacGregor (irrigation adviser), W N Allan (director of irrigation) and W H Luce (private 
secretary to Huddleston).] 
1. The purpose of the meeting was to consider the line of action to be taken in 
the light of Despatch No. 132 of 24.12.44. from Khartoum to Cairo,2 and subsequent 
correspondence, and in particular of a note, which had been prepared as the result of 
technical discussions between Messrs. Macgregor and Allan (see copy attached).3 The 
main points of this note were:-
(i) A definite forecast of the ultimate needs of the Sudan in water for the full 
development of irrigation, totalling 7.1 milliards of m3 annually. 
(ii) The recommendation that when the question of further water supplies is 
taken up with Egypt, a final settlement should be aimed at, on the lines of this 
forecast. 
It was pointed out by Mr. Macgregor that the forecast proposed that the Sudan 
should participate in the Jonglei Scheme, to the extent of 500 million m3 of water, in 
addition to her ultimate share of 50% in the Lake Tana Project; this was a proposal 
not previously contemplated in such a form, the corollary to which would be that the 
Sudan Irrigation Department should take an active part in the engineering 
development of the Jonglei Scheme. 
2. It was noted that the line of action as regards the concession for Lake Tana 
had already been agreed upon in July, 1945, and that preliminary approaches to 
Ethiopia would be made when circumstances permitted, Egypt being informed of 
these after they had been begun. The aim of reaching a final settlement with Egypt 
on the wider issue would remain the same whether or not the Tana concession was 
obtained in the near future. It was necessary to consider when and how this question 
should be opened with Egypt. After discussion, it was agreed:-
(i) That it was not essential to do so immediately since the more urgent question 
of the Tana concession was already in train. 
(ii) That before going further, it was necessary that the forecast of the Sudan's 
final water needs should be considered by Council. To this end, the Sudan 
Irrigation Department would submit a comprehensive note setting out the 
forecast and its implications as regards development in the Sudan. 
(iii) That following on (ii) Egypt should be informed of the Sudan's desire for a 
review of the water question on a suitable occasion. It might be found opportune 
to do this when Egypt was brought in over the Tana negotiations, or at the time of 
discussions with her on the Jonglei Project. Further, on Mr. Macgregor's 
suggestion it was agreed that since the Gezira Scheme had now been in operation 
1 Director of irrigation, Sudan, 1944-1945; irrigation consultant (Sudan Agency, London) from 1946. 
2 See 24. 3 Not printed. 
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languages and the distances in the Southern Provinces are such that almost each 
district would have to have a separate representative and it is Government's aim that 
this Council should be a predominantly Sudanese assembly. 
We have carefully drafted the Ordinance so that later on, when our plans for 
accelerating the educational and economic development of the South have matured, 
it can either join up with the Northern Council or have a separate Council of its own. 
It is interesting that in several Southern areas native Local Government is 
developing well. ... 
Extract from a note of a conversation between Sir D Newbold, Ibrahim Ahmed, Abdel 
[sic] El Magid and Ahmad El Shingeiti in Omdurman on 22 Oct 1943 
... Southern Sudan 
Ibrahim Ahmed said missions had done good work, but were bad educationally, or at 
least results were terribly slow. Shingeiti said Northern Educated Sudanese knew 
nothing of South and felt cut off. We discussed question of Arabic (no one really 
raised religion) and economic development. They suggested a few boys should come 
to Cordon College (Secondary) from South. I told them, as regards future of South, 
that in its present primitive state it was idle to prophecy [sic] its future, that it 
needed development and education (which latter I admitted was backward) whatever 
its future. If we (Education Department) took over education from missions, it would 
be much bigger drain on Northern Funds and staff, and one wouldn't find Northern 
teachers to learn Southern vernaculars as long-resident missionaries do. We did not 
feel Arabic and English could be taught in addition to a group-language or 
vernacular. I agreed that the question was complicated and delicate, but I took the 
opportunity to point out that no frontiers in or round the Sudan can be regarded as 
sacrosanct eternally, and that the happiness and prosperity of the people was more 
important than territorial inviolacy, e.g. if it is legitimate to consider, or press for the 
Anuak of the Baro Salient to be transferred from Abyssinia to Sudan to their Nilotic 
brethren in U.N.P. or for the Beni Amer of Agordat District, or Habab etc. of Keren 
and Nacfa District (which together would mean transfer of over half Eritrea to 
Sudan) surely it is not an outrage to suppose that it might later make for the 
happiness of the Latuka, Acholi, Lango etc. of Equatoria to be transferred to Uganda 
later on, with whom they have common language, customs and religion. (Similarly 
would the Sudanese consider that the Congolese intelligentsia of, say, Stanleyville 
and Leopoldville, if any, were outraged by the transfer of a large block of tribes West 
of Juba from Belgian Congo to Sudan in 19?5 
NB. I didn't ask this question, but I mentioned that two-thirds Zande lived in the 
Congo and only one-third in the Sudan.) I hastened to assure the effendia that no 
negotiations of any sort were in train for any transfer to Uganda, I only wished to 
point out that Southern Sudanese interests might be separate and frontiers were not 
eternal. Mr. Owen6 said economic considerations were valid and I said Yes; these 
point North for some of the Southern Sudan and South for others .. .. 
5 1910, when the Lado Enclave reverted to Anglo-Egyptian rule, following the death of King Leopold I of 
Belgium. 
6 T RH Owen, then deputy gov Bahr al-Ghazal sub-province. 
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great mistakes made in the Treaty of Versailles, was the division of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire into sections differing in language and nationality, but 
economically inter-dependent. If the makers of the Treaty of Versailles were aiming 
at weakening the Austro-Hungarian Empire, militarily and politically, is there any 
justification for weakening the economic unity of the Sudan? It is certain that the 
political separation of the Southern and Northern Sudan will lead at the end to the 
economic separation of the country, and vice versa, as the political unity is one of the 
greatest bonds of economic unity. 
Slavery was a crime against humanity which had before us been committed by 
Europe and America. It has completely vanished in our country, and none of us think 
of reviving it. On the contrary we call for the abolition of any sort of slavery, even in 
its simplest form, such as the control of thought, let alone the control of the body. 
There are no ambiguities in our society which justify any fear in this direction. We 
therefore beg Your Excellency to remove the existing barriers between the Northern 
and Southern Sudan, and let those who are in fact brothers have the right of 
intercourse. We also beg Your Excellency to adopt a quick constructive and 
educational policy, with a view to reducing or removing the cultural differences 
between the two parts of the country. 
We wish to see money from the Central Treasury spent generously on the 
development of the South. None of us would like to see his fellow-countrymen naked 
any longer .... 
Extract from a broadcast on the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan by Sir D 
Newbold, 14 Jan 1944 
... I should like to meet another apprehension, and that is the fear that behind the 
Advisory Councils Ordinance there is hidden a secret policy to split the Sudan in two 
and cut off the Southern Provinces from the North. No such decision has been 
reached nor is the Sudan Government empowered on its own to make such a 
decision. The reasons for confining this Council to the six Northern Provinces are 
much simpler. They are practical and not political reasons and have been explained 
both in the Explanatory Note attached to the Laws and in a simple Note in Arabic of 
which over 1000 copies were circulated about two months ago. We are not 
prejudging the future status of the Southern Sudan. It is simply that the Southern 
Sudanese have not yet, for historic and natural reasons, reached a degree of 
enlightenment and cohesion which enables them to send competent representatives 
to a Council of this kind. Nor are there any Northern Sudanese who can fairly claim 
to be able conscientiously to represent the Southern peoples. We must look facts in 
the face. The same difficulty applies in a lesser degree to the Nuba Mountains 
districts, but owing to their closer connections with the North and the fact that they 
are an integral part of Kordofan Province we have thought it necessary, in spite of 
some differences of language and outlook and social life, to arrange for their 
representation on the Kordofan Province Council and I have just been to El Obeid to 
discuss the method with the Province Authorities. It is not easy but not insuperable. 
It has been suggested that District Commissioners or even Missionaries might be 
nominated as Southern Representatives. A District Commissioner might with 
difficulty represent the Nuba Mountains but the diversity of tribes and customs and 
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apprehensions of a policy which has so far been carried out without legislation, but 
has now been given a legislative form. In this digression we will take up the question 
of South in its entirely. The present Government has now lasted 45 years during 
which we admit that the North has made substantial progress in many walks of life, 
though not to the degree hoped for. We would have liked to see a similar, even 
greater, progress made in the South. Neighbouring countries, like the Congo and 
Uganda, have seen the light of civilisation, while the mentality and the ways of 
production and living of our brothers, the Southerners, have remained as they were, 
in spite of the fact that the possibilities of progress in their area exceed those of many 
Northern areas. 
This policy for the South which has now been disclosed in order to be confirmed 
by the new legislation, has existed in fact since the beginning. All sorts of obstacles 
are placed in the way of those wishing to enter the South. There are also the 
regulations which prevent Southerners from emigration to the North; the official 
encouragement of, and monopoly given to certain missionary bodies, and the placing 
of obstacles in the way of, nay even the complete prevention of the spreading of 
Islam; the great effort made to create among Southerners a lingua franca written in 
Latin letters, whereas Arabic will spread among the people of the South as soon as 
the door between the North and the South is opened. If these missionaries had 
enlightened the Southerners and raised their standard to the level of Northerners, we 
would not have objected to their presence and would have looked upon them as 
servants of humanity and civilisation. But unfortunately they have done nothing of 
this sort. On the contrary, the various missionaries working there threaten to create 
religious differences similar to those to which Europe succumbed in the Middle Ages. 
The seeds of religious antagonism have been sown in Equatorial Mrica in general, 
and in the Southern Sudan in particular. 
We are not selfish people who aspire to positions and power for ourselves. But we 
are a people who feel the responsibility of paving the way and laying the foundation 
for the coming generations, and we want this Valley to maintain the spirit of united 
consciousness in religion and language which, as Your Excellency knows, are among 
the factors of real nationalism. There are nations which suffered before us from these 
differences which time could not remove. Is it compatible with the spirit of humanity 
that these differences should be deliberately created among us? To read what is 
written by Julian Huxley in his book 'Mrica View' on the divergence between the 
different missionary bodies, and their effects on the poor Mrican peoples, is enough 
to make one's flesh creep in anticipation of these results in our "South" in the future. 
Since the old Egyptian regime, the South has formed part of the Sudan, and 
remained so in the Mahdia. Emir 'Arabi Dafa' all [sic]4 was, as Your Excellency 
knows, the last Governor of this region. Mter the Reconquest of the Sudan, the 
South remained as an integral part of the country from the administrative point of 
view. So recent history confirms the unity of the Sudan. From the economical point 
of view the Northern and Southern Sudan form one country. A look at the map 
shows clearly that the Nile Valley is an economic unity, since there are no natural 
barriers. The variations of climate and rainfall in the Sudan make the production of 
various crops contribute to the economic soundness of the whole country. One of the 
4 Arabi Dafa Allah (d. c. 1916), last Mahdist governor of Equatoria, 1890-1898, whose troops are 
remembered locally for carrying out a number of atrocities against the rural population. 
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Extract from a memorandum from Ismail al-Azhari to Sir H Huddleston, 6 Oct 1943, 
giving the views of the Graduates' Congress on the legislation concerning an 
Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan 
... The Advisory Council Ordinance contains a principle which confirms our fears 
and doubts, i.e. the exclusion of the South from this Council whether in its 
constitution or with regard to the subjects to be referred to it. We used to approve of 
the application of different systems of administration in Local Government, because 
every area has its own problems and nobody can solve the problems of any area better 
than its own sons. But we cannot understand nor accept the application of this 
principle to the Central Government. 
It is obvious that the sphere of the Central Government covers in particular all leg-
islation which concerns the development of the whole country and its general progress 
in the fields of education, health, agriculture, trade and industry as well as defence. 
We had believed that the Central Government with which the Sudanese were to be 
associated, included the administration of the whole Sudan. The Advisory Council to 
be formed at the top of the pyramid should therefore cover the whole Sudan. It is not 
an essential condition for the unity of a country that all its parts should be on the same 
level or progress. Nor in fact is this principle applied to what is called the "North" when 
the Juba [sic, Nuba] Mountains which is [sic] included in the sphere of the Council 
resembles the "South", and the policy of the South is applied to it.2 
The principle of separation might be approved if there exist hostilities or 
dissensions which might result in the disturbance of public security. But, praise be 
to God, we have neither seen nor heard of fighting in the streets of large towns 
between the sons of the North and those of the South, as happens in Indian towns 
between the different sections of the Indian population. In fact the sons of both the 
Northern and Southern Sudan have participated, since the Fung era, in the army and 
in the administration of the country; and Sudanese troops under the Turkish regime 
were mostly southerners of whom there were leaders whose names have been 
recorded in history. During the Mahdia Jihadiya warriors enjoyed a special renown. 
One of the greatest leaders in the Mahdia is Hamdan Abu 'Anga, a southerner in 
whose army enlisted Northern leaders and soldiers, who were proud of his 
leadership.3 With them, he defeated Abyssinian forces and conquered Gondar. We 
need not go back to the distant or near past. There is the famous case of the Sudan 
Defence Force to-day and we are all proud of the services it has rendered in the cause 
of Democracy. Its fine qualities on the battlefield have been officially recognised. Did 
we ever discriminate between Northerners and Southerners in its ranks? Did we ever 
ask when an S.D.F. division had displayed valour, whether its men were mostly 
Northerners or Southerners? Heaven knows we did not. 
Here, Your Excellency, we apologise for a digression. We have come to 
2 The Nuba Mountains, also subject to the Closed Districts Ordinance, were contained within Kordofan, a 
northern province. 
3 The non-Muslim peoples conscripted into the armies of the Kingdom of Sennar (sixteenth to early 
nineteenth century), the Turco-Egyptian empire (1821- 1885) and the Mahdiya (1882- 1898) were all 
slaves. Hamdan Abu Anja (d. 1889) was a Bandala, a group of former slaves who continued to owe service 
to their Baggara Arab former masters. A personal client of the Khalifa Abdallahi, he was placed in 
command of the riflemen (jihadiya) ; thus ensuring the Khalifa's control over the only permanent body of 
soldiers in the Mahdist state. 
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38 FO 371145986, no 3128 15 Sept 1945 
[Southern Sudan]: letter from R L Speaight1 toPS Scrivener 
explaining why a statement on the Southern Sudan would be 
undesirable. Enclosures: letter from Civil Secretary's Office, 
Khartoum to the Chancery, Cairo (3 Sept 1945), forwarding 
supporting documents [Extract] 
With reference to our despatch No. 1174 of 21st August, I enclose a copy of a letter 
from Khartoum Secretariat about the Southern Sudan. 
We agree with Khartoum in so far as the lack of a public statement on our policy in 
regard to the Southern Sudan is liable to create the same suspicion here as in the 
Northern Sudan. We are, however, bound to weigh against that consideration the 
undesirability of any move on our side which might gratuitously stir up extra 
interest here in this vexed question. The whole problem of the future of the Sudan is 
bound to come up soon when the Treaty is being revised, and from the Egyptian 
point of view it seems better to hold up until then any reassuring statement which 
we may have to make about our intentions in regard to the South. Meanwhile we feel 
that there is no point in going to meet trouble half way. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to Khartoum. 
Enclosure to 38 
In the enclosure to your printed despatch No.320 Lord Killearn suggested to the 
Secretary of State that the problems of the Southern Sudan which we set out in our 
despatch No.89 might be discussed with the Governor-General in the United 
Kingdom. As you know the Civil Secretary will join His Excellency in the United 
Kingdom within the next few days, and we very much hope that such discussions will 
be held. Robertson is therefore taking with him copies of this letter and of the 
enclosures. 
The point is that we feel that the discussions will be of particular value on one 
point-whether a public statement cannot now be made of the policy. Our present 
secrecy gives rise to exaggerated suspicions in the Northern Sudan, and our silence 
or reticence on the subject to some extent prejudices the all-important good 
relations we hope to maintain with responsible Northern Sudanese. 
We should therefore very much like such a statement to be made but we fully 
realise it will have to meet various Imperial and Egyptian considerations with which 
we are not primarily concerned. From our point of view, it must be uncompromising 
on essentials-that responsibility to the Southerners is ours not that of the Northern 
Sudanese, and that we are best fitted to decide what is best for them,-but we hope 
that it need not go back on anything so far made public by us nor be avoidably 
upsetting to Northern Sudanese opinion. The enclosures therefore comprise, briefly, 
the recent public statements made by us on our policy for the South, and some 
representative indications of Northern Sudanese opinion . ... 
1 First secretary in the embassy in Cairo, 1945-1947. 
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for freedom from foreign domination. This is not the foundation on which 
"particularly close relations" are built. 
45 years of British administration have not turned the Sudanese into African 
Englishmen, nor will another 20 years of it. Their form of self-government and 
standards of public life will be fundamentally oriental and their national outlook will 
be Arab and Middle Eastern. The ties of common origin, common outlook and 
tradition, which play so large a part in binding together the British Commonwealth, 
cannot influence the Sudanese nation of the future. 
Political concessions, however generous, will not be sufficient basis for lasting 
friendship: what appears to the governing power to be a concession is to the ruled 
merely the granting, usually belated, of a right. 
To be effective, in the absence of spiritual ties, the friendship must be built on the 
more solid basis of material aid. The benefits of the British connection must be real 
and practical and visible to all Sudanese-and that means, first and foremost, 
spending money in aid of economic, social and educational development. 
If it is agreed that the case for a declaration of policy has been made out, it remains 
to consider the way in which this can best be done. A unilateral statement by H.M.G. 
would no doubt be undesirable and it is suggested that there are two possible 
alternative courses:-
(i) That H.M.G. should agree to revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1946 
with the definite object, so far as the Sudan question is concerned, of including in 
the new Treaty a provision that training of the Sudanese for self-government is the 
primary object of Anglo-Egyptian administration in the Sudan and that having 
attained self-government, the Sudanese should decide their own future status vis-
a-vis Great Britain and Egypt. 
(ii) That if revision of the Treaty is not desired by H.M.G., Egypt should be asked 
to agree to a joint statement by the Condominium Powers on the above lines, as an 
interpretation of Article 11 of the existing Treaty. In the face of the Atlantic 
Charter, which she herself has invoked, and of the resolutions of the San Francisco 
Conference on trusteeship in backward territories, it would be difficult for Egypt 
to refuse such a request. 
In either case it is suggested, as a preliminary step, that the matter should be dis-
cussed first by Province Councils and subsequently by the Advisory Council for 
the Northern Sudan on a basis to be agreed beforehand between H.M.G. and 
Egypt. 
The difficult problem of the sovereignty and nationality of the Sudan would 
presumably be shelved automatically by the provision that the Sudanese shall 
eventually decide their own fate, and consideration of the equally difficult problem of 
the future of the Southern Sudan would also be postponed until that region has 
developed sufficiently to have some say in its own future. 
In the meantime, Great Britain should without delay set about strengthening her 
position in the Sudan by giving financial aid and by improving cultural relations 
through, for example, the establishment of a branch of the British Council in 
Khartoum. 
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meanwhile."3 This accurately describes the Sudan Government's views, and all these 
objectives "in the light of experience postulate that Egyptian influence in the Sudan 
should be kept at a minimum." 
There is obviously much of all this which cannot be said publicly by H.M.G. 
without provoking a major crisis with Egypt, but is H.M.G. prepared to record in 
some form or other their interpretation as given above of Article II? The policy of 
educating the Sudanese up to self-government is regarded in Egypt as a policy 
directed towards the eventual complete separation of the Sudan from Egypt and 
probably its inclusion in the British Commonwealth, and therefore as being in direct 
conflict with their policy of union. Public statements of its policy by the Sudan 
Government have at once aroused the deep suspicions of the Egyptians and a public 
declaration by H.M.G. would probably create a minor crisis. 
It seems therefore to come to a choice between H.M.G. provoking the crisis first by 
making such a declaration or waiting for Egypt to provoke the crisis by formally 
demanding union through a revision of the Treaty. 
The easy way out is for H.M.G. to shelve the whole problem untill956 by refusing 
to consider revision of the Treaty, or by trying to frighten the Egyptians out of their 
request for revision by threats of counter requirements in a new Treaty. 
But, and this is the most important point to the Sudan Government, by contin-
uing to keep the Sudanese in the dark as to their eventual intentions, H.M.G. may 
prejudice beyond recovery their chances of gaining their basic objectives in the 
Sudan. Like most people, the Sudanese want the best of both worlds: having 
become a self-governing nation, they would like to establish close relations with 
both Egypt and Great Britain and to enjoy the advantages of both connections. 
There can be little doubt that they would value a strong British connection very 
highly but they will not wait indefinitely for the promise of it. As they find, as 
they undoubtedly will, that it becomes increasingly difficult to keep on the right 
side of both Condominium Powers, they would be only human if they turn rapidly 
to the Egyptian connection before they prejudice their position with Egypt by pro-
longed acquiescence in the British policy of excluding Egyptian influence from the 
Sudan. There is already a tendency in this direction amongst certain sections of 
the politically-minded and uncertainty as to H.M.G's intentions is partly the rea-
son for it. 
The Sudan, by the nature of things, has and always will have certain close ties with 
Egypt, geographical, racial, lingual, religious and economic, and to this extent Great 
Britain starts with a handicap in the competition for the Sudan's favour. 
The British connection, if it is to hold the Sudanese, must mean more than 
training them for self-government and in the meantime providing them with a good, 
predominantly British administration. They regard these as the bare minimum of 
our obligations towards them. Their fulfilment will not arouse feelings of lasting 
gratitude towards us. In fact, the later stages of the process are likely to assume the 
superficial aspect of an increasingly ambitious and vocal educated Sudanese class 
struggling for independence against a reactionary and over-cautious "foreign" 
Government. The final curtain will fall on the "victory" of the Sudanese in their fight 
3 See 25. 
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"The Egyptian Government should be under no illusion as regards H.M.G's 
intentions to fulfil strictly and conscientiously the obligations which they 
have assumed in respect of the Sudan under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. 
H.M.G. will tolerate no alteration of the situation established by the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty until such time as the Sudanese have reached a 
stage of development when they can speak authoritatively for themselves. 
Any attempt by Egypt to modify the existing situation by arbitrary methods 
can only result in Egypt's total elimination from the Sudan except in so far 
as the obligations of H.M.G. under the Nile Waters Agreement are con-
cerned." 
In the Foreign Office Brief on Egypt and the Sudan to the British Delegation at the 
San Francisco Conference it was stated that the old Egyptian political programme of 
"complete independence" is still being preached and that it includes the union of 
Egypt and the Sudan. 
"It is claimed that this programme is in accordance with the Atlantic Charter. 
Whether this be the case or not (and it is highly doubtful in the case of the 
union of Egypt and the Sudan) it is divorced from all reality, since, to give 
only the more obvious reasons-the Sudan is itself attaining nationhood, and 
must be left free to work out its own destiny, which may or may not involve 
union with Egypt-probably not." 
"For the union of Egypt and the Sudan to be realised would involve the 
revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty." 
"The attitude of H.M.G. on this question is simple, viz:- there is no provision 
in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty for revision to take place before December 
1946, and then only by mutual consent. When revision does come to be 
discussed H.M.G. may well have important demands of their own to put 
forward in the light of changes in the world situation since 1936." 
While the Sudan question was reserved in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Article II of 
the Treaty provided that the primary aim of the joint Anglo-Egyptian administration 
in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese. 
The statements quoted above provide a definite interpretation of this clause and 
one which supports the policy adopted by the Sudan Government, but if this rep-
resents the firm of policy of H.M.G. the Egyptians have not been told of it offi-
cially and the Sudanese know nothing of it. They know the policy and aims of the 
Sudan Government, and in the main approve them, but they also know that the 
last word lies with H.M.G. and that they, with the agreement of the Egyptian 
Government, could change the policy at any time by a change in the interpreta-
tion of Article II. 
The Ambassador in February 1945, described British objectives in the Sudan as 
being "primarily to maintain our predominant position in a strategically important 
area, and secondarily to carry out in the Sudan our traditional policy of guiding a 
backward people by gradual stages towards self-government, with the definite 
intention that when they have reached that stage they will be willing to maintain 
particularly close relations with us: and to ensure for them a good administration 
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The ideas of the Sudan Government and of the educated Sudanese on the proper 
speed at which the policy should be developed not unnaturally differ-the former is 
guided by what it considers to be to the benefit of the Sudanese as a whole, the latter 
by their claim to speak for all Sudanese and by their impatience to assume the 
responsibilities and the powers of government. They wish to advance at the speed of 
the fastest, not of the slowest nor even of the average. Although the educated class 
numbers only five or six thousand out of a total population of six or seven millions, 
this is an attitude which the Government cannot afford to ignore nor condemn as 
entirely unreasonable. This class can argue that if it has been right for a handful of 
"superior" foreigners to govern the country for the past 45 years, is it not right for a 
handful of "superior" Sudanese to do so now that they exist? They are at least of the 
country. That the handful is as small as it is they say is the fault of the Government's 
educational policy in the past: the "superior" Sudanese cannot be expected to wait 
indefinitely while the Government tries to correct its mistake. 
Like most young people, the Educated Sudanese, though often unsure of 
themselves, are full of apparent self-confidence and are impatient of paternal 
restrictions. Their pride is easily hurt and they are quick to resent criticism of their 
abilities. It makes no impression to tell them that they do not represent the 
Sudanese, that they are over-hasty and that they are not yet fit to govern-they ask 
how they will ever be fit to govern if they are not given the chance to try. It is 
impossible to tell them, however true, that their rule would be less honest and 
disinterested than ours and that the ordinary Sudanese may well be less well off than 
they are now-for this will always be true to some extent and if it were a reason for 
delaying the achievement of self-government, we might as well abandon that goal 
altogether. 
If the British appear to be delaying the achievement of self-government unduly, 
however worthy their motives, the educated Sudanese will turn increasingly to the 
Egyptians in the hope that they will grant it sooner and that they will also provide 
greater material aid in the development of the country. The Sudan cannot from its 
own resources provide all the funds required for reasonable economic, social and 
educational development and Egypt is able and would be only too ready, for political 
reasons, to help. 
If Britain wishes to retain her position in the Sudan, she must state clearly that 
her policy is the achievement of self-government as soon as is reasonably possible, 
and she must provide material aid as earnest of her real interest in the future of the 
country. 
The second and third points can best be considered together. 
In September, 1944, the Ambassador in Cairo, on the authority of the Foreign 
Office, read "unofficially" to Nahas Pasha the then Prime Minister, and later to King 
Farouk, a statement in which were the following passages:-
"There have lately been numerous indications in the press and elsewhere that 
in certain Egyptian circles the time is now considered to have come when 
sweeping changes in relations between Egypt and the Sudan should be 
actively studied. The advocates of such a policy evidently do not take into 
account the essential fact that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty has imposed on 
Great Britain and Egypt alike trusteeship for the Sudanese and their 
education towards self-government." 
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development. If such arguments are needed they are set out in full in the recent 
Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies and are summed up 
in the words: 
"In the stage preparatory to self-government universities have an important 
part to play; indeed they may be said to be indispensable. To them we must 
look for the production of men and women with the standards of public 
service and capacity for leadership which self-rule requires."2 
If self-government is the eventual aim of H.M.G's policy in the Sudan, H.M.G. cannot 
escape the obligation of helping to equip the Sudanese with the essential powers of 
intellect and character and with an economy and social services which will enable 
them to stand on their own feet and to maintain the welfare of the people at a 
reasonable level. 
A generous act of this nature would, of course, be profitable to H.M.G., not only in 
the political field; for development in the Sudan will raise the standard of living of 
the Sudanese and will increase the demand for imported goods. It has always been 
the policy of the Sudan to buy to the greatest possible extent in the British market 
and there is every reason to suppose that this policy will continue. 
The future of the Sudan 
There are three reasons which make it important in the view of the Sudan 
Government that H.M.G. should as soon as possible· decide upon and publish a clear 
and long term policy for the future of the Sudan. 
1. The Sudanese are becoming more and more politically conscious and 
ambitious: they are growing towards nationhood and they are becoming 
increasingly interested in their future. This process has been greatly accelerated by 
the war. They are fully aware of the creditable part the Sudan has played in the war 
and they now expect their reward. 
2. Egypt is demanding her reward for the help she has given the United Nations in 
the war and one of her foremost aims is the old one of union of the Sudan with 
Egypt. 
3. Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, by mutual consent, can first come up in 
1946. Egypt has already made it clear that she wants revision and will no doubt 
formally request it when the time comes. One of the main points on which she will 
ask for revision will be the Sudan question, hitherto reserved. 
To take the first point in greater detail. The Sudan Government has deliberately 
encouraged Sudanese nationalism both in conformity with its obligations as trustee 
for the Sudanese and as a defence against Egyptian aspirations in the Sudan. The 
Government, with the blessing of the Foreign Office, has publicly committed itself to 
the goal of self-government for the Sudanese and is implementing this policy by:-
(a) progressive Sudanisation in all branches of the Civil Service, 
(b) the development of Sudanese local government, 
(c) the creation of an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, which is a 
Sudanese body to advise the Governor-General. 
2 Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, 1944--1955 (Cmd 6647, 1945) [Asquith 
Commission] . 
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the Sudan's request for a grant to endow the new Cordon College, and in the Foreign 
Office reserving the right to re-open the matter during the Governor-General's visit 
to the U.K. in 1945.1 
In putting up the proposal, the Governor-General emphasised that it was based not 
on financial but on political grounds. These latter were set forth at length in two 
despatches and are again mentioned in a note on the Future of the Sudan. 
While the political arguments in favour of the grant are no less strong now than 
they were-indeed the end of the war is an additional reason for an early gesture in 
recognition of the Sudan's war effort-a new factor has arisen lately in the shape of 
the first concrete proposals for a Five-Years Plan of economic, social and educational 
development. These proposals constitute a reasonable and, in the main, essential 
programme of development, much of which is overdue on account of lack of funds in 
the past and on account of the six years of war. 
They follow very closely the lines of development which are being undertaken in 
the Colonies and which are being financed under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Fund. The proposals will require a capital expenditure in the neighbourhood 
of £11,000,000; they by no means exhaust the possibilities of reasonable development 
and demands for capital expenditure over the next few years will without doubt be 
considerably in excess of this figure, but this represents the minimum sum which 
should be spent over the next five years if the Sudan is not to fall sadly behind the 
British Colonies in the welfare of its people and the development of its resources. 
It has been admitted that the present financial position of the Sudan is strong but 
its reserves have been built up only during the last decade and recurrent expenditure 
has now caught up with ordinary revenue and fresh increments to the Sudan's 
reserves are unlikely until fresh sources of revenue are developed-moreover 
expansion of the social services can only safely go forward if such additional revenue 
is found. It would not be possible for the Sudan to meet from its own reserves more 
than about half of the capital expenditure required without imperilling its financial 
stability, particularly in view of the uncertainty which faces the cotton industry. 
It is therefore now recommended that H.M.G. should make a grant of the order of 
£5,000,000 sterling to the Sudan in aid of their programme of development. 
Such a grant would serve the triple purpose of:-
( a) recognising the Sudan's contribution to the war effort, 
(b) proving to the Sudanese Great Britain's real interest in their country and 
thereby strengthening her position vis-a-vis Egypt, 
(c) enabling the Sudan Government to undertake economic, social and 
educational development on a scale comparable with that which H.M.G. are 
financing in the colonies. 
To produce the maximum effect in all these directions, it would be desirable for the 
grant to be made in one instalment at an early date, but if this were not convenient to 
H.M.G., it could be spread over the next five or ten years. 
It is hardly necessary to argue the vital part which the improvement of facilities for 
education, particularly higher education, must play in developing a policy of eventual 
self-rule for backward territories and in any programme of economic and social 
1 See 22 and 28. 
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general formula agreed upon by the parties, as specified in paragraph one above. 
Due consideration is given to the reservation made by the Umma Party not to 
undertake to work for a union with Egypt or any other country, but not to oppose 
such activities. Due consideration is also given to the explanation made by the 
coalition Parties (Ashigga, Ittihadiyeen, Ahrar-Ittihadiyeen) that Union for them 
means a union under the Egyptian Crown. 
(3) They should ask the Graduates' Congress to endeavour to realise the demands 
specified hereafter by all peaceful and legal means which the Congress thinks 
suitable, the help of the Sudan Government should, as far as possible, be sought 
for the realisation of these demands. 
These demands are:-
(a) The issue of a joint declaration by the two Condominium Powers, stating that 
their aim is to work for the formation as soon as possible of a free democratic 
Sudanese Government, with a union with Egypt and an alliance with Great 
Britain. 
(b) to ask for the formation of a joint Committee, composed of an equal number of 
representatives of the Sudan Government and of the Sudanese educated class-the 
latter to be nominated by the Congress-with a view to laying down a scheme for 
the Sudanisation of the administration in the shortest possible period, provided 
the Government gives this Committee all necessary facilities to carry out its 
mission and undertakes to execute its recommendations. 
(c) to ask for the lifting of restrictions on public freedoms such as the freedom of 
the Press, of gathering, of movement, within the frame of the law; to ask for an 
amendment of the existing special ordinances restricting these liberties. 
(Sgd.) Abdel Maged Ahmed 
Secretary 
37 FO 371/45985, no 3088 11-12 Sept 1945 
'Financial aid for the Sudan' and 'The future of the Sudan': 
memoranda by Sir H Huddleston 
[In September 1945 Huddleston visited London for consultation. These two memos were 
produced in London prior to a meeting at the FO. Following the meeting Howe 
summarized Huddleston's arguments on the political need for a £5 million development 
grant to the Sudan in the following terms: 'Any refusal by H.M.G. at this moment to 
support financially the schemes of development which the Sudan have in mind would be 
incomprehensible to the Sudanese people in the face of the establishment of a fund of 
£120 million for Colonial development. It would be interpreted by the Sudanese that we 
had no longer any interest in their welfare. To the Treasury's argument that we just could 
not afford such munificent schemes at this present crisis in our national finances, the 
governor-general proposed that the sum of £5 million could be obtained by taking off 
slices from the allocations for each of the Colonies' (minute by Howe, 18 Sept 1945, FO 
371145986, no 3150).] 
Financial aid for the Sudan 
Correspondence on this subject between the Governor-General, H.M's Ambassador in 
Cairo, the Foreign Office and the Treasury ended in the Treasury refusing to meet 
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of the administration at the slow paces announced in the last Session of the Advisory 
Council, and through the gradual devolution of larger powers to Municipal, Rural 
and Provincial Councils and to the Advisory Council. The Government also declared 
that the constitutional bodies which could advise it were the Province Councils and 
the Advisory Council. This is excellent and does not conflict with the high objective 
aimed at by the educated Sudanese. But the Sudanese cannot agree that this (? self-
government) should be the ultimate aim of the Sudan Government and also cannot 
agree upon the slow procedure laid down by the Government for the attainment of 
that modest aim. We have expressed in Part I our demands concerning the "aim", 
and it remains to set out the procedure which, in our opinion, should be followed by 
the Sudan Government for the attainment of that aim. 
The Committee considers that in order to quailfy the Sudanese for the attainment 
of the proposed aim, it is necessary to proceed, at a quicker pace, with the 
Government of all aspects of progress, whether educational or economic. The 
Committee however considers that it should limit its recommendations to certain 
specific aspects which, in its opinion, should be given priority, since they have the 
way for all others. The Committee also realises that all other aspects of progress have 
been examined by the Congress on several occasions and are being taken care of, in 
accordance with the Congress annual programme. 
Since the Government is now studying the scheme for the Sudanisation of the 
administration, the Committee feels that the present time is suitable for the 
submission to [?of] practical suggestions which would ensure that [?the] execution 
of the scheme in the shortest possible period. The most efficient means, in the 
Committee's opinion, is that the Congress should ask the Sudan Government to 
appoint a Committee formed of an equal number of Government representatives, and 
of representatives of the educated class provided the latter are nominated by the 
Congress. The said Committee would be entrusted with the duty of examining the 
Sudanisation scheme and submitting its recommendations to the Government for 
their execution. The Government, on its part, should undertake to accept the 
Committee's recommendations. 
The second demand which, in the opinion of the United Parties Committee, the 
Congress should present to the Government, is the complete release of restrictions 
on public freedom, such as the freedom of the press, the freedom of writing and 
publishing, the freedom of movements within the frame of general regulations; the 
Government should also be asked to amend all special regulations restricting these 
liberties. Without this release this country will not be able to follow the path of 
progress, and realise its legal national aspirations. 
Signature of the Parties' representatives. 
Conclusion 
The decisions of the United Front, as registered in the Official minutes, can be 
summarised as follows:-
( I) They (the various parties) should all work, under the standard of the Congress, 
for the formation of a free democratic Sudanese Government, with the admission 
of the principle of a Union with Egypt. 
(2) Every party is at liberty to direct its activities according to the principles laid 
down by it, provided these activities do not conflict with the text or the spirit of the 
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Part I 
To demand the publication of a statement by the two Condominium Powers, defining 
the political future of the Sudan and specifying the aim pursued by the two States. 
Part If 
To ask the Sudan Government to expedite the means whereby the Sudanese are 
enabled to reach the desired goal, so that this goal should be attained as soon as 
possible. 
After discussion the Committee considered that the Congress should present the 
following demands, in the way it deems fit, to the Authorities concerned at the 
suitable time. 
Part I. The present political status of the Sudan is abnormal; it does not tranquillise 
the Sudanese about their future, not does it conform to the basic principle laid down 
by the United Nations for the construction of the new world. The Sudan is not a 
colony, and its sons would not agree, at the present stage, that it should be one. On 
the other hand the Sudan is not free and cannot join the ranks of free states and 
cooperate with them in performing its mission, in a way which secures happiness to 
the Sudanese. 
With the termination of resistance in Europe and the unconditional surrender of 
Nazi Germany the United Nations have won a decisive victory on the enemies of 
humanity, of equality and of progress. The nations which are today rejoicing over 
this victory should however remember that this was not the result of their efforts 
alone, but of combined efforts in which all nations have shared. The effort made by 
small nations is not in any way inferior to those made by others. The Sudan which 
has sacrificed both men and money and whose efforts have been recognised by all the 
United Nations, stands today like the runner who wins a race and then looks around 
expecting the prize he deserves. The prize which the Sudan expects is nothing short 
of full freedom; freedom of choosing the sort of government it accepts, a government 
which secures happiness and welfare of the Sudanese; freedom in choosing the 
means whereby the Sudanese can reach the stage of governing themselves and 
joining the ranks of free nations. 
It is therefore not strange that the Sudanese should ask the two Condominium 
powers to recognise this right and to issue a statement clearly defining their aims in 
the Sudan. Since the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty provides for the possibility of 
reconsidering the Sudan question ten years after the signature of the Treaty which 
elapses in 1946, the Committee of United Parties considers that the time is suitable 
for the reconsideration of the Sudan question and the issue of a joint declaration by 
the two Condominium Powers that their aim is to work for the establishment, as 
soon as possible, of a free democratic Sudanese Government with a union with Egypt 
and an alliance with Great Britain. This is the basic demand which, in the opinion of 
the Committee of the United Parties, should be presented now, by the Congress 
before the present opportunity has passed-this being the determination of the 
future of the world following the wars and the lapse of a period of ten years since the 
signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. 
Part Il The Sudan Government, as recently stated by the Civil Secretary, is working 
for the establishment of self-Government in this country, through the Sudanisation 
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(2) the discussion of the first step which should be taken in connection with the 
realization of the country's national demands, in the light of any eventual 
agreement reached by the Parties. 
The Committee held six meetings, the first on 15.5.45 and the last on 19.6.45. A sub-
Committee was entrusted with the task of examining a few details which it was not 
possible for the main Committee to discuss in full Session. The Committee was 
therefore able to consider the various view points and, as far as possible, to reconcile 
them, and was careful in so doing not to interfere with the Congress's decisions and 
to work for the country's general interest, the latter being the highest objective 
towards which the efforts of all parties are sincerely directed. Since the decision 
taken by the coalition Front (representing the Ashigga, the Ittihadiyeen, and the 
Ahrar-Ittihadiyeen) was the point of divergence between this Front and the other 
parties, the Committee decided to examine this decision and find out the reasons 
which had led to their opposition, with the hope of reaching a solution acceptable to 
all of them. 
Discussions have led to the following results:-
(1) All parties agree to work for the formation of a free democratic Sudanese 
Government. 
(2) All parties agree to the principle of union with Egypt, and are perfectly 
convinced that the formation of such a Union is a necessity dictated by the 
historic, cultural and economic relations between the two countries and will serve 
the Sudan's interests more than Egypt's interests. 
The Committee however discussed neither the sort of union which was to be formed 
nor the time within which it should take place; but it unanimously agreed that a 
reference to the principle of union with Egypt was inevitable when submitting a 
demand regarding the sort of Sudanese Government acceptable, provided that the 
said union did not in any way affect the "autonomy" of the Government or limit its 
powers to act in the interests of the country. 
The coalition Front (Ashigga, Ittihadiyeen, Ahrar-Ittihadiyeen) insisted on 
defining the union as one under the Egyptian Crown. The Umma representatives 
made the reservations that although it did not oppose the principle of a union with 
Egypt, the approved principles of their party made no reference to a union with 
Egypt or any other country; the Party would therefore restrict their activities to 
working for the formation of a free democratic Sudanese Government only, but 
would not oppose the other parties' activities in this connection. 
In compliance with the foregoing conclusions, and with due regard to the above 
definitions and reservations the parties' representatives have undertaken that their 
parties should work jointly, through the Congress, for the formation of a free 
democratic Sudanese Government that will accept the principle of union with Egypt. 
It is admitted that this agreement does not prevent the Umma Party from working 
separately, independently of the Congress, provided its activity does not conflict with 
the spirit of the decision agreed upon by the Parties. Thus the desired unity will be 
realised and the work for the attainment of the common aim will be facilitated. 
The Committee then discussed the demands which were to be submitted to the 
Congress, so that the latter should work for their achievement, with the help of the 
Sudan Government, before the present world-wide opportunities had passed. The 
Committee divided its discussions into two parts:-
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United Parties Committee, which is said to represent the various political parties in 
the Sudan; and of the conclusions come to by the United Committee. We have 
obtained these documents secretly. 
2. It is expected that they will soon be dealt with by the Executive Committee, 
and no doubt something will appear in the Sudan Vernacular Press about it, and 
reference may be made in the Egyptian papers. You should therefore hand a copy to 
the Embassy, with a copy of this letter. I am sending two copies also to the London 
Office and asking the Controller1 to show them to Mr. Scrivener unofficially. 
3. This report and its conclusions need not be given too much emphasis; they are 
not very extreme, and they seem to show that the committee members do not expect 
that their aims can be attained in the very immediate future. 
4. If the "requests" (a word which I prefer to the translation "demands") are sent 
to us in the near future, clearly (a) will be a matter for discussion at any revision of 
the 1936 Treaty, and it will be interesting to see what line Egypt takes up regarding a 
"free democratic Sudan". Personally I have always assumed that the Sudan 
Government was working towards a self governing Sudan, tied in some way as far as 
the North is concerned to the Arab Middle East, in connection (whether by alliance 
or something else) with the British Commonwealth. 
5. With regard to (b) the Sudan Government could hardly undertake to execute 
recommendations of which it did not approve, but I think we might meet this 
request part of the way by allowing a committee with Sudanese representation to 
give us suggestions for further Sudanisation, though the Congress is not generally 
representative and we could not accept its nominees. The main drawback at the 
moment of course is lack of qualified Sudanese. 
6. I do not know what is meant by (c)- maybe wartime restrictions on the press 
and the closed District Ordinance. We are now considering the abolition of as much 
war time legislation as possible without weakening our economic controls. I believe 
the ordinary Sudani is as free in all material ways, as the citizen of any country, from 
fear, want, religious persecution, and interference with his spoken or written word. 
I believe therefore that there is not much to worry us at the moment in this. 
Enclosure to 36 
In response to the wish expressed by a number of our compatriots and in 
consideration of the present world conditions which impose upon the educated 
classes the necessity of uniting their opinion and rallying round the Congress, the 
various parties have deemed it necessary to form a Committee, composed of three 
representatives of each party, with Abdel Maged Ahmed2 as Secretary, to consider:-
(1) the possible unification of the various parties' principles concerning the 
political future of the Sudan; 
1 RCMayall. 
2 Abd al-Majid Ahmad, Ahrar (Liberal Party) member of Graduates' Congress Committee of 60, an 
employee of the War Supply Dept., who had earlier refused an invitation to sit on the Advisory Council for 
the Northern Sudan, but was later to sit on the Executive Council as under-secretary for economics and 
trade. 
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5. Your Excellencies 
We are neither intriguing against the existing Condominium rule nor are we 
acting in a revolutionary way. The time of terrorism has gone, with the 
extermination of the Axis. But we are asking for a natural right, necessitated by our 
right to live and in order to live freely in our own country under a regime whihc [sic], 
we feel, will conform to our interests and wishes and will realise our national aims 
and aspirations. That regime is:- "The formation of a Democratic Sudanese 
Government in a union with Egypt under the Egyptian Crown". 
What prompts us to present this note is our deep feeling that these demands are 
just and that the present time is suitable for their realisation and attainment. We are 
encouraged in this line by the present ideas prevailing as to the future organisation 
of the world and by the formation of a Labour Government in the Great Britain, since 
the principles of the Labour Party conforms [sic] to the spirit of these demands and 
will help their realisation. 
6. Your Excellencies 
We present these demands to two Democratic rulers, in a democratic manner. We 
present them in the name of the Graduates' General Congress-the body which 
enjoys the confidence of the whole country, represents the enlightened class, and 
under whose banner all parties in the country are grouped. We present them in the 
name of our dear Country, the Sudan, which has contributed, in the fight of 
democracy against fascism, with the blood of its sons, with its economic resources 
and with its moral support. 
We do not forget, and history will certainly remember it, that the stand made by 
the S.D.F. in the face of the Axis Forces, in the Eastern Sudan together with the 
loyalty shown by the Civilian population in the Sudan were the beginning of the 
turning of the scales in favour of the Allies. This stand was followed by the defeat of 
the Axis at Keren in Abyssinia, at Alamein, in Italy, and then in Berlin and Japan. 
7. Your Excellencies 
Since the Sudanese have the first claim in the determination of their country's 
fute [sic] status, we now present these demands, requesting with insistance [sic] that 
the two Governments of Great Britain and Egypt should issue forthwith a statement 
approving these wishes of ours, and that rapid action should be taken with a view to 
carrying them out. 
In the name of Justice, equity, fraternity and equality, for whose cause Democracy 
has fought, the Graduates' General Congress asks for "the formation of a democratic 
Sudanese Government in union with Egypt under the Egyptian Crown". 
God may guide us to success. 
Amen. 
36 FO 371/45985, no 2977 25 Aug 1945 
[Sudanese political aims]: letter from J W Robertson toE C Haselden. 
Enclosure: draft report of the United Parties Committee to the 
Executive Committee of the Graduates' Congress 
1. I am sending you herewith two copies of a Report about to be submitted to the 
Executive Committee of the Graduates' General Congress by a committee called the 
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In asking for the formation of a democratic Sudanese Government, we realise that 
the act of ruling is divided into two parts, administrative and technical. As regards the 
administration, it can be carried out through the good services of the Omda, Sheikh, 
Nazir, Mamur, the Sudanese O.D. the Sudanese Governor, and the Sudanese Minister. 
The technical side however required additional qualifications which may not be 
adequately available in the Sudan now. This difficulty can be surmounted however 
through the assistance of British and Egyptian advisers and experts, who could help, 
to the extent needed, in educational, financial, judicial, agricultural and medical 
matters, as well as in other services of public utility where competent Sudanese are 
not available, until missions of Sudanese students have been sent to England, Egypt 
and other European and American countries, to complete their studies. In stating the 
above, we have in mind countries of an equal approaching standard, like Ethiopia, 
the Yemen, Iraq, etc which aim at the same objective and are already on the path 
which we intend to follow. 
Our inclination towards the idea of a union, and the selection of Egypt to be the 
second partner in that union, appear to us as a natural trend dictated by the many 
vital and close links which derive their strength from our common history and from 
the union of interests, in addition to the bonds of religion, language, blood, 
education and the Nile, that vital and great link which confirms the unity of its valley 
in the same way as it unites its banks. Our relation with Egypt will guarantee a just 
distribution of the Nile Waters, as well as the co-ordination of the two countries [sic] 
economies. There is no doubt that stable prosperous conditions and economic 
tranquillity will act in support of the great British Empire in a stronger manner than 
at any time in the past. 
In addition we feel that the era of small states has gone, since they are unable to 
resist alone the world turmoil they have theyrefore [sic] to constitute themselves 
into groups and federations in order to face the new world order and to play an 
important part in the new world that was born on Victory Day. 
Our inclination twoards [sic] Egypt is natural and through Egypt our trend is 
directed towards the Arab and Islamic countries with which we are linked with 
sacred bonds which will guarantee the harmony and the strength required for the 
expected union. 
In order to realise the economic, cultural and social needs of the Sudan we 
consider that the Sudan should form a union with Egypt, under the Egyptian crown, 
while its administration is to be taken over by a Sudanese Government in flesh and 
blood. This is the only way in which the Sudan can benefit materially and morally 
and can complete what it lacks in education and finance, the latter will enable the 
country to exploit its resources to the fullest extent, so that the whole of the Nile 
Valley, the North as well as the South, the East and the West, should progress. 
4. Your Excellencies 
This solution of the Sudan question will help to establish stable conditions to 
develop the country economically; it will also assist the country to progress, while its 
economy will continue to be linked with that of the Great British Empire. We feel 
more strongly every day that we shall not be able completely to face future 
curcumstances [sic] or to develop our country in a way which will enable it to gain a 
suitable place in the new world organisation, without the aid of Great Britain. We 
also feel that a spirit of affection and confidence must always govern our relations 
with Great Britain as is now the case. 
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This is a part of the Sudan's contribution towards the war effort, and the triumph 
of the cause of democracy and right. It is the right of her sons, after those efforts, to 
expect that their demands will find from Your Excellency the acceptance and 
consideration they merit; they also have the right to hope that your government's 
[sic] will accede to them in the spirit of justice and equity they deserve. 
1. For about half a century the Sudan has remained under the present 
condominium rule, and it has never [been] thought by any one that the present 
regime should be the final status of the country. It will certainly never [be] 
consider[ed] as such by the Sudanese. Though we recognise the services rendered by 
the present regime, in the organisation of the Administration and the establishment 
of security and justice, the development of the country, however, from the economic, 
educational and social aspects has been carried out at a slow pace which does not 
correspond in any way to the real needs of the country, to the ambitions of the 
Sudanese and to their aptitude for progress. This becomes evident if a comparison is 
drawn between the development of the Norther[n] part of the Valley (Egypt) and that 
of its Southern part (the Sudan), although both parties are gifts of the Nile. While 
prosperity and opulence are found in the lower Valley, misery and harships [sic] are 
then [sic] lot of the upper part. While education and guidance are found there, 
ignorance and backwardness are spread here. Even the small share of progress which 
is the lot of the Sudan has not been equally spread over all parts of the country. The 
South is still in a primitive condition which can hardly be imagined in the twentieth 
century. The same conditions also prevail in many eastern and western parts, and 
have led to the establishment of diffirent [sic] systems of administration, legislation 
and education in the country. The small share of progress which we have enjoyed has 
created a deep gab [sic] between the various parts of one country, and our 
development has thus been partial and lame. All this has taken place under the 
Condominium rule, which has lasted long enough to have been able to raise the 
standard of the Sudan and of its institutions to the level of other advanced countries 
in the world. 
2. The situation of the Sudan has created a general feeling throughout the 
country that rapid action should be taken with a view to putting and end to the 
present policy, and changing the present abnormal temporary status into a natural 
one that would secure to the country a steady advance corresponding to its people's 
aptitude and to its real needs. As a result of this universal feeling the Graduates' 
General Congress was formed in 1938 and began, since its inception, to study local 
conditions and to explore the wishes of the Sudanese. In April 1942 it submitted its 
note in which it expressed the country's aspirations and demands. A copy of this note 
is attached, together with the correspondence exchanged with the Sudan 
Government in this connection.1 
3. Since the first and most important article in the above mentioned note refers 
to the Sudan's right of self-determination, the Congress has, during its Sessions of 
the last four years, explored the country's wishes as to the final form of the Sudan's 
status, which could secure the country's aspirations and guaranteed [sic] its rights. 
In April1945 the Congress General Committee passed the following resolution as 
regards the country's status: "The formation of a democratic Sudanese Government 
in a union with Egypt, under the Egyptian Crown". 
1 See 1. 
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35 FO 371145986, no. 3152 23 Aug 1945 
[Congress' demand for the independence of the Sudan and union with 
Egypt]: letter from Ismail al-Azhari to Mr Attlee and Sidqi Pasha 
[On his return from Egypt al-Azhari sent this demand for independence to the civil 
secretary, for transmission to the British and Egyptian prime ministers. Robertson 
rejected Congress's claim to represent the views of the Sudanese people and refused to 
transmit the letter to the prime ministers (J W Robertson to Ismail al-Azhari, 1 Sept 
1945, FO 371/45986, no 3152), at the same time he relayed the exchange of 
correspondence to the FO.] 
The Graduates' General Congress-the only body representing enlightened public 
opinion in the Sudan, a body towards which the various national view points in the 
country converge, and in which the Sudanese nation places its full confidence-has 
the honour, in fulfilment of its duty towards its country, to present this note in 
which it expresses our national aspirations and demands at this delicate juncture, 
when final victory has been achieved and a new day has dawned in the world for all 
nations, great and small, giving them an opportunity to solve their existing and 
impending problems, and to set up a just world organisation which will secure to 
humanity its rights, to the various countries their liberty, and to individuals the 
happiness and welfare they hope for, in an era of a permanent and stable peace. 
The Sudan's share has not been insignificant and she has shouldered a burden 
exceeding her capacity, so as to take her place with those who fought for the cause of 
justice and democracy in order that the world struggle should be brought to a happy 
conclusion, a conclusion which has been reached earlier than expected by the 
collapse of Japan, the last fortress of tyranny. The great leaders of democracy and of 
the British Empire have recognised her valuable services and sacrifices and have 
praised them. 
In his proclamation to the people of the Sudan on the occasion of V.J. Day His 
Excellency the Acting Governor-General referred to the Sudan's efforts in the 
following terms:-
"The Sudan can look back with pride on the part she has played in this war. 
She has acted throughout with the courage, the orderliness and the 
obedience for which Sir Stewart Symes called in 1940. She has never doubted 
the path to Victory. In 1940 her forces stood valiantly, with their British and 
Indian comrades, in the path of the invader and then pressed forward with 
them to share in the glorious victories in Abyssinia and in North Africa. 
Always they have brought honour to the Sudan by their valour and their 
discipline. At home the Sudan assisted in the vital taks of guarding the 
African lines of communication and gave unswerving support to the military 
forces who used her soil. Her citizens made many generous contributions to 
the effort of war, and endured steadfastly the restrictions and shortages which 
are the inevitable accompaniment of war. Her cultivators worked with faithful 
persistence. Her merchants have loyally obeyed the demands made upon 
them. Her officials have shouldered without complaint new and heavy 
burdens. Her wartime economy has won praise outside the borders of the 
Sudan. This is indeed a proud record and let us remember it with full hearts 
in these days of rejoicing." 
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33 FO 371145972, no 1998 May 1945 
[SAR]: report from SPIS no 48 for March-April, on SAR's disclaimer 
of monarchical ambitions [Extract] 
El Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi Pasha 
The Sayed's long expected disclaimer of royal ambitions fizzled out in a mild and 
rather unconvincing interview with the Editor of the NIL, 1 published on April 17th, 
in which he merely announced that in taking an interest in the Umma party he was 
not actuated by any personal ambition, being quite happy and contented with his 
existing circumstances; he was solely concerned with the country's good, and would 
take an equal interest in any similar movement which had that objective in view. It 
will take more than an indirect disclaimer of this kind to displace the conviction in 
the minds of his opponents that he aims at the restoration of a Mahdist 'dynasty'. 
1 The Ansar sect newspaper. 
34 FO 141/1013, no 71 8 June 1945 
[Ismail al-Azhari and Mustafa al-Nahhas]: letter from A M Hankin to 
J W Robertson reporting a meeting in Cairo 
[Ismail al-Azhari went to Egypt in June and July 1945 in order to gauge the reaction of 
Egyptian politicians to the Congress' declaration in favour of an independent Sudan 
under the Egyptian crown (see 30), and to find out what assistance might be obtainable 
from various Egyptian parties ('Note on the activities of Ismail el Azhari in Cairo', FO 
371/45984, no 2076). Throughout his visit to Cairo the embassy monitored and reported 
on many of his meetings and conversations.] 
On June 6th Ismail el Azhari was received by Nahas Pasha in the latter's house. The 
following is a summary of the conversation as described later by Azhari to a friend. 
(2) Azhari described at length the objects of the Congress, which he summed up 
as aiming at future unity with Egypt, with a common foreign policy and Army and 
under one crown; internal administration only being reserved for the Sudanese. He 
referred to British fears in the Sudan which he claimed had led them to create the 
Umma Party to fight unity with Egypt, but assured Nahas that this party was doomed 
to failure. 
(3) Nahas told Azhari that his attitude towards the Sudan is well known, and that 
he would never agree to its separation from Egypt. He said it was the first subject on 
the Wafd's programme for discussion when the Treaty modification with Great 
Britain is considered. He said that no future settlement of the Egypt-Sudan question 
could be arrived at unless the Wafd participated in the negotiations, as the Wafd 
continue to be the majority party in Egypt and he was convinced that it would 
resume government before any negotiations took place. 
(4) Azhari asked Nahas to allow the Wafdist press to support Congress. Nahas 
replied he would do so when censorship was removed. Azhari said that Sayed Abdel 
Rahman opposed unity with Egypt and supported the Umma Party with influence 
and money and that Sayed Ali Mirghani at present assisted Congress. He said, 
however, that Sayed Ali might alter his policy in future because Congress was 
unwilling to shelter behind the influence of any Tarika leaders. 
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negotiations were correct, it would be desirable to consult MacGregor fully on the 
whole issue as raised in 1939 and now. The agreement of the Sudan Government to 
this suggestion was conveyed in your telegram No. 645. 
MacGregor has now made a detailed examination of the whole correspondence, 
and has most kindly embodied his conclusions in the memorandum of which copies 
are enclosed together with copies of his paper mentioned in paragraph 1.2 These 
conclusions are, broadly, that except for the proposal to raise the reservoir level at 
Sennar by 1.0 metre the case advanced by the Sudan Government will not bear 
critical examination in the light of the Nile Waters Agreement 1925/29; and that, 
since this proposal is by itself inadequate for the purpose in view, we should now 
concentrate our efforts on securing the Tsana concession for the Sudan with a 
minimum of delay. MacGregor's memorandum in fact confirms the misgivings 
expressed in my private telegram, and makes it clear, with the authority of the actual 
technical negotiator of the Nile Waters Agreement, that the Sudan Government, in 
1939, were, to put it mildly, imperfectly advised. 
The following points seem to call for special emphasis:-
(1) The Sudan Government should henceforth base themselves solely on the Nile 
Waters Agreement, and dismiss as irrelevant such treatises as Nile Control and the 
report of the old Nile Projects Commission which, as MacGregor shows, provide 
more and better ammunition for the Egyptian than for the Sudan negotiator. 
(2) The Sudan attitude towards the water agreement as described in paragraph 10 
of Huddleston's despatch is in fact ill-founded and is unfortunate politically since 
there are already sufficient potential causes of friction between the Sudan and 
Egypt without introducing major-and in fact superfluous ones such as this. 
(3) Though this does not arise directly out of the document it looks as though a 
return should be made to the system whereby Sudan had an Irrigation Adviser 
who was in close touch not only with all the central departments at Khartoum but 
also with the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works and with the Foreign Office, and 
was thus able to survey the field comprehensively. 
MacGregor's recommendations about Lake Tsana will require further study which 
we are about to give to them. We shall then write to you again, after consulting Bob 
Howe who had just arrived in this country. You will also receive very shortly 
MacGregor's comments on Murdoch Macdonald's3 "Report on the proposed third 
heightening of the Aswan Dam for the flood protection of Egypt" of which, I 
understand, Macdonald has sent copies to the Embassy. 
For the moment I suggest that you should send both MacGregor's reports to 
Huddleston (with as much of this letter as you think it appropriate to pass on) and 
suggest that, when they have been fully digested, the question-of which we fully 
appreciate the great importance from the Sudan's point of view-should be 
discussed further with MacGregor in London by Huddleston and his advisers when 
they visit the United Kingdom. By that time we should have completed the necessary 
readjustment of our ideas about the Lake Tsana project. 
2Not printed. R M MacGregor, former irrigation adviser to the Sudan government (in charge of the Irrigation 
Department, 1924-1934), retained in 1945 by the Sudan government as a special irrigation consultant (see 
24 and 27). 
3Sir Murdoch Macdonald: adviser, Egyptian ministry of public works, 1912-1921; MP (Lib) for Inverness, 
1922-1951; senior partner in the engineering firm of Sir Murdoch Macdonald and partners. 
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Furthermore active pro-British propaganda in which British officials of the 
Condominium Government cannot play an active part might well be intensified by 
the British Council which at the moment has no representative or activity in the 
Sudan-and I suggest that the British Council should be pressed to open an active 
branch in Khartoum as soon as possible. 
5. It is always difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy the strength of the 
emotional pull which Egyptian influences would exert in the Sudan at a time of 
political ferment. The emotional forces which inspire demonstration and riot are 
only fully released when a crisis has actually arisen. It is all the more important 
therefore that we should do what we can now-before the period of tension sets in-
to secure the sympathy and self-interest of those of our potential supporters who are 
capable of taking a realistic view of political alternatives. This action, as I have 
already ventured to suggest, might take the form of some immediate gesture of good 
will, to be followed, as soon as a clash became inevitable and the Condominium 
facade need be maintained no longer, by a clear pronouncement by His Majesty's 
Government of its intentions for the future of the country. 
6. To turn to Your Excellency's suggestion that in the event of a serious dispute 
with Egypt our physical control of the Nile waters might be used as an instrument of 
persuasion-! venture to think that there are serious objections to such a course. 
From a purely practical point whereas it would be physically possible to divert the 
summer waters of the Nile to a considerable extent to the detriment of Egypt, the 
diversion would take time. New canalisation, dams and other works would have to be 
undertaken to render it effective and the time lag alone between the threatened 
sanction and its enforcement would rob it of all coercive value. During the 
intervening period the situation, if it had not improved would have inevitably so 
deteriorated as to necessitate the application of military or naval sanctions of a more 
immediately forceful kind. I feel, moreover, that in a dispute of which the Sudan is 
the subject it might be more appropriate to apply sanctions other than those in 
which the Sudan itself is involved. 
7. As Your Excellency is aware, I am intending to go to the United Kingdom this 
summer, and I propose, if Your Excellency agrees to discuss the Sudan question 
generally at the Foreign Office, while I am at home. 
32 FO 371146081, no 643 23 Apr 1945 
[Nile Waters] letter from Sir R Campbell to Lord Killearn 
In your despatch No. 213 of the 4th February you enclosed a copy of a despatch1 from 
Huddleston on the subject of additional supplies of Nile water for the Sudan, and 
requested authority to approach the Egyptian Government with a view to the early 
discussion of those proposals by technical experts, the intention of the Sudan 
Government being to employ MacGregor in that capacity. In our telegram No.370 I 
told you that MacGregor had simultaneously handed us a paper explaining certain 
aspects of the Nile Waters Agreement 1925/29, and suggested that, as there was some 
doubt whether the conclusions drawn by the Sudan Government from the water 
1 See 24. 
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31 FO 371/46081, no 1575 12 Apr 1945 
[Anglo-Egyptian relations]: despatch no 55 (reply) from Sir H 
Huddleston to Lord Killearn 
I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's despatch No.44 dated 7th February, 
1945.1 
2. Strategic considerations apart, our attitude to Egypt in the event of a serious 
Anglo-Egyptian dispute on the Sudan question must, I submit, depend primarily on 
the view we take of our obligations to the Sudanese and of the objectives of our 
administration in the Sudan. I will refer later to Your Excellency's ideas as to the 
form coercive action might take should coercive action be necessary. 
3. With Your Excellency's summary of our objectives in this country and with 
Your Excellency's opinion that as far as possible we should maintain the 
Condominium facade I fully agree. The realisation of our objectives will depend on 
our success in resisting the political claims of Egypt, and in creating in the Sudan a 
willingness, on achieving self-government, to maintain those close relations with us 
to which Your Excellency refers, and in the meantime to turn a deaf ear to the 
Egyptian agitator. This willingness will have to be carefully cultivated. The general 
attitude of the educated Sudanese, even of the Congress group which is still 
hesitating to commit itself openly to an active pro-Egypt programme is, on the 
whole, one of suspended judgment. There are at the same time in certain quarters 
observable inclinations in the direction of one or other of the Condominium 
partners-inclinations which we cannot afford to neglect. It is in our immediate 
interest to discourage the one and to stimulate the other. The Egyptian propaganda 
machine is already actively in the field, and Your Excellency is already fully aware of 
the various methods employed: propaganda through the Economic Expert's office, 
large expenditure on the Egyptian Secondary School, a proposed Egyptian hospital, 
infiltration into our quarantine service, and financial support of the pro-Egyptian 
elements. His Majesty's Government aims and intentions remain undisclosed though 
Sir Douglas Newbold in a broadcast address early in 1944, and I myself at the opening 
of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan later in the same year, referred to the 
goal of local self-government. 
4. We shall, I believe, have great difficulty in retaining the support of such 
Sudanese opinion as is today disposed to align itself behind us, unless His Majesty's 
Government is prepared to indicate soon by some definite gesture of goodwill that 
their interest in the Sudan is constructive and continuous and not merely 
opportunist and casual. At the moment the loyalty of the Sudanese is being gradually 
eroded by our silence, which is interpreted as indifference, and by the concessions we 
make to our vocal partner. The re-penetration of the Sudan by Egyptian political 
ideas and Egyptian agents has already begun. It can be checked to a limited extent by 
preventive or restrictive action, but it can only be positively countered by the growth 
of an active pro-British sentiment founded firmly on self-interest and mutual 
understanding. My recent attempts with Your Excellency's assistance to obtain the 
gift of an endowment to the Gordon Memorial College from the British Government 
have unfortunately achieved no success yet, and an opportunity has been missed. 
1 See 25. 
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where it could take over the reins of Government and run its own affairs-this 
nation takes the opportunity of recognising the debt of gratitude owed to the two 
Condominium governments, on whose behalf Your Excellency is administering this 
country, and to the Sudan Government for their many sided efforts, which are 
appreciated and noted with gratitude. It is through those efforts that the nation has 
reached a stage of progress which would enable it to demand the political rights 
which have been held in trust for it. If we compare this nation with other Middle East 
nations, we find that it has achieved a stage of political, cultural and military 
maturity which would warrant the demand for its natural right which is the 
independence of the Sudan within its entire geographical boundaries. 
The Sudan's declaration of war on 11.6.40 against the Axis powers and its 
participation in the war with its troops, the giving of its means of communications 
and its resources and its efforts towards winning the war, have enhanced that natural 
right. Its troops are still in East and North Mrica with other Allied troops doing their 
duty. Perhaps the first victory in this war won by the Allies was the one in which 
Sudanese troops took part for the first time. We recall with pride what those troops 
achieved alone, in preventing the huge Italian armies in East Mrica from attacking 
the Nile Valley and so connecting up with other Italian troops in North Mrica. 
The Atlantic Charter, and the declarations made by the responsible spokesmen of 
the Allied Democracies that have followed it have emphasised for all nations their 
right to self-determination. The San Francisco Conference will meet shortly with the 
intention of safeguarding international peace and security, of maintaining cordial 
relations between the nations, of realising international co-operation in solving the 
international, economic, social or other of humanity's problems, and of finding a 
central machinery for co-ordinating nations' dealings with each other. Naturally the 
Sudan has not been invited to that Conference in spite of its having declared war at a 
time when the enemy's strength was at its zenith and the Allies were not fully 
prepared, and when no one could have imagined that the price of a chair (at that 
conference) was declaration of war against the enemy however late it was done. In 
that critical time the Sudan believed in the justice of the Allied cause and declared 
war voluntarily to support that cause, and events have realised what it had hoped for. 
As the Sudan is to have no representative at that Conference, the Nation Party 
wishes to demand that this country be accorded its right in attending the conference, 
on the same footing as other nations who declared war and participated in it. 
The Sudan is neither a British nor an Egyptian Colony. Its participation in this war 
justifies that it should at least demand its full sovereignty which has been held in 
trust for it, so that it is not deprived of that freedom against whose enemies it waged 
a war, whose effectiveness has been recognised in the whole world. 
The Sudanese nation, which believed in the Allied cause and supported it, wishes 
to place its confidence in the Sudan Government and in the United Nations, with 
whom it fought for the restoration of freedom to those from whom it has been 
temporarily taken away, in order that the Sudan should not be deprived of its 
freedom or of the realisation of its aims-this nation wishes to approach Y.E. with 
this Note asking that steps be taken towards this country's representation at this 
Conference, and as the agent of both H.B.M. and of the King of Egypt, Y.E. will 
support that demand with testimony as to this country's eligibility. 
We are waiting for Y.E.'s reply supporting our aims and accepting our demands. 
With our due respects and regard. 
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Appendix "B" ( 1) to 30 
ANTICIPATING POST-WAR SETTLEMENT 
This party shall be called the Nation Party. 
The Sudan for the Sudanese. 
[30) 
To work for the realisation of the independence of the 
Sudan with its geographical boundaries intact, and 
maintaining friendly relations with Egypt and Great Britain. 
Membership of this party is open to every Sudanese above 
the age of eighteen years of age [sic], who embraces the 
principle of the party and works for its realisation. 
The headquarters of the party shall be the town of 
Omdurman. 
An annual general meeting shall be held in [the Muslim 
month of] Rabie-for all members and shall discuss:-
(a) A review of the previous year. 
(b) Consideration of members' suggestions. 
The party shall have a body selected from its members to 
form its Council. 
The finances of the party shall be derived from the 
following:-
(a) Membership fees amounting to 5 PT. per member to 
to be paid once in life. 
(b) Subscriptions. 
(c) Donations. 
The Council shall make with the consent of the annual 
general meeting rules of procedure for the conduct of 
meetings, regulation of finance matters, and the explanation 
of what matters the Constitution might have left 
unexplained, provided that explanation does not conflict 
with the spirit of the Constitution. 
The Constitution shall not be amended unless with the 
agreement of the annual general meeting. 
The Sudanese nation which has enjoyed freedom and independence during these last 
centuries, except for a period not exceeding sixty years after which it regained 
freedom and independence when the present Administration took over, an 
administration which has from the start declared is intention to serve, and in fact 
striven to champion, the cause of this nation and so bring about its uplift to a stage 
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over, themselves widely proclaiming that they have Government support. The fact 
that the Government had encouraged the formation of a new independent newspa-
per with a non-sectarian rural bias which had been named "El Umma" before the 
party was constituted appeared to confirm the Government connection with the 
party. 
9. It is important that we should make it quite clear to the public at large that 
this claim is untrue and we are taking steps to circulate Governors and others in 
this sense, and to warn off the promoters of the Umma party themselves. Many of 
its more moderate members are fully conscious of the embarrassment of the 
Mahdist connection and would be glad to see persons like Mohammed Khalifa 
Sherif removed from active participation. It has already been suggested to Sayed 
Abd El-Rahman that he should be delegated to his White Nile pump scheme and 
directed to stay there, but nothing has been done nor is likely to be done. Sheikh 
Ahmed Othman El-Qadi's8 activities on the other hand-he is orie of the main 
Umma propagandists-can be, and if necessary will be, restrained. All we can do for 
the time being is to challenge any suggestion that the Umma party is our party, 
damp down any extravagant propaganda, and watch developments (particularly 
Egyptian developments), intervening only in the activities of either party if they 
seem likely to prejudice good order and good government or to lead to a definite 
breach of the peace. 
10. Our main difficulty, as you will have gathered, is that although we cannot 
openly say so, the Umma party, whatever its motive, is on our side, and that however 
much we disapprove its tactical errors, we do not want it discouraged. If we so 
neglect or mishandle it as to lose its support we may find ourselves a trifle friendless 
when the inevitable show down occurs. We can do nothing to encourage it here. 
There is, however, one way in which the Embassy might indirectly help us. The 
members of the Umma party and a good many other moderates who belong to no 
party are very disturbed in their minds over the San Francisco Conference. They have 
misread or misinterpreted various articles which have appeared in the Egyptian and 
world Press and have submitted a letter to His Excellency of which I attach a copy 
with the answer, as Appendix "B".9 They believe that San Francisco will settle the 
future of the Sudan and that the Egyptian and British Governments have already put 
their heads together and "agreed" what that future is to be. We have assured them 
that the San Francisco Conference is not concerned with, and will not deal with, 
their future. This, they say, is all very well but they want something more. They want 
an assurance that, in the course of discussions on subjects which are on the Agenda, 
no Egyptian delegate will be allowed to claim directly or indirectly that he represents 
also the Sudan. The EL NIL article in the Local Vernacular Press Summary No.325 
gives their attitude. Presumably no such claim would be allowed, but may we say so? 
The point may seem to be a small one but an assurance of the kind suggested would 
do a great deal to clear a political atmosphere here in Khartoum which is getting 
definitely cloudy. 
8 Ahmad Uthman al-Qadi, former editor of al-Hadara; at this time superintendent of Arabic publications 
and a member of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. 
9 B(2), Robertson's reply not printed. 
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result of it all would be the emergence of a definite Union with Egypt party. He hoped 
that we should be able to persuade the more longsighted Sudanese to damp down the 
Sayeds' rivalries and to form some sort of united front which would devote its 
immediate energies to the practical realisation of our internal self-government 
programme, without prejudice to the eventual political issue. These hopes were 
defeated by the intransigence of the Sayeds. We were, moreover, not in a position to 
exert any effective pressure on either party. We could not, in view of our Treaty 
obligations, openly comment on the folly of Mirghanist flirting with Egypt, nor could 
we go too far in debunking Sayed Abd El-Rahman, who did and does command the 
allegiance of a large body of influential Sudanese. 
6. The stage is now set for a two party contest-the Ashiqqa and the Umma. The 
latter began to take definite shape soon after the 1944 elections were over. On 
February 18th, 1945, Abdallah Bey Khalil, the party Secretary, submitted to the Civil 
Secretary, through Governor Khartoum, the application attached as Appendix "A".6 
The Governor approved this application as referring to a "club" under Section 165 of 
the Local Government (Municipalities) Regulations 1938. (We do not recognise 
political "parties" as such.) The party then proceeded to register itself as a private 
company for the purpose of producing a newspaper to be called "The Umma", and to 
serve as the party organ. Difficulties in securing a competent editor have delayed the 
paper's appearance but appear now to have been overcome. It is said that in order to 
deprive the opposition of one of their main weapons of criticism, Sayed Abd El-
Rahman will publish in the first issue of the paper a repudiation of the idea that he 
aims at kingship. How categorical his self-denying message will be, or whether it will 
appear at all, we do not yet know. 
7. After the first flush of their election victory the Ashiqqa party remained tem-
porarily inactive-possibly because they were a bit alarmed at the extent to which they 
had committed themselves to their Egyptian supporters and (it is believed) paymas-
ters. They had undertaken to produce a Resolution on their Union with Egypt pro-
gramme which could be made use of in Cairo but hesitated to take the decisive step. 
This hesitation was resolved by the publication in the local Press of the programme of 
the Umma party; a special meeting of Congress was convened; and the Ashiqqa 
Resolution (Union with Egypt, in the form of two independent Governments under 
the single Egyptian Crown) was duly published here on April 6th. 
8. Meanwhile there has been a certain amount of canvassing for both Ashiqqa 
and Umma parties in the provincial north. How these campaigns will go remains 
to be seen. The Umma party suffers from two disadvantages. Its Mahdist origins 
damn it in the eyes of many tribal leaders and educated "moderates"; and, having 
adopted as its programme what is in effect the Government's policy regarding the 
gradual transfer of the administration to Sudanese hands, it has laid itself open to 
the obvious charge of being a Government party. As regards both of these disad-
vantages the promoters of the party have mainly themselves to blame. They hold 
their meeting in, and are largely financed and staffed by, the Mahdist Daira and 
they have selected as their main propagandists persons like Mohammed Khalifa 
Sherif and Mohammed Ali Shawqi, 7 notorious Mahdist partisans. They are, more-
6 Not printed. 
7 Muhammed Ali Shawqi, assistant registrar general (1942-1948) and member of the Advisory Council for 
the Northern Sudan; later to be under-secretary of justice, 1948-1953. 
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claims. With the death of Hussein Khalifa Sherif in 1929 the original "Sudan for the 
Sudanese" group broke up but the group slogan remained as the political motto of a 
number of individual officials and officers, and reappeared again some years later as 
the inspiration of a group of young intellectuals-known as the Fagr group-headed 
by the late Abdalla Mohammed Arafat.4 Arafat had taken a prominent part in the 1924 
disturbances, had no illusions about Egypt and aimed at founding the national 
aspirations of the Sudanese on a constructive patriotic basis, before the reviving 
interest of the Egyptian propagandist again succeeded in leading them astray. 
3. With Arafat's death the Fagr group (and its organ the Fagr magazine) 
disappeared, and the political objectives of the intelligentsia were temporarily lost 
sight of in the prosecution of local internal rivalries eventually reappearing in the 
rather nebulous ideas which were embodied in the Congress Memorandum of 1942. 
The latter day history of the Congress is well known to you-its most sinister feature 
being the appearance once again towards the end of 1944 of a new pro-Egyptian party 
(the Ashiqqa) which under the leadership of Ismail el Azhari fought and won the 
1944 Congress elections on a "union with Egypt" programme. There were admittedly 
other influences which contributed to the Ashiqqa's success. Azhari and Co., made 
deliberate use of sectarian (Mirghanist) support to capture the Congress Executive 
Committees, but at the same time they were and are undoubtedly playing a pro-
Egyptian hand to an extent which has seriously alarmed moderate "patriotic" 
opinion, which aims in the first place at some form of local autonomy unencumbered 
by premature commitments to either Condominium partner. The Umma party is the 
organised expression of this alarm. I have gone into all this at some length because I 
think it important to underline the fact that the Umma is not a Government 
creation; it is an automatic response to the new Egyptian threat. 
4. Unfortunately the clarity of the main issue-"separatism" versus some form of 
union with Egypt-is being hopelessly obscured by the old Mahdist!Mirghanist 
rivalry. Both Sayeds took a hand in the recent (November 1944) Congress elections. 
Both of them roped in to the polls numbers of illiterate adherents who were in fact 
ineligible to vote and had almost certainly no views about Egypt one way or the 
other. In the event the Azhari-Ashiqqa-Mirghanist party won, their victory being 
largely due to the success of their propaganda which threatened the voters, if they 
failed to support them, with the return of the Mahdia, and Sayed Abd El-Rahman as 
King of the Sudan. The folly of some of Sayed Abd El-Rahman's own followers, who 
had themselves been propagating the "kingship" idea, contributed very largely to the 
Mahdist defeat. The failure of Sayed Abdel Rahman to make any attempt to deny this 
idea, and his own royal manner of living lend support to this propaganda. To say, 
therefore, that the Umma party was started as a reaction to the Ashiqqa political 
programme, is only half the truth. Its inspiration was Mahdist. 
5. The late Civil Secretary5 saw this coming last August. He was afraid that Sayed 
Abd El-Rahman's separatist and "royalist" ambitions would drive the Mirghanists 
into the Egyptian camp; that Sayed Ali would go to any lengths to counter his rival's 
rather blatant campaign to "cash in" on Sudanese self-government, and that the 
4 Arafat Muhammad Abdallah (d. 1937), a graduate of Cordon College and a postal clerk who fled to Egypt 
after the failure of the 1924 revolt. He returned to the Sudan in 1930 and founded the al-Fajr ('The Dawn') 
literary magazine in 1934. 
5 Sir D Newbold. 
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area, any form of field survey is lengthy and difficult undertaking. The cost may be 
considerable but it would appear to be conditioned by the amount of information and 
facilities which can be afforded by your staff. Before committing the Sudan 
Government to any expenditure of this nature I should be grateful to receive an 
assurance that it will be refunded by the Egyptian Government and some indication 
of the time factors involved. I note that the project has not yet been officially adopted 
by the Ministry of Public Works and I should be glad to know whether it may be 
assumed that no action by the Sudan Government will be necessary in the matter 
during the period of the present war. 
In the meantime however I would suggest that technical consultations be engaged 
in, without commitment, between your local representatives and those of the 
Governors, Upper Nile and Equatoria Provinces, the Sudan Irrigation Department 
and the Sudan Railways. 
It is, I think you will agree, quite clear that the information required with regard 
to the effects on local interests of the Jonglei Scheme can only satisfactorily be 
obtained through the close co-operation of all concerned. I need hardly add that I 
should be pleased to discuss this matter with you at any time. 
30 FO 14111024, no 3 8 Apr 1945 
[Umma Party]: letter from J W Robertson to C E Fouracres1 on the 
foundation of the Umma Party. Appendices: "A" (2) constitution of 
the Nation Party, 14 Feb 1945; "B" (1) letter from Abdallah Khali12 to 
Sir H Huddleston, 19 Mar 1945 
1. We included a brief account of the new UMMA party in the January issue of the 
S.P.I.S. which you have, and gave some further details in the issue for February, but 
as there have been critical allusions to it recently in the Egyptian Press, and as it 
seems likely that a good deal of capital will be made both here and in Cairo out of its 
alleged connection with the Sudan Government, I think that you and the Embassy 
should have some further information. 
2. The party is a revival in a new form of a group which in about 1926, centering 
round the then Editor of the Hadara (the late Hussein Khalifa Sherif),3 adopted as its 
slogan "the Sudan for the Sudanese". This group was thrown up as part of the direct 
reaction to the Egyptian fiasco in 1924. It was a moderate pro-Government party, 
though Government had no hand in its appearance. It was not an active party, and 
indeed in those years, when Egypt and all things Egyptian were thoroughly 
discredited, there was no need for any active or organised opposition to Egyptian 
1 C E Fouracres: SPS 1922- 1949; assistant Sudan agent, Cairo, 1939-1949. 
2 Secretary general, Umma Party. 
3 Al-Hadara (Hadarat al-Sudan), the Sudan's first independent Arabic newspaper, was founded in 1920 by 
sayyids Ali al-Mirghani, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, and Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi, with the blessing of the 
government. It was in part a reaction to the Egyptian nationalist rising of 1919, and adopted a mainly pro-
government, anti-Egyptian line, contending that Britain should continue its administration of the country 
until such time as the Sudan was capable of governing itself. Its first editor, Husain Sharif, was a relative 
of sayyid Abd al-Rahman and a founding member of the Sudanese Union Society, a moderate nationalist 
group. 
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may be rendered useless because centres of administration will be cut off from it 
by flooded areas. 
(c) Administration 
It is under this heading that the greatest difficulties are foreseen. The existence 
and mode of living of the local tribes are completely dependent upon the regime of 
the Upper Nile swamps. The chief characteristics of the areas and peoples likely to 
be affected by the Scheme are indicated in the attached extracts from a report by a 
former Governor, Upper Nile Province.4 Recent enquiry has shewn that there has 
been very little change since it was written and it is emphasised that a full 
appreciation of the unique conditions therein described is the first essential step 
towards understanding the numerous administrative problems involved. 
It is apparent that any scheme for the purpose of improving the water supply 
from the Upper Nile will materially alter the existing regime within the Upper 
valley of the Nile and that these alterations will directly affect tribal and other local 
interests. 
It will be necessary to ensure that dislocation and damage are minimised to the 
greatest extent possible and that modifications of existing conditions are 
introduced very gradually. A primary consideration would be to avoid, as far as 
possible, the disturbance of existing channels within the Sudd region. 
Observations of the seasonal migration of game animals shows that in certain 
years large areas dependent upon rain-produced conditions fail to support animal 
life. The effect of lack of food for man or beast for even a brief period which exceeds 
their powers of endurance is as disastrous as a prolonged period. Substituted 
conditions must therefore, not only be permanent but must also be within easy 
reach of any group driven out of their normal habitat by local failure of supplies or 
disease. 
The extent of the damage to local interests in this region will be dependent 
largely upon the final alignment adopted for the canal and upon the date at which 
the Lake Albert Reservoir comes into operation. 
From the point of view of local interests it would appear that the minimum of 
damage could be obtained by aligning the canal outside the main swamp areas and 
outside the important grazing, fishing and agricultural areas, and by combining 
the operation of the canal by suitable control from Lake Albert. 
3. From the considerations above described it is clear that much additional 
information is required to enable the Sudan Government to offer any final comments 
on the Jonglei project and the immediate question is as to how this information can 
best be supplied. The technical data has taken some twenty odd years to attain a stage 
of formulation and it will be readily understood that the re-actions upon the 
important interests directly concerned cannot be estimated without adequate time, 
study and expenditure. Tribal, irrigation and economic surveys of the areas 
concerned will be required and the questions of land and river communications, and 
the probable effect of the scheme on local fauna and flora will require examination. 
The cost and time involved in such surveys cannot, on present data, be estimated 
but it will be readily appreciated that, under the physical conditions of the Upper Nile 
4 Not included with this copy, but see C A Willis, et a!, The Upper Nile province handbook: a report on 
peoples and government in the southern Sudan, 1931 (Oxford, 1995), appendix 2. 
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data available is insufficiently precise to enable any final view or commitment to be 
taken by the Sudan Government in regard to the project. 
Generally speaking it would appear that up to the present the subject has been 
studied essentially from the hydrological and engineering points of view and, whilst 
it is only natural that the aspects of the situation should command priority of 
examination, much additional information will be required before any clear view can 
be obtained as to the effect of the scheme on local interests. 
3. These interests may conveniently be classified under the headings of 
irrigation, navigation and roads, and administration and the following observations 
are submitted, without commitment, with a view to providing, so far as is at present 
possible, a broad indication of the nature and extent of the local problems involved. 
(a) Irrigation 
In paragraph 13 of the report of December 1936 of the Director-General Southern 
Nile reference is made to the question of untimely water. Additional water during 
either the timely or untimely season will increase the flood discharge in the White 
Nile from the Zeraf mouth northwards but no data are available as to the extent to 
which flooding of the riverain lands will be increased, and as to the effect on local 
(e.g. agricultural sanitary) interests. Cross drainage is another factor, upon which 
further information is required but preliminary investigation suggests the 
probability that drainage requirements will be considerably greater than is 
indicated in paragraph 24 of the Director-General's report. It will also be necessary 
to obtain an estimate of the effect of regulation at Lake Albert on the river levels 
South of Bor. 
(b) Navigation and roads 
In paragraph 12 of his report the Director-General states that a precise estimate of 
navigation difficulties can be made when the scheme is in operation. Under 
existing conditions the Bahr el Gebel is superior to the Bahr el Zeraf as a navigable 
waterway but there is some apprehension that with the scheme in operation the 
former will deteriorate to an extent that makes it necessary that the Sudan 
Government should have a statement of the Ministry's anticipations in this 
connection. Before a definite opinion can be expressed on the possibility of routing 
shipping through the Zeraf and the canal it will be necessary to ascertain the 
permissible speed for navigating the canal, the arrangements for controlling and 
passing craft and the best point of entry from the Zeraf into the canal. With the 
existing towage arrangements of steamers of the Sudan Railways locks 250 feet 
long and 65 feet in width would be required, but, if navigation of the Zeraf and 
canal proves to be practicable it might be possible, though costly, to change the 
method of working by introducing self-propelled cargo barges either alone or with 
other barges in tow. 
Any conditions of navigation rendering Shambe unsuitable as a port would have 
serious repercussions upon the trade of Equatoria Province. The average tonnage 
handled by steamer services at Shambe is approximately 1,000 tons per annum. 
If Shambe were rendered useless as a port some alternative outlet for this trade 
would have to be provided and this would involve extensive and expensive 
remodelling of the road system in this area. 
As regards Upper Nile Province roads it would appear that such part of the 
existing road system for the Zeraf District as is not put out of action by the scheme 
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29 FO 371146024, no 1346 27 Mar 1945 
[Nile waters: Jonglei canal] letter from Secretariat, Khartoum to 
Chancery, Cairo. Annex: despatch from F D Rugman to Muhammad 
Ali al-AlfV 'Jonglei canal scheme' (17 July 1940) 
[A canal diverting water around the central swamps of the Upper Nile to increase the flow 
of water northward was first suggested in 1904, but no detailed proposals were made by 
the Egyptian Irrigation Department until the 1930s. No serious attempt had been made to 
assess the possible impact of such a canal on the livelihood of the people of the region 
until a local DC2 made his own survey of the proposed canal line through his district and 
submitted a report in May, 1940, coinciding with Italy's declaration of war against 
Britain. Part of his report was incorporated into the Sudan government's response to the 
canal proposals (reprinted here), but all discussion of the scheme was shelved for the 
duration of the war. The objections raised in 1940 led to the formation of the Jonglei 
investigation team after the war.) 
The Egyptian Government, through their Inspector-General of Irrigation here, have 
asked for the initiation of technical consultations on the Sudd project now called the 
Jonglei Canal Scheme. The Inspector-General suggests that if these consultations on 
the technical aspects of the scheme were initiated now with our Irrigation 
Department, time might be saved in the later discussions of the administrative and 
other questions which will arise. He also informs us that the scheme has been 
accepted in its general form by the Minister of Works as the official scheme to be 
carried to the constructional stage in due course. 
2. The Jonglei Scheme was raised in 1938/39, when the Sudan Government's 
general views were sought. The matter was reported to you by Khartoum despatch 
No.101 of 5th July 1938, of which I attach a copy for ease of reference.3 The 
Inspector-General was told in 1940 how we proposed to tackle our study of the 
matter; a copy of the relevant letter is also attached. The Inspector-General however 
agreed that during the War nothing would be done. 
3. Adequate study of the question will mean a call on a considerable staff to form 
a survey team. Whether it will be possible for us to do this or to find irrigation staff to 
go into the purely technical side is not yet clear. 
4. The purpose of this letter is to warn you that the matter has been raised, and 
to assure you that if we eventually have to tell the Egyptian Government that we 
cannot at the moment find staff we shall let you know before such an answer is given. 
Annex to 29 
I have the honour to refer to this Office letter No. FDK/798-1 of 18.12.39 on the 
subject of the Jonglei Canal Scheme. 
2. As foreshadowed in my letter of 5.7.1938 the preliminary study of this complex 
problem has taken a considerable time and it is clear that at the present stage the 
1 Inspector general of irrigation, Egyptian Irrigation Department, Khartoum, 1939- 1941. 
2 J Winder, assistant district commissioner, Zeraf district, 1939-1942; later Jonglei investigation team, 
1946--1948; deputy governor, Upper Nile Province, 1948-1951; and governor, Upper Nile Province, 
1953-1955. 
3 Not printed. 
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for 20 years, the time was ripe for a review of the results and statistics of irrigation 
in the Sudan. This would suitably include the forecast of the Sudan's future 
requirements of water, the publication of which would indicate the Sudan's 
objective, and in itself provide an occasion for raising the water question with 
Egypt with a view to a final settlement. 
3. It was agreed that in view of the points set out in paragraph 3, it was not at 
present necessary to have further discussions with the Foreign Office, which might 
in any case be difficult to arrange. It was to be expected that when Council had 
considered the forecast of final requirements, the matter would be re-opened in a 
despatch. 
40 FO 371145986, no 3119 24 Sept 1945 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty]: draft statement to the Advisory Council for 
the Northern Sudan on consultation prior to any change in the 
Sudan's constitutional position, forwarded by W H Luce toPS 
Scrivener 
[On 3 Sept 1945 five members of the Advisory Council, including Abdallah Khalil and 
Muhammad Ali Shawqi, submitted a question concerning self-determination to the 
secretary of the council, asking whether the opinions of members of council would be 
sought before any new constitutional arrangements for the Sudan were made (tel no 19 
from acting governor-general to HMB ambassador Cairo, 5 Sept 1945, FO 371/45986, no 
3119). The following statement was drafted by Huddleston in London and forwarded by W 
H Luce (his private secretary) to Scrivener (24 Sept 1945, FO 371/45986, no 3119). It was 
approved by the embassy in Cairo on 6 Oct 1945, and by the FO on 9 Oct 1945 (FO 
371/45986, no 3119).] 
"Should the question of the future status of the Sudan be raised by the condominium 
powers in any revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, it would be the intention of the 
Sudan Government that the Advisory Council for the . Northern Sudan should be 
consulted in order that its views should be at the disposal of the Sudan Government 
for transmission to the powers. It is the opinion of the Sudan Government that the 
views of the Sudanese people should be obtained through constitutional channels in 
a matter of such vital importance to their future well being." 
41 FO 371/46024, no 4281 17 Nov 1945 
[Nile Waters: Jonglei canal]: despatch no 129 from Sir H Huddleston 
to Lord Killearn1 
[The construction of a regulator dam at Lake Albert in Uganda in conjunction with a sudd 
diversion canal in the Sudan was proposed as early as 1904,2 and plans for both remained 
linked throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The resurrection of the Jonglei canal scheme 
(see 29) coincided with difficulties over negotiations with Ethiopia for a dam on Lake 
Tsana (see 24 and 27), and the Egyptian government put forward a proposal for a greatly 
expanded dam project at Lake Albert.] 
1 Forwarded by Killearn to Bevin on 10 Dec 1945. 
2 Sir W Garstin, "Report upon the basin of the Upper Nile", Egypt No 2 (1904), pp 147- 148. 
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I have the honour to refer to Cairo despatch No. 352 dated 14th September, 1945, 
transmitting for my information a copy of Cairo despatch No. 1270 of the same date 
to the Foreign Office together with copy of a Note from the Royal Egyptian Ministry 
of Foreign Mfairs regarding the construction of a barrage and a reservoir at Lake 
Albert. 
2. It is observed that the Egyptian Government is desirous of having the views of 
the Government of Uganda upon this subject together with some indication of the 
conditions under which their agreement to it might be forthcoming. Presumably the 
views of the Government of the Belgian Congo are also being sought. But except for a 
reference which is assumed to be to the Nile Waters Agreement (Cmd. 3348) there is 
nothing in the Note itself to suggest appreciation of the close and vital interest of the 
Sudan in this matter. 
3. The Memorandum attached to the Note referred to above gives some 
indication of the main lines and general effects of the project, but it provides no basis 
for technical or administrative opinions except that it appears to be acceptable in 
principle. 
4. Your Excellency will be aware that proposals for the Jonglei Scheme in the 
Upper Nile Province have been passed by Egypt to the Sudan for study. The 
investigation of these by the Sudan Government has already been initiated. Now Lake 
Albert is included in the category of proposals whose execution can no longer be 
considered as a remote possibility. 
5. It is necessary to bear in mind, that from an irrigation point of view, the Lake 
Albert and Jonglei Projects are inter-related if the full benefit is to be obtained from 
the works. On the one hand, to store water in Lake Albert and release it into the 
present channels would only result in increasing the losses in the Sudd swamps. On 
the other hand, the full benefit of the Jonglei Canal by itself could only be expected in 
good years; in low years when the water as most needed, the benefit would be 
seriously reduced. 
6. The Sudan as an interested party in the use of Nile Waters, is closely 
concerned in all features of the combined project in as much as they affect the total 
supplies of water available for sharing between Egypt and the Sudan, and it 
recognises, with Egypt, that the final requirements of both countries can only be met 
if the fullest possible development of storage and conservation works is carried out in 
the most effective manner. Therefore, both countries are concerned to see that each 
work proposed is planned so as to fit into a co-ordinated scheme and thus contribute 
most effectively to the development of the Nile Basin as a whole. 
7. I am advised that, so far as can be judged at the present stage, the Lake Albert 
and the Jonglei Schemes will affect local conditions on the Nile throughout its 
length in the Sudan. On the reaches from Malakal downstream as far as Halfa, 
conditions are likely to be improved on the whole, in that the levels during the low 
river season will be raised, thus facilitating both navigation and irrigation by pumps 
and sagias.3 The levels at high flood will probably be little affected. From Nimule to 
Malakal the effects of the combined project will depend on the alignment and design 
finally settled upon for the Jonglei Canal, and also on the detailed provisions of the 
"Working Arrangements" for the operation of the Albert Reservoir. These "Working 
3 Water wheels used in river bank irrigation. 
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Arrangements" would determine just how and when the extra water would be passed 
down. The combined project will almost certainly have to be developed in stages; in 
any case the ultimate effects in the Sudan cannot be forecast in advance with any 
great degree of certainty. The Sudan should not be expected to agree beforehand to a 
final "Blueprint", without preserving the right to ask for modifications both of 
designs of works, and of the terms of the "Working Arrangements", at any stage of 
development, in the light of actual experience. 
8. In the view of the Sudan Government, as a partner in Nile Waters, it is 
essential to consider the Lake Albert and Jonglei Projects as complementary 
schemes. As has been indicated in paragraph 4 of this despatch, the Sudan 
Government has begun to study the proposals of the Egyptian Government as 
regards the Jonglei Scheme. Similar definite proposals for the Lake Albert Project are 
necessary. The Jonglei investigations will occupy two to three working seasons, and 
the whole process is certain to be lengthy. It is therefore all the more necessary that 
the planning should start on the right lines and that the Sudan should be made 
aware as soon as possible of the intentions of the Egyptian Government as regards 
the Lake Albert Scheme in order that the technical authorities of both countries may 
consider the details and implications of the two Projects as a combined scheme. 
9. I feel sure that Your Excellency will endorse these considerations and I should 
be glad if you would bring them to the notice of his Majesty's Government in order 
that they may be taken into account when instructions are given as to the reply to be 
returned to the Egyptian Note. 
42 FO 371145986, no 4163 26 Nov 1945 
[Sudan Graduates' Congress elections]: letter from J C Penney toE C 
Haselden1 
In response to your personal letter to Robertson dated November 16th I have today 
sent you as requested three further copies of the Congress letter (and enclosure) 
dated October 13th [sic: 15th], the receipt of which we have acknowledged, but to 
which we have not yet replied.2 
2. The first step to be taken in dealing with these papers was to clear up one or 
two obscurities in the letter and enclosure themselves. Neither the Civil Secretary 
nor His Excellency could properly consider them until they were quite certain what 
they meant. In particular (apart from the comparatively minor question of what the 
signatories to the United Parties Committee's 'wathiqa' or charter meant when they 
demanded the removal of restrictions on 'public freedoms') it was not clear whether 
they had seen and approved the Congress President's covering letter before its 
despatch, and whether they accepted his definition of the expression 'union' to mean 
'union under the Egyptian Crown' as correctly interpreting their own wishes. 
Enquiries into these points were postponed until after the Advisory Council Meeting, 
so as to defeat any possible suggestion that 'conversations with Congress' were 
proceeding behind the back of Councillors on matters on which they themselves had 
1 This letter was forwarded to the FO from the Sudan Agent, London, 5 Dec 1945. 
2 See 43, annex. 
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intimated a desire to be enlightened by the Sudan Government at the coming 
meeting. It was felt further that if we answered the letter before the holding of the 
Congress elections on November 16th, our reply, whatever its tenour [sic], might be 
made use of by the Ashiqqa as an electioneering instrument. If our reply were 
conciliatory it would be waved in the face of voters as indicating Government support 
or sympathy; if unfavourable it would help El Azhari to boost himself as a political 
martyr and to rally votes against an arbitrary alien government. There was the 
further point that it was conceivable, though unlikely, that as a result of the elections 
the control of Congress might pass from Ashiqqa to other hands and that it would be 
a tactical error to 'deal' with a party that might shortly be out of power. 
3. With the Advisory Council out of the way (and a satisfactory reaction, at least 
from the Umma party and their associates to the Civil Secretary's reply to the 
question on consultation)3 local interest was focussed on the Congress elections. 
Before 'zero' day there was a good deal of lobbying and jockeying behind the starting 
line. The Ashiqqa party had clearly the best chance of victory, because of the overall 
majority of Mirghanist adherents in the population of the Three Towns and the Rural 
Districts of Khartoum Province; of the superior organisation and unity of the party 
itself and the solid support of the younger graduates; and of the lateness and 
indecision of the Opposition in entering the lists. The Umma party (with their 
Qawmiyin and Ahrar supporters) fully aware of their handicaps, were first inclined to 
attempt to bargain in with their opponents for an agreed number of seats in the 1946 
Congress Committees. Later, meeting with no success, and feeling that time was 
getting short and that they were daily losing ground (the Ashiqqa electioneering 
agents were conducting an intensive canvass with the all-out support, both in the 
Three Towns and in the provinces, of the Khatmia Khulafa)4 they demanded as a 
condition of their entering the elections the setting up of a neutral Committee, 
composed of representatives of all parties, to see that they were regularly carried 
through. (They believed, rightly or wrongly, that the ballot boxes which were, of 
course, in Ashiqqa charge, were already filled, a week before election day, with 
Ashiqqa voting papers). Their demand, which they advertised in the Press, being 
refused, their H.Q. Committee decided to boycott the elections, and an 
announcement to that effect was duly published in the Umma newspaper. The 
announcement included a statement that the Umma, Qawmiyin, and Ahrar parties, 
though they still adhered to the terms of the United Parties Committee's charter, 
withdrew, in so far as the coming session of the Congress was concerned, the 
'delegation' which they had therein given to the Committee of 1945. By taking the 
boycott line, the three parties, of which the Umma party was the moving spirit, 
hoped, apart from saving themselves from an inevitable defeat, to make it clear to the 
world that the Congress of 1946, whatever it might have been before, was a single 
party (Ashiqqa) organisation and that it could no longer rightfully call itself the 
Graduates [sic] Congress, when a large and influential body of graduates 
demonstrably stood outside it and dis-associated themselves, through their boycott 
gesture, from any of its future pronouncements. By the time the boycott was 
3 See 40. 
4 Khulafa, pi. of khalifa, successor or deputy; here used as a term of office in the hierarchy of the Khatmiya 
order. 
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declared El Azhari had no doubts about his party's coming success (he went so far as 
to telegraph to some of his provincial recruiting agencies, instructing them to 
suspend their activities, as he had already enough voters assembled in and around 
Omdurman to ensure his victory) but at the same time he made several attempts to 
counter the Umma's plan to secure the isolation of himself and his supporters in an 
All Ashiqqa 1946 Committee by offering Committee seats to some of the younger 
Umma members. One or two of these seemed at first inclined to disregard the 
boycott instructions of their H.Q. Committee, but in the event the Umma party stood 
· firm and his efforts failed. 
4. On November 16th accordingly the Ashiqqa party went solidly to the 
Graduates Club to vote. They appeared this year to be very highly organised. A series 
of printed lists, each containing fifteen names was distributed to the paraded voters. 
All they had to do was to put them into the ballot boxes. The majority of the lists were 
printed on white paper and contained only selected Ashiqqa names, El Azhari's name 
figuring on every list, the other names being varied to give an appearance of choice 
to the voters. To create further an illusion of competition the white Ashiqqa lists 
were interspersed with a few lists of 'independent' candidates-Ashiqqa partisans so 
camouflaged for the occasion-these lists being printed on blue paper, so as to be 
readily distinguishable. The elections were perfectly orderly and there were no 
incid~nts. According to police reports the majority of the voters were small 
merchants and artisans. 
5. Of some 10,000 Congress members, about 5470 paid their subscriptions for 
1945. Of these 3524 attended the elections and 3512 actually voted. Before the voting 
commenced El Azhari delivered his presidential address, in which he stressed that 
the aim of the Congress was 'a democratic Sudanese government in union with 
Egypt and under the Egyptian Crown'. Apart from this reference, the speech, which 
was a good deal shorter than usual, reviewed the activities of the Congress during the 
past year and was of little consequence. Many telegrams were read out from well-
wishers in the Sudan. There was a telegram also from Ali Maher Pasha; and a 
telephone message from Ali Bereir. 5 The reference to the Egyptian Crown was 
warmly applauded. 
The counting of the votes resulted in the election of a Committee of LX containing 
43 Ashiqqa and 17 'Independents'. El Azhari topped the poll with over 3000 votes. His 
Ashiqqa companions' scores ranged from 1200 to 900, and the 60th member-an 
Independent-scored 50. The all-Ashiqqa LX then proceeded to elect an all-Ashiqqa 
XV, with El Azhari as President and Mahmud el Fudali6 as Secretary. 
Two facts stood out clearly from last year's Congress elections. This year, further 
illustrated by the Umma boycott, they stand out more clearly than ever-that the 
Congress has ceased to represent the educated classes, and that our political rivalries 
have resolved themselves into the old sectarian strife between Mahdists and 
Mirghanists. Congress has now become a movement representing the 
Ashiqqa!Mirghanist interest only-a movement with which a large number of the 
more able and more level headed of the educated Sudanese refuse to be associated. 
6. Shortly before the elections there was some talk of a split in the Khatmia 
5 See 15, note 2. 
6 Mahmud al-Fadli, a teacher at the Ahlia School, member of the Ashiqqa, and assistant secretary of the 
Graduates' General Congress. 
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ranks. Yehia el Fudali, Sheikh Omar Ishaq and Sheikh Ahmed el Sid el Fil (the latter 
backed by Dardiri Mohamed Othman) were reported to be in disagreement over the 
terms of the Ashiqqa connection. In fact the Khatmia seems today to be as solid as 
ever but there is no doubt that El Azhari for a time was a bit worried over the 
possibility of losing some of his Mirghanist backers. Whatever we think of the 
political sincerity of the two Holy Men, the Umma party has at least got a political 
programme to which the majority of its thinking members can subscribe on political 
grounds. The Mirghanist support of the Egyptian Crown formula of the Ashiqqa, on 
the other hand, is to a far greater extent dictated by sectarian feeling and by the 
opportunity presented by the current situation of exploiting the Mahdist bogey. El 
Azhari himself realises the comparative weakness of his 'political' position. The 
Congress/Ashiqqa combine is founded on what appears to be a common formula, 
demanding 'union under the Egyptian Crown', but whereas El Azhari seems to be 
playing with the idea of absorption into the Egyptian Kingdom, Yehia el Fudali-the 
Ashiqqa No. 2-assures me that his party regards 'absorption' as impracticable and 
'utterly undesirable' . El Azhari has therefore somehow to reconcile his commitments 
as President of Congress with his commitments as Leader of the Ashiqqa, and 
however competent he may be as a double-dealer, he may be finding it difficult to do 
so. In any case his political backing has not the comparative solidity which unites the 
educated elements in the Umma party and its associates. It is for this reason that the 
support of the Khatmia 'other ranks' is of such importance to him. It is mainly the 
sectarian cement which holds his racket together. 
7. Another feature of the elections may be of interest. All the opponents of the 
Ashiqqa were not Ansar. Some of the Ittihadiyin and of the Qawmiyin are reported 
from Omdurman to be neither Mahdist nor Mirghanist. Some of our best 
intelligentsia are non-sectarian. They are not afraid of the Mahdist wolf; at the same 
time they object to the corrupt practices of the Ashiqqa; to their reference to the 
Egyptian Crown; and to their premature dabbling in external politics. It is possible 
(though I think unlikely) that these folk, if sympathetically handled, might emerge as 
the nucleus of a middle party with a true non-sectarian constructive policy, with 
aims approximating to those of the Umma party programme. 
8. The situation is still pretty confused. A few days ago I initiated on C.S's 
instructions the enquiries (vide para. 1) designed to clear up the apparent 
contradiction between the Congress letter and its enclosure on the 'union' issue. The 
signatories to the charter (or pact)-of whom I saw one representing each party-
explained to me in the course of a general conversation that the six parties, 
considering that the interests of the country could best be served by some sort of 
coalition front, had after lengthy discussion, arrived through their representatives at 
a joint statement (the pact in question) which represented the furthest they were 
prepared to go together. As signatories to the pact they bound themselves so far but 
no further. They were all agreed that some form of union or association with Egypt 
(the expression 'ittihad' as they used it in the pact was left deliberately undefined; it 
did not mean 'absorption' nor did it necessarily mean a political union as opposed to 
a cultural or economic union), and some form of relationship with Great Britain 
would at some date (and here again they deliberately refrained from being specific) 
be both natural and desirable. Whatever interpretations the several parties to which 
they belonged might subsequently put, or might already have put, upon the word 
'union', they were agreed as signatories, to leave those interpretations unstated, in 
[42] NOV 1945 107 
order to be able to present a common front on the general question. The pact meant 
what it said and no more. The Umma representative intervened to say that he wanted 
it to be clearly understood that it was the intention of his party to postpone all 
consideration of the union question until the appropriate time, which was not now. 
The Ittihadi member on the other hand said that his party had already decided on the 
form of union, which as a party, it intended to advocate. In short the various 
representatives reserved to themselves, as party members, the right to endorse their 
several party programmes. 
They had all agreed to forward their pact via the Congress Committee of 1945. 
They had not seen the covering letter until it was published in the Press. As 
signatories of the pact, they did not accept, and were in no way bound by, the 
Congress President's interpretation of the word 'union'. Nor as signatories did they 
endorse Congress' claim to represent the people of the Sudan. Congress was a 
party-a distinct party-like any other party and its interpretations were only 
binding on itself. Other parties might subsequently agree or disagree with those 
interpretations; as signatories of the pact they had in no way committed themselves 
to more than the bare statement which the pact embodied. · 
9. Whether this distinction between 'signatory' and 'party member' can have any 
practical meaning I don't yet know. The United Parties Committee (which is now 
tending to call itself the 'United Front') may have a future, or it may be squeezed by 
circumstances out of existence. In the meantime the Ittihadiyin who boycotted the 
elections because 'they thought that a coalition front could best serve the country's 
interests', have announced in the Press that, now that the elections are over, and 
while still adhering to the United Parties pact, they will continue to support the 
Congress-the pact and the Congress' recent resolution, i.e. El Azhari's speech about 
union under the Egyptian Crown, being in their opinion not inconsistent with each 
other. Perhaps, at your distance, all this is clearer to you than it is to me. 
10. The important thing now is the action contemplated by the Umma and 
Ashiqqa parties arising out of the result of the elections. (The reply to the Congress' 
October letter is now under consideration; it can hardly fail to take notice of recent 
developments). The Umma party will almost certainly (if they have any tactical sense) 
hammer away in their papers and elsewhere on the 'isolation' theme. They have in 
fact already begun. There are no indications as yet of any move on the part of 
individual Umma adherents to resign their Congress membership, but there is talk of 
breaking away and founding a new Graduates' association. 'We do not mean', says the 
Umma newspaper, 'that the Congress should be closed down; but that a body truly 
representative of the Graduates should be formed as a substitute-a body which 
might find its nucleus in the present United Front Committee'. The intention is that 
membership of the new association shall be strictly limited to those to whom the 
label 'graduate' can fairly be applied and that the association itself should exist quite 
independently of the Umma party (which aims at a membership of all classes). It 
would attempt to earn recognition as a body free from sectarian influence or 
partisanship. The Umma party has also already published a protest against the 
further handling by the 'unrepresentative' 1946 Congress Committee of the 
Congress Education Fund. 
11. It seems likely therefore that the Ashiqqa!Mirghanist combination will be up 
against considerable opposition, and their counter efforts (as I have already 
suggested) may take an Islamic as well as a purely political line. 
108 ANTICIPATING POST-WAR SETTLEMENT [43] 
El Azhari is already in touch with the Ikhwan el Muslimin, agents of which are 
now in the Sudan paving the way for the opening of a Sudan Branch. With an Ikhwan 
stimulus and a Mirghanist organisation to propagate the Society's doctrines, we 
should be confronted (whoever our supporters might be-and the Ikhwan Society 
has already come in for unfavourable criticism in the non-Mirghanist papers) with an 
awkward and potentially dangerous situation. The extent of the 'danger' would be 
largely determined by the amount of energy Egyptian politicians were prepared to 
devote to the Wadi el Nil independence game. If they really meant to create trouble, 
they would have, in the politico-religious organisation of the Ashiqqa!Mirghanist 
group, what is potentially a very effective instrument. 
43 FO 14111013, no 134 8 Dec 1945 
[Sudan Graduates' General Congress]: despatch no 134 from Sir H 
Huddleston to Lord Killearn. Annex: translation of an Arabic letter 
letter from lsmail al-Azhari to Huddleston (15 Oct 1945) 
I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency the following report on recent 
developments regarding the Graduates' General Congress. 
2. On October 15th l received a letter signed by Ismail Eff. el Azhari, President of 
the Sudan Graduates' General Congress, transmitting to me a three-point Agreement 
signed by representatives of the political parties in Omdurman. I attach a copy of this 
letter and of the Agreement to this despatch. 
In view of the impending session of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan 
on November 3rd, and of the holding of the elections to the 1946 Committees of the 
Graduates' General Congress on November 16th, it was considered tactically 
inadvisable to reply to this letter until these events had passed. Its receipt in the 
meantime was formally and non-committally acknowledged. 
3. When the Advisory Council session was over and the elections had been held, a 
member of my Civil Secretariat got in touch with the signatories to the Agreement, 
with a view to elucidating the meaning of certain phrases used therein, and in 
particular of the expression 'union' which appeared in the first of the three heads of 
the Agreement.1 At the meeting which ensued (on November 19th) it was clearly 
established, in the course of a general discussion, that the various party signatories 
did not all subscribe to the interpretation placed on the word 'union' by the writer of 
the covering letter, which, they said, they had not approved, and had not even seen 
until its subsequent publication in the local vernacular Press. Their own 
interpretations (which they had deliberately left unstated in order to achieve some 
semblance of a common front) varied from complete amalgamation with Egypt in 
the case of the Ashiqqa party to a shadowy cultural, economic, and linguistic 
association in the case of the Umma. The Umma party representative was particularly 
insistent that the eventual form a union with Egypt might take could not be 
determined until the Sudanese people had achieved, through the progressive 
practice of responsible self government, the maturity and experience which would 
1 See 42. 
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entitle them to decide for themselves what their political future should be, and until, 
having attained an independent status, they could negotiate with Egypt on equal 
terms. 
4. The Graduates' Congress elections duly took place on November 16th. Held, as 
they were to be, under the auspices of the Ashiqqa-controlled 1945 Committee, 
which had already on a previous occasion given proof of its skill in the manipulation 
of votes, the Umma party and its associates were convinced that they had little hope 
of success, and a request for the appointment of a neutral committee to manage the 
elections being rejected, they decided not to enter the lists. 
Their boycott was designed in the first place to save themselves from an inevitable 
defeat, and in the second to establish finally and decisively the falsity of the Congress' 
claim in its present form and under its present direction, to be a representative 
Graduate body. In the event only members of the Ashiqqa party recorded their votes. 
About 3500 of them went to the poll, which resulted in the election of an all-Ashiqqa 
Committee of LX, and in due course of an all-Ashiqqa Executive Committee of XV, 
with Ismail el Azhari as the 1946 President. 
5. The reaction of the opposition parties to the election results has not yet clearly 
declared itself. Individual members have as yet shown no signs of resigning their 
Congress membership, and so far the Umma party has confined itself to an 
announcement in the local Press disassociating itself from the joint party Agreement 
(referred to above), in so far as its preamble delegated to Congress the authority to 
present to the Sudan Government on its behalf the views which it embodied. They 
are, however, considering further steps. They have in mind, in the first place, to 
challenge the right of the Congress, as at present constituted, to administer the 
Education Day Fund-a fund inaugurated by the Congress in its early days when it 
could claim to be truly representative of the graduate class and they have already 
made unofficial enquiries as to the legal position. Whether a formal application for 
an injunction to restrain the 1946 Congress Committee from continuing to act as 
trustees of the Fund will be made or not is still uncertain. They design, in the second 
place, to attempt to build up a new and independent Graduates association. These 
projects are still in the discussion stage. Their promoters are, characteristically, 
awaiting some indication of the Government's attitude to the post-election political 
situation, before taking any definite action. 
The Ashiqqa party for the time being appears to be resting on its laurels. There are, 
certain signs of dissension within the party over the form of its political programme, 
but, to whatever internal regroupings this may lead, the party will, outwardly at 
least, remain solidly opposed to the Umma and its associates on the Mirghanist-
Mahdist issue. 
6. The Ashiqqa and Umma parties, although they may number by the thousand 
their registered adherents, do not occupy the whole of the field. There is a strong 
educated (but hitherto unvocal) element which welcomed with enthusiasm the 
appearance of the Graduates' General Congress in 1938, as the first native inspired 
representative institution, and which is now disappointed and distressed that a body, 
in which their hopes and aspirations were so confidently centred, should have 
become merely the playground of sectarian partisans. They feel that the Mirghanist-
Mahdist rivalry, in splitting the Congress in two, has done an ill-service to the 
educated classes and to the Sudan itself. Whether the holders of this view will ever 
feel strong enough to denounce publicly the sectarian strangle-hold remains to be 
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seen. It is unlikely, but the possibility exists. The Congress as a non-political body 
had considerable usefulness in voicing the opinions and hopes of the graduate class. 
It provided a vehicle for the expression of their unformulated desire to assist in their 
country's development, and its present collapse as a representative body may leave, 
therefore a gap to be filled. The possibilities of such a situation are receiving 
attention. 
7. Too much significance should not be attached to the recent Ashiqqa success in 
the Congress elections. It should not, in other words, be interpreted as an all out 
victory for a party with a pro-Egyptian political programme. There are strong 
opposition forces . The Ashiqqa party itself is composed very largely of followers of El 
Sayed Sir Ali el Mirghani Pasha, whose adherence is secured by considerations which 
are primarily sectarian. They support the Ashiqqa because it is in opposition to the 
Umma party, the majority of whose members are followers of El Sayed Sir Abdel 
Rahman el Mahdi Pasha, the party's patron. Both parties have enlisted thousands of 
members throughout the country on the sectarian ticket alone, but the Congress 
elections being held in Omdurman, which is predominantly Mirghanist, the Ashiqqa 
were able to bring to the poll a number of supporters out of all proportion to their 
total strength throughout the country. The Umma party is credibly reported to have 
some 100,000 registered members, but the majority of these are resident in the 
Gezira, the White Nile, and Kordofan and cannot therefore be readily made available 
to vote. 
Future moves of the two main opposition groups are difficult to foresee, and there 
is likely to be a good deal of uncertainty; of reorientation of parties and individuals; 
and even of recasting political programmes before the position clarifies. 
8. Only a formal acknowledgment of receipt has been sent to the President of the 
Congress of his letter of October 15th, and next steps are under consideration. 
I have not formally reported these developments to Your Excellency before now as 
the situation has been confused, but the Civil Secretary has kept the Sudan Agent 
informed from time to time so that Your Excellency's Chancery should not be 
unsighted. 
A copy of my reply to the letter from the President will be sent for Your 
Excellency's information in due course. 
Annex to 43 
I have received your letter of the 1st September 1945,2 in which you say that you do 
not intend to transmit the Congress Memorandum to the Authorities concerned, and 
in which you state the reasons which in your opinion justify this procedure. In 
holding this view you are denying the free expression of their aspirations to a nation 
whose great sacrifices and fortitude during the darkest hours of the war entitle it to 
be listened to by those to whose hands it has entrusted its hopes and future 
destiny,-a nation which fully expects that its aspirations will receive the sympathy 
of those who have borne the honour of its trusteeship. We cannot understand the 
reasons which prevented the transmission of this Memorandum, knowing that in 
2 See 35, note. 
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sending it to the Authorities concerned the Sudan Government would incur no 
liability nor infringe its responsibility and terms of office. On the contrary we believe 
that the Government's duty towards the country not only requires it to pass on what 
is submitted to it, but imposes on it an obligation to take the initiative, formulating 
the country's demands and sending them on even without being asked to do so. 
The Government is no doubt aware of the opinions in the minds of the Sudanese, 
especially at such a critical moment, and in the face of the general anxiety which 
exists about the future of this country. The Government is fully acquainted with the 
opinion which the Sudanese have formed in respect of the future status of the Sudan, 
namely "the formation of a Sudanese Democratic Government united with Egypt 
under the Egyptian Crown". It is surprising to find the Sudan Government 
announcing that it does not intend to put forward the Congress Memorandum 
because it does not consider that the Congress is competent to represent Sudanese 
public opinion. What institution other than the Congress should enjoy this right? 
Moreover the Sudan Government draws our attention to Governor Khartoum's letter 
of 16th May, 1945, in which he had to rely for the material for his answer on rumours 
spread about the last elections, and to declare that the Congress Committee and the 
Council of Sixty could not represent the Graduates, thus ignoring the arguments 
conveyed to him in our previous memorandum dated April 3rd 1945. By taking up 
this attitude the Sudan Government ignores the most elementary principles of 
democratic and parliamentary procedure, known and observed throughout the whole 
world. A party which emerges as the outcome of elections held in accordance with 
these principles has always been recognised as a duly elected responsible majority. 
The Sudan Government ignores all this, and goes on to describe the resolution 
passed by the Congress Council of Sixty-a Council freely elected in a General 
Assembly composed of all parties-as being merely the opinion of one section of the 
Congress despite the fact that the Government is fully aware that the resolution 
represents the considered opinion of the Graduates' General Congress. 
The allegation that the Congress is not entitled to speak on behalf of the Sudan is 
very strange. If it means anything it proves that the Sudan Government is 
determined that no opinion from the Sudan is to be heard. Otherwise what is the 
institution, if any, which the Sudan Government considers as the one entitled to this 
right? Surely the Congress constitutes the only popular national body in the country 
and its membership includes the pick of the cultured and thinking classes scattered 
throughout the whole country, and above all it conducts its activities in accordance 
with true democratic principles. It is the Congress which has won the hearts of the 
Sudanese. Even those to whom it cannot extend its membership look to it with 
satisfaction and confidence. 
Your Excellency, in view of the above the Congress indubitably speaks in the name 
of the Sudan and demands the realisation of its legitimate rights to self-
determination. The Congress is thus entitled to submit the demands of the Sudan 
because it knows better than anyone else what will bring well-being to its 
inhabitants. In as much as the Congress enjoys the confidence and the sympathy of 
all classes and as it is looked upon with reverence and respect by the whole Sudanese 
nation, it has the first right to formulate and put forward the national demands. It is 
unnatural on the other hand to entrust the responsibility of expressing the views of a 
people to individuals or groups which have been appointed by Government. Such 
individuals or groups can never be capable of the expression of unbiased opinion or 
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of voicing exactly the national aspirations and demands which are folded in the 
hearts and mixed with the blood of a country's sons. These nominated individuals are 
naturally and largely influenced by considerations of their official position, and it will 
be clear to Your Excellency also that the Sudan Government itself is neither entitled 
nor empowered to determine national aspirations because it also is created by 
appointment. The Congress, Your Excellency, is the only national institution which, 
in speaking for the people of the Sudan, does not derive its entitlement from the 
Sudan Government. It derives it on the contrary from the true national 
consciousness and from the support of the whole Sudanese people. This is the 
natural and true entitlement borne out by the acceptance by the Sudanese of 
Congress' activities, an acceptance which is accorded freely and without compulsion 
and is the outcome of the feelings of true love and trust which the Congress inspires. 
The Sudanese nation regards Congress as a sacred institution to which it goes on 
pilgrimage every year. Every year the Congress members who have the necessary 
qualifications elect a Council of Sixty and an Executive Committee to conduct the 
business of Congress and to speak in its name. The Sudanese nation has not stopped 
here but has organised in all towns and in all the larger villages sub committees to 
act as its eyes and hands and to advise it on all major issues-to spot the disease and 
prescribe the remedy. 
The Graduates' General Congress has said the Sudan word and there is nothing 
more to say-a word which is supported by the provincial sub-committees and was 
formed in the best way to secure the happiness and tranquility of the country. The 
Sudan word is this:-
"the formation of a Sudanese democratic Government in a union with Egypt, 
under the Egyptian crown". 
Since 1942 when the Graduates' Congress set itself up as the exponent of the 
country's political rights, in view of the magnificent part played by the Sudanese in 
the cause of the Democracies, it was the only institution in the country which 
continued to study the question of the political status of the Sudan, and no other 
body or bodies claiming to speak on behalf of the Sudan had begun to act 
independently. All parties moreover which exist today are working within the 
framework of the Congress and consider themselves to be parts of an inseparable 
whole. 
In submitting its memorandum in the name of the Sudan the Congress meant to 
convey the aspirations of the Sudanese nation and to exercise a national right to 
express the Sudanese claim to self-determination. This step was amplified by the 
support of all the Sudanese so that the demands put forward became in fact the final 
word of the whole nation. There is therefore no reason to suppose, Your Excellency, 
that in speaking in the name of the Sudanese for the realisation of the country's 
legitimate aspirations the Congress has not the right to represent the Sudan. 
Your Excellency refers to the Governor, Khartoum's letter in which he denies the 
eligibility of both the Congress Council of Sixty and its executive committee. This 
denial has been received with astonishment. Surely the Governor not being himself a 
member of congress is not competent to utter such a denunciation. The constitution 
and bye-laws give this right to the members only. We therefore seize this opportunity 
of expressing our condemnation of the procedure adopted by Governor Khartoum, 
and of his action in putting an end to the correspondence between us without 
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producing any proof that we were in the wrong. Procedure of this kind, Your 
Excellency will agree, is contrary to the most elementary principles of true 
democracy. We still maintain our original assertion that as no member of congress 
submitted a protest in the proper manner against the last elections we were and are 
entitled to consider that the results of these elections were legitimate. We enclose 
herewith a copy of the correspondence exchanged between the Congress and 
Governor Khartoum3-a correspondence which reveals that the spirit in which it 
was conducted was contrary to democratic principles. Such was the policy which, we 
had hoped, would never have animated the procedure of the Sudan Government and 
especially in the capital city. 
Your Excellency's statement that the Congress resolution merely represents the 
opinion of one party in the congress is also strange, especially as it emanates from a 
Government which draws its inspiration from the oldest democracy in the world. 
Such a statement is not at all in conformity with the principles followed and 
respected by the democratic nations at the head of which Great Britain stands. The 
resolution surely is not that of one party only; it is the decision of the Council of 
Sixty and therefore it constitutes a decision of congress itself. 
The Congress is the legitimate channel for expressing the opinions of the country, 
and though it adopts the views of the party which holds the majority of seats, as 
happens also in the case of British Parliamentary institutions, the decisions of the 
Executive Committee are not to be considered as those of one party only because it 
has had to study the opinions of all sections of the community before formulating 
and forwarding those decisions for approval by the Council of Sixty. If they are passed 
by the latter body they then become the decisions of congress itself. If this course 
were not followed the whole structure would lose its democratic character and fall to 
the ground. 
This Your Excellency is what has been done by the Congress committee in all 
loyalty and straight-forwardness to arrive at an opinion as regards the future status 
of the Sudan. The committee has reviewed the opinions held by all parties 
represented in Congress and after full consideration and discussion the Executive has 
found that the following formula satisfies the principles of all parties:-
"the formation of a democratic Sudanese Government in union with Egypt 
under the Egyptian crown". 
This formula was presented to the Council of Sixty which confirmed and approved it. 
Thus it became the resolution of Congress as regards the future status of the Sudan. 
This proves that this resolution does not represent the viewpoint of one party only, 
but it is a resolution taken by Congress which includes all parties and which repre-
sents their different views. In addition, all parties in the Sudan-Ashigga, Ittihadiyin, 
Umma, Ahrar Ittihadiyin, Qawmiyin and Ahrar have come to an agreement and sub-
mitted on 3.10.45 a note to Congress consisting of the following points:-
1. The establishment of a free, democratic Sudanese Government in union with 
Egypt and alliance with Great Britain. 
2. A request that the Government should approve the establishment of a commit-
tee equally composed of representatives of the Condominium governments and rep-
3 Not printed. 
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resentatives of the enlightened Sudanese, the latter to be appointed by Congress, to 
draw up a scheme whereby the Sudanese will take over the administration of their 
country in the shortest possible time; and that the Government should offer all facil-
ities to the Committee and undertake to enforce its recommendations. 
3. A request that restrictions on the freedom of the Press, movement, public 
meetings and trade should be revised within the limits of the law and in 
accordance with democratic principles. All special legislation at present in force 
which restricts these freedoms should be amended. 
Attached is a copy of the note submitted to Congress signed by representatives of all 
parties.4 
This shows Your Excellency that the decision arrived at by all parties agrees in 
principle with the resolution of Congress submitted in its note to the Condominium 
Governments. 
Thus all sections unanimously request "the establishment of a free democratic 
Sudanese Government in union with Egypt and alliance with Great Britain". The 
parties omitted to define the word "union", but congress after considering all aspects 
of the matter decided that it should be a union with Egypt under the Egyptian crown. 
Your Excellency, when congress addressed its note to the Prime Ministers of Great 
Britain and Egypt it did not expect the Sudan Government to express its views on the 
advisability of transmitting it or otherwise. Its obvious duty was to forward the note 
to the Condominium Powers on whose behalf it administers the country, with such 
comments as it might think it necessary to make. We never realised that the 
trusteeship exercised by the Sudan Government could empower it to extinguish the 
natural right of the individual in the Twentieth Century to express his opinions to 
whomsoever he likes. 
The Congress, Your Excellency, has expressed the real view of the Sudanese-a 
view unprejudiced by any influence, appointment, or authority-the product of 
natural feeling and true realisation of the people's aspirations. The Sudan 
Government should not therefore allow the present opportunity to pass when the 
future status of all nations is being debated in the conferences now working for an 
everlasting peace and in an atmosphere of equality, justice and brotherhood. 
The Congress while realising that it could have submitted its note direct to the 
Condominium government has preferred to follow the proper procedure by sending 
it through the Sudan Government as an intermediary. It sincerely hopes that the 
Sudan Government will reconsider its attitude towards the note and submit it to the 
authorities concerned. 
4 See 36, enclosure. 
44 FO 371153249, no 336 23 Dec 1945 
[Sudan Graduates' Congress]: letter (reply) from J W Robertson to 
Ismail al-Azhari 
I regret that owing to pressure of work it has been impossible before now to reply to 
your letter of October 15th. 1945 addressed to His Excellency the Governor-General, 
except by my former formal acknowledgment of October 18th. 
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I have been instructed to say that consideration has now been given to your letter 
and its enclosure-the All Party Declaration-; and first of all I am directed to 
remind you of the attitude of the Sudan Government towards the claim of the 
Graduates' General Congress to be the sole and authoritative mouthpiece of the 
people of the Sudan. It has already been fully and clearly stated on several occasions 
in correspondence between us, that the Government does not recognise the 
Congress as entitled to speak for the people of the Sudan as a whole, and I must also 
point out that the claim of your committee to represent the educated classes, and in 
particular to interpret the All Party Declaration enclosed with your letter under 
reply, has according to my information been challenged recently by elements of the 
educated classes themselves. 
At the same time, however, I would draw your attention to the answer which in my 
capacity as Chairman of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan I gave to a 
question asked by five members of that Council at the last session of the Council in 
November.1 Mter formally declaring the intention of the Sudan Government to 
consult the Council, should the future of the Sudan be under discussion at any 
revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, I went on to say that the Government would 
also give such weight as they deserved to the opinions of other representative bodies. 
I can assure you, therefore, that it is the intention of the Government when the 
time comes to ascertain as far as possible the sentiments of all sections of the 
community, including those of the Graduates' General Congress, and of other 
representative bodies. Provided such opinions are legitimately presented and are not 
vitiated by unjustifiable claims as to the extent of their representation, they will be 
given due weight at the appropriate time. 
Meanwhile I beg to inform you that your letter, and the specific recommendations 
of the United Parties as presented in the Joint Declaration enclosed with your letter, 
have been filed for future reference. 
1 See 40 and 42. 
45 FO 371153371, no 630 3 Jan 1946 
[Sudan's Nile waters needs]: despatch no 2 from Sir H Huddleston to 
Lord Killearn 
I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 132 of the 24th December, 1944,1 in 
which I addressed your Excellency on the need of the Sudan to secure, with the 
agreement of Egypt, additional supplies of water from the Nile for the extension of 
her irrigation. In that despatch I requested that the Egyptian Government should be 
reminded of the claim made by the Sudan Government in 1939, and should be asked 
to consent to an early examination of the present water storage position in detail, by 
technical experts authorised by each Government for the purpose. If this consent 
were secured, it was proposed to seek the services of Mr. R. M. MacGregor to 
negotiate on behalf of the Sudan Government. 
2. Mr. MacGregor was asked by the Secretary of State to give his views on my 
1 See 24. 
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despatch and on the whole question of the Nile Waters. Following on consideration 
of the memoranda which he prepared, the matter was discussed with him and with 
representatives of His Majesty's Government, while I was in London during the 
summer of 1945. 
3. The Lake Tsana project, with regard to which an agreement already exists 
between Egypt and the Sudan, was considered at a meeting held on the 31st July, 
1945, those present being myself, Mr. MacGregor, Mr. Howe, British Minister at 
Addis Ababa, and Mr. Scrivener of the Foreign Office, with Mr. Mayall of the Sudan 
Government London Office. The conclusion then reached was that action should be 
taken, as soon as circumstances permitted, to re-open with the Government of 
Ethiopia the question of obtaining a concession for the construction and operation of 
storage works on the lake. 
4. Subsequently, on the 18th September, 1945, I and my advisers discussed with 
Mr. MacGregor the wider problem of the whole future development of irrigation in 
the Sudan, in relation to the needs of Egypt as at present known, and to the 
remaining balance of unused water in the river, both that now available and that 
which might be provided by future projects.2 We had before us a preliminary forecast 
of the ultimate needs of the Sudan in Nile Waters, which had been prepared jointly by 
Mr. MacGregor and my Director of Irrigation. The interim conclusions reached on 
this occasion have since been fully studied by my advisers in Khartum, in all their 
aspects and implications. 
5. I am now able to state my considered opinions on this wider question, as 
follows:-
(i) The present surplus of water in the Nile as a whole, and the possibilities of 
future development of storage and conservation works, are definitely limited. The 
surplus will diminish year by year as irrigation is extended in both countries. 
(ii) Additional supplies of water for the extension of irrigation in the Sudan can 
only be obtained as the result of a review of the present position in the light of the 
Nile Waters Agreement, and a settlement leading to the allocation of further 
volumes to the Sudan. If and when this is initiated the aim should be if possible to 
reach a settlement which, so far as the Sudan is concerned, would be final, and not 
just a further instalment. 
Reasons for this are:-
( a) Egypt has already formulated and published fairly definite forecasts of her 
final requirements, and it is right and proper that the Sudan should do the 
same. 
(b) The occurrence of a very low year would quicken Egypt's anxieties about 
water, and intensify the difficulties of a settlement. 
(c) On broad grounds of policy, such a question should not remain unsettled 
any longer than is necessary. 
(iii) In the light of the above considerations, of the terms and spirit of the Nile 
Waters Agreement, of the fact that the Sudan, unlike Egypt, is not wholly 
dependent upon irrigation, and of the areas which may be deemed reasonably 
suitable for irrigation, the Sudan's requirements for full development of irrigation 
2 See 39. 
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on sound and economical lines would be met by a total annual provision of water 
some 70 per cent. greater than that to which she is now entitled. This would be 
supplied partly from the natural discharges of the river during the season of 
surplus, and partly from storage and conservation works, including Lake Tsana, 
for use in the period of shortage. 
(iv) In relation to the forecasts already published by Egypt of the quantities of 
water required for her full and final development, this provision for the Sudan 
seems to be a fair and equitable objective, at which the Sudan might aim. 
6. The Nile Commission of 1925 foresaw (report, paragraph 89) that the position 
would have to be reviewed at some future date, and the passage of twenty years seems 
to provide reasonable grounds for undertaking such a review. It is important that 
this should be regarded and referred to as a review of the water position in the light 
of the Nile Waters Agreement, rather than as a review of the agreement itself. The 
latter might be held to connote a reopening of the whole question, including the 
present entitlements of the Sudan and the safeguards of Egypt, and this is not 
desirable from either party's point of view. What is to be visualised is an additional set 
of entitlements with corresponding safeguards, rather than modifications of those 
now in force. In view of possible discussions with Egypt, I think it well to lay some 
stress on this point. 
7. Closely bound up with the whole question of Nile Waters are the projects for 
the Jonglei Canal, through the Sudd area, and for the Lake Albert Dam and 
Reservoir. Some general views on these have been given in my despatch No. 129 of 
the 17th November, 1945,3 showing how closely the Sudan is concerned in these 
inter-related schemes, both as a partner in the water resources of the Nile Basin and 
as regards the conditions which will result throughout the length of the river from 
Nimule to Wadi Halfa. Cultivation on the river-side slopes, irrigation by pumps and 
sagias, so important in the Northern Sudan, and also navigation, will all be affected. 
Full account must be taken of these schemes, in all their aspects and implications, in 
any examination of the Nile Waters position in the light of the Nile Waters 
Agreement. 
8. The Egyptian Irrigation Service in the Sudan is making preliminary surveys 
and investigations on the Main Nile between Abu Hamed and Halfa in the northern 
province. It is understood that their objective is to find a suitable site for a dam and 
reservoir of large size, as a further development of the utilisation of the Nile waters 
for Egypt's own benefit. Such a project would concern the Sudan not only in its local 
effects, but also generally as a partner in Nile Waters. From the Sudan's point of view 
this project would possess, and probably in still greater measure, the disadvantages 
that attached to the second raising of Aswan from the point of view of the Lake Tsana 
project, which were dealt with in correspondence leading up to Lord Lloyd's note to 
Mohamed Mahmud Pasha dated the 26th July, 1928. There is, however, no need to go 
into this point unless and until some definite proposals emerge from the present 
studies. 
9. The urgency of the Sudan's need for more water was stressed in my despatch 
No. 132. A definite programme of irrigation development over the next five years has 
now been prepared, and it is clear that the Sudan's present resources are likely to be 
3 See 41. 
118 ANTICIPATING POST-WAR SETTLEMENT [45] 
used up completely by 1951. As regards Egypt, it is known that in 1943 and 1944 her 
increased production of crops involved the use of the whole of her present resources 
of stored water in Aswan and Jebel Aulia Reservoirs. It can only be assumed that the 
urgency of her present need for more water is comparable with that of the Sudan. 
The logical conclusion appears to be that a review of the position under the Nile 
Waters Agreement at an early date is equally desirable in the interests of both 
countries, if their immediate needs are to be met without undue delay, and if the 
future development of the remaining water resources of the Nile Basin is to be 
planned on the most effective lines. 
10. In present circumstances the form and occasion of an approach to Egypt on 
this subject will clearly need to be considered very carefully. As foreshadowed in my 
former despatch, I have engaged Mr. MacGregor as expert consultant, with a view to 
his acting as technical representative of the Sudan in any discussions and 
negotiations which may be arranged. Subject to your Excellency's views, I would 
propose that Mr. MacGregor should visit the Sudan in the course of the next few 
months, and after refreshing on the spot his already intimate knowledge of the whole 
question, should be authorised to renew his former official contacts with the 
technical experts of the Ministry of Public Works. These talks could appropriately be 
concerned in the first place with the specific problems of the Jonglei and Lake Albert 
schemes. If negotiations for the Lake Tsana concession should have been opened 
with the Government of Ethiopia, this question might also be discussed. In the light 
of the results of these preliminary talks, I suggest it may be possible to decide on the 
best line of approach to the wider question of an examination of the water position. 
11. The objectives set out in paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 132 were on the 
limited scale necessary to meet the more immediate needs of the Sudan, pending the 
completion of the Lake Tsana scheme. They may be now replaced by, and are 
embraced in, the following more comprehensive statement of her aims:-
(i) To bring the Lake Tsana scheme to fruition at the earliest possible date, and to 
secure the share in the water provided thereby which was allotted to the Sudan 
under the agreement of 1935. 
(ii) To reach a clear understanding with Egypt as to the lines on which the Lake 
Albert and Jonglei schemes are to be developed, and as to the Sudan's interests in 
them. 
(iii) Following on a general technical review of the Nile Water position, to reach a 
further settlement with Egypt which would provide for the systematic 
development of the remaining resources of the Nile Basin in such a way as to meet 
the full needs of both countries. 
(iv) Failing such a general settlement, as is indicated in (iii) above, to obtain 
Egypt's agreement to additional supplies of water for the Sudan, both from the 
river in the period of surplus, and from conservation works for use in the period of 
shortage, sufficient to meet her needs when her existing resources have been fully 
utilised. This I have already predicted in paragraph 8 above as likely to occur by 
1951. 
12. To sum up, I would propose, subject to your Excellency's views, that Mr. 
MacGregor, after visiting the Sudan, should renew his official contacts with the 
technical experts of the Ministry of Public Works and that there should follow a 
formal request for the consent of the Egyptian Government to a review of the water 
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position in the light of the Nile Waters Agreement, on the first occasion considered 
suitable. If negotiations for the Lake Tsana Concession should be opened with the 
Government of Ethiopia in the near future, the notification of these to the Egyptian 
Government should provide a suitable opportunity. But whatever the position as 
regards Lake Tsana, I consider that the request for a review of the water position in 
the light of the Nile Waters Agreement should be made as soon as possible. 
46 FO 371153328, no 527 17 Jan 1946 
[SAM and SAR]: report from SPIS no 55 for December 1945 [Extract] 
The holy men 
440. Sayed Ali el Mirghani still maintains in local politics the position he took up 
some time ago. When pressed to explain the Khatmia support of the pro-Egyptian 
party, he insists that he has no personal political interest. As a religious leader he 
holds, he says, a mandate from all Mirghanists to guide them on religious issues and 
to speak on their behalf. Where political or economic issues are concerned he holds 
no such mandate, nor would his conscience permit him to intervene. Here every 
Khatmi must think and speak for himself, as an individual guided by his own 
intelligence. In so far as he personally was concerned, it was thought unwise to focus 
the attention on a distant political horizon when the foreground was occupied by a 
dangerous enemy. He was as determined as ever to resist the Mahdist menace. The 
Khatmia were not a political organisation and had only entered local politics two 
years ago, when the Mahdist capture of the Advisory Council made it imperative for 
them in the interests of the country to intervene actively to prevent Sayed Abdel 
Rahman from dominating also the Graduates [sic] Congress-the only native 
institution capable of putting up an organised resistance to Mahdist ambitions. Great 
Britain and Russia fought together as allies to defeat Germany, but no intelligent 
man would pretend that Great Britain's cooperation with Russia in war in any way 
committed her, once the immediate common danger had been surmounted, to the 
support or propagation of the Communist political creed. The Khatmia and Ashiqqa 
were similarly united in face of an immediate common peril. . .. 
441. Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi Pasha 
Sayed Abdel Rahman divided his time during the month between Khartoum and the 
Blue Nile Province. He attended the Medani races, visiting on the way the 
headquarters of the Halawin Khut where a large gathering was reported. Further 
afield he has recently betrayed a new interest in Darfur, making gifts of money to the 
ex-Emir of Zalingei, and to the Maahad1 and Mahdist Zawia2 in Fasher. The Governor 
envisages a possible application for a Mulid tent.3 
The Sayed has taken considerable trouble, in the course of a number of 
conversations with District Commissioner Kosti, District Commissioner Omdurman 
and others, to emphasise the danger of Ashiqqa machinations, and of their 
determined drive to capture Local and Provincial Councils, and to publicise and 
1 An Islamic institute. 
2 Small mosque complex belonging to a religious order. 
3 Tent set up during the celebration of the prophet Muhammad's birthday. 
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exploit their successes in the pro-Egyptian political interest. The internal situation 
was, he said, rapidly deteriorating, and he was particularly concerned with the 
appearance on the scene of the Ikhwan el Muslimin, whose dangerous doctrines, 
preaching as they did the unification of spiritual and temporal rule, might appeal to 
Moslem fanatics-even to his own less sophisticated followers . We were faced with 
the definite prospect of a period of unrest, fostered by this dangerous two-pronged 
Egypto-Islamic propaganda, and culminating, perhaps, in actual breaches of the 
peace of a serious kind. In the purely political field, the immediate danger was that 
the Khatmia, still exploiting the Mahdist bogey, might so confuse the fundamental 
political issues (which were in themselves quite simple) as to open the door wide to 
the Egyptian politician and to the home-bred pro-Egyptian agitator. He was 
prepared, in the interests of the Sudan, if we thought it would help to stabilise the 
situation, publicly to deny his alleged dynastic ambitions if Sayed Ali would deny 
with equal publicity his attachment to the Egyptian Crown. Meanwhile sectarian 
antagonism is still at the root of our troubles . ... 
47 PREM 8/1388/1, CP(46)17 18 Jan 1946 
'Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936': Cabinet 
memorandum by Mr Bevin. Annexes [Extract] 
[In submitting this memorandum to the Cabinet, Bevin stated that Egyptian sovereignty 
over the Sudan could not be conceded as 'we must continue to refuse to abandon our 
responsibilities towards the Sudanese peoples'. The Cabinet then approved a reply to the 
Egyptian government in terms of the following memorandum (CM 7(46)5, 22 Jan 1946).] 
I circulate herewith, for the information of my colleagues (Annex A), a translation of 
a Note, received from the Egyptian Government on the 20th December, which 
contains the anticipated demand for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936, and more particularly for the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt in time 
of peace. I recommend that a reply agreeing in general terms to a review of our 
present arrangements should be sent, and attach a draft (Annex B)1 for concurrence. 
I should explain that the principles of those articles of the present treaty which are 
of the greatest importance from our point of view, viz., those establishing the 
alliance and providing for very extended facilities to our forces in time of war, are 
automatically renewable in any revision of the treaty. (Article 16 of the Treaty.) We 
should, of course, insist on this renewal as a point of departure. The remaining 
articles deal with the military facilities afforded us by Egypt in time of peace, the 
Sudan, and various political questions of a general nature. A number of these articles 
(notably those relating to the League of Nations) are in any event out of date and 
since the whole Treaty of 1936 is based on the League of Nations and the Covenant, it 
cannot be contested that some revision is necessary and is called for now . . .. 
As regards the Sudan which, like the question of peacetime facilities for our 
troops, constitutes a major difficulty (and offers little scope for compromise), His 
Majesty's Governments have repeatedly refused to abandon their responsibilities 
towards the Sudanese peoples, amongst whom the idea of nationhood has already 
1 Annex B not printed. 
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taken shape. It is out of the question for His Majesty's Government to accede to the 
request which will probably be made of them, viz., to recognise sole Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Sudanese. They must, I submit, maintain firmly the standpoint 
that the future of the Sudan belongs neither to this country nor to Egypt, but to the 
Sudanese themselves, whose own wishes must be taken in account in any new 
arrangements which may be devised. Our further tactics must depend on Egyptian 
reactions to this standpoint. . .. 
The general lines of the instructions which I would propose to issue to Lord 
Killearn are annexed as Annex C. 
AnnexA to 47: Note from the Egyptian government, 20 Dec 1945 
"The Egyptian Government, certain they are interpreting a unanimous national 
sentiment, consider that the manifest interests of Anglo-Egyptian friendship and 
alliance demand that the two parties should revise, in the light of recent events and 
of their experience, the arrangements which govern their mutual relations at the 
present time. 
2. It is certain that the Treaty of 1936 was concluded in the midst of an 
international crisis at a moment when the spectre of war was already appearing, and 
it is to these circumstances that it clearly owes its present form .. . . 
5. If Egypt accepted the Treaty with all that it implied in the way of restrictions 
on her independence, it was because she knew that they were of a transitory 
character and were destined to disappear at the same time as the circumstances and 
events by reason of which they had been agreed to . ... 
11. Therefore, now that the circumstances which determined the particular 
character of the Treaty of 1936 have changed, it has become necessary to revise it in 
order to bring it into harmony with the new international situation; .its clauses which 
detract from the independence and the dignity of Egypt no longer correspond to 
present conditions . . .. 
15. . .. in view of the unanimous urge of the Egyptian people and their ardent 
desire to see their relations with Great Britain established on the basis of an alliance 
and a friendship which will no longer be inspired by past prejudices or out-of-date 
doctrines, the Egyptian Government express their confidence that these views will be 
shared by their Ally, and that the British Government will take steps to fix an early 
date for an Egyptian delegation to proceed to London to negotiate with them the 
revision of the Treaty of 1936. 
16. It goes without saying that the negotiations will include the question of the 
Sudan and will be inspired by the interests and aspirations of the Sudanese." 
Annex C to 45: Memorandum 
I suggest below the lines on which the preliminary conversations with the Egyptian 
Government might be conducted .... 
3. TheSudan 
His Majesty's Government take note that the Egyptian Government, in discussing 
the future of the Sudan, will base themselves on the interests and the aspirations of 
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the Sudanese. The standpoint of His Majesty's Government is similar, and they need 
only refer in this connexion to the Charter of the United Nations which defines the 
trusteeship system (to which the present administration of the Sudan offers some 
analogy) as designed to promote the political, economic, social and educational 
advancement of the inhabitants . .. and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to ... the freely expressed wishes 
of the peoples concerned. 
The safety of Egypt's southern frontier is a joint Anglo-Egyptian interest as is also 
free access to the trade and commerce of the Sudan. Apart from this His Majesty's 
Government have no objectives in the Sudan save the continued welfare of the 
inhabitants and the safeguarding and continuity, so long as it is needed, of the great 
task of administration which has been performed for almost half a century by a 
number of His Majesty's subjects. Political progress has been rapid in the Sudan in 
recent years, and it has been necessary to devise constitutional machinery to enable 
native opinion to be consulted. As the Egyptian Government are aware, the 
Governor-General, at the last meeting on the 8th November of the Advisory Council 
for the Northern Sudan, declared that:-
"Should the question of the future status of the Sudan be raised by the 
Condominium Powers in any revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, it would 
be the intention of the Sudan Government that the Advisory Council for the 
Northern Sudan should be consulted in order that its views should be at 
the disposal of the Sudan Government for transmission to the Powers. It is 
the opinion of the Sudan Government that the views of the Sudanese people 
should be obtained through constitutional channels in a matter of such vital 
importance to their future well-being."2 
His Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that any discussion of the 
modification of Article 11 of the 1936 Treaty should be postponed until the Sudanese 
people have been consulted and have made known their own wishes. The procedure 
by which this consultation can best take place is being examined by the Governor-
General, who will be available to discuss it with the Egyptian Government if 
required. But His Majesty's Government again wish to emphasise that the facts of the 
situation and modern international doctrine render academic, in their opinion, any 
prior discussion of the vexed question of sovereignty over the Sudan. 
2 See 40. 
48 FO 371153381, no 432 29 Jan 1946 
[Education]: letter from RC Mayall toPS Scrivener on the 
association of Gordon Memorial College with the Inter-University 
Council for Higher Education in the Colonies [Extract] 
[One of the recommendations of the Asquith Commission Report on higher education in 
the colonies (Cmd 6647, June 1945) was the creation of an Inter-University Council for 
the colonial empire. It was tentatively proposed to contain a reference to the Sudan in the 
draft Inter-University Council constitution and terms of reference (KW Blaxter1 (CO) to 
1 Then assistant secretary and head of the CO Social Services Dept. 
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Scrivener, 19 Jan 1946, FO 371/53381, no 262). Beckett advised caution in a minute on 22 
Jan 1946 and proposed that the relevant paragraph 'ought to begin with a clear statement 
in the sense that although the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is in no sense a colony of the U.K. 
but a territory administered under a condominium between the U.K. and Egypt, the 
Governor-General has expressed a view that much practical help could be given to 
education in the Sudan if this Council would as a special measure perform the same 
functions in relation to development of higher education there, and that is has been 
thought that this request of the Governor-General should be met' (FO 371/53381, no 
262). Following consultation with the Sudan government on the matter the council's 
terms of reference were redrafted to meet these objections.] 
I refer to the letter from Blaxter of the Colonial Office to you, No. 12041/12/45 of the 
19th January, on the subject of the participation of the Cordon Memorial College in 
the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies, and to the 
telephone conversation which we had last Saturday morning. 
As I mentioned to you on Saturday, I had cabled out to the Civil Secretary in 
Khartoum on the 21st January, asking him to give me authority to approach you on 
the subject, with a request to the effect that the Cordon Memorial College wished to 
be associated with this Council from its inception. 
I have now received from Robertson a telegram, a copy of which I enclose 
herewith.2 You will note from the contents of this telegram that I am authorised to 
ask you to be kind enough to make, on behalf of the Cordon Memorial College, a 
request to the Colonial Office for this association. In this connection I append 
herewith an extract from the minutes of the Third Meeting of the Cordon Memorial 
College Council in Khartoum which shows the desire of the Council for this 
association:-
. . . *'The College Board, having carefully considered the Report of the 
Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, recommends to the 
Council that the Cordon Memorial College should seek the connection with 
London University as recommended by the Commission, and that 
representation of the College on the Inter-University Council should be 
welcomed as and when it may be possible to arrange it. 
'The Board considers that the College is likely to get from this connection 
benefits which it could not otherwise hope for. At the same time, it considers 
that it should be made clear that the connection is a temporary one made 
only with the object of enabling the College to achieve independence as a 
Sudanese University. We consider that every care should be taken to 
safeguard the Sudanese character of the College, and that the necessary 
adaptations to local needs should be maintained both in academic and in 
other matters. 
'The Board has considered, as an alternative to the proposed connection with 
London, a similar connection with a university of the Near East. But it recom-
mends the connection with London University because its academic standard 
is much higher than that of any Near Eastern university, and because of the 
many facilities which will be provided by the Inter-University Council. At the 
same time, the Board considers it of great importance that this connection 
should not impair the closest possible relations with Universities of the Near 
East, from which also the College can receive much benefit.'* 
2 Not printed. 
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I realise that Robertson, in the opening sentence of his telegram, is correct in 
stating that since the Cordon Memorial College is an autonomous body, application 
for association could be made by it to the Inter-University Council without reference 
to the Sudan Government. Since, however, this latter Council is under the aegis of 
the Colonial Office, I do not think it would be correct for me to make the request 
direct to the Council, and especially so since I understand that the Council is not yet 
actually in being .... 
* The sub-paragraphs of the minute referring to the proposed association of the 
Cordon Memorial College with London University are not strictly relevant to the 
present request for the association of the Cordon Memorial College with the Inter-
University Council for Higher Education, but are included in the extract in order to 
give you a complete picture of the present position. 
49 FO 371153329, no 865 18 Feb 1946 
[Sudanisation]: despatch no 241 from R J Bowker1 to Mr Bevin. 
Enclosure: note by J W Robertson for the Governor-General's Council 
(23 Dec 1945) 
With reference to paragraph 7 of the minutes2 enclosed in my despatch No. 100 of 
January 21st, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note by the Civil 
Secretary to the Sudan Government, on Sudanisation on the Sudan Political Service, 
in the form in which the note was approved by the Governor General's Council on 
30th December, 1945. 
2. I agree with the policy set out in this note so far as it is based on the principle 
of developing local government by Sudanese and avoiding the imposition of a numer-
ous Sudanese bureaucracy on the country. In present world conditions, however, hav-
ing regard to the influence of the United Nations Organisation, and the urge for 
complete independence which is particularly strong in the Arab world, I doubt 
whether it will be possible to carry out a very gra,dual programme of Sudanisation on 
the 20-years basis proposed in this note or to exclude the Sudanese from holding 
responsible posts in the political administration of their country during this period. It 
seems difficult to believe, for instance, that it will be possible for 20 years to prevent 
Egyptians infiltrating into the Sudan Political Service, with results which would be far 
more harmful to the Sudan than any that could arise from the appointment of 
Sudanese to the same posts. Experience in other countries, such as Ethiopia, Iraq, and 
Egypt itself, has shown a strong inherent tendency to prefer inefficient government 
by fellow-countrymen to good government by foreigners. This is probably also the feel-
ing of the Sudanese. In present circumstances they must feel that whatever happens 
as regards the development of local government, it is the District Commissioners and 
Governors who really have all the power. I suggest, therefore, with some diffidence 
1 Minister, Cairo embassy, Sept 1945; counsellor, April1946; charge d'affaires, 1946-1947. 
2 
'Minutes of the 539th meeting of [the Governor-General's] Council' (FO 371153329, no 389), recorded 
that the council approved an alteration to the wording of the recommendations in paragraph 11 of the 
civil secretary's draft note. 
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that the Sudan Government might be well advised to try at a very early date the exper-
iment of appointing Sudanese to responsible political posts and even a Sudanese 
Governor. The plan explained in the paper within would proceed, but meanwhile 
something material would have been done to meet the growing demands of the 
Sudanese. At the came time the wind would be taken out of the sails of the Egyptian 
propagandists [sic] who are now increasingly active in the Sudan. 
3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor General of the Sudan. 
Enclosure to 49 
1. At its 532nd meeting held on the 17th March 1945, Council reaffirmed the 
policy of Dilution on which they had embarked and urged upon Governors and Heads 
of Departments the need to press steadily ahead, without waiting for the detailed 
plans which will later be submitted by the Establishments Committee for Council's 
approval. Inquiries and consultation with Governors have led me to the conclusion 
that dilution in the Political Service raises problems different from those arising in 
other Departments of the Government, and Council's direction is now sought on the 
line to be followed. 
2. Sudanisation of the technical services is usually a process of straight-forward 
substitution of British by technically qualified Sudanese officials but with the rare 
exceptions to which I refer below in paragraph 5, a Sudanese cannot be a satisfactory 
Political Officer among his own people. The functions of Governors and District 
Commissioners are essentially detached and unbiassed [sic] and the Political Service 
is unanimously agreed that it would be wrong to attempt to impose Political Officers 
from among the Sudanese over their own countrymen and that the future of 
Sudanese administrative officers must, therefore, be in an administrative and not in a 
political capacity. Their view is that a bureaucracy recruited mainly from the Three 
Towns and the River would be alien to the great bulk of the Sudan and less 
sympathetic than the existing British bureaucracy. This view undoubtedly has some 
foundation. 
3. The future structure of local government in the Sudan on which the day-to-
day life of the population will intimately depend is bound up closely with the future 
of the British Political Service and with the Sudanisation of that Service. 
Sudanisation in the Political Service will affect the whole future structure of the 
Governmental machine in the country. The development of local government and 
the assumption of responsibility by local government authorities of much of the 
general administration of both urban and rural areas, necessitates the employment 
of competent executive agents who, like the town clerks in English local government 
councils, should be responsible for execution of the orders and policy of the councils 
and for supervising and managing their services and paid staff. Such agents will in 
fact be doing much of the administrative and executive work now being carried out 
by District Commissioners and Mamurs on behalf of the central government, and as 
their numbers increase so will the duties of District Commissioners and Mamurs as 
central government officials decrease. 
4. The common British practice is for such executive staff (though they belong 
to a national association of local government officers) to be recruited from the open 
market, but in the Sudan the bulk of the best men are already in Government 
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service, and if the local councils are to be staffed efficiently and our young 
administrative officers are to play their part in the future of their country, they must 
be transferred from central government to local government employment as the 
transfer of responsibility to local councils proceeds. Simultaneously with this process 
the functions of the British Political Staff will become more advisory and political 
and less executive and administrative and the numbers needed will correspondingly 
decrease. It is not my view that they should be replaced in this advisory capacity by 
Sudanese. 
5. The rate of development of local government will, of course, vary in different 
parts of the Sudan and the need for District Commissioners and Mamurs in the more 
backward areas performing their old functions, political and administrative, will 
probably continue for a long time. In such areas until local government takes over 
there will be a case on grounds of political expediency for replacing a small number 
of British Political officers by Sudanese for a limited period of time, if suitable men 
are available, but I do not visualise such replacement being permanent except 
perhaps in a few exceptional cases. 
6. There will, I hope, in the coming years be a steady growth of local Government 
by rural and district councils in the rural areas and I foresee a possible total of 25 to 
30 such units covering ultimately most of the Northern Sudan. I foresee also about 
10 to 12 independent town and municipal councils and perhaps 20 town committees 
which will form an integral part of the rural district councils, but some of which may 
attain independent status later. I do not in this submission attempt to define the 
future relation of province councils to this organisation. 
7. One of the main duties of British District Commissioners will be as chairman 
in these councils during the early stages and subsequently as advisers when the 
chairmanship is taken over by Sudanese. At the same time their executive and 
administrative functions will be taken over by executive agents employed and paid by 
the councils and drawn generally from the ranks of Sudanese District 
Commissioners and Mamurs. Only in a few places for example in Khartoum, may it 
be necessary to have British executive agents for a considerable time to come. 
8. The full implementation of this policy over a period of 20 years in the six 
Northern Provinces cannot be exactly foreseen yet, but from preliminary 
recommendations received from Governors, which are still under consideration, I 
think that in that period it may be possible to reduce the British Political staff in the 
Provinces from 72 to 30 and replace them by an approximately equal number of 
Sudanese in Division I in local government service, or in a few cases by straight 
substitution in the Political Service. 
9. I have not attempted to bring within the scope of this review the two Southern 
Provinces which now contain 46 posts for British Political officers. It is quite 
impossible to prophesy the rate at which Southern indigenous institutions will 
develop and it is certain that if the approved Government policy for economic and 
educational expansion is to be properly carried out there is little possibility of 
reducing the British Political staff in these provinces during the next 15 to 20 years. 
10. I have also not tried to state here the details of the dilution plan. The training 
of Sudanese in local government methods, the terms of service, and transfer of 
Sudanese from central to local government service, and the appointment of local 
government supervisory staff at Province Headquarters during the early stages, are 
all under consideration, and will be taken up shortly with the Financial Secretary. 
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11. I ask, however, for Council's approval of the principles underlying this 
proposal, i.e.:-
(a) the Political Service should gradually be reduced in numbers as the functions 
of local government are effectively taken over by local councils. 
(b) the Sudanese Administrative officer cadre should in the main be absorbed into 
local Government, as Town Clerks, Clerks to Municipalities, and executive officials 
of Rural District Councils and should not except in a few areas take the place of the 
Political Service. 
(c) the Southern Sudan should continue to be administered by British Political 
officers, until the Southern Sudanese have evolved a local self-government of their 
own, when a similar process to that described in (a) and (b) above should be aimed 
at. 
50 FO 371153251, no 1324 20 Feb 1946 
[Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brothers)]: circular letter from J W 
Robertson to all governors and the commissioner of Port Sudan. 
Enclosure 'D': confidential background report on 'el ikhwan el 
muslimin' 
1. As a result of the recent visit to the Sudan of the young Egyptian lawyer Gemal 
el Din el Sanhuri, during which in a number of our larger towns he addressed local 
audiences on the doctrines of the Egyptian Ikhwan el Muslimin, Governors must 
expect to receive applications for their consent to the formation of branches of the 
Cairo Society, or, alternatively, of local societies on the Ikhwan el Muslimin model. 
An application of the latter type has already been addressed to Governor Northern 
Province in respect of Atbara, and there are indications that other Governors may 
shortly be approached (if applications have not been already received) in respect of 
such places as Omdurman, Port Sudan, Kassala, Wad Medani and El Obeid. 
2. I have given the matter the most careful consideration and have decided that 
such applications should be dealt with as follows. I fully realise that a society of the 
Ikhwan el Muslimin type is a potential source of embarrassment, in that its 
members, under internal or external pressure, may later be tempted into the political 
field, but the primary consideration, upon which you have to decide whether to 
accord or refuse your consent to the formation of a proposed society, must be the 
terms of the Constitution or Rules deposited with you by the applicants. If the aims 
and objectives of the society as therein defined are plainly and unexceptionably 
'religious', you have no alternative but to accord your consent. To refuse consent 
would be to play gratuitously into the hands of our critics and opponents. 
3. In the case of Atbara, the applicant, one Kemal Eff. Bedri, has deposited with 
the Governor Northern Province a constitution which is based on the constitution of 
the Egyptian Society, and proposes to use the Egyptian name and call his society the 
Ikhwan el Muslimin of Atbara. An English translation of this constitution (enclosure 
'A')1 is attached to this letter for your information. You will see that the rules are 
1 Enclosures 'A'-'C' not printed. 
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strictly religious. Indeed every undesirable or political reference in the Egyptian 
constitution upon which they are based, has been carefully excluded. 
4. Governor Northern Province in giving his consent to the formation of this 
society, has been instructed to make it clear to the promoters that he could not (and 
would not) give his consent to the formation of any society whose constitution was to 
be the full constitution of the Ikhwan el Muslimin in Cairo (a short summary of 
which is attached marked 'B'), because he could not, as an official of the 
(Condominium) Sudan Government approve the 'national objective'2-i.e. the 
political objective-of that Society as described in Section 2(e) of Chapter II thereof, 
nor could he approve the provisions of Chapter VI (vide attachment 'C') which 
require the complete subservience of local branches of the Society to the parent body 
in Egypt. 
5. He is, in fact, only giving his consent, to the formation of a local 'religious' 
society, whose unexceptionable 'religious' rules have been laid before him-a 
Sudanese Society, quite independent of the Egyptian Ikhwan el Muslimin, to which 
he recognises no affiliation. 
6. As regards the proposed name of the Atbara society, the Governor Northern 
Province has been directed to press strongly on the promoter the suggestion that, if 
he wishes to preserve its non-political character, he should consider very seriously 
the desirability, in order to stress the difference between its constitution and that of 
the Egyptian Ikhwan, of giving it a different name. Whilst leaving the final decision 
to Kemal Eff. Bedri, he will point out that whatever the basic religious inspiration of 
the Ikhwan el Muslimin may be, they have latterly been closely associated with 
political agitation. They have fallen foul of more than one Egyptian Government; 
their leaders have on more than one occasion been arrested and detained as 
disturbers of the peace; and they show every sign of being prepared to play a 
prominent part in the troublous times now ahead. He will impress upon him that the 
use by the Atbara Society of the Cairo name must inevitably suggest affiliation to the 
Cairo Society, and give rise to misunderstandings which can only be a source of 
embarrassment to himself and his associates. 
7. You should deal similarly with any applications of the like kind which may be 
addressed to you. I enclose (as attachment 'D') a summary of the Ikhwan el 
Muslimin's political history. A good deal of this e.g. the detail of the Society's 
organisation and its possible possession of arms, is confidential, but in illustrating its 
political character to would-be organisers of similar societies in your province, and 
warning them of the embarrassments and dangers of affiliation, you may quote any 
of the public demonstrations and disturbances (e.g. at the time of the recent crisis in 
the Levant) in which it has played a prominent part. 
8. Should any society of the Ikhwan type in your province, having obtained your 
consent to its formation as a purely religious body either under the name of Ikhwan 
el Muslimin or under a name of its own, subsequently indulge in political activities in 
contravention of the constitution deposited with you, you should refer the matter to 
me, with a full report, for consideration of the question of your withdrawing your 
consent and shutting it down. 
2 The 'national objective' is stated to include 'the liberation of the Nile Valley, the entire Arab world and 
the Islamic nation in all its parts, from the sovereignty of the foreigner and the aiding of Islamic 
minorities everywhere in the attainment of their rights.' 
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Enclosure 'D' to 50 
1. The history of the Ikhwan el Muslimin has been summarised at various dates 
by Defence Security and other Intelligence organisations in Cairo. Briefly it is as 
follows. Founded in 1930 by Sheikh Hassan el Banna,3 an undoubted enthusiast for 
the Moslem way of life, the aims and objects of the Society have gradually assumed a 
militant political character. Its creed, in its essence a revivalist one, which attributes 
the debasement of Eastern ethical values to the disastrous influence of Western 
materialism, and the decay of the Egyptian governmental system to the impact of 
foreign ideas and foreign culture, inevitably assumed the character of a call for the 
application of the principles of Islam to practical politics, Islam, it insists, does not 
tolerate the domination of the Moslem world by peoples of other religions, and it is 
the task of the Ikhwan to rid Egypt of foreign influences in both economic and 
political spheres. El Banna's sincerity was unquestioned in the early days of the 
movement, but as the power and influence of the Society grew during the war years, 
the character of their founder underwent a change and from a religious leader, he 
developed, though fortunately lacking in the true courage of the fanatic, into a clever 
and unscrupulous politician, whose followers were to devote their energies to the 
creation of a body of anti-foreign feeling sufficiently powerful to support them 
irresistibly in their demand for "Egyptian independence". 
2. The movement was originally organised on social, educational and charitable 
lines; funds were forthcoming from the most respectable Moslem cricles [sic]; and all 
sorts of schemes (scouts, sporting clubs, schools, clinics, cooperative societies) were 
envisaged, but a comparative failure to put these theoretical schemes on a practical 
basis constituted at this time one of the Society's fundamental weaknesses and 
reduced the attraction of its appeal. In its later years the movement underwent 
several reorganisations. At one time, using the Nazi and Fascist systems, which he 
had carefully studied, as a model, El Banna formed within the Ikhwan the 'Gawala' 
(or Rovers) and 'Katai'b',4 specially trained and trusted groups of adherents who 
corresponded respectively to the Brown Shirts and Black Shirts of the Hitler 
organisation. Each Branch had its own Katiba, composed of its most enthusiastic and 
reliable members, and El Banna had his own special Katiba bodyguard. Certain 
elements of the Katai'b were also reported to have been formed into a suicide 
squad. 
3. This Nazi organisation was, however, short-lived and by the middle of 1944 
the Ikhwan were believed to have been reorganised on the following lines. The 
Branches, estimated at over a thousand, were grouped into Shubas, or Districts, each 
Shuba being controlled by a President and eleven Councillors. The Shubas were 
arranged in turn in a series of seventeen zones, each possessing its own 
administrative body of four officials, this decentralisation providing against the 
disruption or handicapping of the movement's activities through the closing of 
meeting places or the arrest of leading members. The whole association was directed 
by a supreme Committee presided over by El Banna. A number of Sub-Committees at 
H.Q. controlled the activities of the Gawala and of the workers and students (from 
3 Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), founder and leader of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 1929; assassinated in 
February 1949, probably on the orders of the Egyptian government. 
4 
'Squadrons' (sing, katiba). 
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whom the Society's membership was largely drawn, along with some of the more 
educated elements of the lower middle class); organised propaganda, cultural and 
religious teaching; and dealt with other administrative matters. 
4. The organisation described in the previous paragraph is believed to be still the 
organisation today (end of 1945). The Gawala bands have been provided with semi-
military training and parade at least once a week. Certain sections are reported to 
have been issued with firearms and to have been given some preliminary training in 
their use. (There are in Egypt a large number of arms, obtained in the main from 
abandoned dumps in the Western Desert, which could be brought into use, should 
feeling be sufficiently aroused. The existence of these arms makes the Ikhwan a 
potential danger which cannot be discounted). The weakness of the movement 
however still lies in its leadership. El Banna is not only the undisputed leader but the 
only outstanding personality. The society is believed by the Security authorities in 
Cairo to be entirely dependent on him, and although he may be dangerous (if his 
nerve holds) because of the power he can wield, the dependence of the Brotherhood 
on his leadership may yet be the cause of its downfall. Should he be for any reason 
removed, the Ikhwan might crumble away. The membership of the Society has been 
variously estimated at from 100,000 to 500,000. 
5. In a note of this kind the activities of the Ikhwan during recent years can only 
be very shortly summarised. The Society entered the political arena during the time 
of the Palestine troubles (1936-1939) when it played a prominent part in anti-British 
agitation. In 1940 El Banna was associating with Ali Maher and with the anti-British 
group of which he was the head. He was receiving, also, protection and help from the 
Palace. In 1941 members of the Ikhwan became less guarded in their anti-British 
pronouncements; reports were received of attempts at sabotage, collection of 
information about British troop movements etc., and at the instance of the British 
authorities El Banna and his Vice President (Ahmed el Sukkari) were arrested in 
October of that year and interned. He was released in November by the then Egyptian 
Premier (Hussein Sirri) who took fright at the possibility of agitation in protest 
against his internment. El Banna, however, appeared to have been frightened too and 
for some time was more cautious in his public declarations. 
6. The subsequent war history of the Ikhwan is one of initial opposition to the 
British-installed successor of Hussein Sirri (Nahas Pasha); of the subsequent striking 
of a bargain between El Banna (under the threat of reinternment) and the Wafdist 
Premier (who was loath to leave such a promising instrument for agitation 
unattached)-a bargain which was severely criticised at the time by the Society's 
rank and file and caused a temporary split which seriously affected its activities; of El 
Banna's gradual success in convincing his subordinates that his bargain, which left 
him unmolested, was a wise piece of purely tactical opportunism; of the 
intensification of the Society's build-up in the shelter of Wafdist non-interference; of 
his breach of the bargain which led in January 1943 to a ban being placed on all 
Ikhwan meetings, a ban which they attributed to British intervention; of the removal 
of this ban in May of the same year as the result of a further 'understanding' between 
the Society and the Wafd; of the caution which it displayed at the time of the El 
Alamein crisis, in spite of its undoubted Fifth Column and pro-German sympathies; 
and of its (comparative) latter day quiescence since the fall of the Nahas Ministry and 
the installation of Nokrashi Pasha. The December 1944 demonstrations in Cairo 
(over the discussion by the Advisory Council in Khartoum of the Sudanese 
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nationality question) were traced to Wafdistllkhwan instigation, but they were firmly 
dealt with by the Government, and so far as any overt activity was concerned, the 
Society seemed, temporarily at least, to be biding its time. 
In the summer of 1945, however, its activities recommenced. Members of the 
Ikhwan joined in anti-French demonstrations in Egypt over the crisis in Syria and the 
Lebanon, and in October 1945 the Society's growing importance in politics was empha-
sised by further action. Early in that month a well attended mass meeting passed a 
number of resolutions supporting the extremist claims of the Arab countries, and 
according to Cairo reports the Society is now gradually growing strong enough to be 
independent of the Wafd or of other political parties. Its President, Sheikh Hassan el 
Banna, 'is feeling his way to influence in national affairs'. 
51 FO 371/53250, no 1195 11 Mar 1946 
[Consultation with the Sudanese on their future]: despatch no 354 
from R J Bowker to Mr Bevin. Enclosure: despatch no 31 from Sir H 
Huddleston to Lord Killeam, 23 Feb 1946 
With reference to your telegram No. 25 Saving of 25th January, I have the honour to 
transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from the Governor-General of the Sudan, 
regarding the method by which the views of the Sudanese should be obtained in 
connection with the Treaty negotiations and their effect on the future of the Sudan. 
2. I agree generally with the draft memorandum, subject to one criticism of 
detail, namely, that the last sentence but two in paragraph 2, regarding the 
proportion of Sudanese in the Central Government service, is somewhat misleading 
having regard to the sentence which immediately follows it. 
3. It is inevitable that the questions asked in the memorandum will be regarded 
by Egyptians as being to some extent in the nature of leading questions, and that the 
process of consultation should be considered by Egyptians as artificial. Any 
consultation of a primitive country is bound to be somewhat unreal and this 
fundamental difficulty is inherent in the present proposals. The unreality of 
consultation is all the greater in that it will be restricted to the Northern provinces, 
but this again is inevitable, as it will be quite impossible to institute any serious 
consultation of the tribesmen of the Southern Sudan. Obviously consultation must 
be directed by the Sudan Government as proposed, since the alternative would be 
consultation by less direct methods from the Egyptian side. Nevertheless, I consider 
that the British control over the means of consultation should be kept as far as 
possible in the background for purposes of publicity, and I assume that the estimates 
of popular opinion in the provinces which, as suggested in the last sentence of 
paragraph 4 of the enclosed despatch, would be obtained from Provincial Governors, 
should be for the use of the Sudan Government, and not for production as evidence 
of the results of consultation. The evidence of British Provincial Governors, however 
careful and objective, would not be regarded by Egyptians as accurately reflecting 
Sudanese opinion. This argument could also be applied by Egyptians to most of the 
existing constitutional channels in the Sudan which are at present more or less 
under British influence, but it would apply more effectively to the evidence of British 
officials. 
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4. As regards timing, Lord Killearn proposed in paragraph 5 of his telegram to 
the Foreign Office No. 146 of 31st January that the Sudan issue should not be raised 
in the Treaty negotiations until the military question had been settled. It would 
clearly be undesirable to start consulting the Sudanese on Treaty revision as it affects 
the Sudan if the negotiations are subsequently to break down on the evacuation 
question without touching on the Sudan at all. I therefore consider that consultation 
of the Sudanese should not begin until there is a good prospect of a favourable 
outcome to the negotiations over the military question. 
5. May I please be informed by telegraph if you agree? 
6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor-General of the Sudan. 
Enclosure to 51 
As I informed Lord Killearn in my telegram No. 9 of February 1st, I have been 
considering methods of consulting the Sudanese so that their views about the future 
of the Sudan may be available at a later stage of the negotiations. I understand from 
Embassy telegram No. 12 of January 30th, 1946, that the Sudan will be discussed 
during the present negotiations, but at a later phase when the question of the 
evacuation of British Troops has been disposed of. 
2. On this assumption, I consider that arrangements for the consultation of the 
Sudanese should be agreed upon as soon as possible, and I have had the attached 
memorandum prepared for submission to the various bodies which I propose should 
be consulted. In my opinion it would be impossible for these bodies to be consulted 
without guidance of this sort being given. 
It will take time to convene the Province and Advisory Councils and it is therefore 
doubly essential to settle the preliminaries so that when the time for consultation 
comes the members of these bodies can at once be made aware of the issues on which 
their views are required. 
3. With the approval of His Majesty's Ambassador and of His Majesty's 
Government, 1 and as quoted in Foreign Office Saving telegram No. 25, I have 
informed the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan that they will be consulted in 
this matter, and in my opinion if such consultation is to be really valuable, it is 
essential that the representatives of the Province Councils in the Advisory Council 
should have the advantage of knowing the view of their parent councils. The 
Province Councils are composed of tribal leaders, merchants, and others, partly 
elected by Town Councils and by Rural District bodies and partly nominated to 
secure a representation of all interests. I propose, therefore, that the Memorandum 
should first be debated in the Province Councils, and that it should then be 
considered by the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan. 
4. As you are aware, the Graduates' General Congress, a body composed partly of 
politically minded persons, resident almost entirely in Omdurman, and claiming to 
be the most representative body in the Sudan, has already made two declarations as a 
result of which it has recently split up into a number of parties, of which the Umma 
and Ashigga are the largest. The Congress has always boycotted the Advisory Council 
1 See 40. 
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for the Northern Sudan, and it therefore has not been possible for it to be 
represented upon it. The Sudan Government would be open to criticism, however, if 
they did not obtain the views of these parties composed of the politically minded 
younger members of the educated classes, and I should propose to ask them and the 
Congress Committee whether they wished to submit their views on the 
Memorandum or whether their previous declarations were to be taken as their final 
statement. The influence in the country of Sayed Sir Ali el Mirghani Pasha and Sayed 
Sir Abdel Rahman el Mahdi Pasha, is still very great; these religious leaders are 
Honorary Members of the Advisory Council, and would therefore also be asked for 
their views. The Chamber of Commerce in Khartoum elects two representatives to 
the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan and should similarly be asked to 
consider the memorandum. Provincial Governors would also be asked to estimate 
popular opinion in their Provinces, and the likely results of any change. 
5. On receipt of the replies to the Memorandum and after the Advisory Council 
had held its debate, I should propose to convey the views collected in this way to you 
for the information of the Condominium powers. I should be grateful if you would let 
me know as soon as possible whether the procedure proposed is approved and 
whether you have any comments on the draft Memorandum. 
' ANNEXURE 
Memorandum on the future of the Sudan, to be submitted to representative bodies in 
the Sudan 
1. As you are aware, the question of the Sudan's future government is to be 
discussed in the present negotiations between Great Britain and Egypt. The Sudan 
Government have already announced that they intend to obtain the opinions of the 
Sudanese, through constitutional channels regarding their future, before the 
Condominium powers come to any decision on this subject, so intimately concerned 
with the well-being of the country. 
2. The Sudan is at present administered by a Government which was set up by 
the British and Egyptian Governments in 1899. The aims of this Government were 
defined in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty as being to work for the welfare of the 
Sudanese, though in fact this policy has been followed since 1898. The Sudan 
Government have interpreted this definition by working towards local self-
government and in pursuit of this aim have recently set up Municipal, Town and 
Rural District Councils, in addition to the other local administrations which have 
existed for some time under the authority of tribal leaders. The Government have 
furthermore in the last few years established Province Councils and an Advisory 
Council with the avowed aim of associating the Sudanese more closely with the 
administ~ation of the country. With similar intentions the Government have trained 
Sudanese for central government service until at the beginning of 1946 out of 
approximately 6000 posts in Divisions I and II, 78% are held by Sudanese. 81 of these 
posts are in Division I which contains approximately 800 posts. The Sudan 
Government have stated that they have imposed no limit to the scale of post to which 
a Sudanese may attain when qualified for it. 
Schemes of Educational, Medical, and Economic development have been pushed 
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ahead, and the progress achieved in the period since 1898 when no school, hospital 
or wealth existed in the country has been remarkable. The budget for 1946 is 
balanced at a figure of over seven and a half million pounds, compared with Revenue 
of £E. 126,596 and Expenditure of £E. 230,238 in 1899; a vast irrigation scheme has 
been created in the Gezira area, schools of all grades up to the post-secondary level 
have been established; hospitals and dispensaries are widespread throughout the 
country. Law and order has been firmly established, and general freedom of 
movement, thought and speech has developed. A plan for further economic, 
educational and general expansion is at the moment being worked out. 
The Sudan Government have repeatedly declared their aim for the Sudan to be 
gradual evolution to complete internal self-government. 
3. In considering the question now being put to the Sudanese it will be necessary 
for you to distinguish between immediate and long-term policy, for these are not 
necessarily the same. There can be little doubt that the Sudan as a whole still 
requires a considerable time to develop into a homogeneous entity, and to attain that 
degree of cohesion and unity required before it can stand firmly on its own feet. For 
this intervening period it needs guidance and assistance, and in considering the 
present situation it is essential to consider separately and distinctly:-
(a) the final objective to be aimed at, and 
(b) the constitution and organisation to be maintained during the immediate 
training period, and especially the question of who is to guide and train the 
Sudanese. 
4. Your views as to the ultimate objective should be given. The possibilities seem 
to be as follows:-
(a) a completely independent Sudan which is able to enter into relations with 
other independent states on a basis of equality and to control its own affairs; 
(b) a Sudan completely incorporated into the Egyptian State like an Egyptian 
Province and subject to the laws of Egypt; 
(c) a self-governing Sudan joined in some form of union with Egypt under the 
Egyptian Crown (either with or without an alliance with Great Britain); 
(d) a self-governing Sudan in some form of association with the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, such as that of Canada, Australia or New Zealand. 
5. The possible alternatives for the immediate future may be summarised as 
follows:-
( a) the progressive development of the present policy adopted by the 
Condominium Government of creating a self-governing and economically self-
dependent Sudan and of replacing non-Sudanese officials by Sudanese in all ranks 
of the Government service as Sudanese become qualified to fill their posts; 
(b) the continuation of the present regime but subject to a substitution of a 
considerable number of Egyptians for British in all ranks of the Government 
service. Attention should be given to the difficulties which might arise from a 
personnel drawn from different nationalities in the higher ranks of Government; 
(c) substitution of Egypt for Great Britain as the predominant partner in the 
Condominium Government with a concomitant substitution of Egyptians for 
British in the higher posts of the Government for which Sudanese are still not yet 
qualified. 
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6. This note has been written as objectively as possible without any discussion of 
the merits or demerits of any particular solution, it being thought outside the 
function of the Sudan Government to point out these. It is incumbent upon the 
bodies to whom these questions are being put to consider the matter objectively and 
calmly, viewing the welfare and future prosperity and happiness of the people of the 
Sudan as a whole, not giving undue weight to personal or private considerations and 
in full consciousness of the responsibility laid upon them. Attention should be paid 
too to the immediate advantages and disadvantages of any change at a time when 
schemes of development are being initiated and when modification of the present 
regime might delay their implementation. 
52 FO 371153329, no 865 18 Mar 1946 
[Sudanisation]: letter (reply) from PS Scrivener toR J Bowker 
We have read with great interest your despatch No.241 of 18th February, and enclo-
sures in regard to the question of the "Sudanisation" of the Sudan political service.1 
I may say at once that we fully share your view in the light of the ever-mounting 
volume of evidence that the Middle East countries are determined to have indigenous 
(and doubtless inefficient) administrations at the earliest possible moment. We feel 
that the Civil Secretary's note is unassailable if viewed exclusively from the angle of 
correct British administrative theory (and we also feel that your suggestion of a 
Sudanese Provincial Governor at an early date may go rather too far the other way). 
But the fact remains,-and here we are on our own ground-that, as you say, we 
cannot go on keeping Egyptians out of the Political Service unless we can put in 
Sudanese. The practical choice, in fact, "in present world conditions" as you rightly 
express it, is between the fairly rapid introduction of British-trained Sudanese and 
some loss of artistic perfection, and an influx of Egyptian-trained Egyptians, with the 
rapid disappearance of all artistry whatsoever. We hope therefore that in the light of 
your remarks and ours, which are made in no carping spirit, the Sudan Government 
will give the matter some further consideration. An extra copy of this letter is 
attached for transmission, if you agree, to Khartoum. 
1 See 49. 
53 FO 371153250, no 1195 25 Mar 1946 
[Consultation of Southern Sudanese]: letter from R C May all to P S 
Scrivener [Extract] 
[Mayall, then Sudan agent in London, had served in the Upper Nile Province, a southern 
province, in 1922-1923. This is the first comment on the future of the Southern Sudan 
from a British official with any experience of the South to enter FO correspondence on 
the treaty negotiations.] 
With reference to my conversation with Howe and yourself this morning on the 
subject of the contents of Khartoum despatch No. 31 dated 23rd February/ I have 
1 See 51. 
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now had an opportunity of studying carefully the despatch and the annexure 
thereto. 
2. My own private and personal view is that the Governor-General, in asking for 
the approval of His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo and of His Majesty's Government 
in London that he should be empowered to consult the Sudanese at an early date as 
to the future well-being of the country, had in mind the whole Sudan, i.e., the eight 
Provinces including the two Southern Provinces.2 I base this view on the words in 
line 4 of paragraph 3 of the annexure, where it is emphatically stated that "there can 
be little doubt the Sudan as a whole still requires . . .. " etc. 
3. As regards the method of consultation, I fully realise and appreciate the 
doubts which Howe and you yourself have as to whether or not the Governor-
General, when he wrote the despatch, had in mind the method of consultation to be 
used to obtain the views of the population of the two Southern Provinces. I can fully 
appreciate that H.M.G. would find it impossible to agree to the step proposed by His 
Excellency the Governor-General unless they were certain that their obligations 
under the United Nations Charter were completely fulfilled. 
4. I am, however, of the opinion that there should be no difficulty in obtaining 
some measure of opinion from the population of the two Southern Provinces. You 
will note from paragraphs 3 and 4 of the despatch that the Governor-General intends 
to consult the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, Province Councils, the 
Graduates' General Congress, the two Sayeds, the Chamber of Commerce in 
Khartoum, and the Provincial Governors. I would therefore suggest that His 
Excellency the Governor-General may have had in mind that, with a view to carrying 
out the obligations of the Condominium powers under the United Nations Charter, 
he would obtain the popular opinion of the two Southern Provinces as regards the 
future of their areas, through the medium of the Provincial Governors. Although the 
two Southern Provinces are not represented on the Northern Advisory Council-nor 
do I think it would be wise to suggest that for an ad hoc meeting of the Council at 
which this matter was to be discussed, representatives from these two Provinces 
should be present-there should be no insuperable difficulty in the two Southern 
Governors summoning ad hoc and informal Provincial Councils composed of 
District Commissioners and the Chiefs of the Tribes in the two Provinces. I submit 
that such consultation would be likely to result in as true a picture of general 
popular opinion as would result from the use of the more constitutional machinery 
in the case of the six Northern Provinces and the various Sectional interests.3 
5. I suggest, as a personal opinion, that paragraph 4 of the annexure is 
incomplete. I would add that there should be a further alternative (which is, 
incidentally, that of the all-Party resolution) "a self-governing Sudan joined in some 
form of association with Egypt, but not under the Egyptian Crown". I would not, 
however, suggest including such an additional alternative of an independent or 
dominion status under the Anglo-Egyptian joint guarantee and safeguard.4 Such an 
2 Mongalla and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces had been amalgamated into a single Equatorial Province in 1936, 
and were to be re-divided into Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces in 1948. 
3 Scrivener's marginal note: "I agree". 
4 Scrivener's marginal note: "Caveat only against adopting an idea of SirS. Symes!", the former governor-
general who had recently written on the future of the Sudan in the Times of 13 Mar 1946. 
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objective, to my mind, would satisfy none of the three parties, i.e., the Sudanese, 
Egyptians, British, concerned in the present problem. 
6. I have one further comment to make. I showed Howe and yourself the 
interchange of letters between Bowker and His Excellency the Governor-General on 
this subject; I understood that you were not in possession of these papers. May I be 
presumptious [sic] enough, in this private letter, to differ from the opinion not only 
of the Minister in Cairo but of my own Governor-General? I personally feel, and feel 
strongly, that the time has come when consultation with the Sudanese should be 
begun and I cannot help feeling that if permission for this consultation is not given 
at a very early date, further incidents such as those of the recent demonstration by 
Cordon Memorial College students, and the despatch by the Graduates' Congress of a 
delegation to Cairo, may be followed by events and incidents of a more serious 
nature. I hope and trust that I am being an alarmist over this and that the 
Declaration to be made to-morrow in the House of Commons by the Foreign 
Secretary will quieten the position in Khartoum, but to anyone like myself who still 
has vivid memories of 1924 in the Sudan it is difficult to believe that the Sudan 
Government can act too early if peace and public security in the country are to be 
maintained .... 
54 H ofC Debs, vol421, col217 26 Mar 1946 
[Sudanese self-determination]: statement by Mr Bevin on HMG's policy 
[Following an exchange between Huddleston and Killearn concerning the increase of 
Egyptian propaganda efforts in the Sudan, Huddleston expressed his concern that there 
was confusion among the Sudanese about Britain's policy towards the country's future. 
He claimed that the government's silence was being interpreted as consenting to the 
recent Egyptian government announcement that their aim was to incorporate the Sudan 
into Egypt. He urgently requested that Bevin issue a formal statement reiterating the 
British government's commitment to self-government in the Sudan (tel no 25, 12 Feb 
1946, Huddleston to Killearn, FO 371/53250, no 1112). The following statement follows 
closely the language Huddleston proposed.] 
His Majesty's Government look forward to the day when the Sudanese will be able 
finally to decide their political future for themselves. It is not proposed by His 
Majesty's Government to influence their eventual decision in any way. His Majesty's 
Government have no object in the Sudan other than the true welfare of the 
Sudanese, and this principle has likewise been proclaimed by the Egyptian 
Government in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The welfare of the Sudanese 
cannot be secured unless a stable and disinterested administration is maintained in 
the Sudan. The objects of such an administration must be to establish organs of self-
government as a first step towards eventual independence, to accelerate the process 
of appointing Sudanese to higher Government posts in consultation with Sudanese 
representatives, and to raise the capacity of the mass of the people to effective 
citizenship. These are the objects of the present Sudan Government, and His 
Majesty's Government fully support them. In the meantime, His Majesty's 
Government consider that no change should be made in the status of the Sudan as a 
result of treaty revision until the Sudanese have been consulted through 
constitutional channels. 
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55 FO 371153371, no 1658 27 Mar 1946 
[Nile Waters: Lake Albert reservoir]: inward telegram no 211 from Sir 
J HalP to Mr HalP objecting to plans for the construction of a dam at 
Lake Albert 
[The Egyptian Irrigation Department's proposal to meet Egypt's anticipated water needs 
by increasing the flow of the Nile through the construction of the Jonglei Canal and a 
dam near Lake Albert had already provoked strong comment from the Sudan government 
(see 41 and 45). The Sudan's irrigation adviser, MacGregor, noted that Egypt's plans to 
enlarge Lake Albert by fifty per cent implied the submerging of more than a thousand 
square miles of territory in both Uganda and the Belgian Congo, an area which seemed 
likely to contain 'some features of importance and value.' He also noted that the 
Egyptians had not clearly indicated the potential site for such a dam, and concluded: 'It 
does not seem quite reasonable that the Governments of Uganda and the Belgian Congo 
should be approached with a suggestion to submerge 1000 square miles of their territory 
so long as the Egyptian Government, as promoter of the scheme, are themselves unable 
to come to a final decision on this obviously vital point. It would be fair to expect them to 
advance their ideas for the dam to the point of a definite design and a definite site, before 
the other two Governments are asked to consider the problems that would arise from 
submergence of this very large area, so much in excess of anything previously considered' 
('Note by Mr. MacGregor (19.10.45)', FO 371/46024, no 3149). Writing in defence of the 
Egyptian proposals, Bowker commented that the area in question 'relates largely to 
sleeping-sickness country and game reserves-all very thinly inhabited; and that there 
would be some positive advantage to Uganda, where the greater part lies, for purposes of 
development of fishing' (Bowker to Scrivener, 31 Dec 1945, FO 371/53371, no 159) . The 
Egyptian proposals were forwarded to the governor of Uganda via the CO for comment.] 
Your telegram Saving No. 388 of the 12th December, 1945. Construction of Lake 
Albert Reservoir. 
2. The proposals of the Egyptian Government have now been considered in as 
full detail as is possible, having regard to the absence of a fully detailed survey of the 
effects of the flooding contemplated. 
3. The implications of a dam of the size contemplated in the Nimule area are that 
over 1,000 square miles of territory would be flooded, most of which lies in this 
Protectorate. 
4. After detailed consultation with my advisers, I feel bound to reply that I am 
strongly opposed to the construction of any dam of any size by the Egyptian 
Government, in or near this Protectorate. This view has the full and unanimous 
support of my advisers. My reasons are as follows:-
( a) It is felt that the probable aim of the Egyptian Government is to control 
completely the headwaters of the Nile, and that if the request for permission to 
construct a dam at Nimule were granted, other demands would follow, and control 
of the water would gradually lead to demands for a greater measure of political 
control, which might well extend to the whole of the area surrounding the Victoria 
Nile. 
(b) While there is at present no land hunger in the area which would be 
submerged, with an increasing population and improvements in education and 
social services, and the consequent demand for a higher standard of living, a 
1 Governor of Uganda, 1944-1952. 2 S of S for the colonies, 1945-1946. 
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greater cash return from land will be required, which will entail extended 
cultivation. 
(c) With the increasing political consciousness of the people of Uganda, the 
question of land is becoming of more and more importance, and the submergence 
of such a large area would undoubtedly cause such great dissatisfaction as to 
render the project politically impracticable. 
(d) The scheme would give the Egyptian Government the right of control over the 
waters of Lake Albert and Lake Kioga and would make it impossible for this 
Government to embark upon any large scale irrigation project which might 
involve the divergence of water from those lakes. 
(e) There are indications of the presence of oil near Lake Albert, production of 
which would be impossible commercially if the area were inundated. 
(f) The tribes living on the Semliki flats own approximately 10,000 head of cattle, 
and there is no suitable grazing land to which they could be moved. 
(g) There would be very considerable movement of game and consequently danger 
from the tsetse fly they would carry with them while the size of the Game Reserve 
would be much reduced. 
(h) The danger of human trypanosomiasis would be enhanced by an increase in 
the area under water owing to the greater incidence of the palpalis fly. 
(i) The valuable salt industry at Kibiro would be lost. 
(j) Lake services would be seriously disturbed and present port facilities at Butiaba 
would be entirely lost. The gradual rise in the level of Lake Albert over a period of 
ten years would entail the provision of improvised port facilities during the whole 
of that period, and owing to the variation in the level of the water depending upon 
the amount which Egypt drew off in good or bad years, it would be necessary for 
tidal port installations to be provided ultimately. 
(k) A dam at Nimule would entail the flooding of the area near the Albert Nile, and 
would consequently dispossess numbers of the Madi tribe for whom no other land 
could be found. 
(I) The effects of the dam on the hydrography and climate of the Protectorate 
cannot at present be gauged. 
56 FO 371/53250, no 1195 28 Mar 1946 
[Consultation of Sudanese]: outward telegram (reply) no 588 from Mr 
Bevin to R J Bowker 
[This reply to despatches from Huddleston and Bowker on consultation with the 
Sudanese incorporates a number of points raised by RC Mayall (see 53).] 
Your despatch No. 354.1 
I approve generally so far as the six Northern Provinces are concerned; but it 
seems to me essential that ad hoc machinery should also be devised for consulting 
the two southern provinces, and I should be glad if Governor-General would consider 
this point and telegraph his recommendations. 
1 See 51. 
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2. agree with criticism in paragraph 2 of your despatch: and I consider 
(paragraph 5 of Governor-General's despatch) that views collected should also be 
conveyed to the Egyptian Prime Minister. While it is difficult for us (paragraph 4 of 
your despatch) to dispute from here your conclusion that consultations with 
Sudanese should be deferred until there is a prospect of a favourable outcome of 
Egyptian negotiations, is there not something to be said for giving Sudanese 
politicians some local interest, in the form of proposed consultation, to distract their 
minds from less convenient activities such as present visits to Egypt? It is also 
perhaps for consideration (c.f. recent all-party resolution) whether Sudanese should 
not be given additional choice of "a self-governing Sudan in some form of association 
with Egypt, but not under the Egyptian Crown". 
57 FO 371153251, no 1634 13 Apr 1946 
[Sudanisation] : outward telegram no 65 from Sir R Campbell to Sir H 
Huddleston, commenting on J W Robertson's principles for 
Sudanisation 
[Bevin minuted on his copy, 'Action is needed immediately'.] 
Mr. Robertson has explained the principles on which Sudan Government plans for 
Sudanisation are based, namely:-1 
(I) promotion of Sudanese who are competent to take on more responsible jobs 
(such men are limited in number) and 
(2) building up of locally selected administration in the provinces (rather than 
imposition on the country of a Sudanese bureaucracy from towns) and eventual 
transformation of British administrative officials into advisers. 
2. I fully appreciate the wisdom of these principles. The main difficulty at present 
seems to be that they and the plans based on them are insufficiently known to the 
politically conscious Sudanese and that the pace is too mild to satisfy them. The 
latter are anxious to know just when they will be able to take over the administration 
of the country, and the present danger is that unless they are given an answer to 
their question which they consider reasonably satisfactory they may throw in their 
lot with the Egyptians simply in order to get rid of the British. For this reason it 
seems to me most necessary that the Sudan Government should reluctantly accept 
the certainty of a lowered standard of efficiency and at once proceed to work out a 
detached and bold plan of Sudanisation giving the stages in the year in which the 
process will operate. Such a plan no doubt will take a little time to prepare but I 
think it essential that an announcement should be made at once (to Adviserory [sic] 
Council next week) that the plan is in preparation and some indication given of its 
probable scope. 
3. I appreciate the desire that any plan should be based upon the principles 
referred to in paragraph 1 above. Neverhtless [sic] at the present critical moment 
with things moving so fast it seems to us at this end important that the plan should 
be made as impressive as possible and that it may be worth while taking certain risks 
1 See 49, enclosure. 
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as regards the efficiency and reaction of the British officials in order to hold the main 
position. If the interests of British political and other staff are prejudiced thereby it is 
essential that they should receive adequate guarantees from His Majesty's 
Government as regards future employment and pension. 
4. At the same time, I would recommend the appointment of an experienced 
publicity officer on the staff of the Public Relations Office whose business it would be 
to put out carefully prepared material to the Arabic Press about progress in 
Sudanisation already made, and plans for future and about general policy of the 
Sudan Government. 
58 FO 371153252, no 1743 17 Apr 1946 
[Future of the Sudan]: address delivered by Sir H Huddleston at the 
opening session of the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan 
[Extract] 
... Before we proceed to the Agenda with which this Council has been specifically 
called to deal I feel it is due to you that I should make reference to the Political 
situation. Some of your number have asked for an opportunity to be given you now 
for a formal debate on the future status of the Sudan. This request has been most 
carefully considered by me and by my advisers and I have decided that the time for a 
formal debate has not yet come. Both His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian 
Government have announced their readiness to discuss the revision of the Treaty and 
have appointed their representatives for the purpose but those representatives have 
only just assembled and preliminary conversations have only just begun. I assure you 
once again that the question of your future will not be decided without your advice. 
Since we last met the Condominium Governments have both endorsed my 
assurance. Egyptian Government spokesmen have said that the aspirations and 
hopes of the Sudanese will be considered in any settlement. The British Government, 
through their Secretary of State for Foreign Mfairs, Mr. Bevin, have categorically 
stated that they consider that no change should be made until the advice of the 
Sudanese has been sought through constitutional channels such as this Council. 
When the time comes, therefore, this Council will be summoned to give its views. 
I would, at this time, draw your attention to two other phrases in Mr. Bevin's 
speech.1 He referred to the objects of the Sudan Government as being to build up the 
organs of self-Government with the aim of eventual independence and to accelerate 
the transfer of responsible posts to Sudanese in consultation with Sudanese 
representatives. I wish to take this opportunity of declaring again that these are 
fundamental objects of the Sudan Government policy and to announce to you the 
following methods of attaining them more quickly, which I intend to put into 
practice at once. 
With regard to the former, I propose to call a conference forthwith, at the close of 
this session under the chairmanship of the Civil Secretary, to study the next steps in 
associating the Sudanese more closely with the Administration of their country. The 
1 See 54. 
142 THE ANGLQ-EGYPTIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SUDAN PROTOCOL [59] 
recommendations of this conference will be laid before you at your next session for 
full discussion and consideration. 
Secondly, as regards accelerated Sudanisation you will perhaps have noticed in the 
public press that I have set up a joint British and Sudanese Committee of Civil 
Servants to enquire into the present plans for Sudanisation and to make 
recommendations as to how they may be accelerated. I hope that this Committee will 
prepare a scheme in carefully defined stages, designed to show the expected progress 
of Sudanisation. This Committee or a similar body will remain in existence and meet 
at regular intervals to review progress. I have recently discussed the question with 
many Heads of Government Departments and have urged them to speed up the 
process without waiting for the Committee to submit their plans. 
I wish definitely to deny any suggestions that the Sudan Government is 
unsympathetic to Sudanese aspirations. The Government is aiming at a free 
independent Sudan which will be able as soon as that independence has been 
achieved to define for itself its relations with Great Britain and Egypt. There is much 
to be done; hard thinking and hard work lies ahead; but with good will and a 
cessation of political upheavals I see no reason why even in the short space of the 
next five years a great advance should not be made; and in the ensuing five when our 
educational developments have gained a further impetus, progress should be 
sufficiently rapid to satisfy everybody except our most extreme critics. 
I feel confident that in twenty years' time the Sudanese will be governing their 
own country assisted and advised by a certain number of non-Sudanese specialists 
and technicians. These dates, of course, are only estimates but when we meet again 
to discuss the views of the Conference which I have just announced to you, I hope 
that a more definite timetable can be given .... 
59 FO 371153391, no 1169 12 Apr 1946 
[Selection of governor-general]: letter from Sir R Campbell toR G 
Howe on the qualities needed in the next governor-general of the 
Sudan. Minutes by P S Scrivener and E A Chapman-Andrews 
Please refer to Foreign Office telegram No. 647 asking for the final views of the 
Governor General of the Sudan and myself about his successor. Sir E. Bridges has 
suggested the names of four soldiers from whom to choose Huddleston's successor. 
They are Generals Gammell, Scobie, Macready and Templer.1 Macready is the only 
1 Lt-Gen Sir James Gammell, chief of staff to supreme allied commander, Mediterranean Theatre, 1944; 
representative of British Chiefs of Staff with USSR and head of British Military Mission in Moscow, 1945; 
retired 1946. 
Lt-Gen Sir Ronald Scobie, general officer commanding (GOC), Torbruk fortress, 1941; GOC, Malta, 
1942; chief of general staff, Middle East, 1943; GOC, Greece, 1944-1946; retired 1947. 
Lt-Gen Sir Cordon Macready, chief of British Military Mission to Egyptian army, 1938; assistant chief of 
imperial general staff, 1940- 1942; chief of British Army Staff, Washington, 1942; retired 1946; served 
subsequently on Control Commission in Moscow. 
Lt-Gen Sir Gerard Tempter, served in Middle East in two world wars; director, Military Intelligence, War 
Office, 1946-1948; vice-chief of imperial general staff, 1948-1951; general officer commanding-in-chief, 
Eastern Command, 1950- 1952; high commissioner and director of operations, Malaya, 1952-1954; chief 
of imperial general staff, 1955-1958. 
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one I know but from what I hear of the others I myself would put them in the 
following order-Scobie, Templer, Macready, Gammell, bracketing Templer and 
Macready. The foregoing is on the assumption that a soldier is to be appointed and is 
not intended to exclude the possibilities of other soldiers being suggested as 
candidates. 
I had some discussion with Huddleston on April 13th. His views are as follows:-
The Governor General should be a comparatively young man nearer forty-five than 
fifty. He should be energetic and his job would be largely to spur the officials to 
progressive action and ideas. He considers this is more important than the 
possession of administrative experience or ability on the ground that the machine 
pretty well turns itself. He attaches great importance to a man who, from his 
contacts and position in the United Kingdom, could keep the Sudan "on the map" in 
high quarters in London. For this reason, therefore, the candidate in the Governor 
General's opinion must be sufficiently well known and repandu to have easy and 
natural access to and gain the ear of such circles. He doubts therefore that a run of 
the mill good Civil Servant or Colonial Office Governor would meet the case. He is 
not convinced that a soldier is required or is necessarily the best choice. He would 
exclude neither a sailor nor an airman nor a civilian. He thinks that among Foreign 
Service officers might be found the kind of man he is looking for.2 But he feels 
strongly that, in view of the importance of continuity, the candidate should be 
prepared to spend a long period and finish out his public career in the Sudan which 
means that he should not regard the post as a stepping stone, that he should be 
comparatively young (because he should not stay in the Sudan beyond sixty) and that 
he should have a sense of mission. 
Huddleston comments that the four above-mentioned soldiers are the suggestions 
of Sir E. Bridges3 and that the Military Secretary might have other names to suggest. 
But he is most anxious to avoid the risk of anyone being appointed mainly from the 
point of view of finding a post for a deserving officer. 
If Huddleston's criteria, which seem eminently sensible and even desirable, are 
accepted, names which occur to me from my limited acquaintance in the United 
Kingdom as worth considering are Ian Jacob4 or Roger Makins.5 But you will be able 
to think of many others, no doubt. 
I am sending a copy of this letter strictly personally to Huddleston. 
Minutes on 59 
The Governor General is, quite frankly, being a little exigeant. One would indeed need 
a 'sense of mission' to take this job on at the age of 45 with the prospect of remaining 
to age 60 (as opposed to entering the Sudan service at 22 with the prospect of a pen-
sion at 48) and, maybe, of being summarily displaced by a Sudanese! It would be 
2 Marginal note by Scrivener: 'Fancy that!' 3 Cabinet secretary, 1938-1946. 
4 Lt-Gen Sir Ian Jacob, served in Egypt, 1936- 1938; military assistant seceretary to War Cabinet, 
1939-1946; retired 1946; subsequently director-general of BBC, 1952-1960. 
5 Serving in the FO from 1928, Makins was an assistant under-secretary of state in 1947 and deputy under-
secretary of state, 1948- 1952. He was UK ambassador in Washington, 1952- 1956. 
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deceiving a candidate to suggest that he will have any 'mission' other than that of 
transferring power to Sudanese who are probably ill-developed to exercise them, with 
the added complication that British influence in Egypt will (in view of recent devel-
opments) tend to be a steadily diminishing factor. And, par desous [sic, dessus]le 
marche the candidate must be able to gain the ear of 'high quarters in London' what-
ever they may be. All in all, it strikes me that it is in political, rather [than] in service 
or civil service circles, that we must continue to search, that is if we are to continue 
it and not go for General Scobie, who is the favourite at the moment. But would Mr. 
Chapman-Andrews kindly say whether he knows of a suitable Foreign Service candi-
date, with an urge to leave diplomacy for 'Sudanisation'? 
P.S. 
27.4.46 
On the point whether a member of the Foreign Service can be made available for this 
post my feeling is that our own needs are so great at the present time that we cannot 
spare a really good man and nothing less would fill the bill. 6 • •• I must say I share the 
Governor-General's misgivings about having a soldier in this post at present. You 
want someone who can command the respect of the Sudanese, however, and who can 
goad the Sudan Political Service to more rapid progress towards Sudanisation .... 
6 Marginal note by Scrivener: 'I agree'. 
E.A.C.A. 
27.4.46 
60 FO 371153252, no 1824 22 Apr 1946 
[Future of the Sudan]: despatch no 546 from Sir R Campbell to Mr 
Bevin, relaying Sir H Huddleston's views on the treaty revision, 
consultation ofthe Sudanese, and Sudanisation 
With reference to my telegram No. 702, I have the honour to submit a record of my 
discussions with the Governor General of the Sudan at Wadi Halfa on April 13th. The 
record has been arranged to show the main subjects touched upon in the 
conversations. 
2. Treaty revision 
The Governor General said that the clause about the Sudan in the British draft of the 
new Treaty was ideal from the point of view of the Sudan Government. The Sudanese 
would, however, be disappointed because it contained no provision for consultation 
of them. It was true that your statement in the House of Commons, 1 that the 
Sudanese would be consulted before there was any change in their status, implied 
that if, as was suggested in the British draft Treaty, there was to be no change in the 
status of the Sudan, then there was no need for consultation. The Sudanese mind 
was however not logical enough to appreciate this point. 
3. This led to a discussion of the best means by which any consultation of the 
Sudanese should be carried out. The Governor General admitted that any enquiry by 
the Sudan Government alone would be suspect to the Egyptians and he said that the 
1 See 54. 
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Sudan Government would not object to an enquiry by a Commission from outside 
the Sudan, perhaps something on the lines of the Mandatory Commission which 
visited Iraq and which consisted of Lord Lugard, a Belgian, a Turk and one other 
member. Such a Commission would not be able to do its job inside three months and 
for climatic reasons it would be best for it to wait until October. Sir H. Huddleston 
thought that in general the Sudanese would be content if they had free access to the 
Commission when it came. 
4. I said that the Egyptians would probably agree that consultation must 
necessarily take time but they would want an Egyptian member on the Commission. 
The Governor General did not demur. 
5. The Governor General said that, in his view, Sidky Pasha was not really 
interested in the Sudan problem which, in all cases, was brought forward for political 
purposes by the opposition. Egypt's prime interest in the Sudan was in the Nile 
Waters, and from this point of view the present arrangement suited them well, since 
without the internal security provided by the Sudan Government the Egyptians 
would be unable to work their water schemes in the Sudan. The Governor General 
agreed that we must do what we could to help the Egyptian Government to reach an 
acceptable solution over the Sudan. 
6. It was agreed that the procedure for consultation would have to be worked out 
in concert with the Egyptian Government. 
7. I then put the case for accelerated Sudanisation as explained in my telegrams 
Nos. 652 to Khartoum and 662 to you. 
The Governor General recognised the force of these arguments, but dwelt at some 
length on the practical difficulties of Sudanisation at the higher levels, which were as 
follows:-
( a) There existed Sudanese who could "hold down" responsible jobs, but in 
present circumstances this was not enough; the Sudan Government had just 
embarked on an important development scheme and there were few or no 
Sudanese capable of carrying out the additional functions which this demanded, 
including the training of junior officials for the expansion involved in the 
Government's activities. 
(b) Putting in Sudanese who were not up to the job of development would mean 
throwing more work on the already overworked British staff. In fact, the Sudan 
Government's development schemes had been based on the assumption that it 
would be necessary to increase the British staff. These schemes would be 
proportionately held up by Sudanisation. 
(c) As the Sudan Government had already pointed out, drastic Sudanisation would 
undermine the faith of the British personnel. The effect on them of appointments 
made for political reasons and not on grounds of efficiency would be serious, in 
fact they would be like the effects of the same policy if applied to the Foreign 
Service, as was emphasized by Mr. McNeil in his speech in the recent debate on the 
Foreign Service.3 
(d) Moreover, as already pointed out, the Sudan Government did not want to 
create a Sudanese bureaucracy, but wished to proceed more slowly by 
strengthening the local authorities. 
2 See 57. 3 Marginal note by Bevin: 'Rot'. 
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(e) Another point already made by the Sudan Government was that to promote 
the good young Sudanese officials, who certainly existed, over the heads of more 
senior Sudanese, would do more harm than good and would create widespread 
grievances among the section of the population now most attached to the Sudan 
Government. 
(f) Another point which might not be appreciated was that the Sudan Government 
were under a great disadvantage in so far as all enterprise in the Sudan is run or 
sponsored by the Government. The Sudanese tended to grumble, seeing the vast 
budget of the Sudan Government and the large number of foreign experts 
employed. What they did not appreciate was that, owing to this arrangement, they 
had been saved from the very much worse evil of foreign concession-hunters. 
(g) Another serious difficulty was the educational one. The Sudanese were most 
interested in what would be done in the next five years. This was however just the 
most difficult period during which the Sudan Government would be shortest of 
teachers. The training of teachers was a long business and education was a field in 
which it was supremely difficult to meet suddenly increased demands. The Sudan 
Government's teachers' training college at Bakht er Ruda had in fact only been 
started in 1930. The Sudan was suffering now from the errors of the educational 
policy of the 1920s, when higher education had been at a discount owing to the 
fear of creating a number of "failed B.As.". Moreover, it was most desirable that 
Sudanese destined for responsible positions should do a course of study in the 
United Kingdom, but for this it was necessary to reach a high educational level 
first. Another serious limiting factor was the need to learn classical Arabic. The 
Sudan Government had however a large educational programme on hand. 
8. Generally speaking, the Governor General felt that the Sudan Government 
had gone as quickly as possible. Three Sudanese members had recently been taken 
on to the Sudan Government's Sudanisation Committee. The trouble was that the 
Sudan Government's measures were unspectacular and that no committee could 
produce results at once. 
9. I took note of these points, but urged that the Sudan Government would, all 
the same, be able to come out very soon with a phased programme of Sudanisation. 
10. The Governor General said that he hoped the Sudanese Delegation in Cairo 
would soon be split by its internal feuds.4 The Delegation was already ceasing to be 
news in the Sudan. I emphasised how important it was in my view to cut the ground 
from under their feet by showing, through Sudanisation and by other means, that 
the Sudan Government really was in a hurry to bring the Sudan to the point of self-
government. The Governor General expressed the view of the Sudan Government 
that serious and moderate educated opinion in the Sudan would not be impressed by 
the Delegation. The Delegation themselves would never be satisfied by any proposals 
which the Sudan Government could introduce. The point was to carry moderate 
educated opinion with the Government. 
11. I am very grateful to Sir H. Huddleston, to whom I am sending a copy of this 
despatch, for having made possible this most valuable exchange of views. 
4 A Sudanese United Front delegation, led by Ismail al-Azhari, was then in Cairo meeting with various 
Egyptian politicians. It had issued two declarations insisting on the right of the Sudanese to be 
represented at the treaty negotiations, the second qualifying the first after adverse reaction in Egypt (see 
despatch no 533 from Campbell to Bevin, 18 Apr 1946, FO 371/53252, no 1816). 
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61 FO 371153252, no 17 43 23 Apr 1946 
[Political situation in the Sudan]: circular letter by J W Robertson to 
all governors and heads of departments 
The political situation seems to have eased a little as far as can be judged. This is due 
to two things:-
( a) His Excellency's declaration to the Advisory Council on 17.4.46 with its 
estimated date for self-Government, and its expressed aim of eventual 
independence. 
(b) The realisation by the United Parties deputation in Cairo that the Egyptians do 
not wish to give the Sudanese self-Government or independence. 
The pressure put upon them by the Egyptians to withdraw their declaration of 
Sudanese aims has shewn the Egyptians in their true light.1 A number of the 
deputation have returned to the Sudan, and it may well be that most of them will 
turn to the Sudan Government, and try to co-operate with us in hope of accelerating 
the period quoted in His Excellency's speech. 
His Excellency stated that the joint Committee set up to enquire into the 
Sudanisation programme would be required to produce detailed plans in defined 
stages and His-Excellency has also called a conference to enquire into methods of 
associating the Sudanese more closely in the Government of their country. The 
conference is a representative one, and includes British Officials, Members of the 
Advisory Council, other leading Sudanese officials and non-officials, and 
representatives of the Congress and the Political parties. 
The first meeting will take place on Wednesday April 24th. under my 
Chairmanship. I have heard no reports yet of how this conference has been greeted 
by Sudanese opinion generally, but members of the Advisory Council seemed to 
welcome the proposal. I imagine we shall deal with the following:-
(a) the future development of the Advisory Council-its powers and size, 
representation, elections etc., 
(b) similarly with Province Councils, 
(c) the composition of central Government Boards and committees, 
(d) the establishment of consultative and advisory boards, representing the staff in 
departments. 
The Sudan Government has had its well-established Sudanisation policy and the 
British Government has in the past supported the aims and intentions of this policy 
and its proposed pace. Recently, however, the Cairo Embassy and Foreign Office have 
pressed the Sudan Government strongly to accelerate the process, chiefly on the 
grounds that too much insistence on Western standards and high performance 
would drive the Sudanese intelligentsia towards Egypt, and that unless a much more 
rapid pace was adopted, it would be impossible to keep out Egyptian officials and 
influence. His Excellency has now received an assurance from the Foreign Office that 
1 See 60, note 4. By 20 April the delegation had split over the issue of Sudan's independence from Egypt 
and the appropriate response to be made to Huddleston's address to the Advisory Council (see 58) (inward 
telegram no 186 (saving) from Campbell to FO, 12 May 1946, FO 371153252, no 2176) . 
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in implementing a bold policy of Sudanisation, he is carrying out the wishes of His 
Majesty's Government. You should make this known confidentially to British 
officials, who may seem worried by the present policy of Sudanisation. 
In all this political hotch-potch the position of the South has not yet been defined, 
and it is probable that some statement of the Sudan Government's views on the 
future of the South will have to be given soon. The policy on which we have been 
working, and which has the approval of the British Government is as follows:-
"Our obvious duty is to push ahead as fast as we can with their (i.e. the 
Southern Sudanese) economic and educational development on African and 
Negroid lines, and not upon the Middle Eastern and Arab lines of progress 
which are suitable for the northern Sudan. It is only by economic and 
educational development that these people can be equipped to stand up for 
themselves in the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the 
Northern Sudan or with East Africa (or partly with each). In the former event 
they would have to resist as a large progressive and cohesive minority the still 
instinctively predatory attitude of the more sophisticated Arab north, and in 
the latter they would have great strides to take to catch up with the more 
rapidly advancing territories of East Africa."2 
To me the South seems daily to become more tied up economically and socially with 
the North. More Southerners are coming North, and more Northerners are taking an 
interest in the South. We have also the nationalistic feeling of the Northern 
Sudanese to cope with. So the solution of this problem will be no easy one. 
2 This was a restatement of the 1930 Southern Policy, issued by J W Robertson in an internal despatch on 
4Aug 1945. 
62 FO 371153371, no 1658 30 Apr 1946 
[Nile Waters: Lake Albert dam]: letter (reply) from PS Scrivener to A 
B Cohen (CO), drawing attention to international treaty obligations 
regarding the possible construction of a dam in Uganda 
Thank you for your letter No. 40146/46 of the 9th April transmitting a copy of a 
saving telegram dated the 27th March from the Governor of Uganda concerning the 
Lake Albert Reservoir scheme.1 
While we fully appreciate the Governor's reasons for opposing the construction of 
a dam in or near the Protectorate, we consider, and hope you will agree, that the 
international aspect of this problem makes it quite impossible for us to present a flat 
non-possumus to the Egyptian Government. For the last quarter of a century the 
construction of at least a major work at Lake Albert has been a more or less accepted 
plan. Moreover we would point out that paragraph 4 (v) of the Nile Waters Agreement 
of 1929 (Treaty series No. 17 (1929) q.v.) provides that, "His Majesty's Government in 
the United Kingdom shall use their good offices so that the carrying out of surveys, 
measurements, studies and works of the nature mentioned in the two preceding 
1 See 55. 
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paragraphs is facilitated by the Governments of these regions under British-
influence". Again in regard to the Governor's point (d), paragraph 4(ii) of the 
agreement makes "irrigation or power works or measures" on the Nile or on the 
lakes from which it flows expressly subject to the "previous agreement of the 
Egyptian Government". In fact it looks as if the Governor had ignored the agreement 
altogether. 
But this is not to maintain that the Governor's objections are not of sufficient 
validity to make some modification of the present scheme essential and we consider 
in the circumstances that His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo should inform the 
Egyptian Government officially that a scheme at Lake Albert in the scale at present 
contemplated raises internal political, social and economic issues of a very serious 
order for the Government of Uganda, who as we anticipated are unable to take a final 
decision on the questions propounded by the Egyptian Government without further 
information and detailed discussions. His Majesty's Government suggest, therefore, 
that a conference attended by representatives of Egypt, the Sudan, Uganda and the 
Belgian Congo should be convened as soon as possible, and that all the relevant data 
should be prepared for submission to this conference. 
May we have your views urgently on this proposal? 
I am sending copies of the correspondence, unofficially at this stage, to the 
Embassy in Cairo. 
63 FO 371153371, no 2170 15 May 1946 
[Nile waters: Lake Albert dam]: letter (reply) from AB Cohen toPS 
Scrivener on the need to obtain further data on the area under 
consideration for the proposed dam site 
Please refer to correspondence ending with my letter of the 3rd May about the Lake 
Albert scheme. 
The Governor of Uganda has now replied to our telegram No. 1481 of which a copy 
was sent to you. It is clear that he is very much concerned about the project which, 
he feels, overlooks the interests of the people of Uganda, which we are of course 
under solemn obligations to protect. He does not dissent from the view that, from 
the point of view of tactics, the Egyptian Government should not be met with a blank 
refusal but he is very much opposed to a conference in the near future. 
There are a number of points which require to be weighed. In the first place, as 
MacGregor pointed out in his memorandum (a copy of which was enclosed with your 
letter of the 13th November to Footman2), it is hardly reasonable to expect the 
Uganda Government to consider the proposal until the Egyptian Government have 
advanced their ideas in a more definite form to enable all the implications of the 
project to be examined. Moreover there does not exist even a remotely accurate 
survey from which the limits of the area likely to be inundated could he gauged. In 
the absence of statistical data it is quite impossible to make any reliable estimate of 
1 In which the contents of 62 were summarised. 
2 C W F Footman, Colonial Service, East Africa, from 1930; seconded to EAG conference, 1942; to CO, 
1943. 
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the probable effects, (social, economical, hydrological and climatic) of the proposed 
inundation. In short the whole scheme needs consideration by an expert in 
hydrology and irrigation and the Government of Uganda would be at a very serious 
disadvantage if it were asked to partake in a conference without expert guidance. 
The Uganda Government is indeed in no position as yet to take part in a 
conference such as has been suggested and the Governor thinks it essential that this 
should be deferred, so that he may have time to collect essential data and to obtain 
the expert advice. In our view his request is a reasonable one and, bearing in mind 
the issues at stake for Uganda, we do feel that the Uganda Government should have 
adequate time and facilities to examine the whole question. 
The Governor has suggested that the Egyptian Government should be informed 
that if they will set out their project in more definite form on the lines suggested 
above, the Uganda Government will forthwith examine the project from the point of 
view of the possibility of devising measures to safeguard local interests (vide article 
(iv) of the 1929 Agreement). For this purpose it will be necessary to assemble special 
technical staff and for the project to be studied in all its aspects. He further suggests 
that when this preliminary study has been completed and the economic, social and 
hydrological data collected a technical commission consisting of representatives of 
Egypt, the Sudan, Belgian Congo and Uganda (and possibly also Kenya and 
Tanganyika) should be appointed to report on the project. 
It is clear that the Governor has given a great deal of thought and attention to the 
matter. He has personally visited some of the area likely to be affected and we feel 
that his suggestions and warnings should be heeded. Accordingly we must strongly 
support the Governor's views and express the hope that any communication which it 
may now be proposed to make to the Egyptian Government may be couched on the 
lines which he has suggested. We are the more strongly in favour of this view because 
we feel that if consideration of the project can be deferred for a period it will be 
possible for the Governor to obtain the expert advice without which it is virtually 
impossible to see where a scheme of this magnitude is leading. 
Perhaps it might be useful if we could have a word about this either by telephone, 
or Footman or I could come over and see you. 
64 PREM 8/1388/1 July 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations, position on 4th July 1946': note 
by Lord Stansgate to Mr Attlee. Appendix 'C' [Extract] 
Minutes by T L Rowan1 and Attlee 
[By June 5 it was decided to deal with the Sudan in a separate protocol, as this wish of the 
Egyptian government also coincided with the desires of HMG (CP(46)219, 5 June 1946, 
'Revision of Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Memorandum by the Secretary of state for foreign 
affairs'). Discussions of a preliminary draft of the protocol were held between Campbell 
and Sidqi (inward telegram no 1121 from Campbell to FO, 20 June 1946, PREM 
8/1388/1) . Stansgate left this note with Attlee prior to his return to Egypt to resume 
negotiations.] 
1 One ofthe Attlee's private secretaries. 
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It may be useful before leaving to resume the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations to 
review the position on the main points outstanding .. .. 
(c) The Sudan 
In a draft Protocol on the Sudan, which we have communicated to the Egyptian 
Delegation, we have proposed to set up a Joint Anglo-Egyptian Commission to make 
recommendations on the future of Sudan in full consultation with the Sudanese 
peoples, and we have stated as basic principles of our policy that we intend to aim at 
self government for the Sudanese and to let them decide, when they reach this stage, 
on their relationship with Egypt. This theoretically is a reasonably unassailable 
position, but in view of the strength of feeling on the subject of Egyptian sovereignty 
which has not only always manifested itself in previous Treaty negotiations but is 
known to exist today, it is doubtful if we can hope to secure the acceptance of our 
proposals without considerable difficulty .... 
Appendix 'C' to 64 
... In past Treaty negotiations with the Egyptians, the question of sovereignty over 
the Sudan has always been a thorny one. The Egyptians have always claimed sole 
sovereignty; we have never admitted it. No agreement on the point has ever been 
reached; the best we have ever been able to do is to agree to shelve the issue. In the 
1930 negotiations for example which broke down on the Sudan question, it is 
noteworthy that a direct claim by Mr. Henderson2 to joint sovereignty provoked the 
'loudest protestations to date' from the Egyptians and that, in winding up the 
negotiations, Nahas Pasha said 'The Sudan was sacred to Egypt and Egypt was 
sovereign there'. 
On the other hand, in modern conditions, our policy of insisting that the Sudanese 
peoples themselves must determine their relationship with Egypt, including the 
question of sovereignty, seems quite unassailable and this, combined with the fact 
that Sidky Pasha seems genuinely anxious to conclude a Treaty, may enable us to get 
round this awkward question once more with a protocol on the lines of our own 
draft. Sidky's willingness to postpone a direct conflict on the issue may be indicated 
by his recent suggestion to H.M. Minister that, in place of a Joint Commission, a 
purely Egyptian fact finding commission should visit the Sudan in the first instance. 
This is a suggestion to which we presumably cannot agree. 
There is a possibility, however, that the pressure of public opinion may make it 
impossible for the Egyptians to conclude a Treaty of Alliance with us without, at the 
same time, negotiating a settlement of the Sudan question satisfactory to 
themselves. In other words we may have to choose between receding on the Sudan 
issue or not having a Treaty of Alliance. This however can only be faced when the 
time comes.3 
2 A Henderson (Lab), S of S for foreign affairs, 1929-1931. 
3 The last two sentences are marked in the margin by a blue pencilled 'X'. 
152 THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SUDAN PROTOCOL [65] 
Minutes on 64 
P.M. 
This is no doubt a very obvious point, but the phrasing of the last sentences of the 
Appendix on the Sudan is very loose. Is not the position that if there is a breakdown, 
then the existing treaty continues. One knows all the objections to this, but the 
passage now reads as though we have no alternative open if the Egyptians wish to 
force us into doing what we consider wrong about the Sudan. But as I see it we have 
an alternative-though perhaps not a very happy one. 
Yes literally, but practically the alternative is no use. 
T.L.R. 
[nd] 
C.R.A. 
5.7.46. 
65 PREM 8/1388/1 23 July 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: inward 
telegram no 33 from Lord Stansgate to Mr Attlee, 1 reporting Sidqi 
Pasha's initial reaction to the British draft of the Sudan protocol 
[Extract] 
[Prior to leaving London it had been agreed that Stansgate would leave discussion of the 
Sudan protocol until after agreement had been reached on the treaty articles and the 
evacuation protocol. On resumption of talks the Egyptian delegation presented its own 
draft of the protocol but agreed to leave it for later discussion (inward telegram no 1 from 
Stansgate to Attlee, 10 July 1946, PREM 8/1388/1).] 
.. . 7. The Sudanese protocol. We then passed to a consideration of a Sudanese 
protocol which Lufti [sicl2 had clearly been determined to raise. I suggested that 
assuming that it were agreed that negotiations should take place surely a short 
statement to this effect would satisfy all parties. They said they had waited long for 
our comment on their draft. We said we had not yet had your final instructions but 
we could say at once as the Ambassador had already explained to Sidki Pasha that 
reference to Egyptian sovereignty presented serious difficulty. Lufti [sic] and Sidki 
Pasha then went into a long explanation of Egyptian thesis that there could be no 
doubt whatever regarding the sovereignty of the Egyptian Crown over the Sudan. 
This they said they could document with papers knee deep. When asked what they 
meant by consulting the Sudanese they said that they had no desire to make any 
profit out of Sudan, in fact Egypt had already spent vastly in money and treasure on 
the Sudan. All they wanted to do was to find out how the Sudan wished 
administration to be carried out and what were in fact the practical steps which 
would be taken to accelerate their progress. There could however be no question 
whatever of asking the Sudanese their opinion on question of sovereignty which was 
1 Bevin was then in Paris attendiHg the peace conference, and was kept informed about the progress of 
negotiations through the FO. 
2 Ahmad Lufti al-sayyid, Egyptian foreign minister. 
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[gp. undec: ?in fact] already in the King's, i.e. King of Darfour Senaar and Kordofan 
[?gp. omitted]. We suggested that from everyone's point of view it seemed advisable 
not to raise this question specifically but leave it as it had been left. They said that 
there was only one basis on which they could carry on negotiations and that was the 
basis of fact as they saw it. There would be no difference in the actual situation. We 
should continue to administer the country. They both emphasised the embarrassing 
position they would be in, if they had to tell their colleagues that no agreement had 
yet been reached on a protocol dealing with the Sudan. They emphasised that from 
their point of view the points of importance in the treaty were evacuation of troops 
and unity of the Nile Valley. I asked Lufti [sic] what precisely was meant by unity of 
the Nile Valley and he replied Egyptian sovereignty of course. 
8. Conclusion . ... The question of the Sudan ... is largely a question of national 
emotion and amour propre; further complicated by personal desires of the King. This 
is the first time that this problem has been seriously discussed and it is difficult to 
estimate the chances of the Egyptians agreeing to a compromise. Whatever these 
chances are they are at the moment unfortunately prejudiced by general 
despondency and diminution of goodwill which has resulted from the line we have 
taken on other main treaty issues. 
9. The very firm stand we have taken upset Sidki Pasha and Lufti [sic] who 
described it as a serious step backward in the negotiations. Sidki Pasha is seeing his 
delegation on Saturday and his account to them of this interview may precipitate a 
critical situation. It is therefore urgently necessary that we should at the earliest 
possible moment decide what line we intend to pursue .... We recommend therefore 
that we should be authorised:- ... 
(c) to endeavour to obtain Egyptian agreement to our Sudan protocol. We fully 
realise that His Majesty's Government cannot agree to the present Egyptian 
demands regarding the Sudan as set out in their protocol. . . . 
66 PREM 8/1388/1, CM 76(46)7 1 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan Protocol] : Cabinet 
decision to resist Egyptian claims to sovereignty over the Sudan 
[Extract] 
The Cabinet were informed that .. . the Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that a firm 
stand should be made on the question of the Sudan. 
The Prime Minister ... agreed that a firm stand should be made with regard to the 
Sudan. It would, of course, be open to the Egyptian Government to make a unilateral 
declaration on this matter, but we should resist the inclusion in the protocol of any 
words admitting the sovereignty of the Egyptian Crown over the Sudan .... 
The Cabinet:-
Agreed that the British Delegation ... should resist the inclusion in the Sudan 
protocol of any provision implying recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over the 
Sudan. 
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67 FO 37115325, no 3385 1 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: inward 
telegram no 43 from Lord Stansgate to Mr Attlee, listing options for 
resolving the issue of Egyptian claims to sovereignty over the Sudan 
As you know question of the Sudan protocol is now being pressed by the Egyptians 
and the issue must be faced that in the near future even if we reach a satisfactory 
compromise on other points in the dispute on the Treaty and on the evacuation 
protocol it will probably reach a major obstacle to the completion of our task. 
2. The objects we are seeking to secure in the Sudan as defined by the Foreign 
Secretary in his statement on March 21st [sic 26thF are, firstly true welfare of Sudan 
which we have always insisted can only be secured by maintaining the existing stable 
and [grp. undec.] administration; and secondly gradual build up towards eventual 
self government. We are also pledged to agree to no change in status of the Sudan as 
a result of these negotiations until the Sudanese have been consulted through 
constitutional channels. 
3. This position is entirely in line with the letter of United Nations Charter and 
the Egyptians would find it difficult to justify before the world a rupture of the Treaty 
negotiations by contesting it. 
4. The major difficulty will I think arise on their claim to specifically recognise 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, a claim which they have sustained through all 
past treaty negotiations and which the present delegation is publicly and by the 
terms of the Senate resolution committed to sustain in the present negotiations. 
5. The Prime Minister in a recent conversation with the Ambassador after a long 
discourse on sovereignty was prepared to admit that Egypt is not qualified for and 
does not wish for a larger share in the government of the Sudan. He said too that 
they have no wish to draw profit from the country. But he and his delegation do press 
with extreme fervour and conviction for recognition of Egyptian sovereignty even 
though such recognition would, they say, in no way affect the present position. The 
King is of course behind the delegation in their claim and it is not one on which he 
would welcome a compromise. 
6. I can conceive a situation arising therefore in which the Egyptians would 
agree to our basic principles as stated in paragraph 2 and to the appointment of 
commission which we have suggested as the best machinery for consulting the 
Sudanese themselves but would break on the sole question of recognition of the 
sovereignty. They might, even though they would do it most reluctantly, and I 
personally think it doubtful (see my telegram No. 39), admit that the Sudan should 
have an ultimate right of secession. Vital issue would then be confined to recognition 
of Egyptian sovereignty in the interim period until the Sudanese are able to decide. 
7. The difficulties about the unqualifi ed recognition of Egyptian sovereignty 
are:-
(a) It prejudices an issue which ought to be decided ultimately by the Sudanese 
themselves: 
1 See 54. 
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(b) This fact would be seized on by the Sudanese and almost certainly cause 
trouble in the Sudan. It would undoubtedly be strongly resented by all the UMMA 
party whose avowed aim is to establish an independent Sudan which will then 
herself decide on her relationship with Egypt and Great Britain. It would probably 
also be resented by some of the Ashigga party, who are not entirely satisfied with 
the whole hog Egyptian policy of their leaders. The rest of the Ashigga would no 
doubt accept recognition of Egyptian sovereignty which has already been publicly 
affirmed by Azhari since UMMA party broke away from the Delegation. Their 
reason for accepting is probably that they hope it will provide them with a lever for 
getting us out of the Sudan. 
(c) It might be regarded by the Sudanese as an indication of declining British 
influence and would therefore increase the difficulties of administration. 
(d) In spite of assurances in paragraph 5 of the above it might well prove to be the 
thin edge of the wedge for attempts by Egyptians to increase their influence in and 
their share in the administration of the Sudan. 
(e) It would be difficult to defend at home. 
On the other hand it must be admitted we have not since 1922 publicly recognised 
Egypt's sovereignty. There is considerable legal and historical justification for the 
Egyptian claim which juridically might be awkward if the issue were referred to 
U.N.O. 
8. There seem to be only three solutions:-
(a) A protocol on the lines of our existing draft i.e. agreement set [grp. undec.] in 
your telegram and meanwhile to maintain existing arrangements based on Article 
11 of 1936 Treaty. 
(b) A simple deferment of the issue by agreeing to enter on subsequent 
negotiations at an unspecified date and meanwhile to maintain the existing 
arrangements. Such a bare agreement to shelve the issue would no doubt 
disappoint the Sudanese who are expecting the Treaty to include some indication 
of their advancement [grp. undec.] self-government or at least a re-affirmation of 
our intention to consult them about their future. 
If this position emerged therefore it would no doubt be necessary for the Sudan 
Government to give assurances that there was no intention of delaying the 
withdrawing of machinery recently set up for Sudanisation and the association of 
Sudanese with the administration. 
In either of these solutions the question of sovereignty would remain as dealt with 
in Article 11 of 1936 Treaty, i.e. the agreement would be without prejudice to the 
question of sovereignty "and on (sic ? in) the present form this will not satisfy Egypt. 
(c) The incorporation into either (a) or (b) above of some gesture in the direction 
of Egypt's sovereignty. If Egyptian delegation as is possible are determined to 
break on this question it will be necessary to decide whether we can in the last 
resort agree to any compromise. 
You will no doubt wish to consult the Governor-General on this point and I hesitate 
to make any suggestions. I wonder, however, whether the Governor-General would 
regard the position of the Sudan Government as compromised if we accepted some 
such phraseology as "pending the adoption of any new arrangements resulting from 
156 THE ANGLo-EGYPTIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SUDAN PROTOCOL [68] 
a commission or resulting from subsequent negotiations (as the case may be) 
Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan as at present existing remains unimpaired". 
9. I will telegraph further as Sudan question develops in more detail. 
It may be useful to you, however, to have this advance summary of the position. 
68 PREM 8/1388/1 2 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: inward 
telegram no 44 from Lord Stansgate to Mr Attlee, on the Egyptian 
counter-proposals concerning the Sudan 
Egyptian note delivered yesterday and sent to you by last night's air bag. 
I do not propose to comment on the note of the Egyptian delegation which in its 
recapitulation presents various points of the negotiations in an unobjective manner 
and lends itself to justifiable criticism. I propose to limit myself to what appears to 
me the essential features of the position created by this note. 
2. If His Majesty's Government are not prepared to accept Article 2 of the 
Egyptian draft treaty unmodified and to compromise on the period of evacuation it is 
clear from the note that there is no possibility at present of continuing the 
negotiations. 
3. If His Majesty's Government are prepared to accept Article 2 of the Egyptian 
draft treaty and to compromise on the period of evacuation we think it should be 
possible to continue the negotiations on that basis and on the basis of a clarification 
of the Egyptian delegation's claims as detailed in its note. The claim for Egyptian 
sovereignty is strongest for it might be difficult to convince international opinion 
and any international juridical body that the Sudan was not under Egyptian 
sovereignty. 
4. However the delegation's note goes beyond the claim of sovereignty. The 
penultimate paragraph on page 6 states that Egypt has "all the rights without any 
exception" on the Sudan. The second paragraph on page 7 refuses to admit our right 
to invoke interests of Sudanese to contest "Unity of the Nile Valley". The following 
paragraph states that it is in the interests of the Sudan to "be part of an organised 
state" i.e. Egypt. The following paragraph claims that Egypt is the country to which 
the Sudan must attach themselves since it offers them the advantages of a state 
having a "modern administrative organisation". These passages would be taken by 
any honest unsophisticated reader to suggest that the Sudan must be not only under 
sovereignty of Egypt but also part of administrative machine of Egypt and that the 
Sudanese have no right to object to this administrative unity. 
5. No doubt once we began to discuss these claims Egyptian negotiators would 
try to attenuate these implications and perhaps suggest the administrative role of 
Egypt would be allowed to develop (? gp. omitted) local self-government. It would 
appear from the note however that this is not the real objective of the Egyptians, for 
they then propose to substitute Egyptian domination for British control in order to 
preclude the eventuality of an independent Sudan which they regard as dangerous to 
Egyptian interests particularly in the matter of water and (gp. undec. ? irrigation). 
Anyhow the phraseology used in this note would seem clearly to deny the Sudan the 
right of secession and all independence. It would be to our interest in our discussions 
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with the Egyptian delegation to put them into the position of denying the right of 
self-determination to the Sudan as, in the event of a breakdown of negotiations, we 
would be on the best possible wicket before international opinion and before United 
Nations Organisation. 
6. The possibility need not be excluded that these discussions might lead the 
Egyptians to accept some face-saving formula regarding sovereignty in view of 
the fact that they had got their way as regards Article 2 and the evacuation. However 
the influence of King Farouk who is particularly keen on this sovereignty issue will 
no doubt make it difficult for Egyptian negotiators to agree to a formula which would 
not compromise our present administrative position in the Sudan. 
7. You will no doubt think it necessary to consult the Governor General 
regarding the views which I have expressed in this telegram. 
8. Sidki Pasha has gone to his country estate and returns to Alexandria on 
Monday. I have told him and the press that the Egyptian note has been forwarded to 
you. I would be grateful for earliest direction as to what line I am now to take. 
69 PREM 8/1388/1 4 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: outward 
telegram no 30 (reply) from Mr Attlee to Lord Stansgate [Extract] 
... We seem to be placed in the position, that, unless we give way on all points to the 
Egyptians, we get no Treaty. His Majesty's Government cannot conscientiously give 
way all round. They consider that Sidky should be faced bluntly with the outstanding 
feature of these negotiations, namely, the fact that since they started we have met the 
Egyptians on practically every issue they have raised, whereas their own response to 
our requests has been both slight and grudging .... 
6. On the question of the Sudan the Cabinet stands absolutely firm. His Majesty's 
Government cannot compromise on this. Nor can I see anything in your No. 441 
received since the Cabinet met which adduces any new argument in support of the 
Egyptian demand. The Egyptian Government can of course make a unilateral 
declaration on this matter; but we can accept no form of words in the protocol which 
admit the sovereignty of the Egyptian Crown. 
1 See 68. 
70 FO 371153254, no 3385 10 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: outward 
telegram no 43 (reply) from Mr Attlee to Lord Stansgate, on the legal 
issue of sovereignty 
I am most grateful for the review of the Sudan problem in your telegram No. 43. It is 
clear from your telegram No. 441 and from Egyptian note that the comparative 
caution displayed by Sidky Pasha over this issue (paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 
1 See 68. 
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39) is not shared by the Delegation, whose extravagances, now that they have 
apparently leaked out (your telegram No. 45) may nevertheless produce a useful 
reaction in the Sudan itself. I do not like the formula suggested in the last sentence 
of paragraph 8 of your telegram No. 432 and my view is confirmed by the Legal 
Adviser. 
2. The answer to the Egyptian thesis on sovereignty is given briefly in the 
Foreign Office minutes of which a copy was taken by you to Egypt, but a slight 
elaboration may be useful to you:-
(1) The question of sovereignty in relation to the Sudan is legal and theoretical. 
Differences of opinion on questions of sovereignty in unusual cases do not usually 
turn on the actual position of the territory in question, but on what the criteria of 
sovereignty are. Though sovereignty is an every-day term in international law, 
international lawyers seldom agree exactly on the definition of sovereignty itself. In 
particular there is a School A which regards the sovereign as being the owner of the 
ultimate title as opposed to the owner of the immediate rights of administration and 
a School B which holds that the sovereign is the person internationally responsible 
at the moment. Thus in the case of a leased territory, some lawyers hold that the 
sovereign is the lessor, and others that he is the lessee; yet there is no difference as to 
the actual position of the leased territory. In the case of the Sudan School B holds 
that the sovereignty is divided because the administration is divided. On the view of 
School A the position is more complicated and depends on 
(a) Whether Egypt ever lost sovereignty over the Sudan before 1890 and 
(b) If so whether the re-conquest is to be regarded as an operation to re-establish 
Egyptian sovereignty or to establish a new position of joint sovereignty. 
(2) In the treaty under negotiation, the United Kingdom are not concerned in 
theoretical questions, and refuse to commit themselves to any statement in the 
treaty about sovereignty over the Sudan which would inevitably be misunderstood 
and create more political difficulties than it would solve. 
(3) Consequently they are not prepared to do more than in 1936 viz. to say that 
nothing in the new treaty prejudices the question of sovereignty; a formula which, so 
far as the United Kingdom is concerned, neither admits nor denies Egyptian 
sovereignty and enables the Egyptians if they so desire, to say outside the treaty that 
they consider themselves the sovereigns. 
(4) Our task is to deal with practical matters viz. what should be put in the treaty 
about the future of the Sudan, a matter of practical interest to the Sudan as well as to 
the United Kingdom and Egypt. We stand by our policy that the governing factors 
must be 
(a) the interests of the Sudanese and 
(b) the wishes of the Sudanese, 
and are proposing machinery for ascertaining what are the wishes, and perhaps also 
the interests, of the Sudanese, with a view to forming a basis on which the interests 
of the Sudanese shall ultimately be decided. 
3. Finally I might restate the last paragraph of CP(46)17 of January 18th:-3 
2 See 67. 3 See 47. 
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"His Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that any discussion of the 
modification of Article 11 of the 1936 treaty should be postponed until the 
Sudanese have been consulted and have made known their own wishes. The 
procedure by which this consultation can best take place is being examined by 
the Governor General, who will be available to discuss it with the Egyptian 
Government if required. But His Majesty's Government again wish to 
emphasise that the facts of the situation and modern international doctrine 
render academic, in their opinion, any prior discussion of the vexed question 
of sovereignty over the Sudan". 
4. We have not yet thought it necessary to consult the Governor General, but we 
are in touch with his staff who are being kept informed. 
71 FO 371153254, no 3525 10 Aug 1946 
[Umma Party demand for independence for the Sudan]: despatch no 
927 from Sir R Camp bell to Mr Bevin. Annexe: letter from Abdallah 
Bey Khalil1 to Mr Attlee and Sidqi Pasha (19 July 1946) [Extract] 
[As early as May the Umma Party had asked for clarifications to Huddleston's April 
address to the Advisory Council (see 58), requesting a reassurance that reference to 'the 
Sudan' included both Northern and Southern Sudan, a reduction in the twenty year 
period for achieving self-government, and a pronouncement that 'Self Governing 
Sudan'meant a 'fully independent Sudan with complete Sovereignty'. They also proposed 
that the Advisory Council become a general council for the entire country, and that the 
Sudan Administration Conference be transformed into 'the Sudan Independence 
Conference' ('Note by the Umma Party to the Sudan Government', 9 May 1948, FO 
371/53257, no 4075). The civil secretary (letter from Robertson to secretary, Abdallah 
Khalil, 14 July 1946, FO 371/53257, no 4075) eventually reassured them on the matter of 
maintaining the Sudan within its geographical limits, conceded that the twenty year 
period could be shortened (or extended), depending on the availability of competent and 
experienced Sudanese, but insisted that 'self-government' did not equal independence. He 
left the creation of a general council for the whole Sudan to the Administration 
Conference to decide and rejected the proposal to transform the conference into an 
independence convention. Abdallah Khalil's letter to the British and Egyptian prime 
minister's followed his receipt of the civil secretary's response.] 
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith in original a letter addressed to the 
Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Egypt by the Secretary of the Sudanese 
Umma Party, together with a translation. 
2. It will be seen that the theme of the letter is the Sudanese right, for reasons 
both of history and of the standard of civilisation the Sudan has now attained, to 
complete independence of the condominium. The letter of course shows no gratitude 
for the part played by ourselves in bringing the Sudan to the level which she has now 
reached; this need be no surprise to us. But the letter is useful as evidence that an 
affirmation of Egyptian sovereignty at this moment, as proposed by the Egyptian 
Government, would be bitterly resented by many Sudanese, and if the occasion arises 
I propose to refer to it in this connection in discussion with the Egyptian delegation. 
I am also suggesting to the Sudan Government that the Secretary of the Umma party 
might be encouraged to give the letter some publicity not only in the Sudan but in 
1 Secretary general, Umma Party. 
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Egypt as a counterblast to the repeated pronouncements by the leader of the 
Sudanese delegation in Egypt in favour of the unity of the Nile Valley. 
3. I would venture to suggest that the Acting Governor-General might be 
authorised to send the Secretary of the Umma party a simple acknowledgement. .. . 
Annexe to 71 
We claim that we, the Sudanese, have a legal and moral right to independence. From 
the dawn of history up to the last century we have been independent. Neither Egypt 
nor Great Britain had any claims to sovereignty over us. In 1820 Mohammed Ali the 
Turkish ruler of Egypt, acting in the Turkish interest, invaded us in order to exploit 
us by taking our natural riches, and by selling our youth into slavery, and bondage; 
the response to the call by those Islamic leaders who formed the pioneers to his 
invading army paved the way to an easy victory for them. From that time until our 
liberation by the Mahdi, the Turkish flag flew over the Sudan, and under its shadow 
flourished one of the most oppressive, inhuman, and corrupt regimes in the whole 
history of mankind. In 1885 we regained our freedom and for fourteen years we were 
completely independent, acknowledging no master except our own rulers. These 
fourteen years of freedom erased any claims based on the sixty five years of misrule 
that had gone before. The rights based on conquest terminate when that conquest is 
turned into defeat. As Halleck says (International Law Ch.33) "The rights of conquest 
are derived from force alone. They begin with possession and they end in the loss of 
possession". 
In 1898 the Sudan was invaded for a second time, but on this occasion the 
invading forces were not Turkish troops, but a joint force made up of British and 
Egyptians. The present existing administrative rights of the two powers in the Sudan 
are based on this conquest. Neither Britain nor Egypt had any rights prior to 1898. 
For reasons connected with the entry of another power, France, into the Sudan, an 
attempt was made to picture the "Reconquest" as the suppression of a rebellion in 
some of the outlying Egyptian Provinces, but this pretention was merely a political 
manoeuvre unfounded on any tenable basis in International Law. That Lord Cromer 
was the first to recognise this is shown by his statement in 1901, when in a speech at 
Khartoum he said (Translated), "Both the Egyptians and the British are strangers ... 
We aim at a true Sudanese Parliamentary Representation, and it is possible for such 
to be created." At no time since the conquest has Great Britain claimed the Sudan as 
part of the British Empire; neither has Egypt treated our country as though it were 
part of the Kingdom of Egypt. On the contrary, the British have consistently rejected 
the suggestion that the Sudan should be treated in the same way as the dependencies 
in the Colonial Empire, and the Egyptian Government, on their part, have gone so 
far as to plead before the Mixed Courts in Egypt that the Sudan Government was 
constitutionally an autonomous Government absolutely separate from the Egyptian 
Government. The court upheld this plea and found that by the 1899 agreements a 
new state was established in the Sudan distinct from and independent of Egypt. 
(Bencini et Quistas contre le Gouvernement egyptien et le Gouvernement du 
Soudan. vide Macmichael's "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan"} 
2 H MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (London, 1933) pp 65-66. 
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It is clear, therefore, that from the beginning of the Condominium Rule, the 
Sudan has been treated as a · separate and detached territory over which the two 
condominium powers separately hold administrative rights not prejudicing its 
sovereignty. (Vide Clause 1, Article 11 of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which 
reads "Nothing in this article prejudices the question of sovereignty over the 
Sudan".) 
The part played by the Sudan during the recent World War represented the 
people's maximum possible contribution both militarily and economically. This was 
duly acknowledged by His Excellency the Governor-General in his message to the 
people of the Sudan on victory day when His Excellency said:-
"The Sudan can look back with pride on the part she has played in this war. 
She has acted throughout with the courage, the orderliness and the 
obedience for which Sir Stewart Symes called in 1940. She has never doubted 
the path to victory. In 1940 her forces stood valiantly, with their British and 
Indian comrades, in the path of the invader and then pressed forward with 
them to share in the glorious victories in Abyssinia and in North Africa. 
Always they have brought honour to the Sudan by their valour and their 
discipline. At home the Sudan assisted in the vital task of guarding the 
African lines of communication and gave unswerving support to the military 
forces who used her soil. Her citizens made many generous contributions to 
the effort of war, and endured steadfastly the restrictions and shortages which 
are the inevitable accompaniment of war. Her cultivators worked with faithful 
persistence. Her merchants have loyally obeyed the demands made upon 
them. Her officials have shouldered without complaint new and heavy 
burdens. Her war time economy has won praise outside the borders of the 
Sudan. This is indeed a proud record and let us remember it with full hearts." 
His Britannic Majesty King George VI also expressed his appreciation of the efforts by 
the people of the Sudan in his message which read:-
" Some years have passed since you swept the enemy from your frontiers in 
the early stages of the conflict which has proved so disastrous for the 
aggressors. Now the seal has been set on African and European victory and I 
am deeply conscious of the great contribution in the field and at home which 
has been made by your country throughout the whole period of the war." 
It is unnecessary to mention that the contribution by the Sudan to the war effort for 
the cause of Democracy which resulted in complete victory over the Axis powers, is 
in fact a direct contribution to the United Nations, to Great Britain and to Egypt. By 
stopping the forces of Italy on the East African front, the Sudan Defence Force have 
defended the rear of Egypt and the British lines of communication. The participation 
of our forces in the battle of Alamein is but another service rendered to both Egypt 
and Great Britain at the darkest phases of the War. Last and not least the food stuffs 
and livestock offered by the Sudan to help easing the food situation in Egypt. In 
rendering all these services we have not for a moment doubted both Great Britain 
and Egypt's appreciation of our efforts. 
Your Excellency, 
In view of the above and of the present state of advancement in the Sudan in the 
military, economic, cultural and social fields, a state which surpasses levels attained 
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in a number of the Middle East Countries, the people of the Sudan feel it is high time 
for them to claim complete independence of their country. 
The Umma Party regard it their solemn duty to ask for the cancellation of the 
present condominium rule and the establishment of an independent Sudan enjoy-
ing complete sovereignty over the territory lying within its present geographical 
limits. 
The Umma Party, fully alive of your sincerity to discharge loyally those obligations 
to which your Government have committed themselves by International 
Agreements, claim an unrefutable right trusting that you will realise the people's 
national aspirations without their having to resort to the United Nations 
Organisation or to any other means, 
Awaiting Your Excellency's most favourable reply, 
72 FO 371153311, no 3666 27 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: inward 
telegram no 101 from Lord Stansgate to Mr Bevin, reporting Sidqi 
Pasha's arguments for recognising Egyptian sovereignty over the 
Sudan [Extract] 
[The Egyptian government's claim to sovereignty over the Sudan was embodied in their 
draft of the Sudan protocol, which read: 'The High Contracting Parties agree to enter 
immediately into negotiations in order to determine the status of the Sudan within the 
framework of the welfare of the Sudanese peoples, and on the basis of the unity of the Nile 
Valley under the Crown of Egypt' ('Sudan Protocol', FO 371/53311, no 3776). Arguments 
between the British and Egyptian delegations revolved around what was meant and what 
was implied by 'sovereignty' and 'unity'. ] 
. . . 2. On the Sudan Sidki Pasha urges a recognition of Egyptian sovereignty 
arguing that article 3 of the 1899 agreement providing appointment of Governor 
General by Khedivial decree should make it easy for us to do this. Moreover we had 
never denied Egyptian sovereignty. Further, the fact that our protocol provided for 
Sudan attaining self-government and deciding their relationship with His 
Highness' government implied that they were under some sovereignty at present 
and since we had not denied Egyptian sovereignty that sovereignty was Egyptian. 
Sir R. Campbell after repeating our general attitude countered with our usual 
arguments adding that there were conflicting views about the sovereignty amongst 
jurists and that anyhow we wanted to deal with the matter as a practical one. 
Moreover to subscribe to a formula on sovereignty in the way Egyptians wanted 
would inject a disturbing element into the Sudan since at this stage it would 
appear to them as something new. Sidki Pasha could however let him know on 
this point also any suggestions he had to make. Sir R. Campbell pointed out the 
phrase "unity of the Nile Valley" had really no meaning or with its wide geographi-
cal scope a ridiculous meaning. He did not see how two governments could sub-
scribe to such a phrase. Sidki Pasha said that it of course meant merely the Sudan 
and that he thought he could devise an alternative phrase to satisfy public opinion 
for whom it was a slogan .... 
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73 FO 371/53255, no 3718 27 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: minute by 
Sir 0 Sargent to Mr Bevin, proposing alternative drafts of the Sudan 
protocol 
Secretary of State 
After discussion with the Governor-General of the Sudan we submit in an amended 
form the draft Sudan article put forward by you at this morning's meeting. 
As you will see, the water question is now being dealt with under section 2. We are 
advised that the idea of a Nile Board would not appeal to the Egyptians, whose claims 
to the control of the Nile are almost monopolistic; but that the possible danger to 
Egypt's water supplies from an independent Sudan is one which must be taken into 
account. 
We have further restored the idea of a Commission in order to consult the 
Sudanese, but it is to be noted that the Commission will now function at the end of 
the period of preparation for self-government and not (as when we proposed to leave 
the future wholly vague) in the near future.* 
As regards the question of sovereignty, the Governor-General has advised us most 
emphatically that, whatever safeguards as regards the actual administration might be 
devised, an open admission by His Majesty's Government of Egyptian sovereignty 
would be the only point on which the Sudanese would concentrate, with results in 
the Sudan which would be both unsettling to the people themselves and disastrous 
to the British position. Such an admission would in fact be far from being the 
theoretical future which it is represented as being by the Egyptians, since it would 
weight the scales in Sudanese minds in favour of an ultimate union with Egypt 
rather than of independence. Furthermore, the Egyptians cannot be trusted not to 
take advantage of the concession to develop their propaganda in the Sudan so as to 
undermine our position in the Sudan and to advance their own. 
We therefore suggest that in the first instance the Delegation should only try the 
first four sections on the Egyptians. But we have added two formulae the first of 
which (A) 1 we suggest might be given to the Delegation for their comments, and with 
a view to use if the Egyptians remain unresponsive. 
This formulae amounts to no more than a further reservation of the position, but 
it does enable the Egyptian claim to appear in writing. It is acceptable to the 
Governor-General. The second formula (B)2 in fact embodies the Egyptian proposals. 
We do not think it should yet be sent to the Delegation: and we only offer it as a 
proposal which you might feel you had to put to the Cabinet with an emphatic 
warning as to its dangers and disadvantages if 
(a) it became evident that without something of the kind the Egyptians would run 
out on the Treaty itself, and/or appeal to U.N.O. or the International Court on the 
question of sovereignty and the validity of the 1936 Treaty, and 
* Although the King has rejected our original proposal for a Commission, we felt that we should offer it 
again as a sign that we wish to associate the Egyptian Government in deciding the future of the Sudan. 
1 (A) refers to section 5 in the attached Sudan protocol. 
2 (B) refers to the alternative section 5 in the protocol. 
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(b) you felt that it was worthwhile paying this price to prevent either of these 
things happening. 
Sudan protocol 
(1) The High Contracting Parties agree that their primary policy in the Sudan 
shall continue to be the welfare of the Sudanese and the active preparation of the 
Sudanese for self-government. 
(2) As soon as this latter objective is attained, the Sudanese people shall be free to 
decide their future. It is understood that if the Sudanese should decide in favour of 
independence, suitable agreements shall be made with regard to the development 
and utilisation of the waters of the Nile Valley for the greatest benefit of the Egyptian 
and Sudanese peoples. 
(3) The High Contracting Parties will, from time to time, consult with each other 
with a view to accelerating the progress of the Sudanese peoples towards the goal of 
self-government. At a suitable time the High Contracting Parties will appoint a joint 
commission to report on the question whether the Sudanese are prepared for full 
self-government and in a position to decide upon the future of the Sudan and, if so, 
to recommend suitable arrangements for ascertaining what are the wishes of the 
Sudanese peoples and for giving effect thereto. 
(4) Meanwhile, the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be exercised 
jointly by the United Kingdom and Egypt in accordance with the Condominium 
Agreements of 1899 as modified by Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936. * 
(5) The Egyptian Government declare that the preceding provisions of this 
Protocol do not prejudice the claim of H.M. the King of Egypt to be the sovereign of 
the Sudan. The Government of the United Kingdom, while pointing out that it will 
be for the Sudanese people to decide upon their future in accordance with 
paragraph (2) above and declining to make any pronouncement on the question of 
sovereignty, declare that nothing in the preceding Protocol prejudices that question. 
Alternative (5). Subject to the preceding provisions of the present Protocol, the 
High Contracting Parties agree that H.M. the King of Egypt is the ultimate sovereign 
of the Sudan. 
* Article 11 of the 1936 Treaty gives the Egyptians valuable rights in the Sudan, such as the right to 
maintain Egyptian troops, which will lapse when the 1936 Treaty is replaced by the new one. It is therefore 
in the Egyptian interest to keep Article 11 of the 1936 Treaty alive in this way. 
7 4 FO 371153255, no 3719 29 Aug 1926 
[Sovereignty and self-determination]: memorandum by Mr Bevin on 
the Sudan 
I have to face the modern tendency that in dealing with any Colonial or Quasi-
Colonial problem, the United States' Government is not satisfied unless some hope 
and prospect is held out of self-government. 
2. It is the principle of U.N.O. that where self-government cannot be established, 
the method of international trusteeship should be introduced. 
3. If, therefore, we were, in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, to recognise Egyptian 
sovereignty with the Sudan, it would be regarded as a retrograde step. 
[75] AUG 1946 165 
4. It would be wise for Egypt and ourselves to look forward and weigh carefully 
world opinion before taking a decision on this question. 
5. I am not in favour of making the Sudan a trusteeship because I believe that, 
arising out of our mutual responsibility, we can settle the problem satisfactorily 
between ourselves without bringing extraneous powers into discussion. 
6. We have no desire to prejudice the Egyptian claim for sovereignty over Egypt 
[sic], but for us to take the step of recognising it, would introduce problems such 
as:-
(a) the weakening of our own position; the King of Egypt's title is never 
mentioned in the Sudan and the Sudanese would think that we had sold them to 
Egypt; 
(b) the Sudanese would look to Egypt as their ultimate master and accept union 
as their ultimate destiny; 
(c) the Sudanese people would become restless and uncertain about their future. 
7. If we agreed to what the Egyptians want without having consulted the 
Sudanese people themselves, we should be charged with Imperial behaviour and with 
overlooking the fundamental modern concept that the people themselves should be 
heard before a change in their status is made. There is no doubt that the Sudanese 
would regard as a change the measure the Egyptians are trying to get us to accept. 
8. The King of Egypt said that he is convinced of the need of a Treaty, but not at 
any price (the price being the Sudan). Equally I cannot do what I believe to be wrong 
in order to get a quick Treaty of Alliance. 
75 FO 371153255, no 3707 29 Aug 1946 
[Sovereignty and self-determination]: inward telegram no 608 (reply) 
from Mr Bevin to Sir 0 Sargent, on possible consequences of 
recognising Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan 
(1) I have been thinking about the Sudan following yesterday's meeting with the 
Governor-General and after receiving your minute of yesterday's date with a new 
draft of a Sudanese protocol.1 As far as I can see it, three important consequences 
might result from unqualified recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan:-
(A) There might be serious unsettlement in the Sudan, involving difficulties to 
our administration during the interim period. 
(B) The recognition of Egyptian sovereignty might be viewed as a considerable 
sacrifice of face on our part; 
(C) Recognition of Egyptian sovereignty would weight the future status of the 
Sudan in favour of union with Egypt. 
(2) Before we decide the importance to attach to (C) we must have a clear picture 
in our minds of what we wish the future of the Sudan to be. I am not, for instance, 
convinced that independence is the best solution. It seems to me that the Sudan will 
have considerable difficulty in standing alone. Provided our defence interests in 
1 See 73. 
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Egypt are sufficiently secured and the Defence Board is working effectively, I am not 
sure that our interests would not best be served by the Union of the Sudan with 
Egypt. 
(3) However, even if we accept Union as a desirable goal, I would not be prepared 
to agree to any wording such as that used by the Egyptians in their draft protocol 
recognising "the unity of the Nile Valley under the crown of Egypt". Nor do I like the 
formula attached to your minute under which "the high contracting parties agree 
that His Majesty The King of Egypt is the ultimate sovereign of the Sudan". Both 
these formulae are, I consider, open to grave objections under the headings (A) and 
(B) above. 
I believe that Egyptian amour propre and their wish to promote the prospect of 
union, might be secured by a different approach. I have been considering whether it 
would be possible to have a form of words which would acknowledge the sovereignty 
of Egypt while also acknowledging the position of Great Britain as eo-administrator. 
4. The following formula has occurred to me. "Meanwhile the high contracting 
parties agree to exercise their existing rights of sovereignty in the Sudan pending a 
final decision as to the future of the country etc.". This draft meets King Farouk's 
wish that we should recognise his Sovereignty. At the same time it does not define 
that Sovereignty and safeguards our own position. It does not in fact do more than 
recognise the status quo while avoiding the difficulty of defining the respective rights 
of the Egyptians and ourselves in the Sudan. 
(5) My immediately following telegram contains the draft text of a Sudan protocol 
including this alternative. As you will see I have omitted any reference to a joint 
commission as I do not favour the idea. 
(6) I would like to have your views on my suggested formula. 
(7) If you think some compromise on these lines would be workable I would like 
to put it to Stansgate for his views. Although we are still waiting for the Egyptians to 
produce their counter-drafts on Articles 2 and 3 I do not think that we will get 
anything further from them on the Sudan. We must not lose time, and ought to be 
ready to put our proposals on the Sudan to the Egyptians not later than September 
1st. I shall consider how best the proposals can be presented after I have received 
your views on the present telegram. 
76 FO 371153255, no 3708 29 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: inward 
telegram no 609 from Mr Bevin to Sir 0 Sargent, forwarding a 
re-draft of the Sudan protocol 
Following is draft of Sudan protocol referred to in my immediately preceding 
telegram.1 
(1) The High Contracting Parties agree that their primary policy in the Sudan 
shall continue to be the welfare of the Sudanese and the active preparation of the 
Sudanese for self-government. 
(2) As soon as this latter objective is attained, the Sudanese people shall be free to 
1 See 75. 
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decide their future. It is understood that if the Sudanese should decide in favour of 
independence, suitable agreements shall be made with regard to the development 
and utilisation of the waters of the Nile valley for the greatest benefit of the Egyptian 
and Sudanese peoples. 
(3) Meanwhile the High Contracting Parties agree to exercise their existing rights 
of sovereignty in the Sudan pending a final decision as to the future of the country in 
accordance with paragraph 2 above. 
77 FO 371/53255, no 3708 30 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: outward 
telegram no 1224 (reply) from Sir 0 Sargent to Mr Bevin, relaying FO 
and Sir H Huddleston's comments on the proposed re-draft of the 
Sudan protocol 
We and the Governor-General feel it is as yet too early to get a clear picture of what 
we wish the Sudan's future to be. The treaty and therefore the Sudan protocol 
attached to it will have a proposed time-limit of twenty years which will only carry us 
to the time when the Sudanese are expected according to the speech made by 
Governor General last spring to be ready for self government. The essential objective 
therefore it [sic, is] to keep our hands free at this stage in order that when the time 
comes we shall not have prejudiced any of the various solutions between which we 
and the Sudanese shall then have to choose. Meanwhile the question of Egyptian 
sovereignty must primarily be considered from the point of view of the immediate 
effect on the Sudanese people and the Governor-General is emphatic that the effect 
of recognising it in any form would be very serious. For this reason we are glad that 
you rule out second formula (5) in draft taken by you to Paris. 1 
2. As regards paragraph 3 of formula in your telegram No. 6092 if we say that 
both High Contracting Parties will continue to exercise their existing rights of 
sovereignty, this must mean, that both High Contracting Parties possess some rights 
of sovereignty and therefore that sovereignty in the Sudan at the moment is shared. 
Such a text is all right from the United Kingdom point of view so far as the question 
of sovereignty is concerned because we have never thought of contending that the 
whole sovereignty in the Sudan is vested in the United Kingdom. The issue has 
always been whether 
(a) the sovereignty resides solely in Egypt, or 
(b) is shared between the United Kingdom and Egypt. 
Thus this text would be an affirmation of what may be said to be the extreme United 
Kingdom view and for this reason it could hardly be acceptable to Egypt, whose wish 
is to assert that sovereignty over the Sudan resides solely in Egypt. In fact your 
formula might be more palatable to Egypt if the words "of sovereignty" were omitted 
and it simply said "the High Contracting Parties agree to exercise their existing 
rights". 
1 See 73. 2 See 76. 
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3. Your formula moreover might lead to practical difficulties in so far as it 
merely says: "their existing rights". The repeal of the Treaty of 1936 by the new 
Treaty might not affect the continuance of the condominium agreements of 1899, 
but it would certainly repeal the concessions in favour of Egypt made in 1936. (See 
footnote to draft protocol attached to my minute of August 28th [sic 27th]). It was for 
that reason that, in the draft protocol which you took to Paris, paragraph 4/ we 
proposed to say that, subject to the provisions above relating to the decision by the 
Sudanese people of their future, "the administration of the Sudan shall for the time 
being be exercised jointly by the United Kingdom and Egypt in accordance with the 
condominium agreements of 1899 as modified by Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936". 
4. To sum up we agree that paragraph 3 in our draft protocol about the 
commission should be dropped, and we think that paragraph 4 is the best formula we 
can devise in the circumstances. We suggest that Lord Stansgate should only be 
instructed to put forward in the first instance paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of our draft 
leaving for later consideration in the light of Egyptian reactions question of finding a 
formula to meet sovereignty difficulty. In this connexion we adhere to our formula 5 
(a) since it mentions existence of Egyptian claim but does not prejudice the future by 
accepting it. Governor-General maintains the view that while it may be difficult at 
first to get the Sudanese to understand it this formula (a) is helpful in so far as it 
stresses that their future lies in their own hands. 
3 See 73. 
78 FO 371153255, no 3712 31 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: outward 
telegram no 15 from Mr Bevin to Lord Stansgate, explaining 
principles behind the re-draft of the protocol 
I have been considering the Sudan problem in consultation with the Foreign Office 
and have tried to set down the principles which should guide us through this 
intricate problem. They are contained in the memorandum in my immediately 
following telegram.1 
2. You will see that my conclusion is that for various reasons we cannot do what 
the Egyptians want and recognise the King of Egypt as the sovereign of the Sudan. 
Nor am I disposed to buy a treaty at that price. The furthest I should be prepared to 
go would be to include an article in the Sudan protocol allowing the Egyptian 
Government to put on record that the provisions of the protocol did not prejudice 
the claim of the King of Egypt to be the sovereign of the Sudan, accompanied by a 
statement that the Government of the United Kingdom decline to make any 
pronouncement on the question of sovereignty but declaring that nothing in the 
protocol prejudices this question. 
3. We have also reconsidered the draft Sudan protocol as a whole and have 
arrived at the text contained in my telegram No. 17 as the best we can offer. You will 
1 Outward telegram 16 from Bevin to Stansgate, 31 Aug 1946, FO 371/53255, no 3713, relaying the text of 
73. 
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see that we have introduced into Article 2 a provision regarding the Nile waters in 
order to meet the Egyptian anxieties about water (paragraph 8 of your telegram No. 
65 to Foreign Office).2 
4. Since the King expressed opposition to the idea (your telegram No. 94 to 
Foreign Office) we have omitted the idea of a Joint Commission for the purpose of 
making recommendations for the future of the Sudan in consultation with the 
Sudanese people. 
5. I have not felt able to omit in Article 3, reference to the existing agreements 
since I am advised that unless they are specified, our position as eo-administrator 
may be questionable. But I have attempted to make the wording more palatable to 
the Egyptian Government. Moreover, article 11 of the 1936 treaty gives the Egyptians 
valuable rights in the Sudan such as the right to maintain Egyptian troops which will 
lapse when the 1936 treaty is replaced by the new one. It is, therefore, in the 
Egyptian interest to keep Article 11 of the 1936 treaty alive in this way. 
6. Article 4 represents the furthest we can go to meet the Egyptians on the 
question of sovereignty. I had, however, suggested to the Foreign Office that the 
following form of words might go some way to meet King Farouk's wish that we 
should recognise his sovereignty:-
"Meanwhile the high contracting parties agree to exercise their existing 
rights of sovereignty in the Sudan pending a final decision as to the future of 
the country in accordance with paragraph (2) above." 
This form of words would meet the King's wish by acknowledging in terms, his 
sovereignty while also acknowledging the position of Great Britain as administrator. 
But I am advised that it could hardly be acceptable to Egypt whose wish it is to assert 
that sovereignty over the Sudan resides solely in Egypt. 
7. I am anxious not to lose time and feel that our latest proposals should be 
presented as a whole to the Egyptian Government as soon as possible. But before you 
do this I should like your observations on the present telegram and also the clean draft 
of the remaining articles less the Sudan for which I asked you in my telegram No. 13. 
2 
'Amr stresses Egypt's interest in "unity of the Nile valley" centred on two points of view: (A) long 
standing popular tradition (B) water. It seems we should be prepared to say we would help in securing 
from any future autonomous Sudan guarantees for Egypt on this subject. There are indeed such ingrained 
instinctive anxieties about their water amongst the Egyptians that we consider we should be prepared to 
meet them if they raise the matter'. Inward telegram 65 from Stansgate to Bevin, 17 Aug 1946, FO 
371/53254, no 3558. 
79 FO 371153255, no 3714 31 Aug 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol]: outward 
telegram no 17 from Mr Bevin to Lord Stansgate, forwarding text of 
re-drafted Sudan protocol [Extract] 
Following is text of Draft Sudan Protocol referred to in my telegram No. 15 .... 1 
4. The Egyptian Government declare that the preceding provisions of this Protocol 
do not prejudice the claim of His Majesty the King of Egypt to be the Sovereign of the 
1 Articles 1-3 are as in 76. 
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Sudan. The Government of the United Kingdom, while pointing out that it will be for 
the Sudanese people to decide upon their future in accordance with paragraph 2 
above and declining to make any pronouncement on the question of sovereignty, 
declare that nothing in the preceding Protocol prejudices that question. 
80 FO 371153255, no 3771 5 Sept 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: the Sudan protocol] : outward 
telegram no 21 from Mr Bevin to Lord Stansgate [Extract] 
[In response to 79 Stansgate argued for the inclusion of a proposal for a joint commission 
on the Sudan, on the grounds that it might satisfy the Sudanese expectation that the 
treaty would contain something specific about their future attainment of self-government 
and independence and the Egyptian insistence that there should be immediate 
negotiations. He went on to warn that the article on sovereignty satisfied Egypt's 
minimum demands only and therefore was unlikely to be accepted. He also commented 
that Egyptian interests in the Nile valley went beyond water, and embraced economic 
considerations and the possibility of emigration; therefore the protocol should include 
some general wording concerning safeguards for Egypt's 'material rights and interests' in 
the Nile valley. Finally, he provided alternative drafts, which were incorporated into the 
following re-draft of articles 2, 3 and 5 of the protocol (inward telegrams no 111 and 112 
from Stansgate to Bevin, 3 Sept 1946, FO 371/53255, nos 3749 and 3753). Bevin refused 
to alter the sovereignty article, instructing instead that Stansgate should argue along the 
lines set out in 79 above, 'in order to reach position in which you will have made it clear 
why His Majesty's Government cannot commit themselves to any agreed statement on 
Egyptian sovereignty. You will then be in a position to say that His Majesty's Government 
nevertheless are now prepared as a concession to allow the Egyptians to write down in the 
text of the Treaty that they claim themselves to be sovereigns' (outward telegram no 20 
from Bevin to Stansgate, 5 Sept 1946, FO 371/53255, no 3770). In the following re-draft 
articles 1 and 4 remained unchanged.] 
Following is redraft of Sudan Protocol (amendments to text in my telegram No. 17 
are underlined) .. .. 1 
(1) The high contracting parties agree that their primary policy in the Sudan shall 
continue to be the welfare of the Sudanese and the active preparation of the 
Sudanese for self-government. 
(2) As soon as this latter objective is attained, the Sudanese people shall be free to 
decide their future. It is understood that if the Sudanese should decide in favour of inde-
pendence, suitable agreements shall be made with regard to the development and utili-
sation of the waters of the Nile Valley for the greatest benefit of the Egyptian and Sudanese 
peoples and with regard to the other material interests of Egypt in the Nile Valley. 
(3) Meanwhile the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be exercised 
jointly by the United Kingdom and Egypt in accordance with the condominium 
agreements of 1899 and Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936 .... 
(5) The high contracting parties shall from time to time secure reports from the 
Governor General on the progress of the Sudanese people towards the goal of self-
government. At a suitable time they will appoint a joint commission to report on the 
question whether the Sudanese are prepared for full self-government and in a 
position to decide on the future of the Sudan and if so, to recommend suitable 
arrangements for ascertaining that [sic, what] are the wishes of the Sudanese people 
and for giving effect thereto . 
1 Italicised in the text reproduced here. 
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81 FO 371/53312, no 4066 28 Sept 1946 
[Anglo--Egyptian treaty negotiations: Egyptian reply]: inward 
telegram no 149 from Lord Stansgate to Mr Bevin, conveying the text 
of the Egyptian reply to the British draft protocol [Extract] 
[As the British delegation neared the completion of its draft for presentation to Egypt, 
Stansgate reported growing opposition to Sidqi among the members of the Egyptian 
delegation. He warned that acceptance of the terms of the evacuation of troops from 
Egypt appeared to be dependent on settling the Sudan protocol on a basis acceptable to 
the Egyptians. Britain's version of the Sudan protocol was unlikely to be accepted, and a 
breakdown in negotiations was a very real possibility (inward telegram no 120 from 
Stansgate to Bevin, 11 Sept 1946, FO 371/53310, no 3838). At a meeting with the entire 
Egyptian Delegation on 17 Sept Stansgate presented the latest draft of both the 
evacuation article and the Sudan protocol. Egypt's reply, objecting to the terms of 
evacuation1 and rejecting the Sudan protocol, was presented on 28 Sept. Stansgate here 
transmits a slightly abbreviated version of the Egyptian text.] 
The Sudan 
In the course of negotiations it has become clear that the object of the British 
delegation is to settle finally the regime in the Sudan according to 1899 arrangement 
as at present applied by British authorities in the Sudan. For her share in Sudan 
campaign British Government claimed the right to share in administration (see 
paragraph 3 of preamble of agreement of January 1899). 1899 agreement therefore 
sets up a joint Anglo-Egyptian administration but Great Britain's position in Egypt, 
encroachment of British officials in Sudan and unilateral measures imposed by 
British Government by force in 1924 have reduced Egyptian share in administration 
of Sudan provinces to nothing. 
The first draft protocol proposed by British delegation was merely a reproduction 
of Article 11 of 1936 Treaty with addition of a joint commission charged with the task 
of making recommendations on the [gp. undec. ? regime.] 2 The same idea is 
reproduced in second draft, which departs even further from Egyptian point of view 
since it makes no provision for a subsequent agreement about the Sudan. 
The British protocol lays down that the object of high contracting parties is 
actively to prepare Sudanese for self-government. This is also the sincere desire of 
Egypt. But Egyptian delegation are not prepared to accept this merely as a 
declaration of principle in execution of which Egyptian Government will have no 
share. On the contrary, Egyptian Government must take an effective part in 
elaborating democratic regime towards which Sudanese should be moving. The 1899 
and 1936 agreements give Egyptian Government no means of sharing in this task. In 
arrangement proposed in British draft protocol it will be the Governor General who 
under instructions from London alone will elaborate new Sudan statute. The only 
1 Egyptian objections to the terms of evacuation under a new treaty with Britain were based on 
disagreements, not only over the length of the evacuation period but also over the terms upon which 
British forces would be allowed to return to Egypt in the event of an external threat either to Egypt or to 
neighbouring countries. These issues are extensively documented in BDEEP series B, vol, 4, John Kent, 
ed, Egypt and the defence of the Middle East, part I, chapter 1 (see especially documents 68 & 82). 
2 The undeciphered words should read 'future of Sudan' (correction from text of document 82 cited in 
note 1 above) . 
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amendments protocol makes to the Egyptian Government's objections [? gp. omitted 
'are that'] they will be informed from time to time by reports from Governor General 
of the Sudan of progress made by the Sudanese towards self-government and to 
make appropriate recommendations. 
Sovereignty 
The British draft states that the protocol does not prejudice claim of King of Egypt to 
be sovereign of the Sudan. Egyptian sovereignty does not need to be claimed. It 
exists; it has never been possible to contest it. The British Government can no longer 
maintain their refusal to pronounce on this question. Either Great Britain admits the 
right of Egyptian sovereignty, in which case she can have no objection to recognising 
it, or she contests it, in which case she must state the fact in order that Egyptian 
people may know that Great Britain is denying them the only link which still unites 
them with the Sudan at the very moment that she is asking them to become an ally 
of Great Britain and to share with her the grave responsibilities which derive from 
the alliance. 
For all these reasons Egyptian delegation cannot accept draft protocol presented 
by British delegation. 
82 FO 371153326, no 4471 Oct 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: Umma Party statements] : report 
from SPIS no 59 for August-September [Extract] 
. . . 522. The Umma comments on the British draft protocol were embodied in 
telegrams to the delegations (the British delegation has not yet confirmed receipt) 
which were published in the Star of September 26th and ran as follows:-
"that the Sudanese will not suffer the present negotiations being concluded 
without the admission being made of the full right of Sudanese to sovereignty 
over their country, and their right to enter into direct negotiations with the 
representatives of the two Governments of the Condominium to discuss the 
necessary steps to the establishments of a free democratic Sudanese 
Government, which bears no allegiance to any country or crown". 
The two Governments will, the telegram went on, "be responsible for any results that 
may ensue from ignoring the wishes of the Sudanese nation". 
523. The Umma leaders are worried at the enforced silence of the Sudan 
Government since His Excellency's statement to the Advisory Council in April. 
In a letter dated August 23rd (to which we have not yet replied) they deprecate the 
suggestion that 20 years will bring self government and not independence, ask for 
reference to U.N.O. if the Co-domini can't agree, and emphasise that their 
participation in the Sudan Administrative Conference was "with the aim of eventual 
independence" . . . . 
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83 FO 371153312, no 4117 3 Oct 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: inward telegram no 159 from 
Sir R Campbell to FO reporting Sidqi's interpretation of sovereignty 
[In a subsequent meeting on 3 Oct with Campbell, following Stansgate's departure, Sidqi 
proposed a further meeting in London and attempted to clarify his stance on the Sudan.] 
My telegram No. 157, paragraph 3. 
About the Sudan, Sidki Pasha said that Egypt was asking for no more than 
recognition of symbolic sovereignty. As he had said, she did not expect a share in the 
administration. I remarked that this hardly seemed to tally with claims made about 
the Sudan in Egyptian Delegation's preceding Note. 1 Sidki Pasha brushed this aside 
by saying that it was obviously not possible for the Egyptians publicly to state their 
disinterestedness in the administration. I understood him to say that if satisfaction 
were given on the sovereignty every assurance would be forthcoming about the 
maintenance of the present administration. He repeated the familiar theme that 
sovereignty existed and that the King of Egypt could at any moment declare himself 
to be King of the Sudan. His title as Lord of Dartew [sic, Darfur] etc. was stated in 
Egyptian Consular exequaturs. I pointed out that these ancient titles were far from 
being equivalent to Kingship of the Sudan and repeated the familiar arguments 
about conflicting legal opinions and the more practical consideration of opinion in 
the Sudan. On the latter point Sidki Pasha as usual took the line that any expression 
of Sudanese views contrary to the idea of Egyptian sovereignty were instigated by the 
Sudan Government. 
2. For the rest, Sidki Pasha did not refer to the necessity of including in the 
Treaty provision for immediate negotiations about the Sudan, but suggested that 
Egypt would be perfectly satisfied if some time-say in a year or two-an Egyptian 
and a British Commission should visit the Sudan and make recommendations about 
the handling of the question of ultimate Sudanese self-Government. Such 
recommendations would then form the subject of subsequent negotiations between 
the two condominium Governments. I gathered in this conversation Sidki Pasha was 
mostly repeating what he had said to Lord Stansgate just before his departure. 
1 See 81. 
84 FO 371153314, no 4213 5 Oct 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty': FO minutes of a meeting between Mr Bevin 
and the British treaty delegation in Paris on the Sudan [Extract] 
[Following the Egyptian rejection of the British draft Stansgate and the British delegation 
reported back to Bevin in Paris, where he was attending the Peace Conference. Also 
present at the meeting were Sir 0 Harvey, Sir R Campbell, Sir W Smart (oriental 
minister, Cairo), P Dixon (Bevin's private secretary), Wood, and D M H Riches of the FO.] 
... 3. The Sudan 
Lord Stansgate said that, in his view, in their minds the Foreign Office had always 
acknowledged Egyptian sovereignty, though they had prevented the Egyptians from 
exercising it. The Secretary of State was also doubtful of the validity of our previous 
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position, and it was recognised that in order to obtain a Treaty at all it was necessary 
that sovereignty should be conceded to the Egyptians in some form. The Secretary of 
State directed that the matter should be dealt with on the following basis:-
(i) A Protocol should be drafted providing for 
(a) a distinction between sovereignty and administration. Thus, the preamble 
should re-affirm both the historical position of the King of Egypt in the Sudan, 
and the administrative position of His Majesty's Government; 
(b) the appointment of a Joint Council of British and Sudanese, which would be 
a continuing but not a permanently established Body (i.e. it would not have 
Headquarters and a permanent Secretariat) which would not be empowered to 
interfere with the Governor-General's supreme authority but which would give 
the Egyptians an opportunity of keeping an eye on the . methods adopted to 
promote the self-government for the Sudanese. 
(ii) Sir Ronald Campbell should reply to Sidky's message asking him to elaborate 
what he meant by "symbolic sovereignty" .... 1 
1 See 83. 
85 FO 371153257, no 4334 9 Oct 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: letter from J W Robertson to 
G H Hancock (acting civil secretary), relaying the governors-general's 
and the civil secretary's reactions to the draft Sudan protocol 
I went yesterday with H.E. to the Foreign Office where we had a meeting in the 
morning with Sir Orme Sargent, Sir Waiter Smart, Howe, and Beckett. We were told 
that the Treaty had come to a standstill on the Sudan question, that Lord Stansgate 
and Sir Ronald Campbell had gone to Paris, explained the position to the Secretary of 
State, and had been told by him to see whether the Treaty could not be saved by some 
rewording of the Sudan protocol.1 I attach hereto copies of the various drafts. The old 
draft of September 5th was the one to which H.E. agreed when we were up here at 
the end of August;2 there is a draft which was prepared in Paris, and which was 
shown there to the Secretary of State, and the third and last draft is the Paris one 
amended in the Foreign Office a day or two ago.3 
H.E. was asked what his views were on this third draft, and while he agreed that 
Clauses 1, 2 and 4 contained a fair and reasonable statement of what the Sudan 
Government wants, he said that the preamble, in which "sovereign rights" of the 
King of Egypt are admitted, is bound to make things extremely difficult for the 
Sudan Government. Although "the existing system of administration" is to continue, 
by the insertion of this clause in the preamble we will be certainly faced by 
immediate rejoicings in the pro-Egyptian Sudan Press and in Egypt, by the 
discomfiture of our own friends, and by a swing of the moderates to the Egyptian 
side-it may be that if the administration continues unchanged and we are still 
1 See 84. 2 See 76 and 79. 3 See 92, AnnexA. 
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obviously in power, that the effect of the admission of sovereignty will gradually 
lessen, but it is very doubtful whether the Egyptians will leave us alone: it seems 
much more probable that with "sovereignty" admitted they will intensify their 
propaganda and infiltration into the country in order to make sure that the choice 
given to the Sudanese under Article 2 will be for union with Egypt. 
H.E. (and I) made these sort of objections and Sir Orme Sargent admitted their 
force, and said that no one liked this formula, but that the benefit of a Treaty with 
Egypt was so great from the general world viewpoint, that the Secretary of State 
wished to get one if possible. 
The analogy of the Sultan of Turkey's sovereignty over Egypt in Cromer's time was 
quoted, and the Foreign Office's idea is apparently that some symbolic sovereignty of 
this sort will satisfy the Egyptians and that they will be content once they have this. 
We doubt it-and we are also sure that it will not be easy to explain this to the 
Sudanese. 
On the other hand, it can be said that in paragraphs 1 and 2 we get an 
acknowledgment from Egypt that what H.E. said in the Advisory Council is agreed to, 
and that should be some gain. 
We were asked to return in the afternoon. At 4.30 p.m. we met again; this time 
Lord Stansgate, Sir Ronald Campbell, Riches and Lord Stansgate's Secretary were 
also present. 
We went over the same ground, and the delegation from Cairo emphasised that 
unless some acknowledgment of Egyptian sovereign rights was made in the Sudan 
protocol, it would be impossible to get the Treaty which was essential for British 
requirements in the Middle East. H.E. asked several questions: he wondered what the 
Governor-General's position would be if a similar case to the Desuki4 one arose: the 
Foreign Office people thought that his position would be worse, that the King of 
Egypt would probably have the Egyptian constitution altered to make his title "King 
of Egypt and the Sudan"; Beckett said that he thought there would be no way of 
stopping him putting this title on his stamps and coins; H.E. also said that the word 
"historic" was being used in two ways: the Egyptians were allowed to infer a meaning 
"historic and continuing" and the Sudanese would be asked to read it as "historic but 
obsolete". I asked whether this wording did not mean a change in the status of the 
Sudan, because the Secretary of State had said that no change would be made in the 
status of the Sudan without consulting the Sudanese people through constitutional 
channels. I was told by Beckett that it made no alteration, and if we were asked, we 
should say so: I must say that this answer does not satisfy me, and that I think it does 
alter the status, in that H.M.G. thereby admit what they have never admitted before. 
I am sure we shall be faced with very strong opposition from S.A.R., the Umma, 
and the great mass of the moderates, if this goes through, and there might easily be 
active revolt against it. To what lengths this might go I can't estimate, but we might 
have quite considerable difficulties to face. If we did, we should be placed in the 
4 Bimbashi (Major) Dassuki al-Sabbagh was an Egyptian officer stationed at Port Sudan who led his troops 
in cheering Faruq as 'King of Egypt and the Sudan' during the King's birthday celebrations in February 
1945. He was subsequently withdrawn from the Sudan but was received by Faruq on his return to Egypt 
(see inward telegram no 251 from Campbell to FO, 15 Feb 1945, FO 371/53284, no 659; letter from E W 
Thomas (commissioner, Port Sudan) to civil secretary, 12 Feb 1946, FO 371153287, no 1124; and letter 
from Campbell to Bevin, 7 May 1946, FO 371/53295, no 2116). 
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intolerable position of having to put down our own friends and supporters, on behalf 
of our opponents. I can't see S.A.R. and his people agreeing that the Egyptians have 
any "historic rights"-they believe that these were ended by the Mahdia, and that any 
sovereign rights now existing are vested in the joint Anglo-Egyptian administration, 
on behalf of the peoples of the Sudan.5 
I am also not at all sure what the reaction among our British staff will be. I 
imagine we shall have a number of resignations, and that the question of 
recruitment of new staff will be more difficult than ever. No one will wish to continue 
under the Egyptian Crown, nor to take on a new job under such conditions. These 
factors have not been considered by the Foreign Office at all; or if they have, they 
have been brushed aside by the importance of a Treaty. 
I have been trying to think what would be the result of having no Treaty on the 
Sudan. Our position would be difficult, and we should have trouble from the Ashigga 
and their following, but if we had this Treaty we should probably have just as much 
trouble and should be in a much weaker position than we are now, having lost the 
confidence of those who now support us, and having less power than now, to prevent 
Egyptian propaganda and infiltration. 
Sidki Pasha apparently intends to come here about the 16th and stay for some 
days. It is not clear in what capacity he intends to come, and whether he will be able 
to negotiate a final Treaty or not: it looks from telegrams I have seen that he intends 
to come here on an exploratory mission, and to take any concession he gets back to 
the Egyptian Delegation in Egypt for approval. It is unlikely that the Secretary of 
State would agree to negotiate on these terms as he would be put in the position of 
playing his last card, and perhaps having it trumped by the Egyptians in Cairo, and 
this is now being considered. Sir Orme Sargent asked H.E. to remain on here over 
the time of Sidki's visit, and H.E. has said he wishes me to stay with him. So I shall 
not be leaving for some time yet-perhaps about the 27th. 
I very much doubt whether this draft will satisfy the Egyptians, and believe that 
when it is offered to them they will ask for something more. How far the British will 
go to meet them I don't know, but the old tag comes to mind "facile est descensus 
averno". 
I tried to get some idea from Sir Waiter Smart about the Joint Council proposed in 
paragraph 5 of the protocol, but I don't think any clear picture has been drawn about 
the numbers or constitution of the Council, which is the present shape of the 
commission which we once suggested for discovering the views of the Sudanese. 
I think you had better carry on yourself with the Administration Conference; what 
I intended to do was to preside over the Conference and try to get an agreement over 
the Sub-Committees' reports for submission to H. E. I did not intend to take an active 
part myself as I thought I should not better appear to be backing any 
recommendations, on which I should afterwards have to advise H.E. If you would 
take my place therefore, I shall come to the recommendations fresh, and be more 
impartial, than if I had presided over the conference myself. 
I am sorry not to come out when I said I should, but I think it is more important to 
remain at this end at present. 
Will you please show this to Creed. 
5 This position was never admitted by either the British or the early Sudan governments, who styled the 
occupation of the Sudan as a 'Reconquest' undertaken to restore Egyptian rule. 
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86 FO 371153257, no 4373 11 Oct 1946 
[Egyptian sovereignty and the Sudan]: letter from Sir R Wingate1 to 
Mr Bevin 
I have never had the privilege of meeting you and I can only hope to recall my 
existence to you as one who was for 17 years Governor-General of the Sudan and 
later High Commissioner in Egypt. 
The interests of the Sudanese whom I knew so well, and of the Egyptians amongst 
whom I worked and whose servants as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and as Governor-
General under the Condominium I was, prompt me, with considerable diffidence, to 
put forward the following suggestion to you. 
You may have something of the kind already in your mind, but I am sure that, if 
H.M.G. see no insuperable objection, it would work. I myself always regarded the 
sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan, as modified by the Condominium of 1899, as 
undoubted. In fact it was I who, during the Fashoda Incident when Kitchener and 
myself met Marchand, persuaded Kitchener to fly only the Turkish (Egyptian) flag 
and to use the argument that we had reconquered the Sudan on behalf of the 
Khedive and not of the British Government. 
Arrangements between Great Britain and Egypt after 1922 may have modified, to 
some extent, the working of the Condominium in Egypt's disfavour. But it is far 
better to give Egypt a status in the Sudan openly if we wish ourselves to retain our 
paramount interest there. What must undermine our position on the spot is the 
ability of Egypt to influence the Sudanese against us because we, if we maintain our 
present position, must in effect exclude their influence. Nor does the contention that 
we are possibly right in protecting the Sudanese against Egyptian exploitation-and 
no one alive can know more at first hand of what this was than myself who saw it-
alter the fact that the assertion of the protection is the worst possible way of securing 
it. Egypt given an assured status in the Sudan is controllable there. It will depend 
largely upon the personality of the Governor-General. She will doubtless try to 
influence the Sudanese to opt for her, but she will do it openly, and it is then up to 
the Sudanese. 
1 Governor-general of the Sudan and Sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army, 1899- 1916; high 
commissioner of Egypt, 1917-1919. 
87 FO 371153315, no 4389 18 Oct 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty': FO record of first meeting with the Egyptian 
delegation [Extract] 
[Following the debriefing in Paris (see 84) preparation for the meeting with Sidqi in 
London included an attempt to get him to clarify in advance what he meant by 'symbolic 
sovereignty', and the status of his delegation to England. Sidqi proposed no alteration to 
the current administration of the Sudan and was prepared to follow the 
recommendations of an Anglo-Egyptian commission on the future form government in 
the Sudan should take. He was not planning to come with full authority to conclude a 
treaty, but hoped to be accompanied by the leaders of the two principal parties in 
Parliament (al-Nuqrashi of the Saadist Party and Haikal of the Wafdist Party), so as to 
ensure ultimate parliamentary approval of any terms agreed in London (inward telegrams 
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nos 162 & 163, Alexandria to FO, 7 Oct 1946, FO 371/53313, nos. 4161 & 4162). Bevin was 
willing to hear what Sidqi had to say, but would commit himself no further than that 
(inward telegram no 891, Paris to FO, 9 Oct 1946, FO 371/53313, no 4191). In the 
meantime the Egyptian embassy in London urged the importance of a sympathetic 
hearing of the Egyptian case concerning the Sudan, warning that neither al-Nuqrashi nor 
Haikal would attend if HMG was not prepared to talk "sympathetically" (outward 
telegram no 1840, FO to Paris, 11 Oct 1946, FO 371/53313, no 4191). In the end both 
al-Nuqrashi and Haikal refused to be part of the delegation, and Abd al-Hadi, the minister 
of foreign affairs, attended instead. Five meetings were held over the next ten days. In the 
following documents (87-93) those sections concerning defence aspects of the treaty 
have been omitted.] 
The Secretary of State said difficulties were outstanding both over the Treaty of 
Alliance and over the Sudan. He was disappointed that the question of the Sudan was 
proving so difficult because he had thought that the Egyptian Government were 
more concerned over evacuation. He had declared in the House of Commons that he 
could not leave a vacuum in Egypt and he had not yet seen anything that would, in 
his opinion, avoid the creation of the vacuum. He invited Sidky Pasha to state what 
was in his mind. 
Sidky Pasha said that after the war Egypt thought it right to express her 
aspirations which centred on two principal matters: evacuation and unity of the Nile 
Valley . .. . 
The Sudan 
Sidky Pasha said that Mr. Bevin had mentioned that Egypt had not given sufficient 
thought to the question of the Sudan. The truth was otherwise. Egypt had made 
sacrifices over the Sudan not for hundreds but for thousands of years. As Herodotus 
said: "Egypt was the gift of the Nile" and, in fact, Egypt only existed by the Nile. It was 
not possible, therefore, for Egypt to forget the Sudan. He understood that the Sudan 
was not the whole Valley of the Nile but that phrase had become a slogan. Egypt had 
always had bonds with the Valley of the Nile. But by the present use of the word 
"sovereignty" they did not mean the bond of the conqueror. Egyptians would be the 
first to say that any domination was bad. "Sovereignty" was an emblem of unity. 
Egypt wanted the well-being and progress of the Sudan and wished to prepare the 
Sudan for the day when it would be capable of self-government. Their first aim was 
the welfare of the Sudanese and they were prepared to make sacrifices for that object. 
Egypt and the Sudan had such common interests that separation of the two could 
not be envisaged. A parallel was the bond between the United Kingdom and Canada 
who were under the same King. If the Secretary of State asked why this bond 
between the two countries should be symbolic only, he would reply that the Sudan 
must remain loyal in order to preserve the common interests of the two countries. 
Egypt was the continuation of the Sudan. There must never be hostility between the 
two and they must work harmoniously together. The question of the administration 
was quite secondary. Naturally the Sudanese wanted to run their own country and 
Egypt understood this feeling. It was in Egypt's interests that the Sudan should be 
well-governed. There was no question of the ideas of sixty to eighty years ago when 
the Sudan feared Egypt. Egypt wanted to regard the Sudan as a smaller and weaker 
brother. 
The Secretary of State said he was still not clear on Sidky Pasha's attitude. His 
Excellency had said that he wanted the Sudan well and justly governed. Did he 
suggest that this was not the case at present? 
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Sidky Pasha said that the Governor-General was an Anglo-Egyptian functionary 
and he could not make such an accusation against him .... 
The Secretary of State explained that he had received Sidky Pasha's message 
concerning the Sudan in which he asked for "symbolic" treatment. He was not clear 
as to the meaning of the Egyptian requirement. 
Sidky Pasha explained that the word "symbolic" was designed to show the attitude 
of the Egyptian Government towards the question of the sovereignty of the Sudan. 
The Egyptians did not seek supremacy to exploit the country nor did they look for 
material and moral profit. There was, however, unity with the crown of Egypt and a 
unity of bond which had always existed between the two countries. Furthermore, an 
outlet was required for the Egyptian youth which emerged from the universities. The 
Egyptians were willing to offer to the Sudan experts and professors in an "elder 
brother" relationship towards the Sudan. Although Egypt had equal Treaty rights she 
had been completely excluded, and, indeed, almost disregarded in the administration 
of the Sudan. Posts in the administration had not been given to Egyptians and he 
complained that Egyptian influence had been consciously brushed aside. Egypt must 
at all times have the loyalty of the Sudan as it is from that country that her prosperity 
originates. 
The Secretary of State replied that he had tried and failed to understand the 
Egyptian point of view. He, however, took exception to the statements in the 
Egyptian press which suggested to him that the Egyptians were determined at a later 
date to secure British evacuation from that area. 
Sidky Pasha asked the Foreign Secretary to disregard the views of the extremists 
in the service of the Opposition. Egypt sought only a union with the Sudan based on 
the interests of the Sudanese. Immediately the union was recognised the critics of 
Great Britain would disappear. 
The Secretary of State said that the only impression of the Egyptian point of view 
which he possessed was in the draft protocol at the end of the Treaty, the meaning of 
which was not clear to him. 
After some discussion Sidky Pasha agreed to submit a personal note which would 
explain the Egyptian point of view. 
The Secretary of State pointed out to Sidky Pasha that his visit to this country did 
not permit him to take decisions on these matters, and he was placed in a certain 
difficulty in putting forward suggestions. 
The Secretary of State said he could not accept the position where he could come 
to a conclusion on his side and then someone in Egypt would make it a jumping-off 
board for demanding further concessions. 
Sidky Pasha assured the Foreign Secretary that he and the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister represented the large majority in the Egyptian Parliament and they could be 
relied upon not to raise the demands after their return to their own country. 
In conclusion, the Secretary of State stated that he would put forward for 
discussion a re-draft of Articles 11 and Ill of the Treaty and he asked Sidky Pasha in 
his turn to submit his personal note on the Sudan question and to reconsider the 
time required for the evacuation. 
The terms of a communication to the press were agreed and a further meeting was 
fixed for 11.30 a.m. on the 19th October, 1946. 
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88 FO 371/53257, no 4390 19 Oct 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty': FO record of second meeting with the 
Egyptian delegation. Annex: translation of a personal note by Sidky 
Pasha on the Sudan question [Extract] 
Sidky Pasha handed the Secretary of State a note (annexed) embodying his views on 
the Sudan, which was read out in English by Mr. Howe. 
The Secretary of State said that he was concerned with what was involved in the 
conception of sovereignty. He took it that Sidky Pasha would agree that until the 
Sudan achieved self-government the present administration should continue. 
Sidky Pasha said that until Great Britain and Egypt reached an agreement on the 
form which self-government for the Sudan would take, the present administration 
should continue. There was no question of change in the currency, the stamps, or 
the method of the appointment of the staff of the Sudan Government. 
The Secretary of State enquired why it was desired to make this change regarding 
sovereignty in the Sudan now. 
Sidky Pasha said that the present situation was not ideal for Egypt, but it was 
necessary for her to reach agreement with Britain on the measures to be taken to 
promote self-government. Until self-government was achieved there would be no 
need to make drastic changes. It was Egypt's right that the Sudan should be under 
the same crown. 
The Secretary of State said that directly the sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan 
was stated, the Sudanese would think that Great Britain had surrendered her 
position there. 
Sidky Pasha replied that there was no fear of this. The British Governor-General 
and the British character of the Administration would remain. The only thing that 
would take place would be the reaffirmation that the Sudan remained under the 
Egyptian Crown. 
The Secretary of State said that there was agitation in the Sudan. He had received 
protests from Sudanese against any change.1 
Sidky Pasha said he had received messages from Sudanese to the contrary. 
The Secretary of State said that Sidky Pasha spoke about Dominion status. But if 
the Sudanese chose Dominion status under the Egyptian Crown the position of Great 
Britain would be gravely prejudiced. 
Sidky Pasha said that when the time came for the Sudanese to choose, a new 
political situation might have arisen and matters would probably have to be re-
examined. In the meantime nothing would be changed. Egypt could not wait longer 
for a settlement. It was not the first time that she had asked for a reaffirmation of her 
sovereignty over the Sudan. The position had always been provisional in the past. 
Now it should be made definite as part of a general settlement. 
The Secretary of State asked whether he was to understand that if sovereignty 
were conceded to the King of Egypt this would not give Egypt a greater right to enter 
into the administration. 
1 One such telegram of protest had been sent from SAR to Bevin (though probably not yet received or read) 
that same day (see FO 371/53258, no 4468). 
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Sidky Pasha said that this was correct since the 1899 agreement continued. The 
consecration of the bond between the two countries would not of itself involve 
greater Egyptian intervention. The normal relationship between the Egyptian Prime 
Minister and the Governor-General would continue. Egypt had no wish to meddle in 
the affairs of the Sudan. 
The Secretary of State referred to the ancient titles of the King of Egypt and asked 
what title King Farouk would wish to take. 
Sidky Pasha said that His Majesty would be called King of Egypt and the Sudan. 
The Secretary of State said it was very difficult to see how the administration 
would work. What period did Sidky Pasha envisage before Great Britain and Egypt 
dealt with self-government for the Sudan? 
Sidky Pasha replied that that will emerge by agreement as a result of talks 
between the two countries. 
The Secretary of State said that it was difficult to accept a principle until you knew 
what was to follow. If he accepted Egyptian sovereignty the decision of the Sudanese 
on their future would be prejudiced in advance. 
Sidky Pasha replied that this would not be so, because no one could deny the bond 
between the two countries. Egyptian intervention as sovereign would only be 
designed for the well-being of the Sudanese and to develop their sense of 
responsibility. Egypt would not prejudice the position of His Majesty's Government 
in the Sudan. 
The Secretary of State asked whether Sidky Pasha would begin the Sudan protocol 
by reaffirming the condominium agreement. 
Sidky Pasha replied that he would reaffirm article 11 of the 1936 Treaty less the 
last sentence of the first paragraph.2 Egypt had affirmed her sovereignty in the past 
but Great Britain had not recognised this affirmation. Egypt did not wish to continue 
to be faced with this negative attitude. 
Sidky Pasha said that the King of Egypt had the powers indicated by the Egyptian 
Constitution and by becoming King of Egypt and the Sudan no new rights would be 
created for him. 
The Secretary of State asked whether a statement to this effect might be put in the 
Sudan protocol. 
Sidky Pasha replied that out of regard for the person of the King this could not 
appear, though the fact would remain that he would not have added powers. 
The Secretary of State asked whether the position of the Sudan Defence Force 
would be affected. 
Sidky Pasha replied that nothing at all would be changed in the Sudan. 
The Secretary of State asked when, if Egyptian sovereignty were conceded, Egypt 
would wish to begin the movement for a change in the administration of the Sudan. 
Sidky Pasha replied-as soon as possible. Egypt was thinking along the same lines 
as His Majesty's Government in regard to the promotion of self-government for the 
Sudanese. 
The Secretary of State said that if the Sudanese opted for independence the issue 
was clear; if only for self-government the situation for His Majesty's Government 
would be very difficult. He had the impression that that was the position in which 
Egypt was trying to put him. 
2 For article 11, paragraph 1, see 6. 
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Sidky Pasha replied that this was not the case. It was His Majesty's Government 
who had first spoken of self-government for the Sudan. Egypt was willing to work on 
the same lines and had no interest in embarrassing His Majesty's Government. 
The Secretary of State pointed out that the British proposals for self-government 
pre-supposed that the question of sovereignty would not arise. He was now asked to 
agree that before self-government was considered the Sudan should go under 
Egyptian sovereignty. 
Sidky Pasha said that there were examples of highly developed countries such as 
Canada which were self-governed though under a common monarchy. Canada 
encountered no difficulties and was not troubled by this arrangement. The Sudan 
should have a normal not an abnormal status. It was in fact a country under the 
sovereignty of Egypt with a special regime. It was right that the Sudan should have a 
King. He was not anxious to go too fast about self-government. Britain and Egypt 
should decide together what was a propitious moment. 
The Secretary of State pointed out that, should the Sudanese decide on 
independence, Egyptian sovereignty must necessarily go. Was it the Egyptian claim, 
he asked, that sovereignty would remain after self-government had been arranged 
and was it recognised that the right of decision would rest with the Sudanese? 
Sidky Pasha replied that he thought that it would be many years before self-
government was attained. Egypt could not envisage a hostile country on her borders 
and the Sudan must always remain a friendly neighbour. 
The Secretary of State pointed out that in Great Britain we had always insisted 
upon the right of a dependent nation, on reaching the status of self-government, to 
secede if it so wished. He reminded Sidky Pasha of recent events in India. 
Sidky Pasha agreed, but he pointed out that the right of secession would be a 
voluntary action on the part of Egypt. Furthermore he felt that it was too early to 
discuss these matters, as one could not foresee the distant future. There would be, in 
his opinion, some long time before this matter became a live question and one could 
not foretell the situation at that time. 
The Secretary of State insisted that the situation should be made perfectly clear. 
He asked Sidky Pasha to say if the Sudanese were being given a chance to be free or if 
the Egyptians were seeking a lasting settlement of sovereignty. It must be quite clear 
that the Sudanese were free to renounce the sovereignty of Egypt if they so wished. 
Great Britain had held a position in the Sudan which she was being asked to 
surrender, and before she did so he must be perfectly clear on this particular point. 
Sidky Pasha replied that nothing in the Sudan would be changed vis-a-vis 
England. On the question of sovereignty he felt it was impossible to speak now. No 
one knew what developments would be taking place over the next half-century and 
he felt that the question which Mr. Bevin had asked him was a matter for our 
children to decide. Furthermore, the United Nations Organisation was discussing all 
these things and seeking their solution. There was a forward movement of ideas and 
in his opinion it was not possible to look so far ahead. 
The Secretary of State asked for provision for these difficulties to be made now 
and said he sought to avoid handicapping our children when the time came to seek a 
solution to this problem. He said frankly he must have an assurance that a situation 
was not created where the Sudanese could never be independent. He pointed out to 
Sidky Pasha that the Egyptians had sought to embody in a protocol between two 
Powers the future of a third party to which Great Britain and Egypt would feel 
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committed in the future. He repeated that the position must not be brought about in 
which the Sudan, struggling for independence, would forever be under Egypt. He 
wanted to make it quite clear to the British people that nothing was being done to 
prejudice the right of self-determination. 
Sidky Pasha replied that if the Sudanese reached a certain point of development 
they would surely become independent. Nothing on paper could prejudice the right 
of independence nor could it bind a people in search of liberty. It was a universal 
principle and not a matter for incorporation in a treaty. He went on to say that as the 
proposed treaty was based on the United Nations Charter, which affirms 
independence of nations, he felt it was unnecessary in any new agreement to repeat 
what had already been specified in the United Nations Charter. 
The Secretary of State felt that the reference to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter 
should be incorporated in the treaty. 
Sidky Pasha felt this was already covered in the preamble. 
The Secretary of State asked for time to study the matter further. He stated he had 
received a general statement on the Sudan from Sidky Pasha which, he understood, 
to be a personal view only. He would like to examine how this could be shaped into a 
draft article of the treaty. 
Sidky Pasha repeated that his draft represented his personal view only but he was 
certain that it came very near to the opinion of his country. 
The Secretary of State stated that he would like to examine these matters further 
and would get in touch with Sidky Pasha again on Tuesday . ... 
Annex to 88 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan is a historical and juridical fact which has been 
solemnly recognised by the British Government both before and after the 1899 
agreement. 
The sole object of the 1899 agreement was to regulate the administration of the 
Sudan and, even though Great Britain has asked for and obtained the right of very 
extensive association in this administration, she has not intended to affect the 
principle of Egyptian sovereignty. 
Quite on the contrary, Great Britain has affirmed this sovereignty on numerous 
occasions in her contacts with foreign Powers and has always declared that she was 
acting in the Sudan only to establish the authority of the Egyptian Sovereign. 
In asking to-day that the new treaty of alliance with Great Britain should include a 
protocol reaffirming the existence of the bond uniting Egypt to the Sudan under the 
same crown, the Egyptian Government takes its stand as much on legal grounds as 
on those of vital common interests. 
The spirit underlying this bond is not one of domination nor is it the instrument 
of a policy of expansion and exploitation. 
In effect, Egypt wishes that the chief object of the policy to be followed in the 
Sudan should be to ensure the well-being of the Sudanese, the respect and 
development of their interests and their preparation to take over the direction of 
their own affairs at the right moment. 
To take more precise examples, Sidky Pasha contemplates the future relations of 
Egypt and the Sudan from the viewpoint of the existing relations between Great 
Britain and her Dominions. 
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This example abundantly proves that allegiance to the same crown is in perfect 
accord with full independence in internal affairs and with an administrative regime 
entirely conducted by the inhabitants of the respective territories. 
This link with the crown has, besides, allowed a very close sacred union in the last 
two wars. 
Egypt will never be able to accept that this bond should be broken and that the 
Sudan, whence come the sources of the life of Egypt, should be able to fall one day 
under a foreign domination which could prove hostile. 
Until such time as the Sudanese are in a position themselves to take over the 
direction of their own affairs, a time which he hopes will be not far off, Sidky Pasha 
would be disposed to accept the maintenance of the present regime which resulted 
from the 1899 agreement. 
Furthermore, Sidky Pasha could not understand that the British Government 
could invoke the rights and the interests of the Sudanese as a reason for hesitating to 
accept the mention of Egyptian sovereignty in a protocol to the treaty which is to be 
concluded. 
Such a mention could not harm any right of the Sudanese since, as Great Britain 
formally recognises, they have not yet reached a degree of political evolution which 
would permit them to express their wishes freely. 
So far as the interests of the Sudanese are concerned, it must be recalled that 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan has always manifested itself as a care for the 
well-being of the Sudanese and by powerful help in all spheres of Sudanese life; this 
help has been given by Egypt without any quid pro quo and with no ulterior motive. 
In addition, the Sudan does not by itself form a political entity and it is clearly in 
the interests of the Sudanese to continue to be joined to an organised State to which 
they are joined by historical bonds and which has a perfect understanding of their 
interests by reason of the existing geographical, racial, religious and linguistic bonds. 
89 FO 371153318, no 4814 23 Oct 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty': FO record of third meeting with the Egyptian 
delegation [Extract] 
... The Secretary of State said that he had read Sidky's [sic] Pasha's draft Sudan 
protocol. It was on lines which he would find very difficult to accept. The more he 
looked into the question of the Sudan the more he felt that it was not right 
permanently and finally to decide now that the Sudan was under the sovereignty of 
the Egyptian Crown. 
Sidky Pasha wished to make his position quite clear. It was not the intention of 
Egypt to impose the future regime. When the time came the Sudanese would 
determine their future. 
The Secretary of State asked whether His Excellency meant that when it came to 
the question of self-government or independence, then the Sudanese would also be 
free to determine their own sovereignty as well? 
Sidky Pasha replied that as explained in his note there was no doubt that the 
Sudan was vital to Egypt and must be friendly to Egypt. The note was also clear that 
the interests of the Sudanese should be kept in mind. 
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Britain was administrating the Sudan and was on the spot. Egypt had noth-
ing to do with the administration and could not interfere with the wishes of 
the Sudanese. It was, therefore, unfair for the Sudanese to choose their future 
now. 
The Secretary of State said he approached this question from a different point of 
view. He did not want to be unfair to Egypt when the time came or to impose British 
sovereignty at the expense of Egyptian. 
He would like to say at the beginning of the Sudan protocol that the primary aim 
of the High Contracting Parties should be the welfare of the Sudanese and their 
preparation for self-government. 
Sidky Pasha agreed. 
The Secretary of State said that the best way of achieving this was not to send a 
Joint Commission to the Sudan on a specific date in the near future but to set up a 
continuing organ-a Joint Council-which would study, say, every two or three 
years, the development of the Sudanese towards self-government and report to the 
two Governments. Self-government would come in stages and even in provinces 
(since development was not uniform throughout the Sudan). He thought that 
though it was very difficult for His Majesty's Government to make a declaration on 
sovereignty, through such an instrument as a Joint Council, the rights of both 
parties would be recognised. 
Sidky Pasha felt, and emphasised that the whole of Egypt felt, that there was a 
legitimate union between Egypt and the Sudan. He did not use the word 
"sovereignty" but "union under the Egyptian Crown." A;:, regards a Joint Council, the 
Egyptian members would have no responsibility and would have their position 
prejudiced by the British administration. The present state of affairs would be 
perpetuated. He thought that to send a Commission now to the Sudan would stir up 
a great deal of trouble. 
The Secretary of State said that the members of his proposed Council would be 
independent persons of high standing and not Government officials. Its object would 
be to examine what the administration was doing and to remove the Egyptians' fears 
that they were being kept out of the Sudan. However, he did not wish to press the 
matter now. The Secretary of State said that it was quite clear from Sidky Pasha's 
draft that the administration was to remain as at present. 
Sidky Pasha agreed. He said that his draft was extremely discreet and designed to 
meet Mr. Bevin's point of view. Even the Sudanese could not contest it. The 
Egyptians were not claiming rights or recognition of something new. They only 
asked that something already existing should not be disturbed. 
Sidky Pasha further observed that he had not fully applied his rights under article 
11 of the 1936 Treaty. The moment he pressed for them he encountered difficulties 
and he realised that the questions were best left alone. There could not be two 
administrators in the Sudan. 
The Secretary of State thought it was a question of the meaning of words. No 
international lawyer had ever defined the meaning of the word "sovereignty". 
Sidky Pasha replied that he had not spoken of sovereignty in his draft but of 
"unity." The most important part of the Sudan was almost Egyptian in character. 
Arab tribes in the Sudan had their counterparts with the same names in Egypt and 
the tribes had the same origins. 
The Secretary of State said that neither he nor Sidky Pasha was in a position to 
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accept any draft finally as they were not plenipotentiaries. Drafts would have to be 
put before the Egyptian Government. 
Sidky Pasha replied that naturally this was so but he knew what Egypt wanted. 
The Secretary of State said that he knew what Britain wanted. The difficulty was to 
reconcile the two points of view. 
Sidky Pasha said that the question of the Sudan was the synthesis of the whole 
Treaty. If Egypt undertook great responsibilities in war in Egypt or in neighbour-
ing countries, thus making great sacrifices and freeing British troops, it was not a 
great thing to ask in return that their point of view on the Sudan should be 
accepted. 
The Secretary of State suggested that officials on both sides should look into the 
matter in the afternoon. He would have to consult the Prime Minister and put the 
matter to the Cabinet, and would not be able to say anything definite in any case 
until he knew whether Sidky Pasha's attitude was also the official Egyptian atti-
tude. 
Sidky Pasha replied that he felt he had taken into consideration both the 
administration of the Sudan and the welfare of the Sudanese. He was asking for 
something which Britain never denied. He was confident that he could rally Egypt 
behind him. 
The Secretary of State said that so far the discussions had only been exploratory. It 
was difficult to make progress until proposals came from Egypt which were known to 
have the Egyptian Delegation behind them. 
Sidky Pasha replied that he understood this, but the object of his visit 
accompanied by the vice-chairman of the biggest party in Parliament was to take 
back the British point of view to Egypt. So far this fully met the Egyptian point of 
view. Immediately he returned to Egypt he would submit the British views to the 
King, the Cabinet and the Delegation. When he had secured general agreement he 
would ask the Secretary of State to ask the members of the British Delegation to go 
to Egypt again to take the final decision. This would not take long. He had counted 
on leaving the next day and hoped to have an answer for Mr. Bevin by the end of the 
following week. 
The Secretary of State said that he still felt that a difficulty remained. The 
Sudanese might be consulted on the question of sovereignty. 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said that if they were ripe to decide that, then they were ripe to 
decide their whole future. But we all agreed that they were not yet ready for such a 
decision. 
The Secretary of State said that he would like the officials to meet that afternoon 
to complete a clean draft of the whole Treaty. 
Sidky Pasha said that he agreed to the redraft of Articles II and Ill which had been 
jointly prepared and reiterated that he agreed to the 1st September, 1949, as the final 
date for evacuation. 
Amr Pasha suggested that no redrafting was necessary on the Sudan protocol, but 
the Secretary of State thought there was some wording which required looking into. 
The Secretary of State said that he would like one more meeting. Thursday 
afternoon would be possible and he would try to arrange the time later. He would do 
his best to meet His Excellency's wish to leave for Egypt as soon as possible. 
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90 PREM 8/1388/1, D0(124)46 23 Oct 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations': memorandum by Mr Bevin for 
Cabinet Defence Committee [Extract] 
[Bevin reported back to the Cabinet Defence Committee after the third meeting with the 
Egyptian delegation. An earlier draft of this memo, written by Howe immediately after the 
second meeting, gave greater emphasis to the governor-general's warning of unrest in the 
Sudan following any recognition of Egyptian sovereignty. In that draft Bevin noted, 'I 
should here record that the Governor-General of the Sudan, while prepared to accept my 
proposed formula in the last resort in the higher interests of Anglo-Egyptian 
understanding, at the present difficult juncture, has warned me most emphatically that 
the recognition of Egyptian sovereignty, qualified though it be, will lead to widespread 
political ferment in the Sudan and may be to outbreaks of disorder, for the reason that 
the highly excitable Sudanese will regard such recognition as weakening the position of 
the Sudan Government (and of this country) and strengthening that of Egypt, a situation 
of which the Egyptians and their supporters in the Sudan will not be slow to take 
advantage' ('Preliminary draft of memorandum on the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
negotiations', 19 Oct 1946, FO 371/53316, no 4480). With the outcome of the third 
meeting the danger of widespread disorder seemed to have receded, and a more 
optimistic, though still cautious memo was presented to Cabinet.] 
... (d) The Egyptian Ministers have again assured me that in asking for recognition 
of Egyptian "sovereignty" over the Sudan they are not asking for any change in the 
existing status of the Sudan; and in particular it is not their intention to touch the 
existing system of administration until the Sudanese people themselves have decided 
what their ultimate future status is to be; nor the arrangements under which the 
military defence of the country is at present conducted. All they ask is that Egyptian 
Sovereignty, which certainly exists in some measure as witness the fact that the 
Governor-General is appointed by Egyptian decree, shall receive recognition instead 
of being passed over in silence. Having regard to the agreement now reached on the 
defence clauses of the treaty, I have authorised my Department to meet the Egyptian 
officials in an endeavour to reduce these assurances, and our recognition of the King 
of Egypt's sovereignty, to a mutually acceptable form which shall not prejudice our 
present position in the territory or the ultimate freedom of the inhabitants. I wish 
particularly to emphasise that under the proposed arrangements the Sudan will be in 
the same position from the point of view of imperial defence as it is at present. At the 
same time, I must add that any reference to the existence of Egyptian sovereignty 
may create considerable political tension-even if only temporary-in the Sudan, 
and that the possibility of disorder cannot be excluded. In that event we must be 
prepared to give full support, military and political, to the Governor General. 
91 PREM 8/1388/1, DO 30(46) 24 Oct 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: Cabinet Defence Committee 
minutes. Annex: minute by Lord Jowitt (lord chancellor) to Mr Bevin 
on sovereignty [Extract] 
The Sudan 
The Foreign Secretary said that in the course of his discussions with the Egyptian 
Ministers, the latter had again assured him that in asking for recognition of 
"Egyptian sovereignty" over the Sudan they were not asking for any change in its 
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existing status. In particular, it was not their intention to touch the existing system 
of administration until the Sudanese people themselves had decided what their 
ultimate future status was to be, nor would any of the present arrangements be 
altered under which the military defence of the country was at present conducted. 
Nevertheless, they had insisted that Egyptian severeignty, which certainly existed in 
some measure, for for [sic] example the Governor General was appointed by Egyptian 
decree, should receive recognition instead of being omitted from the Treaty. It was 
on this point that the main difficulty of the present negotiations occurred and the 
Egyptians appeared to be adamant that if no reference was included about 
sovereignty rights, they would not be prepared to conclude a Treaty. The point, 
therefore, which he had had to consider was whether, by maintaining our objection 
to including the reference to Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, we were prepared 
to run the risk of foregoing any defence agreement with Egypt. He had therefore 
examined exhaustively the present legal position of the United Kingdom on the issue 
of sovereignty rights from the beginning of our conquest of the Sudan under Field 
Marshal Kitchener, which when concluded, had led to the agreement of January, 
1899, up to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. He had therefore asked for legal 
advice from the Lord Chancellor's office, in order to bring out quite clearly what 
would be the position of the United Kingdom if the Egyptians thought fit to refer this 
question to the United Nations Organisation or to an international court. 
The Committee was then read a statement compiled by the Lord Chancellor giving 
his opinion as to the juridical position new prevailing in regard to the Sudan. 
The Foreign Secretary, continuing, said that with these legal conclusions before 
him and having regard to the agreement now reached on the defence clauses of the 
Treaty, he had authorised his Department to meet the Egyptian officials in an 
endeavour to draft a mutually acceptable form of words which would convey a 
certain measure of our recognition of the King of Egypt's sovereignty over the 
Sudan, but which would not prejudice our position in the territory, or the ultimate 
freedom of the inhabitants to choose the form of status they wished. He had received 
a draft of the clause which the Egyptian Ministers would like to see included in the 
Treaty but, with the foregoing considerations in mind, he had re-drafted this clause 
as follows:-
"The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the 
Sudan (within the framework of that unity between the Sudan and Egypt 
which results from a common Crown) will have for its essential objectives to 
assure the wellbeing of the Sudanese, the development of their interests and 
their active preparation for self-government and the exercise of the right to 
choose freely the future status of the Sudan. Until the High Contracting 
Parties can in full common agreement realise this latter objective the 
Agreement of 1899 will continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936 together 
with its Annexes and paragraphs 14 to 16 of the agreed minute annexed to the 
same Treaty will remain in force notwithstanding the first Article of the 
present Treaty. 
Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the present status of the Sudan, nor 
impair the right of the Sudanese people, when deciding the future status of 
the Sudan, to choose in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
the complete independence of their country." 
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The Prime Minister said he was much impressed with the legal arguments set 
forward by the Lord Chancellor and he felt that we should be bound to accept it as 
governing the position of the United Kingdom if the issue of sovereignty was referred 
to an international organisation for settlement. In his opinion, and remembering 
back to the incident of Fashoda, he had never thought that there was doubt about the 
rights of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. There had recently been a tendency to 
press our claims in this connection further than was supported by the facts. He 
suggested that our policy in the negotiations should be based on the opinion given by 
the Lord Chancellor. 
The Minister without Portfolio1 said he felt we were bound to accept the legal 
arguments governing this question but he would ask to be assured that the form of 
words ultimately decided on for inclusion in the Treaty should not omit the question 
of consulting the Sudanese people, as to their future and that no settlement was 
reached with the Egyptians which might lead to a situation whereby we had not the 
same strategic control over the Sudan as we had at the present moment. 
The Secretary of State for the Dominions2 made a similar point in that, whatever 
form of agreement was finally reached, we should be quite certain that it would not 
invalidate our present position in the Sudan, both from the strategic and 
administrative aspects, and that no alteration to its present status should be made 
until the Sudanese people were in a position to determine their future. 
The Chancellor of the ExchequeYJ said that, whilst he could not gainsay the 
legal opinion, he had previously thought in 1932 when he was at the Foreign 
Office, that the issue on the question of sovereignty had turned rather on the 
meaning of the word "condominium". He was apprehensive lest any admittance by 
us of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan might ultimately lead to an alteration 
of our strategic position. The Sudan itself was not a natural or geographical 
entity, but had been artificially created as such, and he suggested that some alter-
native might be found by splitting the country and allowing the Egyptians rights 
over the Northern half, whilst retaining British control over the Southern half to 
ensure that our strategic position in our Colonies to the South was in no way 
weakened. 
The Prime Minister said he thought this suggestion would not satisfy the Egyptian 
Government nor the Sudanese and might, on examination, prove not to be of such 
strategic benefit as might at first be apparent. On the subject of the Treaty itself, he 
agreed that the rights which we obtained from it were largely dependent on the 
goodwill of the Egyptians. On the issue of the Sudan, he felt that, having regard to 
the importance of some form of agreement on defence with the Egyptian 
Government and of our position as legally defined by the Lord Chancellor, the 
Foreign Secretary should be authorised to proceed with the discussions on the basis 
of his draft clause. This clause, whilst admitting of a certain measure of Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Sudan, would guarantee that the Sudan would be in the same 
position from the point of view of Imperial defence, and that the administration of 
the country would remain as at present, until the Sudanese were in a position to say 
what they wanted. 
1 Mr A V Alexander. 2 Viscount Addison. 3 Dr H J N Dalton. 
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There was general agreement with this view. 
The Committee:-
[91] 
( a) Approved the draft wording of Articles 2 and 3 of the proposed Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty. 
(b) Accepted the date for the total evacuation of British Forces from Egypt as 1st 
September, 1949. 
(c) Agreed that the question of Air Transit Rights should be discussed by the 
proposed Anglo-Egyptian Joint Defence Board. 
(d) Authorised the Foreign Secretary to negotiate with representatives of the 
Egyptian Government a clause for insertion in the Treaty which, whilst 
recognising a measure of Egyptian Sovereignty over the Sudan would safeguard 
our present defence and administrative rights, and would not prejudice the rights 
of the Sudanese to choose the ultimate status of their country. 
Annex to 91 
You asked me on Tuesday evening, 22nd October, to give you an opinion as to the 
juridical position now prevailing in regard to the Sudan. By that I mean the 
conclusion to which an International Court of Lawyers would be likely to come to if 
the matter were referred to them. 
I disregard entirely any questions of the political issues involved and give you my 
opinion on the bare legal question. 
I should state at the outset that there is no subject on which lawyers are more 
divided than this question of sovereignty. No one has succeeded in defining the 
conception underlying sovereignty. 
There are two schools of thought about it and it is therefore impossible to 
pronounce on the matter with any certainty, but having formed a view on what is 
admittedly a juridical question I proceed to give it to you. 
We start with the position that prior to 1882 the Sudan was part of the undisputed 
possessions of the Khedive subject to the suzerainty of the Sultan. It is for those who 
seek to assert that the sovereignty has passed from Egypt to state when and by what 
means this has been brought about. 
Two methods have been suggested-one, conquest; two, by the Agreement of 
January 1899. It is to be observed that Lord Salisbury in his speech in the House of 
Lords on the 7th February 1899 preferred to rest our claim on conquest, and to a 
consideration of that claim I now pass. 
The title by conquest 
It is obviously material to consider in the first instance who was the person 
conquered and by whom was that person conquered. A title by conquest cannot arise 
unless the person conquered was previously sovereign and if the previous sovereign 
is himself concerned in bringing about the conquest, I do not think that such a claim 
can be established. It is the fact that the operations undertaken were taken against 
rebels and by a joint force composed in part of His [sic, Her] Majesty's troops and in 
part of Egyptian troops. The Officer in Command was Sir Herbert Kitchener who 
held Her Majesty's Commission but was also Sirdar and that is to say, an officer of the 
Khedive. Three-quarters of the cost appear to have been borne on the Egyptian 
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Treasury. These considerations alone satisfy me that any claim based on conquest is 
untenable. Recently our forces invaded Belgium to get rid of a foreign invader; we 
operated there with the approval and co-operation of the lawful Government of 
Belgium. Is it conceivable that anyone could assert that having "reconquered" 
Belgium we were entitled to claim sovereignty by right of conquest? 
Secondly, to establish title by conquest it is necessary to show that after conquest 
came an annexation. It is quite clear that there was not only no claim to annexation 
made on behalf of this country, but it was in the most express terms asserted that the 
sovereignty of Egypt was restored and the Egyptian flag at the time of Fashoda was 
the only flag flown by Sir Herbert Kitchener. 
On both these grounds, I come to the definite conclusion that a claim based on 
conquest is untenable. In this I am in agreement with Mr. Headlam-Morley4 and I 
think also in agreement with Sir Maurice Amos5 who places our title upon the 
Agreement of 1899, which I now proceed to consider. 
The claim based on the agreement 
I should explain in the first place that an English lawyer would confine himself to the 
text of the Agreement which in his view would have exclusive authority. A 
continental lawyer would have regard also to contemporary facts and expositions by 
the chief actors. In my view, whichever system of construction is adopted, the result 
is the same. 
I regard the Agreement as proceeding on the basis that it leaves the juristic 
sovereignty where it was before-that is to say, in Egypt with the suzerainty of 
Turkey, and ·deals with a system of administration and law-making for the 
reconquered provinces. So far as administration is concerned, it is to my mind plain 
that this does not involve an assertion of sovereignty-because it must surely be one 
of the attributes of sovereignty that any such arrangements in regard to the 
administration of the sovereign's territory may be made as seem fit to the sovereign. 
So far as law-making is concerned, I agree that this may be regarded as one of the 
criteria of sovereignty, but as the law-maker is to be the Governor-General of 
the Sudan who is to be appointed by Khedivial decree, (albeit with the consent of the 
British Government) I cannot see that this involves a derogation from sovereignty. 
There remains the question of the flags. I do not think the fact that the flags are to 
be used together throughout the Sudan (except in Suakin)6 is in any sense conclusive 
of the point of where the sovereignty resides. I should suppose that the American flag 
would fly over the American base at Bermuda even though the sovereignty in the 
whole of Bermuda rests in the British Crown. So far as Suakin is concerned, it is 
impossible to separate this from the rest of the Sudan and to say that there is one 
sovereignty in Suakin and another and different sovereignty over the rest of the 
Sudan. 
I regard the Agreement as being deliberately made so as not to involve a question 
of sovereignty which in its turn would have raised the question of Turkish 
4 (Sir) lames Headlam-Morley (1863-1929); historical adviser to FO from 1920. 
5 Sir Maurice Amos (1872- 1940); judicial adviser to government of Egypt, 1919- 1925. 
6 Egypt retained the Red Sea port of Suakin throughout the period of the Mahdist state in the Sudan; thus 
Suakin was never 'reconquered' and in fact was one of the bases from which the subsequent 'reconquest' 
was launched. 
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suzerainty. It was an Agreement by which this country secured for itself certain 
preferential treatment in the Sudan and the right to share in its development. It was 
not in my view an Agreement affecting the juridical sovereignty which had pre-
existed. 
I therefore come to the conclusion that:-
(1) the title was originally Egyptian 
(2) that it has not been shown that this title was taken from Egypt and vested in 
whole or in part in this country. 
I conclude by saying that I feel that this question really depends on the meaning of 
the word "sovereignty" which, as I have previously said, has never yet been defined. 
Of course, if you define sovereignty as resting in that person who has the power to 
govern so as to secure peace and good order it follows that we together with Egypt 
are sovereigns of the Sudan, but if you accept the conclusion which I prefer that the 
juridical sovereignty can lie exclusively in one power and that a share in 
administration and control can lie in two, then I think we are not the sovereign. In 
my view the Agreement, which is inconsistent in its terms, was a practical working 
agreement and was deliberately drawn so as not to involve any transfer of the 
sovereignty in its juridical conception. 
92 FO 371153316, no 4455 24 Oct 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty': FO record of an understanding reached at the 
fourth meeting between Mr Bevin and the Egyptian delegation. 
Annexes [Extract] 
Sudan protocol 
Mr. Bevin, accompanied by Lord Stansgate and Sir R. Campbell, called on Sidky 
Pasha at Claridge's Hotel on the evening of 24th October for a personal discussion 
with His Excellency and Abdel Hadi Pasha and the Egyptian Ambassador in order to 
clear up outstanding points and, in particular, the question of the Sudan. 
No notes were taken. 
Mr. Bevin pointed out that Sidky Pasha's revise (Annex B) of the draft Sudan 
Protocol left with him by Sir R. Camp bell earlier in the day (Annex A) presented him 
with certain difficulties. It was of great importance for him that it should be possible 
to explain clearly to the Sudanese people and to the British Parliament that nothing 
agreed now in the Treaty changed the status of the Sudan. He had given an 
undertaking that no change of status should be made until the Sudanese people had 
been consulted. He had therefore chosen words for his draft designed to make 
possible a clear explanation that no change of status was being made. 
The Egyptians stated that there was in fact no change of status; all they asked was 
that the existing status should be affirmed. 
Mr. Bevin pointed out that it was a practical question, namely, that of making this 
clear to the Sudanese and to Parliament. He had had conversations with the 
Governor-General of the Sudan, who had pointed out that the words proposed by the 
Egyptians would make this explanation very difficult. 
Mr. Bevin, therefore, had proposed the words "within the framework of that unity 
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between the Sudan and Egypt which results from the common Crown." Sidky Pasha 
had amended this to read: "within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and 
Egypt under a common Crown." It would help him if his own words could be 
retained. If, however, this was not possible for Ismail Sidky Pasha, it would help him 
if His Excellency would agree to insert the word "historic" or "existing" before the 
word "unity." 
Ismail Sidky Pasha argued against this that to the Egyptians the suggested 
insertion would imply that the unity was a thing of the past. 
Mr. Bevin agreed to omit it. 
Ismail Sidky Pasha then suggested the substitution of the words "the Crown of 
Egypt" for "a common Crown," and after some discussion Abdel Hadi Pasha stated 
that the Egyptian side would agree to the words "the common Crown of Egypt." 
Another point which Mr. Bevin urged that it was essential to make clear was that 
the Sudanese could, if they so desire, choose independence when they had reached 
the stage of being able to chose the future status of the territory. 
With the foregoing in mind Mr. Bevin had proposed the phrase "within the 
framework of that unity between the Sudan and Egypt which results from a common 
Crown" in the draft left with Ismail Sidky Pasha in the afternoon, and he now 
proposed an insertion in the second sentence of the draft designed to make clear that 
the Sudanese would be consulted when the time came for the two High Contracting 
Parties to realise in full common agreement the objectives stated in the first 
sentence. Mr. Bevin proposed that in the sentence beginning "Until the High 
Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realise this latter objective the 
Agreement of 1899 will continue, &c." There should be inserted between the words 
"objective" and "the Agreement" the words "in consultation with the Sudanese." 
Ismail Sidky Pasha asked whether this affected the intention of the draft that the 
objective should be realised in full common agreement between the two High 
Contracting Parties, which meant that the decision lay with these two parties. 
Mr. Bevin said that this was not the intention, but that there should be 
consultation of the Sudanese before the two Contracting Parties reached their 
agreement. 
Ismail Sidky Pasha took note of this and agreed to the proposed insertion with the 
substitution of "after consultation" for "in consultation." This would make the point 
clear. Mr. Bevin agreed. 
Mr. Bevin also accepted the deletion of the final paragraph contained in the draft 
left with Sidky Pasha by Sir Ronald Campbell in the afternoon. 
The text of the Sudan Protocol as agreed between Mr. Bevin and Ismail Sidky 
Pasha is at Annex C. 
Mr. Bevin then said that he wished to say frankly that there was one point which it 
was very important to him to clear up. Would anything in the Sudan Protocol lead 
the Egyptians to argue that the British undertaking to withdraw their troops from 
Egypt applied also to the Sudan; would Great Britain now be asked to evacuate the 
Sudan? Now that we were withdrawn from Egypt it was very important for the whole 
strategic arrangement in the Middle East that Great Britain should be able to retain 
troops in the Sudan. 
Both Ismail Sidky Pasha and Abdel Hadi Pasha immediately and most 
emphatically declared that there was no question of this and that there would be no 
question of this. It was the right of Great Britain to maintain troops in the Sudan. 
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Ismail Sidky Pasha added that he wished to emphasise this strongly. Mr. Bevin took 
note and stated that Great Britain might possibly wish at some time to increase the 
number of British forces in the Sudan slightly, perhaps a certain number of airmen. 
He enquired whether there would be any difficulty about this. Ismail Sidky Pasha 
and Abdel Hadi Pasha both declared there would be none. Once Great Britain had 
satisfied the Egyptian claims in the ways now proposed, she would find that the 
Egyptian people would not only be her friends and Allies, but would act as such, and 
he thought that the record of their action during the late war showed that when they 
acted as friends they well knew how to do so . ... 
Annex A to 92: Sudan protocol: British revise of 24 October (based on Egyptian draft of 
Sudan protocol received 22nd October, with no heading, date or indication of origin) 
The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan 
within the framework of that unity between the Sudan and Egypt which results from 
a common Crown will have for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the 
Sudanese, the development of their interests, and their active preparation for self-
government and the exercise of the right to choose freely the future status of the 
Sudan. Until the High Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realise this 
latter objective the Agreement of 1899 will continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of 
1936 together with its Annexes and paragraphs 14 to 16 of the agreed minute 
annexed to the same Treaty will remain in force, notwithstanding the first Article of 
the present Treaty. 
Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the present status of the Sudan, nor impair 
the right of the Sudanese people, when deciding the future status of the Sudan, to 
choose in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter the complete 
independence of their country. 
Annex B to 92: Sidky Pasha's revise of the secretary of state's draft Sudan protocol 
The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan 
(within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under a common 
Crown) will have for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the Sudanese, 
the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-government 
and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan. 
Until the High Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realise this latter 
objective the Agreement of 1899 will continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936 
together with its Annexes and paragraphs 14 to 16 of the agreed minute annexed to 
the same Treaty will remain in force notwithstanding the first Article of the present 
Treaty. 
Annex C to 92: Sidky Pasha's revise of the secretary of state's draft Sudan protocol, 
18.00 hrs, 24th October 
The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan 
(within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common 
Crown of Egypt) will have for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the 
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Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-
government and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of 
the Sudan. Until the High Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realise 
this latter objective after consultation with the Sudanese the Agreement of 1899 will 
continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936 together with its Annexes and 
paragraphs 14 to 16 of the agreed minute annexed to the same Treaty will remain in 
force notwithstanding the first Article of the present Treaty. 
93 FO 371153317, no 4634 25 Oct 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty': FO record of the fifth and final meeting with 
the Egyptian delegation [Extract] 
British troops in the Sudan 
The Secretary of State said that, if he were challenged in the House of Commons on 
the point of the right of His Majesty's Government to maintain whatever troops were 
required in the Sudan in the future, he would say that the new Treaty did not impair 
our rights in this matter at all. 
Sidky Pasha assented ... . 
The Sudan 
The Secretary of State said that the Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, had asked him 
whether acceptance of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common 
crown of Egypt changed the status of the Sudan. The Secretary of State had replied 
that such acceptance left the status of the Sudan as it was, but made clear a situation 
which had been undefined hitherto. 
Sidky Pasha and the Egyptian Representatives agreed that this was the position .... 
Sudan protocol 
The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan 
(within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common 
Crown of Egypt) will have for its essential objectives to assure the wellbeing of the 
Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-
government and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of 
the Sudan. Until the High Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realise 
this latter objective after consultation with the Sudanese, the Agreement of 1899 will 
continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936, together with its Annexe and 
paragraphs 14 to 16 of the Agreed Minute annexed to the same Treaty, will remain in 
force notwithstanding the first Article of the present Treaty. 
94 FO 371/53259, no 4604 31 Oct 1946 
[Sudan protocol]: inward telegram no 122 from Sir H Huddleston to 
the embassy, Cairo, with text of Huddleston's address to the nation 
[Sidqi's statement to the Egyptian press on 27 Oct that he had secured sovereignty over 
the Sudan created an immediate reaction among pro-independence nationalist groups in 
Omdurman and Khartoum. Despite a denial issued by Attlee in parliament the next day, 
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and a subsequent partial retraction by Sidqi, a number of meetings were held in the Three 
Towns on 27-29 Oct denouncing the British government for betraying their pledge to 
consult the Sudanese people prior to any change in status (see 98). Huddleston and 
Robertson returned to Khartoum on the evening of 29 Oct and were faced with the twin 
tasks of reassuring disaffected Sudanese and British administrators. Huddleston issued an 
address to the nation, while Robertson wrote confidentially to senior administrators (see 
95). Huddleston's statement was later reported to have calmed the provinces but had 
satisfied neither the pro-Egyptian nor pro-independence factions of the nationalist 
movement (telegram no 48, Khartoum to FO, 20 Nov 1946, FO 371/53260, no 4878).] 
Following is statement I have issued to-day. Begins. I returned two days ago to 
Khartoum from leave and have been disappointed to find here a state of uncertainty 
and confusion. I now call upon all classes and conditions of .... 1 the conclusion of 
the treaty negotiations between Great Britain and Egypt has been reached after 
inaccurate press reports. Mr. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, confirmed in the 
House of Commons that no change is contemplated in the administration of the 
Sudan, nor is anything proposed which will impede the progress of the Sudanese 
towards self-government or their consequent free decision concerning the future of 
their country. Sidky Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt, subsequently issued a 
statement saying that previous announcements about the results of the 
conversations in London were inadequate and inaccurate. It is only by co-operation 
and good feeling between all sections of the community and between all classes of 
government servants that self-government can be attained and I appeal therefore to 
all to work together towards the goal when a full self-governing Sudan can make a 
final choice of its future status, and violence will not bring these objectives closer; 
they will only lead to unnecessary disorders, resignations from Government service 
from the Advisory Council and other similar bodies, or failure to co-operate with the 
government in its progress towards these objectives; the ends of those who are 
working towards them can have no result except to put back the clock. I therefore 
call upon all good citizens to go about their business patiently and hopefully, and to 
political parties to refrain from jumping to conclusions, giving you my promise that 
the foundations of the future Sudan, which have been laid so carefully will not be 
(word omitted?) by these negotiations. Ends. 
1 Several words from this sentence were lost in transmission. 
95 FO 371153260, no 4809 31 Oct 1946 
[Sudan protocol]: circular letter from J W Robertson to heads of 
departments and governors, explaining the current state of the treaty 
negotiations 
His Excellency the Governor-General returned to Khartoum from the United 
Kingdom on the evening of Tuesday the 29th October. 
He has asked me to write to you and explain the present position regarding the 
Treaty Negotiations. 
You will have been rather confused and bewildered I am afraid by the various 
reports which have recently come out in the Press and Broadcasts, about the course 
of the negotiations. You will realise that as these matters are still highly confidential 
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I cannot give any clear description of the terms of the proposed treaty. The following, 
however, describes the present position:-
Before Sidki Pasha went to London he categorically announced in Egypt that he 
was going to bring back with him 'the sovereignty of the Sudan'. This statement was 
widely exploited by pro-Egyptian elements in the Sudan and immediately gave rise to 
distrust and anxiety amongst the anti-Egyptian Sudanese who feared that the fort 
might be sold. Rumours which followed during the course of the London talks led to 
telegrams being sent by Sayed Abdel Rahman and some of the Nazirs to the Foreign 
Secretary and to Sidki Pasha asking for assurance that the pledge given in March by 
Mr. Bevin that the status of the Sudan would not be changed without consulting the 
Sudanese, would not be forgotten. The state of doubt and distrust culminated on 
October 26th when Sidki Pasha was reported by the B.B.C. as saying on leaving 
England that he had in fact obtained the sovereignty of the Sudan for Egypt. The 
subsequent statement by Mr. Attlee on October 28th in the House of Commons that 
no change was contemplated in the administration of the Sudan and that nothing in 
the proposed treaty impaired the right of the Sudanese to eventual decision as to 
their future status did not reassure anybody. The feeling generally seems to be that 
the British Government has not denied Sidki Pasha's statement and the Sudanese 
believe that Mr. Bevin's pledge has been dishonoured and the sovereignty has been 
given to Egypt. Sidki Pasha has now issued a statement in Cairo stating that the 
reports in the press are incomplete and inaccurate but I do not think that this will 
convince Sudanese opinion. 
Negotiations are still in progress and are highly delicate and secret; it is, therefore, 
impossible for me to tell you what is really taking place. The background of the treaty 
negotiations of the last six months has been a strong desire on both sides to obtain a 
new treaty: the main Egyptian object is to rid themselves of the British occupation 
and control, and the British object is to secure the friendship of Egypt as a basis of a 
bloc of friendly territories which would ensure lines of communications with the 
dominions and the Far East and which would present a solid face against anti-British 
influences in the Middle East. Such an object could in earlier days have been 
obtained by a sufficient show of force in support of our diplomacy but at the present 
time negotiations and compromise must take the place of this out-moded method. 
The disruption of our Eastern lines of communication and the hostility of Arab states 
would leave the Sudan along with other Middle Eastern territories open to 
exploitation and attack by anti-British powers. It is, therefore, very much in the 
Sudan's interest, however distasteful it may appear, to preserve British influence in 
the Middle East until the country can stand on its own feet. 
However advantageous to the Sudanese may be the terms of the present draft and 
whether they are accepted or not by the negotiating powers, the announcement of 
the Egyptian Prime Minister has seriously damaged our relationship with the 
Sudanese and their confidence in His Majesty's Government and in the Sudan 
Government has been shaken. Sudanese are already talking of resigning from the 
Advisory Council, the Sudan Administration Conference and similar bodies. There 
may be resignations of Government officials and it is possible that local government 
authorities may refuse to co-operate. Our great handicap at the present moment is 
that we cannot come out into the open and explain what is proposed in the present 
draft. 
Our immediate task, and I do not wish to minimise its difficulty, is to restore 
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confidence. Lack of confidence cannot but retard our programmes of administrative, 
economical, and educational advance, all of which are to the future benefit of the 
country. 
His Excellency wishes me to convey to you his personal conviction and assurance 
that the proposals which are at present being considered are, in his opinion, in the 
best long-term interest of the Sudanese and whatever may be your immediate 
personal feelings he is confident that you will do all in your power to restore 
confidence throughout the country. 
96 PREM 8/1388/2 3 Nov 1946 
[Sudanese reaction to the Sudan protocol]: inward telegram no 46 
from Sir H Huddleston to Mr Attlee and Mr Bevin 
In my recent conversations in London regarding the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations 
and especially concerning acknowledgement in the Sudan protocol of a common 
Egyptian Crown, I always stressed the difficulties which I was sure I should 
experience in persuading the great majority of Sudanese to accept even a symbolic 
Egyptian sovereignty. When I was in London I thought that by emphasising the 
undoubted advantages which the protocol gives to the Sudanese, such as the 
maintenance of the present administration, the promise of an advance towards self-
government and consequent self determination of their future status, it would be 
possible to get them to accept the Egyptian sovereignty of the protocol. 
2. During the last four days since I returned to Khartoum I have had opportunity 
of estimating how the above prospects have been almost totally impaired by 
premature leakages in Egypt, by Sidki Pasha's emphasis upon sovereignty and failure 
to mention balancing concessions by Egypt to the Sudan, and by the unfortunate use 
of the Arabic word "seyada" meaning to the Sudanese "mastery" or "domination". 
This word here implies relationship of a "master" to a "slave" and has aroused a 
fanatical feeling of opposition amongst leaders of the Independence movement.1 
Their attention is so concentrated on this aspect to the exclusion of all others that 
few find reassurance in Mr. Attlee's statement in the House of Commons last Monday 
owing to the absence of a direct denial of Egyptian sovereignty. 
3. It is still too early to estimate whether these leaders will resort to violence in 
their opposition to an acknowledgement of Egyptian sovereignty but this is a 
possibility, and in any case co-operation of officials and local Government authorities 
with the Government is bound to be greatly prejudiced and resignations have already 
occurred. As 78% of the Government officials and 100% of the local authorities are 
Sudanese, the danger to the Administration is grave. 
4. Bulk of the parties of the Independence [? grp.omtd: ? movement] are backed 
by Sayed Abdul Rahman El Mahdi whose followers are mainly recruited from among 
virile and fanatical western tribes. It is most unlikely that the Sayed would go to the 
1 When asked to comment on the meaning of 'sayada' the oriental minister replied: 'I am advised that 
"Sayada" is the usual Arabic translation here for "sovereignty" and that it would be unusual to use any 
other word. This fact does not of course weaken our case for complaints over original disclosure but 
discussion having arisen over Egyptian sovereignty it was inevitable that this word should be used' (inward 
telegram no 1642, Bowker to FO, 5 Nov 1946, FO 371/53259, no 4632). 
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length of calling out these tribes but many of his supporters are irresponsible and 
local disturbances are to be feared. The Sayed has to-day issued at my request an 
appeal for calm during the negotiations. He was unwilling to tie this to my own 
recent appeal (reference my telegram No. 40 of October 30th to Foreign Office) but 
informed me that in framing his appeal he relied upon Mr. Bevin's personal message 
to him (your telegram No. 44 of October 26th). 
5. When I was in London I believed that I had a chance of putting the Sudan 
protocol across without too much difficulty. But the indiscretions of Sidki Pasha 
have caused such a deterioration in the situation here that I feel the possibility of 
putting across the protocol without a major breakdown no longer exist. 
6. I therefore propose to return by air to England to explain the situation more 
fully as soon as I receive your approval to do so. 
97 PREM 8/1388/2 5 Nov 1946 
[Sudanese reaction to the Sudan protocol]: outward telegram no 52 
(reply): from Mr Attlee to Sir H Huddleston 
Personal from Prime Minister to Governor-General. 
I am disappointed and disturbed by your admission of failure to persuade Sudanese 
leaders of the very real advantages of the Sudan Protocol, such as maintenance of the 
administration in its present form, self-government and free choice of their future 
status which more than counter-balance the symbolic and face-saving concession 
implied in the words "within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and 
Egypt under the common crown of Egypt".1 I had hoped that these positive 
advantages plus my statement in the House of Commons about the Sudan on 28th 
October, if well and truly pressed home to the Sudanese leaders would have told 
effectively against partial disclosures from Cairo, even taking into account an 
admittedly exciteable [sic] race such as the Sudanese. Moreover, your telegram No. 
126 of the 3rd November had given me the impression that situation might be 
tending to ease a little. I hope that your propaganda efforts with important Sudanese 
have sufficiently emphasised what the continuation of Article 11 of the 1936 Treaty 
implies and that they have been made to understand that their right to choose 
independence is not impaired in any way. We are as you know taking action to assist 
you in stepping up your propaganda machine. If there is anything more that we can 
do to help you to cope by means of publicity with the present emergency please let 
me know. Meanwhile I hope that you will be able to influence Sayed Abdul Rahman 
El Makdi [sic] and Sayed Ali Mirghani, who have been the recipients of much honour 
from His Majesty's Government in the past, in the direction of controlling their 
followers. I understand that additional troops requested by you will be sent by air on 
7th November. The letter from the Foreign Secretary which you are to show to 
Government officials ought to reach you within the next few days. 
I am not certain whether your action in returning at this moment might not by 
arousing Egyptian suspicions stir up feelings in Egypt which are now beginning to 
subside a little. 
1 See 96. 
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Unless, therefore, you consider it absolutely necessary to return, I should prefer 
you to remain for the present.2 
2 The Foreign Office was not keen on a return visit of the governor general but could not deny him in the 
face of his insistence. They took comfort in "the fact that he feels that he can leave his post at this moment 
would seem to indicate that the position in the Sudan is not, at any rate for the moment, so desperate as 
his telegram No. 46 [h]as led us to infer" (minute, Howe to Sargent, 6 Nov 1946, PREM 8/1388/2) . 
98 FO 371153259, no 4740 5 Nov 1946 
[Sudanese reaction to the Sudan protocol] : aide memoire by J W 
Robertson. Annex: diary of events since 12 October 
1. A report on the events of the last week in Khartoum is attached. On Friday 
November 1st. the feeling was tense, and prolonged disorder with serious results 
seemed possible. The good sense shewn by the bulk of the population, the efforts by 
Sayed Abdel Rahman to get his wilder followers out of the towns and the strong 
measures taken by the Government, have restored the position considerably and for 
the immediate future, I do not expect anything more than isolated incidents. But 
while immediate danger of widespread rioting and an upset of Government authority 
is much smaller than it was a day or two ago, there remains the likelihood of a great 
deterioration if the draft Protocol goes through. 
2. The political position has far from settled down but His Excellency's call to 
good citizens to have patience and await the outcome of the negotiations has had 
some effect, and the first bewildered astonishment at what everyone considered the 
British "betrayal", has given place to a less immediately explosive attitude; but the 
sense of distrust and bitterness still remains. 
It is true however that whatever hopes His Excellency may have had in London of 
being able to persuade the Independent Front that the acknowledgment by Egypt of 
the Sudan's right to self Government and consequent self determination, was worth 
the acknowledgment of a symbolic Egyptian crown, have been wrecked by Sidki 
Pasha's indiscretions, and especially by the use of the word "Seyada" to denote 
"sovereignty" when its meaning to the Sudanese is one of "dominance" and 
"masters", and means the personal status of slavery as well. It is not now possible, in 
view of the unreasoning opposition shewn by the Independents, to get this across, 
and His Excellency has had all his good cards wasted. It will hardly be possible to 
restore this position for a considerable time. 
3. Reactions to Sidki's indiscretions 
(a) The Ashigga, and their Mirghanist supporters were astonished and surprised. 
The Mirghanists, who had allied themselves to the Ashigga because the Mahdists 
were with the Independents, were genuinely shocked and dismayed. They no more 
than the Independents want Egyptian rule in the Sudan. The Mahdist reactions and 
especially the importation of fanatical westerners into the towns, have however 
realigned the Mirghanists with the Ashigga. The Ashigga will be disappointed at the 
continuation of the present administration, and the symbolic nature of unity will not 
satisfy those who hoped that by a substitution of Egypt for Britain as the controlling 
power in the Sudan to obtain substantial personal benefits. 
(b) The Independents are fanatically opposed to Egyptian sovereignty in any form. 
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They see in any acknowledment of it the thin end of the wedge, and the eclipse of 
their hopes of a Sudanese state. Sayed Abdel Rahman especially sees his hopes of 
founding a dynasty on the Feisul modeJl vanishing. The feeling of the Independents 
is very bitter, and the fanatical intensity of men, whom I have known personally for 
many years has struck me forcibly during the last few days. 
4. The strength of the two parties 
(a) The Ashigga are stronger in Khartoum and Omdurman, and more of the semi-
educated and educated men (i.e. effendia and merchants) belong to this party: the 
Independents (Umma) have among them practically all the best Sudanese brains; 
they are strong in the Advisory Council and in both the central and local 
Administrations. Each party has attached to itself one of the big religious sects, and 
in this way together they represent most of the Northern Sudan. 
The Mirghanists (i.e. the Khatmia Tarika under Sayed Ali Mirghani) are the 
orthodox Mohammedans. Sayed Ali was brought back to the Sudan by the 
Anglo-Egyptians in 1898, and for many years was the undisputed head of Sudan 
Mohammedans. He has always been loyal to the Anglo-Egyptian Government, and I 
believe still is, but his loyalty is now obsessed by fear of his upstart (as he thinks) rival 
Sayed Abdel Rahman, the son of the Mahdi, who from the lowliest position until 
1915, has since built up great influence and wealth, and is now probably more 
influential than Sayed Ali. Sayed Ali's influence is now thrown on the side of the 
Ashigga because he fears Sayed Abdel Rahman's pretensions to Kingship, though 
Sayed Ali does not apart from this favour Egyptian influence increasing in the Sudan. 
The Mirghanists dominate the north, Kassala Province, Khartoum and Omdurman 
and have pockets of influence in the Gezira and western towns. The Mahdists are prob-
ably as numerous and stronger than the Mirghanists though less sophisticated and 
without so much influence in the towns and the north. They are fanatically supported 
by the strong tribes of the west, and the Gezira. Especially by the Baggara who formed 
the backbone of the Khalifa's Army during the Mahdia. The whole position is affected 
by S.A.R's dream of a crown. This makes him quite intransigent regarding any acknowl-
edgment of an Egyptian sovereignty, gives the support of his fanatically inclined west-
ern followers to the Independents, and makes S.A.M. side with the Ashigga. Those who 
care little for either camp, the steady middle class man, small Government official and 
shopkeeper tend to go with the orthodox Mirghanists, being afraid of Mahdist rule, and 
the introduction of wild western Tribesmen into the Central Sudan and its cities. 
5. If Egypt accepts the present protocol 
It will be no relief to the two political parties that the present administration will 
continue unchanged, though it will reassure the ordinary moderate, and non-
politically minded classes and some of the outside tribal leaders. 
The Ashigga leaders who have hoped for leading places in a Sudan administration 
under Egyptian aegis, will be disappointed. The 'Umma' leaders in their fanatical 
opposition to the Egyptian crown for the reasons given above, will equally be 
disappointed. They have always hoped for a cleavage and the continuation of the 
present regime is abhorrent to them after Sidki Pasha's reported statement that it is 
1 Faisal ibn Husain the Hijazi prince who, as Faisal I, founded the Hashimite dynasty in Iraq following the 
First World War. 
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in Egypt's interest for the present administration to continue a little longer, until 
Egyptian propaganda can have time to win over the country. 
It is probable that, if Egypt accepts the protocol and it goes through, there will be 
failure on both sides to co-operate with the Government, then resignations from 
Government posts, and from the Municipal, Town and Rural District Councils. There 
will in all likelihood be risings and disorders in the west, which will require to be put 
down by force; progress towards self-government will be severely prejudiced, and the 
administration will return to that of a police state. Educational, economic and 
administrative progress will receive a severe set-back. 
6. If Egypt refUses the draft protocol as being inadequate, the Ashigga as a party 
will take the Egyptian line, and will look upon the protocol as a British trick, which 
the Egyptians have seen through. Symbolic sovereignty without the fruits of 
sovereignty does not appeal to the Ashigga. The Mirghanists will be affected largely 
by what the Mahdists do. 
The 'Independents' will see in Egyptian rejection a clear proof of Egypt's desire to 
dominate the Sudan, which they fear will be the result of the present protocol, and 
will say that they knew a symbolic sovereignty would never satisfy the Egyptians. By 
Sidki's indiscretions the terms of the draft protocol have been disclosed, we have lost 
the confidence of the Independents who say that the British and the Sudan 
Governments have tried to betray them to the Egyptians, and have broken our pledge 
to consult them before the status of the country was changed. 
If no Treaty was signed it will nevertheless be a very long time before the 
confidence which existed can be restored, if indeed this can ever be done. 
7. Possible way out 
(a) The ideal would be for the Sudan protocol to contain a declaration by Great 
Britain and Egypt that sovereignty in the Sudan, which was previously held jointly by 
the two High Contracting Parties is now declared by them to be inherent in the 
Sudanese people; that the two High Contracting Parties intend to act as Trustees for 
the well-being and progress towards self government of the Sudanese, until self 
governing status has been reached, and the Sudanese can themselves decide their 
future and their relationship with both High Contracting Parties. 
(b) It is most unlikely that such a solution will be agreed to by Egypt, and as it 
seems certain that the present protocol will have most serious repercussions in the 
Sudan, it is recommended that another way out be sought. 
It is suggested that in order to save bloodshed and a possible breakdown in the admin-
istration as a result of this protocol it should be shelved, and that the two codomini 
should instruct H.E. the Governor-General to enter into immediate consultations with 
the Independents, the Ashigga, and other representatives of Sudanese opinion to work 
out an interim type of Government to administer the Sudan, until it is self-governing 
and can make its decision as to its final status. The help of constitutional experts from 
outside the Sudan would be appreciated by the Government and by the people. 
This solution will have the advantage of redeeming the pledge to consult which it 
is believed by all Sudanese and a large number of British officials, has been broken. It 
will give a breathing space and allow present passions to subside and also show the 
opposing parties that they must both compromise and that one party cannot expect 
the Sudan Government or the Codomini to crush the other. If the Egyptians 
suspected that the consultation under British rule would not be fairly carried out, 
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they should be invited to send an observer to be present: but the freedom of speech 
etc., which the Sudan Government has given to both Ashigga and Umma in recent 
months is well known to all responsible persons in Egypt (for instance no attempt to 
muzzle El Azhari has ever been made). If such consultations produced any result, 
proposals would then be submitted by H.E. to the Codomini; if no result was 
achieved then H.E. and the Sudan Government would submit their own proposals, 
after receiving assistance of experts from outside the Sudan. 
It must be emphasized very strongly that continuation of the administration, in its 
present form, is no winning card. It is a debit rather than a credit. The Ashigga who 
want the end of British influence, dislike it, and the Independents now think little of 
an Administration which in their view has betrayed them. 
Annex to 98 
October 12th. In view of reports that Azhari was to accompany Sidki Pasha to 
London, the Umma Party decided to send Abdullah Bey Khalil there at once. 
October 18th. S.A.R. decided that in view of Sidki's confidence that he would bring 
back from London sovreignty [sic] over the Sudan, he had better go to London 
himself in order to explain the position to Mr. Bevin. 
October 19th. S.A.R. wired Mr. Bevin and several Nazirs followed suit. Abdullah Bey 
left for London. 2 
October 20th. S.A.R. wired to Sidki. Reply received from Governor General that there 
was little point in S.A.R. going to London. 
October 23rd. Reuter contained statement from London that Sidki Pasha, "is 
understood to oppose the British suggestion of consulting the Sudanese people by 
plebiscite or otherwise until a period of Egyptian sovreignty [sic] has done 
something to offset British influence." 
The general effect of this on Umma opinion was that it rendered it most unlikely 
that H.M.G. would agree to Egyptian sovreignty [sic]. 
October 27th. The B.B.C. on their 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. broadcasts (G.M.T. 06.00 and 
08.00 hours) announced Sidki's claim to have brought back sovreignty [sic] over the 
Sudan. No denial or qualification of this statement was issued untillO p.m. (G.M.T. 
08.00 hours-a time when nobody in the Sudan ever listens in). It was reported at 6 
a.m. on the 28th, but was dropped from subsequent broadcasts, and the first 
information the Sudanese had that Sidki's claim was not fully justified, was when Mr. 
Attlee's statement in the House was broadcast at 6 p.m. local time. 
Meanwhile on the morning of th~ 27th the Umma Leaders asked for an official 
denial of Sidki's statement, and were told that this Government had every reason to 
believe it to be misleading, but had no information from London. They were advised 
to await further news. Instead they held an immediate meeting and decided to 
summon their supporters from outside Khartoum, boycotting the Advisory Council 
and the Sudan Administrative Conference, to cable a protest to Mr. Attlee, and to 
hold a demonstration in Omdurman that night. 
2 Abdullah Khalil and Yaqub Uthman (editor of an-Nil) requested a meeting with a representative of the 
Secretary of State on 24 Oct and were granted an interview with C P Mayhew, parliamentary under-
secretary of state, on 8 Nov. Mayhew reported that 'they put their case simply & well, & I formed a good 
impression of them' (minute, May hew to Scrivener, 8 Nov 1946, FO 371/53259, no 4671) . 
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About 3,000 persons assembled at the Umma Club that evening, and after fiery 
speeches denouncing the British for having sold the Sudan to Egypt, marched to the 
Congress Headquarters in the Graduates' Club. They were prevented by the Police 
from entering the Club, and after another demonstration at the Mahdi's Tomb 
dispersed, after throwing stones at tramcars, breaking the windscreen of a private car 
and injuring some of the Ashigga Leaders. 
The Ashigga remained quiet. 
October 28th . Early in the morning the boys of the Farouk School marched through 
the streets to a number of about 200 in celebration of the Unity of the Nile Valley. 
This demonstration was a complete fiasco. In the evening the Umma Party had a 
meeting with the Republicans, the Liberals and the Nationalists and they decided to 
join to form a new Independent Front to oppose the Unionists Front, of which the 
Nationalists had hitherto been nominal members. 
October 29th. His Excellency and the Civil Secretary were due to arrive by air that 
evening, and there had been strong rumours of an Umma proposal to stage a 
demonstration either at the aerodrome or at the Palace on their arrival. 
The Acting Governor General interviewed four of the Umma Leaders in the 
morning, and pointed out the dangers of provocative behaviour. They informed him 
of the formation of the new United Independence Front, and said that a delegation 
would be at the Kitchener Statue the following evening to hand over a manifesto to 
the representative of His Excellency. They indicated that they would probably be 
followed by a crowd, but did not ask permission to hold a public meeting. 
Meanwhile the Cordon College Union were holding a stormy meeting prepatory to 
staging a demonstration that afternoon in celebration of the achievement of the 
Unity of the Nile Valley. The College authorities warned them that any 
demonstration outside the College grounds would lead to the immediate closing of 
the College, and representatives of the Unionists Front, who were anxious to prevent 
a clash, succeeded in dissuading them from their purpose. Parties of Mahdist 
supporters armed with sticks and whips had meanwhile assembled at strategic points 
to attack them should they venture out. 
His Excellency arrived early in the evening and proceeded to the Palace without incident. 
A big Umma Meeting was held that night in Omdurman and a demonstration 
arranged for Abbas Square at 4 p.m. the following evening. 
October, 30th. A crowd of between 3,000 and 4,000 assembled the following evening 
and proceeded in good order in companies with banners, including the red, green 
and black tricolour of the Independent Sudan to the Kitchener Statue, led by 
Abdullahi Fadil el Mahdi.3 The Umma Leaders and various Independents, including 
practically every prominent Sudanese in the three towns, were already in position, 
and handed over a written protest, "against the decision taken by Great Britain and 
Egypt regarding the sovereignty over the Sudan." This was signed by representatives 
of the four parties and by four prominent non party men, including the Sharif. The 
meeting then dispersed. 
October 31st. His Excellency's appeal for moderation was published on the morning 
of the 31st, and the Umma Leaders, who had been asked by the Civil Secretary to 
discuss the situation with him, refused to see him on the grounds that His 
3 Ansar member of the Graduates' Congress Committee. 
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Excellency's declaration was unsatisfactory, since neither he nor Mr. Attlee had 
denied the vital point of sovreignty [sic] . 
Meanwhile the Cordon College irritated by the Umma demonstration of the 
previous day, absented themselves from lectures to hold another mass meeting, and 
since any possibility of getting any serious work done was now out of the question, 
the College authorities decided of their own initiative to close the College. 
Meanwhile the Unionist Party had decided that it was time something was done, 
and asked permission to hold a demonstration on the following (Friday) morning. 
It was decided to give permission for this demonstration in view of the Umma 
demonstration having taken place the previous day, but a request to the Independent 
Front to avoid any provocative action, in recognition of their having been 
unmolested on the previous day, was met with an evasive reply. 
November 1st. The town was now filling up with bodies of fanatical Mahdists from 
outside, and early in the morning attempts were made to interfere with parties of 
Unionists on their way in to Abbas Square. One lorry was overturned and the 
passengers set upon with spears (15 casualties, none fatal), and there were minor 
incidents in Khartoum and Omdurman, but the main procession passed off with very 
little incident, until it returned to Abbas Square and began to disperse. Numbers of 
riffraff from the market then attacked the offices of the two opposition newspapers 
which were guarded by strong bands of Umma supporters. Stones and bricks were 
thrown, and amongst others the District Commissioner and Commandant of Police 
were hit, but after a struggle lasting for over an hour, during which a Company of 
Camel Corps stood by at Province Headquarters, the police succeeded in dispersing 
the crowd without serious casualties. 
Meanwhile an exaggerated report of the attack of the newspaper offices had 
reached the Umma Headquarters in Omdurman, where the party responsible for the 
attack on the lorry in the morning had been confined by the Umma Leaders (Said 
Sadiq [sic, Siddiq], the son of S.A.R. had been doing very good work in dispersing the 
crowds in Abbas Square). These fanatics had once marched on the Graduates Club 
and wrecked it, the depleted Omdurman Police Force being unable to prevent them. 
The Camel Corps Company was then rushed to Omdurman and with this support the 
Police were then able to prevent any further incident that day. 
November 2nd. The events of the previous day had shocked both parties. The 
Unionists realising for the first time the strength and fanaticism of the Umma 
Supporters, and having had, many of them their first experience of civil disturbances, 
were appealing for Police protection and denouncing the Sudan Government for 
their alleged failure to maintain order. 
S.A.R. arrived in Khartoum during the morning and had an interview with His 
Excellency, and subsequently issued an appeal to his followers to be patient and return 
to their homes. He based his appeal upon Mr. Bevin's telegram to him of October 26th. 
Meanwhile the Civil Secretary had interviewed the secretaries of the rival Fronts 
and directed them to send their supporters home, abstain from all public political 
meetings, and give similar instructions to their branches in the provinces. At the 
same time a ban was placed upon all public meetings throughout the country. 
Since then the situation has temporarily quitened [sic] down, and attention has 
concentrated on trying to remove from the three towns as quickly as possible the 
thousands of rival supporters who had flooded in during the week. 
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99 FO 371153318, no 4885 7 Nov 1946 
[Sudan protocol]: translation by FO of a note prepared by Sidqi Pasha 
for the Egyptian treaty delegation giving the Egyptian interpretation 
of the Sudan protocol 
[A continuing stream of Egyptian press reports left the FO uncertain about Sidqi's 
presentation of the treaty, and particularly whether the Egyptian government and 
parliament understood and would accept the Sudanese right to choose their own future 
status. Political rivalries within the Egyptian treaty delegation meant that Sidqi could not 
count on a majority there, despite the king's strong support for the new agreement, and 
despite the interpretation of the Sudan protocol Sidqi offered the delegation in this note. 
N. a result he was reported considering bypassing the delegation and going directly to the 
Council of Ministers to get authorisation to sign the treaty (inward telegram no 1660, 
Bowker to FO, 9 Nov 1946, FO 371/53317, no 4679).] 
The Protocol first of all consecrates the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the 
Crown of Egypt.+ For the first time the sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan is 
formally and expressly recognised by Great Britain in an international act. This 
recognition will definitely put an end to the policy of Great Britain or her 
representatives in the Sudan of assuring for themselves a part of the sovereignty over 
the Sudan by different and more or less indirect means by calling it in official 
documents "Anglo-Egyptian Condominium" which suggests a joint sovereignty. 
This policy has spread abroad even among statesmen and jurists an erroneous idea of 
the rights of Egypt over the Sudan. To cite only one example, a renowned author like 
Fauchille, in his International Public Law, cites the Sudan in a section entitled 
"Copropriete, Condominium, Coimperium", and speaks of the "undivided 
sovereignty of Egypt and of Great Britain" over the Sudan. 
The Protocol will have this great advantage of making incontestable in the eyes of 
all the nations the exclusive right of sovereignty of Egypt over the Sudan. That is a 
fact which may have great importance in the future if a problem concerning the 
Sudan should be one day brought before U.N.O. 
But there has been opposed to this consecration that part of the Protocol which 
defines the future policy in the Sudan of the two High Contracting Parties and which 
assigns as an essential object the wellbeing of the Sudanese and their active 
preparation for self-government and for the exercise of the right which derives from 
it of choosing the future status of the Sudan. 
To realise the correct implications of this declaration, we must first of all define 
the term "self-government". Now in international law this expression is not the 
equivalent of independence nor of the right of sovereignty. The United Nations 
Charter, in the chapter on the international regime of trusteeship, has employed this 
term speaking precisely of the progressive evolution of the populations of the 
territories under trusteeship. Article 76 mentions in fact "their progressive 
development towards self-government or independence", translated in the official 
French text as "leur evolution progressive vers la capacite a s'administrer eux-
memes ou !'independence". 
+In the course of the discussion on the Sudan, Mr. Bevin asked me what title the King of Egypt intended 
to take. I replied that the imperial firmans styled him Khedive of Egypt, Sovereign of Nubia, Darfur, 
Kordofan and Sennar, but that to answer the desire of his peoples, the King would take the title of "King of 
Egypt and the Sudan". Mr. Bevin raised no objection. 
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Accordingly, in the most recent and most authorised official interpretation, that 
accepted together by Great Britain and Egypt and with them all the signatory states 
of the United Nations Charter, the expression "self-government" only signifies 
administrative autonomy; it is distinct from independence, which is defined by the 
authors as being internal sovereignty. 
This question did not moreover give rise to any dispute in our conversations in 
London. From the British as much as from the Egyptian side, a distinction was made 
between self-government and independence. I specified on many occasions that we 
wished the Sudanese to be able to assume themselves the direction of their affairs 
and that this was not in contradiction with the right of Egyptian sovereignty. 
But Mr. Bevin was chiefly occupied with the hypothesis that the Sudanese would 
claim their independence. At the beginning of the conversations he thought that he 
had obligations towards the Sudanese and that he could not bind them indissolubly 
to the sovereignty of Egypt. He also would have wished to include in the treaty a text 
giving assurances to the Sudanese on the question of independence. In one of the 
drafts presented by the British, it was foreseen that the provisions of the Protocol did 
not hinder the Sudanese from choosing later a status carrying with it the complete 
independence of their country, in conformity with the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter. I struck out this text and I formally refused any mention in the Protocol of 
even an eventual renunciation of Egyptian sovereignty. 
I made clear to Mr. Bevin that it was unlikely that the Sudanese would one day 
demand to be separated from Egypt, that this was a hypothesis that could only be 
admitted in the distant future, whereas the treaty between Egypt and Great Britain 
was only concluded for a period of 20 years, after which the two countries would 
resume their liberty. 
On the other hand if this question came up Egypt would resolve it with the Sudan 
in the most friendly spirit and in conformity with the United Nations Charter. But as 
Mr. Bevin abandoned the idea of independence and the eventual renunciation of 
Egyptian sovereignty and wished to be able to give the Sudanese assurances about 
their future, he insisted that the protocol should mention the future status of the 
Sudan. 
The word "status" has not the juridical precision of "self-government"; it is rather 
vague and open to different interpretations, depending on its context. 
To avoid the inconvenience resulting from the absence of precision in the word 
"status", the Egyptians, after having studied carefully different formulae, stopped at 
that which occurs in the Protocol and which has been finally accepted by Mr. Bevin. 
This formula allows the Sudanese to choose their future status as a result of self-
government. This text does not accordingly grant the Sudanese immediate self-
government, and then something in addition outside the self-government, that is to 
say the right of choosing the political, international and sovereign status which 
would allow them the right of secession from Egypt. It specifies, on the contrary, that 
the right of choosing their future status is an application and a result of self-
government. The latter being only administrative autonomy, the status in question 
cannot exceed this framework and can only be an administrative status or internal 
autonomy. 
It must be noted in addition that if we wish to maintain that the "future status" 
foreseen by the Protocol is a political and international status, we will come up 
against a formal contradiction in the very terms of the Protocol. This specifies that 
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the policy of the High Contracting Parties will be carried out "within the framework 
of the unity of the Sudan and Egypt under a common crown, the crown of Egypt." 
This policy is accordingly limited by the idea of the sovereignty of Egypt. It cannot 
bring about measures which will go beyond these limits and which will exceed the 
framework of the unity of the two countries under the same crown. This excludes 
completely the right of secession or the grant to the Sudanese of the right of 
breaking the bond of sovereignty which joins them to Egypt. 
In addition paragraph 2 of the Protocol foresees that the future status of the Sudan 
will be realised by "common agreement" between the High Contracting Parties after 
consultation with the Sudanese. Now if the exercise of the right of choosing the 
status of the Sudan, deriving from self-government, brings the right of secession for 
the Sudanese, it is clear that the establishment of the regime of complete 
independence which ex hypothesi they would be able to choose would have to be 
made without the intervention of Egypt and not by common agreement between the 
two Contracting Parties with simple consultation of the Sudanese. 
Whatever may be the interpretation to be given to the present texts, Egyptian 
sovereignty over the Sudan could be abandoned only by virtue of a subsequent 
formal renunciation by Egypt, either as a result of a revolution of the Sudanese 
people, of a secession by force to which Egypt submitted, or by virtue of a voluntary 
renunciation, by an admission of the hypothesis that the Sudanese could one day 
freely express their desire for independence-going outside the framework of the 
Protocol-and which Egypt agrees to grant them. 
The Sudanese do not in fact acquire by virtue of the text of the Protocol the right 
to claim their secession. 
It is, furthermore, not in a Protocol of this nature annexed to a bilateral Treaty 
that the right of Egyptian sovereignty could be ceded or abrogated, even for the 
future such a serious change of relations between Egypt and the Sudan could only 
take place by an express and solemn act, first of all directed to the people of the 
Sudan and accepted by them and afterwards submitted to all the United Nations. 
Egyptian sovereignty pre-exists the treaty and is affirmed vis a vis all the States. The 
Protocol only establishes the consent of Great Britain to recognise this situation as 
far as that country is concerned; it does not create that sovereignty. 
The Protocol itself, however, does in fact in its first paragraph admit for Great Britain 
the obligation to modify the present regime, for the benefit not of Egypt but of the 
Sudanese; if the sovereignty of Egypt is permanent, the present administrative regime 
has, on the contrary, a temporary character since it must evolve towards self-govern-
ment, that is to say towards the progressive elimination of non-Sudanese elements. 
The Protocol furthermore contemplates in this modification of the present system the 
simultaneous participation of Egypt, Great Britain and the Sudanese themselves. 
Egypt has accordingly acquired the right to participate in the elaboration of the 
reforms to be made in the Sudan regime. She must henceforth study and put forward 
the modifications which she thinks necessary for the realisation of the policy that 
Great Britain and Egypt are pledged to follow. Furthermore, even before these 
reforms are decided upon, she will equally have the right to examine and see whether 
the regime set up by the 1899 convention takes sufficient account of the well-being 
of the Sudanese which is one of the goals pursued by the two High Contracting 
Parties and whether in its present state, it can serve as a point of departure for the 
establishment of a regime of self-government. 
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This right of intervention and examination allows Egypt to protect the interests of 
the Sudanese and to improve their lot. Thanks to this right and also because she will 
herself be freed from British occupation and influence, Egypt will be able to take 
back at least a part of her authority and her influence in the Sudan, as her action will 
be exercised in a domain which the Sudanese certainly consider more important 
than the day-to-day administration, since it will be a question of giving satisfaction to 
Sudanese national aspirations and to regulate in a permanent fashion the future of 
the Sudan. 
There have been criticisms of the absence in the Protocol of any mention of 
subsequent negotiations, but the Protocol, after having recognised the unity of Egypt 
and the Sudan under the Crown of Egypt, has defined the future policy to be followed 
in the Sudan by the two High Contracting Parties; this was the aim of the 
contemplated negotiations. 
This policy consists of granting self-government to the Sudanese and of 
determining the future status of the Sudan. This cannot however be immediately 
realised in detail, even after study and prolonged negotiation; it is a matter of a 
progressive evolution which will take some years. The execution of this policy of 
which the final aim has been inscribed in the protocol, is a long term task to be 
arranged by the two governments. It will involve mutual exchange of views, 
discussions, preparations, programmes and even, for the most important points, 
negotiations which will be able to be carried out in a quasi-permanent manner 
during the years to come. 
In the course of the London conversations, Mr. Bevin showed himself to be a 
supporter of the institution of a permanent Sudan joint board which would study the 
progress of the development of the Sudanese. 
It is difficult to say now what will be the best method for Egypt to intervene in 
Sudanese affairs. She can be interested in making investigations, either alone or in 
conjunction with the British; she can prepare to have a permanent High 
Commissioner at Khartoum or a permanent office. Finally, it is perhaps preferable 
for her to act through the intermediary of the Joint Board proposed by Mr. Bevin. In 
any case, it would be premature for her to bind herself at the present time in this 
connection. 
It will be for the Egyptian Government of the future to exercise vigilantly and by 
the most appropriate means the henceforth recognised rights of Egypt to control the 
regime in force and to share in the elaboration of the future status of the Sudan. 
100 PREM 8/1388/2 8 Nov 1946 
[Sudan government]: inward telegram no 1525 from Mr Bevin (New 
York) to Mr Attlee, criticising the attitude of Sudan government 
officials 
Your telegram No. 52 to Khartoum.1 
I am not happy about the attitude and set-up of the Sudan Government. The whole 
position is quite different now from what it was up to the war. We cannot any longer 
1 See 97. 
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run the Condominium as if it existed in isolation from the rest of the world. Critical 
eyes are now fixed on all our Imperial arrangements and a new outlook on the part of 
the Sudan Government is required. 
2. I hope that the letter for the Government officials will help to explain the new 
situation to them. But it is also necessary that I, as Foreign Secretary, should be 
continuously and punctually informed of the programmes and actions of the Sudan 
Government. In regard to the Condominium the Foreign Secretary ought to be in as 
close touch with the Sudan as the Colonial Secretary is with the affairs of the 
Colonies. 
101 PREM 8/1388/2 9 Nov 1946 
[Sudan government]: minute from Sir 0 Sargent to Mr Attlee on the 
changed political circumstances in which Sudan administrators will 
be required to work 
Prime Minister 
Reference Foreign Secretary's personal telegram No. 1525.1 
I should like to say (a) that we in the Foreign Office and in Cairo have long been 
aware that the Sudan could not continue to be run as a model colonial 
administration in isolation and (b) that in fact the Foreign Office is very closely and 
accurately informed of the policies and actions of the Sudan Government; and that, if 
the Foreign Secretary feels that existing arrangements are inadequate, the reason is 
that we have, owing to his present immense responsibilities, brought questions of 
Sudan policy to his notice only when it was essential to do so. 
It is very largely true that the Sudan Government have run the Sudan in isolation 
from the rest of the world. Mter the murder of General Lee Stack in 1924 we cleared 
most of the Egyptians out of the administration and we have in effect run the Sudan 
as a British colony under the supervision of the British Foreign Secretary. (The 
Governor-General has supreme military and civil command, under the original 
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 and he has always been a British subject). It is 
generally acknowledged that this administration has been a model of its kind. Apart 
however from the day to day dealings of Sudan frontier officials with their opposite 
numbers in Ethiopia, French Equatorial Mrica etc. there have been little or no 
international contacts with the Sudan. No foreign consuls have ever been allowed to 
function in the Sudan. 
This was all very well up to the outbreak of the war. The war has provoked a great 
increase of interest among the Sudanese themselves in their own administration, 
together with Egyptian aspirations to closer unity of the Sudan with Egypt. The 
former development has led to a very great increase in the Sudanisation of the 
administration. About 80 per cent of all the lower grade posts in the administration 
are now held by Sudanese. The effects of the latter development have been seen in 
the negotiations for a new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and these have focussed an 
international spotlight on this part of Mrica. 
1 See 100. 
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All the posts in the higher levels of the administration are held by British officials. 
They have been solely concerned with the good administration of the Sudan and they 
have had a free hand in this on behalf of the two condominium governments for 
twenty-five years. This may possibly have bred a certain narrowness of outlook. Now 
that all forms of colonial administration are under attack in certain international 
quarters and in view of the growing nationalism of the Sudanese the administration 
will be compelled to widen its horizons. As far as the actual material administration 
of the welfare of the Sudanese is concerned I do not think we have much to fear from 
hostile criticism. But we may well be criticised, and here the Egyptians would be 
against us, for insulating the Sudan from the rest of the world. We shall probably 
want a new type of British official whose job will be to advise and assist Sudanese in 
the administration of their own affairs. Up till now the Sudan officials have been able 
to be perfectionists. This is not really possible any longer, and they will have to be 
content with something less than perfection. 
We should begin this process with the appointment of a new Governor-General 
which is due in the spring. It is clear that a man of wide political experience besides 
administrative qualifications is required. 
102 PREM 8/1388/2 9 Nov 1946 
[Political situation in the Sudan]: letter from Sir H Huddleston to Mr 
Attlee. Enclosure: letter from T P Creed, J W E Miller and J W 
Robertson to Sir H Huddleston, 6 Nov 1946 
My dear Prime Minister1 
Before I left London for the Sudan a fortnight ago, I told Mr. Bevin that in spite of all 
the difficulties which I foresaw, I believed that I could persuade the Sudanese to 
accept the Protocol. 
Before I reached Khartoum however, Sidki Pasha had completely destroyed 
whatever chance of success I may have had by his statement on the Sovereignty of 
the Sudan. The whole attention of the Sudanese was immediately focussed 
exclusively on the Sovereignty question and an "Egyptian Domination" Fear 
Complex developed of a far greater intensity than could possibly have been foreseen. I 
and my three principal advisers whose letter to me is attached having talked to 
several of the leading Sudanese and in particular to Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi 
are now quite convinced that it is impossible to persuade the Independent Front, 
which has the support of the majority, that there are any advantages in the Protocol, 
which could in any way offset Egyptian Sover[e]ignty, and that the terms of the 
Protocol could only be carried out by force. 
To use force to impose Egyptian Sovereignty on the Sudanese would be so 
complete a reversal of all that the Sudan Government has worked for for the past half 
century and would so completely destroy Sudanese faith in the good intentions of 
His Majesty[']s Government that I have returned at once so as to explain in person 
the basic change that has taken place in the situation in the last fortnight[.] 
1 Huddleston handed this letter personally to Attlee on 10 Nov. 
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I feel that it is no overstatement to say that if the Protocol has to be implemented 
by Force all the confidence engendered by fifty years of cooperation between British 
and Sudanese will vanish overnight. 
I trust therefore that before the Cabinet makes its final decision full consideration 
may be given to these altered circumstances. If however the Cabinet decides to 
approve the present Protocol I must record that I am no longer in agreement with 
the Sovereignty clause: but nevertheless if His Majesty[']s Government wish me to 
continue as Governor General I am ready to do so and to carry out the terms of the 
Protocol in view of Paragraph 8 of attached letter-believing that my personal 
influence might possibly reduce the amount of Force required. 
Enclosure to 102 
Your Excellency, 
1. In your recent consultations in London Your Excellency agreed with some 
hesitation to the inclusion in the proposed Sudan protocol of the reference to 
Egyptian sovereignty. Your Excellency believed that you had a chance of getting it 
accepted in the Sudan by emphasising its advantages to the Sudanese, as 
outweighing the concession of a symbolic sovereignty to the King of Egypt. We think 
that as things were then, there was a chance. We also realise that the maintenance of 
a strong British position in the Middle East is an essential condition of any 
advancement of the Sudanese. 
2. Sidki Pasha's statement that he had brought back Egyptian "sovereignty" 
caused an instantaneous reaction in the Sudan. It has been made abundantly clear 
that the bulk of the Sudanese will not willingly accept the protocol as long as it gives 
sole sovereignty of any kind to Egypt. In their view "sovereignty" cannot be qualified 
and the protocol in this respect represents a breach of all British pledges. 
3. The Sudan Government have taken the line that Mr. Bevin's statement of 
March could be trusted implicitly and to this is due the remarkable restraint shewn 
by the Sudanese throughout the past six months of negotiation. This government 
has for very many years with the encouragement of His Majesty's Government 
stressed the joint sovereignty of Great Britain and Egypt, adopting roughly speaking 
the line taken in chapter 5 of "The Anglo--Egyptian Sudan" written by Sir Harold 
MacMichael, a former Civil Secretary of this government and read by educated 
Sudanese. In unsophisticated Sudanese eyes this belief is fortified by daily visible 
signs of joint sovereingty [sic] with Great Britain as the predominant partner. To 
them any idea that Great Britain has no share in the sovereingty [sic] of the Sudan is 
meaningless. All Sudanese therefore consider that a change of status is involved and, 
whatever the legal arguments may be regarding the correct interpretation of the 
Condomium agreement, they believe that H.M.G. will be committing a breach of 
faith by making without previous consultation of the Sudanese its admission, never 
made in any previous negotiations, of sole Egyptian sovereignty. 
4. The Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on October 28th, 
did not satisfy the Sudanese whose comment was that it did not deny the reported 
inclusion of Egyptian sovereignty; the advantages gained by the Sudanese were 
entirely ignored in view of their obsession with the sovereignty issue. When the 
protocol is published, Mr. Attlee's statement denying any change of status will be 
considered to have been misleading and will be bitterly resented. 
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5. On your return to Khartoum Your Excellency found that Sidki Pasha's 
statement had entirely altered the situation, but on the instructions Your Excellency 
had received in London and from the Secretary of State's telegram No. 49 of the 29th 
October, it was impossible to discuss the protocol publicly while it was still under 
consideration by the Egyptians. The many private conversations which have taken 
place have shewn fanatical opposition on the sovereignty issue and complete 
indifference to the advantages set out in Mr. Attlee's statement, which the Sudanese 
in any case regard as having been already promised. 
6. If the protocol goes through, we believe, resignations will occur from 
government and local government service; there will be widespread non-cooperation 
from both parties, i.e. the independents who believe themselves betrayed and the 
"Unionists" (Wadi el Nil front) who wish to see the present administration ended. 
There may be risings among the tribes resulting in the loss of British lives. There will 
be a relapse to a police state and a consequent postponement of all the benefits to the 
Sudanese which it is claimed the protocol safeguards. 
7. For these reasons we believe the position has been completely changed by 
circumstances beyond your control since Your Excellency consented in London to 
try to persuade the Sudanese of the real values of the protocol, and we recommend 
most strongly that Your Excellency should personally see the Prime Minister so that 
H.M.G. may reconsider the position. 
8. Finally we wish to place on record that if in spite of recent events and in spite 
of our protest His Majesty's Government persists in acknowledging sole Egyptian 
sovereignty in the Sudan which we believe will result in the substitution of a 
government of force and repression for a government of cooperation and political 
development a policy repugnant to us and contrary to all the traditions of this 
government, we desire that Your Excellency should see the Sudan through the 
difficult months ahead. Your Excellency has the complete confidence of the British 
officials of this service and no Governor-General could rival you in your influence 
with all classes of Sudanse. 
9. We request that this memorandum be presented to the Prime Minister on 
your arrival in the United Kingdom. 
103 PREM 8/1388/2 11 Nov 1946 
[Political situation in the Sudan]: outward telegram no 2079 (reply) 
from Mr Attlee to Mr Bevin, reporting and commenting upon the 
governor general's assessment of the political situation in the Sudan 
Your telegram No. 1525 (of November 8th: Sudan).1 
Personal from Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary. 
[Extract] 
The Governor General of the Sudan arrived here on November 9th and he has 
given me his views on the situation created in the Sudan by the ill-timed and ill-
1 See 100. 
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considered statement on Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan attributed to Sidky. 
These views are as follows .... 2 
7. Even admitting the extreme parochial outlook of the Sudanese I find it very 
difficult to understand their line. In this country we have always understood that 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan existed though not explicitly stated. This has 
apparently not been understood by the Sudanese. The Governor General explained 
that up till 1924 there was a true condominium but in that year we turned out all 
Egyptian troops and there was practically a complete British administration 
thereafter with an anti-Egyptian bias which was only slightly modified by the return 
of an Egyptian battalion in 1936. The fact is that the Sudanese have for the last 
twenty-two years shut their eyes to any Egyptian connexion and nothing was ever 
done to open them to the true state of affairs.3 
8. At the best, the Governor General considers that if the protocol goes through, 
Sudanese officials who form 78 per cent of the administration will resign and there 
will be a boycott. There may be resignations among the British administration. At 
the worst, there will be disorders and bloodshed. 
9. As regards our future policy and having balanced the situation in the Sudan as 
described by the Governor General with the facts in the world at large, I feel that we 
have no alternative but to continue the line which you have taken with Sidky. If we 
go back now on the Sudan Protocol there is no doubt in my mind that we lose the 
Treaty for Sidky's Government could no longer stand. Our relations with Egypt and 
all our defence arrangements in the Middle East would once more be thrown into the 
melting pot. We should probably be taken to United Nations Organisation by the 
Egyptians, on the whole issue and certainly to the International Court on the 
sovereignty aspect and we are advised that the Court would confirm the Egyptian 
case. Our position in the Sudan as a result of an adverse judgment on this point 
would be infinitely worse, it seems to me, than it will be under the present Sudan 
Protocol. Moreover, we should have gained nothing in the Sudan since the Sudanese 
already know that we have admitted Egyptian sovereignty. 
10. There remains the question what steps we can take in the Sudan to 
strengthen the Sudan Government's position. It might help if the Protocol were 
accompanied by a joint Anglo-Egyptian declaration that the Sudanese would be free 
to decide their own future within a fixed period, say 10 or 15 years. In the meantime 
we could hurry on the process of Sudanisation by the establishment of Sudanese 
legislative and executive organs, the role of British officials being progressively 
confined to advising and assisting. When the Sudanese saw that in practice they were 
being put in control of their own affairs without any more interference from the 
2 Paras 2- 6 give a near verbatim record of Huddleston's views set out in 102. 
3 In a comment on this telegram which Huddleston later sent to Bevin, with Attlee's permission, 
Huddleston stated: 'The Sudan Government has always believed that Egyptian sovereignty existed jointly 
with British sovereignty over the Sudan and has consistently brought up the Sudanese in that belief, with, 
as far as it was aware, the complete approval of His Majesty's Government. .. . It is not the Sudanese who 
have shut their eyes to the Egyptian connexion during the past 22 years; they were deliberately shut for 
them with his Majesty's Government's cognisance. Their violent disillusionment now through Sidqi's 
indiscretions without my having an opportunity to prepare them can only be regarded by them as a 
betrayal of the promise that there should be no change of status without consultation' (outward telegram 
no 2166, Huddleston to Bevin, 14 Nov 1946, PREM 8/1388/2). 
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Egyptian Government than in the past, we might hope for a progressive and peaceful 
evolution towards self-government. 
11. I propose to request the Governor General to return and carry on until the 
future is clearer. On his way through Cairo he might call on King Farouk in order to 
impress on him the seriousness of the position in the Sudan and see whether the 
King in his speech to Parliament on the 14th could not say something to help ease 
the tension or at least say nothing to exacerbate it. 
104 PREM 8/1388/2 12 Nov 1946 
[Political situation in the Sudan]: inward telegram no 1613 (reply) 
from Mr Bevin to Mr Attlee 
Your telegram No. 2079.1 
Thank you for sending me this full account of your talk with the Governor 
General. 
2. I am certain that in spite of the threat of trouble in the Sudan which the 
Egyptian leakages have aggravated we should stick to the line agreed with Sidky. 
Vacillation under the threat of force would be the worst thing for our position not 
only in the Sudan but throughout the Arab world. 
3. In paragraph 4 of your telegram under reference you mention the Governor 
General's view that "if force has to be used and if what he calls a police state with 
censorship etc., has to be instituted all the confidence engendered by fifty years of co-
operation between the British and the Sudanese will vanish overnight". This really 
does seem to be painting our activities in the blackest light. If we had to use force it 
would only be to maintain law and order nor do I see why we should be called upon 
to set up a "police state with censorship". As for the disappearance overnight of all 
the confidence in the British built up over fifty years that could only come about as a 
result of either malicious interpretation of the draft protocol or excessively bad 
presentation on our part. 
4. As to your suggestions in paragraph 10, I am not in favour of a fixed date by 
which the future of the Sudan has to be decided. It is very difficult to tell how events 
will work out and at what speed. I do not believe in having to work to a hard and fast 
time schedule in political questions of this character. However, I am all in favour of 
intensifying Sudanisation. Effective action to this end together with adequate 
publicity on the development towards self-government emphasised in the Sudan 
protocol should serve to dispel any argument that we are sacrificing the Sudan to 
Egypt. We would review the progress of Sudanisation periodically. This was the 
reason for my telegram No. 1525 asking for periodic reports to the Foreign Office on 
the administration of the Sudan.2 I had no knowledge that we had been acting since 
1924 in the manner indicated. 
1 See 103. 2 See 100. 
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105 FO 371153260, no 4861 12 Nov 1946 
[Political situation in the Sudan]: notes by Sir H Huddleston for and 
in discussion with Mr McNeil 
[As Bevin was then in America, Huddleston met with McNeil at the FO. Mter the meeting 
McNeil commented: 'He is in a Messianic frame of mind, and I think he is going to 
resign'. He proposed that a conference of Sudanese leaders be called in London after the 
treaty was signed and suggested that 'this might be a straw on which Huddleston could 
cling, and would certainly stall his resignation' (minute, H McNeil, 12 Nov 1946, FO 
371/53260, no 4861). Huddleston continued to display his 'Messianic' frame of mind in 
two further 'urgent' letters sent to McNeil the following day (see 106 and 107).] 
1. When I tell you that the whole of the Sudanese Independents Party look upon 
the inclusion of the Egyptian Sovereignty clause in the Protocol as an absolute 
betrayal of them by H.M.G., and that in their present state of mind it is impossible for 
anybody to get them to change their opinion on this point in the slightest degree-
Do you believe me without any reservation whatsoever? 
2. Can you give me the same assurance for the Prime Minister, and for Mr. 
Alexander, and for Mr. Bevin when he has seen the papers? 
3. If your answer to the above question is "yes"-Do you fully appreciate that the 
only alternative to persuasion is force, and that once force is employed, no guarantee 
can be given of the amount required and, in the present fanatical state of the 
Sudanese, very serious resistance to Government, especially in the more distant 
districts might easily develop which could only be put down at the cost of very 
considerable bloodshed? 
1. We have lived on bluff for the last twenty-four years and now our bluff has 
been called-why should the Sudanese be punished for believing that we were 
honest men and not bluffers? 
2. Is the matter being referred to Mr. Bevin before final decision; if so, can I go to 
America to see him? 
3. S.A.R.-Visit of, most important. Stansgate protested against because they 
had been discouraged from seeing Azhari-situation entirely different-Azhari self-
elected free-lance. S.A.R. acknowledged head of largest Party and group in the Sudan. 
4. If I was dealing with trustworthy people, I should have no qualms-but can 
the Egyptians be trusted? and since when? What Ronald Weekes told me. 
5. Are they counting on Egyptian Army? Is the Treaty worth while? 
6. Somebody yesterday said that the Sudanese see the Egyptian flag, know the 
Governor-General is appointed by Egypt etc.-don't they recognise Egypt here? The 
answer is they saw 1924. 
7. Anthony Eden.1 
8. Written answer to my letter-! reserve the right to resign immediately. 
Egyptian sovereignty life and death to Sudanese but not to British-therefore my 
first duty to Sudanese though resignation might have serious effect on British staff. 
1 Anthony Eden, shadow foreign secretary, was then preparing a speech of on the Sudan, which he 
delivered in the House of Commons on 14 Nov. Huddleston remained in touch with him, and 
subsequently Eden relayed to Attlee his own, and Huddleston's disquiet over the King of Egypt's claim of 
sovereignty over the Sudan (PREM 8/182, Eden to Attlee, 26 Nov 1946). 
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106 FO 371153260, no 4860 13 Nov 1946 
[Political situation in the Sudan] : letter from Sir H Huddleston to Mr 
McNeil 
When I gave you my written questions1 yesterday, you very frankly admitted that I 
had failed to convince the members of the Cabinet, including yourself, who were at 
the meeting at No.lO on Monday, the 11th November, that the Sudan Independence 
group were, in their present state of mind, completely unmovable on the sovereignty 
clause. This is wishful thinking on your part, and like all wishful thinking, at base 
dishonest. If you don't believe me, produce only one other person with knowledge of 
the Sudan comparable to mine who disagrees with me; otherwise you MUST believe 
me. Say to me-as I said to you yesterday-"It is meet that one man die for the 
people" and I will agree with you. 
It may be necessary for the Sudan to pay the price of the mistake of His Majesty's 
Government in the past. That is honest and logical. Don't avoid the issue by saying 
that if the Sudanese were sensible there would be no price to pay; the whole essence 
of our trouble is that on this particular point the Sudanese are not "sensible". 
· The situation is then clear and I can decide whether I can be their executioner or 
not. 
1 See 105. 
107 FO 371153260, no 4762 13 Nov 1946 
[Proposed visit of SAR]: letter from Sir H Huddleston to Mr McNeil 
Reference the visit of S.A.R. to this country: shortness of time prevented me 
yesterday from pointing out the close historical parallel to Zaghlul Pasha's1 demand 
in February 1919 to go and state the case of Egypt before the Peace Conference in 
Paris, or at least before the Cabinet in London. 
Wingate, the High Commissioner in Egypt, strongly recommended that Zaghlul 
should be allowed to come-but not to the point of saying "I know for certain that 
there will be an attempt at a general anti-British rising in Egypt if you refuse. 
Therefore if you will not take my advice I must resign". Zahglul's appeal was turned 
down-there was a general rising-a number of unarmed British scattered about 
Egypt were murdered-a much larger number, far larger than was known at home, 
of fanatically excited Egyptians were killed. I know because I helped to kill them; I 
was then in military command of all Upper Egypt. 
Wingate was made the scapegoat; he was replaced by Allenby and was never re-
employed again. But that is by the way. The point of my story is that, being wise after 
the event, everybody agreed that if Zaghlul had been allowed at least to come to 
London and unburden himself of Egypt's wrongs, there would have been no rising in 
1 Zaghlul Pasha, leader of the Wafd Party, pressed for Egyptian independence after the end of World War 
One. The rebuff of nationalist aspirations by the British Government led to demonstrations and riots in 
1919. The opinion Huddleston expresses here was shared by Wingate, high commissioner for Egypt at the 
time (seeR Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London, 1955) chapter 9). 
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Egypt in March 1919. Reading S.A.R. for Zaghlul and me for Wingate, is not the case 
the same? 
I most strongly recommend that S.A.R. be allowed to come. It might be just that 
concession which would win him over-and would at the worst give us more time-
and time is a most valuable factor in a state of general tension such as exists in the 
Sudan to-day. It may excite the Egyptians; but must we always dance to their tune?-
must we always say "Yes, I quite agree, we ought to do so and so but it will upset the 
Egyptians and we must never do that"? 
I enclose copies of this letter for the Prime Minister, Mr. Bevin, Sir Orme Sargent, 
and the members of the British Treaty Delegation. 
108 PREM 8/1388/2, CM 96(46)1 14 Nov 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations: Sudan protocol': Cabinet 
conclusions [Extract] 
[In the meeting on 14 November Attlee briefed the Cabinet on the aftermath of Sidqi's 
disclosure, reading out Huddleston's letter (see 102), and summarising the exchange of 
telegrams between himself and Bevin (see 103, 104).] 
. .. Discussion showed that it was the view of the Cabinet that, notwithstanding the 
possible reactions in the Sudan, we should not withdraw from the understandings 
reached with Sidky Pasha about the Sudan Protocol. There were good prospects that 
within the next few days the Egyptian Government would accept the latest proposals 
regarding the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty; and it was most important that nothing should 
be said or done at this stage to prejudice these prospects. At the same time, we 
should lose no opportunity of averting serious trouble in the Sudan. Apart from long-
term measures for expediting Sudanese progress towards self-government, more 
immediate action could be taken to reassure the Sudanese. Thus, some of the leaders 
of political parties in the Sudan might be brought to this country, so that they might 
satisfy themselves at first hand of the desire of His Majesty's Government to enable 
the Sudanese to achieve self-government. Though it would be inexpedient to issue 
such an invitation before the Egyptian Government had reached their decision on 
the Treaty, preliminary arrangements could be made at once so that the invitation 
could be issued as soon as the decision of the Egyptian Government was known. 
Further, the Prime Minister could send to the Governor-General of the Sudan a 
letter, which he could show to some of the Sudanese leaders, assuring him that His 
Majesty's Government had considered his representations and were satisfied that the 
position of the Sudanese was fully safeguarded. This would be separate from the 
personal letter which the Prime Minister had already decided to send inviting the 
Governor-General to continue in office despite his apprehensions about the effect of 
the sovereignty clause in the Sudan Protocol to the Treaty. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Endorsed the Prime Minister's recommendation that, despite the possible 
reactions in the Sudan, we should not withdraw from our understandings with 
Sidky Pasha about the text of the Sudan Protocol to the new Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty. 
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(2) Asked the Minister of State to put in hand preliminary arrangements for 
inviting leaders of political parties in the Sudan to visit this country. 
(3) Took note that the Prime Minister would ask the Governor-General of the 
Sudan to continue in office1 and that the Foreign Secretary was also sending him a 
letter which he could show to British Members of the Administration explaining 
the reasons why His Majesty's Government had recognised the Egyptian claim in 
regard to the Sudan and stating that the position and prospects of British officials 
would not be jeopardised.2 
(4) Suggested that a further letter should be sent to the Governor General in 
suitable terms to be shown "to the Sudanese leaders assuring him that His 
Majesty's Government had considered his representations and were satisfied that 
Sudanese interests were fully safeguarded by the proposed Sudan Protocol to the 
new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. 
1 Attlee wrote to Huddleston the same day, informing him of the Cabinet decision, asking him to continue 
as governor-general, and assuring him that 'it is the considered view of His Majesty's Government that 
your presence in the Sudan at this moment is indispensable in British interests' (letter from Attlee to 
Huddleston, 14 Nov 1946, PREM 8/1388/2). 
2 See the copy of this letter in 111. 
109 FO 371153260, no 4844 15 Nov 1946 
[Political propaganda in the Sudan]: note by Sir H Huddleston on 
measures to be taken to regain Sudanese confidence1 
My first and principal objective on returning to the Sudan will be to recover as far as 
possible the confidence of the Sudanese, which has been so severely shaken by recent 
events, and to find some way of attracting their co-operation during the period of 
their training for self-government. 
The only hope of achieving this will be an immediate and really substantial first 
instalment of self-governing institutions, something much more rapid and drastic 
than we have hitherto contemplated for the immediate future, which will be an 
earnest of the good intention of the Condominium Powers, will demonstrate the 
value of the protocol to the Sudanese and may offset to some extent their dismay 
over Egyptian sovereignty. 
Speed is the essence of the matter; if there is any delay after my return to 
Khartoum, riots may compel me to use force and once this had happened there 
would be no hope of co-operation. 
I therefore request that H.M.G. and the Egyptian Government shall authorise me, 
immediately on my return to Khartoum, to call together the leaders of all political 
parties and other representative persons and to invite them to formulate agreed 
proposals for the immediate establishment of such political and administrative 
institutions as they may consider necessary during the period of their training for 
self-government. 
1 This note was forwarded to Attlee with an endorsement from Sargent on 18 Nov 1946 (PREM 8/1388/2). 
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Their proposals would undoubtedly involve considerable alterations in the present 
administrative arrangements in the Sudan and I therefore request authority likewise 
to submit my recommendations, based on these proposals, to the Condominium 
Powers for approval. 
110 FO 371153260, no 4859 18 Nov 1946 
[Political propaganda in the Sudan] : note by Sir H Huddleston on 
propaganda to be undertaken in the Sudan 
[Huddleston was given approval to make the points listed in this note, with some 
qualifications. 'It would be desirable to connect point one very closely with point three, 
and indicate that the sovereignty of the King of Egypt does not mean that Egypt can 
directly interfere with the administration of the Sudanese, whose administration remains 
as it was. As regards point two there is, technically speaking, no such thing as an Egyptian 
"subject". The Egyptian nationality law speaks of Egyptian "nationals", and it should be 
put therefore that Sudanese are not Egyptian nationals. Furthermore the Sudanese 
remain a group of their own which can only be described as Sudanese or, if and when a 
Sudanese citizenship law is enacted, Sudanese citizens' (letter from Sargent to 
Huddleston, 20 Nov 1946, FO 371/53260, no 4859).] 
Can I make use of the following points for propaganda purposes, as soon as I return 
to the Sudan? 
1. The symbolic nature of Egyptian sovereignty. 
2. The Sudanese will not be Egyptian subjects. 
3. No change in the administrative arrangements other than those made with the 
consent of the Sudanese towards the objective of self-government. 
4. Right of the Sudanese eventually to choose independence, including separation 
from the Egyptian Crown. 
P.S. I do not think that this would involve any breach of confidence, as all the above 
have appeared in some shape or other in the newspapers.1 
1 Scrivener minuted (18 Nov) : 'The answer in all cases appeals to be "Yes".' 
111 FO 371153318, no 4965, CP(46) 18 Nov 1946 
'Anglo-Egyptian treaty': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Attlee. Annexes 
[Extract] 
[In Bevin's absence in New York, this memo was drawn up in the FO for submission to 
the Cabinet over Attlee's signature. In fact it did not go to Cabinet, for the reasons 
explained in 113 and 115.] 
As my colleagues will be aware, the Foreign Secretary conducted a series of 
conversations with the Egyptian Prime Minister in London between 17th October 
and 26th October with a view to removing the differences which had, until then, 
prevented agreement on the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936. As a 
result, a personal agreement was reached on the basis of the texts enclosed in the 
present memorandum as Annexes 1, 2 and 3,1 which are to be interpreted in the light 
1 Of the eight annexes to this memo, only nos 4 and 8 are reproduced here. 
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of the draft confidential letter to Sidky Pasha, which forms Annex 4.2 It was 
understood that, provided the texts of Annexes 1, 2 and 3 were accepted in their 
entirety by the Egyptian Government, the Foreign Secretary would recommend their 
approval by His Majesty's Government. Having now received notification of the 
Egyptian Government's acceptance of these texts, I seek the Cabinet's authority to 
proceed to the formal signature of the treaty, and to request the British delegation to 
return to Egypt for that purpose. 
The texts consist of:-
(1) A treaty of mutual assistance in seven articles. 
(2) A Sudan Protocol. 
(3) An Evacuation Protocol. ... 
(2) ... the Defence Committee authorised the Foreign Secretary to negotiate a 
clause "which, while recognising a measure of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, 
would safeguard our present defence and administrative rights, and would not 
prejudice the rights of the Sudanese to choose the ultimate status of the country." 
The Sudan Protocol annexed to the present memorandum in my opinion fulfils these 
conditions and, in particular, meets a desire expressed in the Committee that the 
Sudanese people shall be consulted before the future status of the Sudan is finally 
determined. The Protocol provides that until the parties, after consultation with the 
Sudanese, are agreed on the ultimate status of the territory, the agreements of 1899 
(see Annex 5) and Article 11 of the 1936 treaty with its annex and paragraphs 14 to 16 
of the agreed minute annexed to the 1936 treaty (see Annex 6) shall remain in force. 
Article 11 of the 1936 treaty itself reaffirms the 1899 agreement and provides that the 
administration of the Sudan shall be that which results from them. It confirms the 
exercise by the Governor-General, on the joint behalf of the British and Egyptian 
Governments, of the powers conferred on him by those agreements. In particular 
this article vests appointments and promotions of officials in the Governor-General 
and provides that posts "for which qualified Sudanese are not available" shall be filled 
by suitable Britons and Egyptians. It also provides that "in addition to Sudanese 
troops, both British and British [sic] and Egyptian troops shall be placed at the 
disposal of the Governor-General for the defence of the Sudan. The confidential letter 
(Annex 4) records, moreover, that the Protocol constitutes an affirmation of, and not 
a change in, the existing status of the Sudan; that the Sudanese shall, when the time 
comes, be free to choose complete independence, and that the United Kingdom has 
an unconditional right to maintain what troops she wishes in the territory. 
The text of the Sudan Protocol was accepted by the Governor-General of the 
Sudan, who at the same time emphasised the difficulty of persuading the Sudanese 
2 As a result of Sidqi's public statements to the Egyptian press it was proposed that Sidqi give a written 
confirmation of the verbal undertakings he made concerning both the Sudan and Evacuation protocols. 
This was considered especially urgent as Sidqi was unlikely to remain in power long and it was anticipated 
that future Egyptian governments would not consider themselves bound by any 'Gentlemen's Agreement'. 
The terms of a confidential letter to be presented to Sidqi to sign at the time of the treaty signing were first 
drafted on 30 Oct. It originally proposed a ten year period for the continuation of the Condominium, after 
which the Sudanese would be consulted on whether they wanted independence, the maintenance of the 
Condominium, or some other status (minute, Sargent to Bevin, 30 Oct 1946, FO 371/53317, no 4549). 
This was changed in subsequent redrafts following comments by Bevin (see 104). 
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that in fact the Protocol, with its affirmation of the union between the Sudan and 
Egypt under a common crown, did not constitute a change of status such as would 
have obliged His Majesty's Government, in the light of their public undertaking of 
26th March last (see Annex 7) to consult them before its acceptance. But the 
Governor-General was on the whole satisfied that he could succeed in this task 
provided that His Majesty's Government gave him their firm support. Unfortunately, 
as the Cabinet are aware, the Egyptian press published an interpretation of the draft 
protocol which stressed the affirmation of Egyptian sovereignty but concealed the 
provisions regarding the administration of the Sudan and the right of self-
determination of the Sudanese. The results of this disclosure, which my statement in 
the House of Commons on 28th October unfortunately failed to efface, have been to 
create in the Sudan a situation of such seriousness that the Governor-General felt 
bound to return to London to report to me personally. It appears that the powerful 
Nationalist (as opposed to the pro-Egyptian) party in the Sudan, which is led by a 
(posthumous) son of the Mahdi, have been thrown into a mood of bitter and 
dangerous fanaticism, that they accuse His Majesty's Government and the Sudan 
Government of betraying them to Egypt, that they cannot be persuaded of the 
advantage of the protocol from their point of view, that force would be required to 
maintain public order if the protocol became an accomplished fact, and that a 
widespread boycott of the administration would take place. Finally, Sir H. 
Huddleston urged that to use force to impose Egyptian sovereignty on the Sudanese 
would be so complete a reversal of policy that it would destroy Sudanese faith in the 
good intentions of His Majesty's Government. 
While I have deep sympathy with the position in which Sir H. Huddleston has been 
placed by the indiscretions, if not the deliberate duplicity, of the Egyptians, I am 
satisfied that it would be wrong to retrace our steps at this stage. If we now repudiate 
the Sudan Protocol we shall lose the whole treaty, for Sidky Pasha's Government 
would be swept away. Our relations with Egypt and our defence arrangements in the 
Middle East would again be in the melting pot, and we might face the international 
complications of an Egyptian reference to the United Nations Organisation. This 
might take the form of the Egyptian Government either arguing that the treaty of 
I936 was out of date and its continuance a matter of dispute, or alternatively that we 
are violating it by maintaining a number of troops in Egypt greatly in excess of what 
the treaty allows. In addition there is, of course, the issue of sovereignty over the 
Sudan which the Egyptians might very well take to the International Court. I am 
therefore satisfied, after consultation with the Foreign Secretary, who is in full 
agreement, that we should proceed on our course. Finally, I think that my colleagues 
would be interested to read a letter (attached as Annex 8) which the Foreign 
Secretary has sent to the Governor-General explaining, for the guidance of the 
British officials of the Sudan Government, the implications of the Sudan Protocol. . .. 
Annex 4 to 111: draft confidential letter to Sidky Pasha 
At the moment of signing the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Mutual Assistance, I must 
ask your Excellency to be so good as to confirm the following interpretations agreed 
upon during your recent visit to London:-
(i) It is agreed that the provisions of the Sudan Protocol involve no change in the 
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present status of the Sudan; and that in particular the phrase regarding the unity 
between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt merely constitutes 
an affirmation of the existing status. 
(ii) The Sudan Protocol provides that the Sudanese people shall, when they are 
ripe for self-government, be free to choose the future status of the Sudan. It is 
understood that a completely free choice is implied here, and nothing in any part of 
the Protocol shall limit the right of the Sudanese people to choose complete 
independence if that should be their wish at that time. 
(iii) It is agreed that the Sudan Protocol in no way affects the unconditional right 
of the United Kingdom to maintain whatever troops they wish in the Sudan; and that 
in the exercise of this right the United Kingdom may reinforce the British 
contingents (more especially Royal Air Force) in the Sudan, and extend their base 
facilities there. 
(iv) It is agreed that, until the completion of the evacuation in accordance with the 
provisions of the evacuation Protocol, the British forces shall continue to enjoy their 
present rights of transit and flight over Egypt. It is also understood that the two 
Governments shall, after the signature of the Treaty of Alliance, discuss, with a view 
to arriving at a mutual agreement, the transit rights which shall be enjoyed for their 
aircraft by the British forces after the evacuation of Egypt is completed. Reciprocal 
treatment will also be accorded to Egyptian Air Forces in British territory. 
(v) It is agreed that the abrogation of the Treaty of 1936 does not affect the 
position of either party with regard to financial rights and liabilities which had 
accrued under the Treaty of 1936 at the time of the coming into force of the new 
Treaty of Alliance which abrogates it. 
Annex 8 to 111: letter from Mr Bevin to Sir H Huddleston 
The Protocol dealing with the Sudan which is to be signed at the same time as the 
new Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance may be perplexing to the British officials in 
the Sudan in that it admits "the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the 
common Crown of Egypt." 
It is true that, since the date of the 1899 Agreement, there has been no admission 
on the part of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the King of 
Egypt was the King of the Sudan, and that some writers have taken the view that the 
effect of the 1899 Agreement was to create a joint sovereignty shared between the 
United Kingdom and Egypt. 
On the other hand, on the Egyptian side, it has been continuously claimed 
throughout that the Khedive (and later the King) of Egypt remained the King of the 
Sudan, and His Majesty's Government, though they have not admitted this title, have 
never expressly denied it. The attitude of His Majesty's Government throughout this 
period has been that, as the 1899 Agreement provided fully for the administration 
and settled all practical matters, the question of sovereignty was a purely academic 
one. Throughout the period, and particularly in connexion with the recent 
negotiations, the greatest value was attached by the Egyptians to obtaining a 
recognition by His Majesty's Government of the position of the King of Egypt as King 
of the Sudan. 
His Majesty's Government for their part, although they continue to regard this 
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question as an academic one, saw no objection to admitting this claim of the King of 
Egypt provided that such an admission did not conflict with the undertaking given 
by me in the House of Commons on 26th March to agree to no alteration of the 
status of the Sudan without consultation with the Sudanese. 
Accordingly they obtained the advice of the highest legal authorities on this 
question of the claim of the King of Egypt, and were advised that the 1899 
Agreement, while providing fully for administration, did not affect the ultimate 
sovereignty over the Sudan of the Crown of Egypt which did undoubtedly exist before 
the 1899 Agreement, and that consequently such an admission now made by His 
Majesty's Government would not constitute any change of status. 
As you are aware, the possession by two territories of a common crown does 
not imply any common system of law or administration. Nor does it itself imply 
that the citizens of one territory which is under the common crown enjoy the 
rights of citizenship of the other territory which is under the common crown. The 
exact effects of a common crown, for which there are very many precedents both 
in the past and at the present time, depend in each case on both history and the 
exact arrangements which are made. Consequently, the exact effects of a common 
crown in one case do not, necessarily, afford any guide to the position in another 
case. 
The Sudan has always been and still remains to some extent sui generis, and in any 
case the exact position of the Sudan was made plain by the 1899 Agreement and the 
1936 Treaty. So far from this position being in any way changed by the new Sudan 
Protocol, it is expressly provided "that the Agreement of 1899 will continue and 
Article 11 of the Treaty of 1936 together with its annex and paragraphs 14 to 16 of 
the agreed minute will remain in force" notwithstanding that the new Treaty of 
Alliance abrogates the whole Treaty of 1936. 
The only new feature contained in the recent Sudan Protocol is an explicit 
recognition by Egypt, as well as by the United Kingdom, that the Sudanese are to be 
prepared for self-government, and that as soon as they are ripe for self-government 
the Sudanese people are to choose the future status of the Sudan. The choice of the 
Sudanese is entirely unfettered. If they so desire they will be free to choose that the 
Sudan should become a completely independent and separate State. They may also 
choose, if they so desire, union with Egypt or some new regime which is neither of 
these things. 
Further it is provided that the objective of preparing the Sudanese for self-
government so as to place them in a position to make this choice is to be carried out 
after consultation with the Sudanese and by the United Kingdom and Egypt in 
common agreement. 
This common objective, namely that the Sudanese should be prepared for self-
government and should, at the right moment, freely choose the future of the Sudan, 
has not hitherto been officially admitted by the Egyptian Government, and it is the 
admission by both parties of the condominium of its common objective which 
constitutes the only new feature created by the Sudan Protocol. 
In the present unsettled position of world affairs, and more especially in the need 
for a friendly Arab bloc in the Middle East, the concession which His Majesty's 
Government have made as regards the position of the Egyptian Crown is the more 
fully justified. 
It is His Majesty's Government's firm intention that the present administration in 
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the Sudan shall continue, and that the position and prospects of British officials in 
the country should not be jeopardised. 
I hope you will pass on these assurances to your British officials by whom so much 
has been done in the past for the welfare of the Sudanese, and on whom the future 
well-being and progress of the country depends. 
112 FO 371153262, no 5267 21 Nov 1946 
[Political propaganda in the Sudan]: circular letter from J W 
Robertson to all governors and heads of department on the 
presentation of treaty negotiations in the Sudan 
1. I refer to my personal circular of 31.10.46 and circular to Governors No. 36.M.15 
of2.11.46. 
The political situation throughout the country has improved and the unrest which 
was obvious in many places at the end of October has abated. There is still of course 
great anxiety amongst all classes of the community, and the tension among political 
parties and in the vernacular press is not likely to subside, until the Treaty 
negotiations are concluded, and forgotten. 
2. I have no doubt that we shall have political manoeuvring and party conflict in 
Khartoum and Omdurman with us now more or less permanently, and that we 
cannot hope to get rid of it. But permanent extension of these symptoms to the 
provinces need not take place yet, and can be slowed up for the future, if we take the 
proper measures now. 
3. It has been abundantly proved during the past month, that the chief anxiety in 
rural areas has been caused by reports that the "Hakuma"1 is losing grip; that the 
"INGLEEZ" are going, that we are about to hand over the Government to (a) the 
Egyptians or (b) Sayed Abdel Rahman or (c) the Effendia. The prospect of any of these 
as their rulers is most heartily disliked by the rural populations and their chiefs in all 
parts of the country, from Darfur to Dongola, and Gedaref to Geneina. Prominent 
leaders of Mahdist and Khatmi groups alike have everywhere stated in no uncertain 
terms that it is of the utmost importance to scotch rumours that the British are 
about to evacuate the country. The solid mass of tribal leaders and their people, the 
older officials and responsible townsfolk have no sympathy with the politically-
minded young men of Omdurman, and wish only to return to peaceful conditions 
under the present Government. Every reasonable person knows, that if the British go 
anarchy and chaos are inevitable. 
4. You should make it known in no uncertain terms, that whatever the outcome of 
the present Treaty negotiations:-
(a) there will be no change in the administration of the country. The Union Jack 
will not be pulled down: British Troops will remain in the Sudan: British officials 
will continue at their posts. 
(b) the policy of the Sudan Government as enunciated by His Excellency the 
Governor-General at the Advisory Council last April will continue unchanged, i.e.-
1 Hakuma: government. 
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(i) the building up of self-governing institutions in town and rural district. 
(ii) the introduction of Sudanese officials into the highest Government posts, 
when they are capable of doing the work. 
(iii) progress towards self-government at the centre. 
(iv) the consequent right of self-determination of their future status by the 
Sudanese.2 
(c) any acknowledgment of Egyptian sovereignty will not impair this policy. 
(d) these promises were categorically made by Mr. Attlee in the House of 
Commons on October 29th and they will be carried out. 
5. You should take every opportunity of explaining the situation, and of 
emphasizing the fi rmness of the present regime's position. Personal contacts, official 
tours, increased fantasia and parades, big displays at King's Day, etc. will impress 
rural, tribal and town populations alike and should be arranged. I hope that when His 
Excellency the Governor-General returns, he will be able to visit provincial centres, 
and that Departmental officials from Khartoum will tour more than has been 
possible in recent years. I believe such inspections by Education, Public Works, 
Finance, Agricultural and other officials can be used in the provinces to show that we 
are still here and intend to stay until we have carried out our task. 
6. The desire of the mass of the population for the continuation of the present 
regime is unquestioned, but they have been confused by recent reports. We must see 
that they are reassured, and this can be done only if we are determined and confident 
ourselves. It will not be so easy to win back the confidence of the politically-minded, 
but the first task is to restore confidence in the provinces, and to prevent 
uncertainties which may lead to risings and subsequent patrols. 
7. This circular is marked SECRET: it can be shewn to all British officials and to 
Senior Sudanese at your discretion. 
2 In a comment to the Sudan agent Scrivener wrote: 'Will you kindly let Khartoum know that the circular 
to Governors of 21st November enclosed therein has struck everyone here who has read it as admirable. 
Our only comment is that paragraph 4(iv) might perhaps have said, "the consequent right of self-
determination and the exercise by the Sudanese of the right to choose their futu re status"' (letter from 
Scrivener to Davies, 19 Dec 1946, FO 371/53262, no 5267). 
113 FO 371153319, no 4994 21 Nov 1946 
[Egyptian treaty ratification]: letter from R J Bowker toP S Scrivener 
on a major crisis in the treaty negotiations 
[The proposal to commit Sidqi to an exchange of letters on the Sudan protocol upon the 
Egyptian government's acceptance of the treaty and protocol texts had to be revised in 
light of information that Sidqi was intending to present his own interpretation of the 
protocol (see 99) to a secret session of the Egyptian parliament. Attlee and Bevin agreed 
that Bowker should be authorised to warn Sidqi that this interpretation was unacceptable 
to HMG. Attlee suggested that Sidqi be shown the text of the understanding it was 
proposed he sign (see 111), but Bevin asked that it be re-worded to incoroporate the 
wording in the minutes of his meeting with Sidqi in which he made clear his own 
understanding that the Sudanese had the right to choose independence (outward 
telegram no 2303 from Attlee to Bevin, 19 Nov 1946, and inward telegram no 16 from 
Bevin to Attlee, 19 Nov 1946, FO 371/53260, nos 4835 and 4856) . In the meantime 
Sargent delivered to Amr in London a memo which reiterated that 'nothing in any part of 
the Protocol shall limit the right of the Sudanese people to choose complete 
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independence if that should be their wish at that time' (note Sargent to Amr, 21 Nov 
1946, FO 371/53261, no 4923). Sidqi's difficulties in persuading the Egyptian treaty 
delegation that his interpretation of the protocol was valid made it increasingly unlikely 
that the Egyptian government would accept the treaty, much less that Sidqi would agree 
to a secret understanding radically different in interpretation than that to which he was 
publicly committed. Mter his meeting with Amr, Sargent was convinced that they risked 
losing the treaty altogether if they insisted on the proposed exchange of letters (outward 
telegram no 2411, 22 Nov 1946, FO 371/53260, no 4884).] 
We have reached a major crisis in the Treaty negotiations and the whole picture is 
now getting so confused that it is difficult to see any light. Sidky and the King are 
still straining every nerve to get the Treaty through and they are still hoping that it 
will be possible for Sidky to get a vote of confidence in Parliament and so short-
circuit the Treaty Delegation. Meanwhile, the Liberals, as I reported by telegram 
today, are said to have accepted the proposals subject to conditions which would be 
quite inacceptable to us, and without the Liberals Sidky has no chance of getting a 
vote of confidance [sic] in the Chamber and far less in the Senate. According to 
present arrangements the interpellation will be dealt with on 26th November. It is 
possible that between now and then the opposing members of the Delegation may 
issue a statement giving their reasons for not accepting the latest proposals. Any 
such statement is likely to cause a fairly large commotion. 
Meanwhile Sidky seems to have committed himself up to the hilt to 
interpretations of the Sudan Protocol, particularly on the point of the right of the 
Sudanese to choose their future status, which are diametrically opposed to Mr. 
Bevin's understanding of what was agreed with him in London and which can never 
be accepted by His Majesty's Government. There is no doubt that Sidky has up to now 
been relying on these interpretations in order to strengthen his by no means certain 
chances of getting a vote of confidance [sic] in Parliament. 
At least Sidky has now been warned that these interpretations have no chance of 
acceptance by His Majesty's Government and he must realise now that it is no good 
his trying to get the Treaty through by using them. To that extent the position has 
been clarified. 
Things are further complicated by Sidky's recent relapse and the fact that he is 
now back in bed and unable to receive visitors. 
I fear the prospects are gloomy. 
114 FO 371153262, no 5130 29 Nov 1946 
[SAR]: FO record of an interview between Mr Attlee and Sayyid Abd 
al-Rahman al-Mahdi on Nov 28, 1946 
[Huddleston's proposal that SAR be allowed to visit to London (see 107) was approved, 
and it was agreed that it would be best for him to join the existing Umma delegation in 
London after the governor-general had returned to the Sudan, but before the treaty was 
signed. 'Time will have been gained, and if the Sayed is reassured by his visit the worst 
may be avoided' (minute by Sargent to Attlee, 15 Nov 1946, PREM 8/1388/2). The Sudan 
government was instructed to assist SAR with his air priorities, and to offer the same 
facilities to SAM, or any leading Ashiqqa party member (outward telegram no 8421 from 
Luce to Robertson, 21 Nov 1946, FO 371153261, no 4916). In the event SAM politely 
declined the invitation for reasons of ill health (inward telegram no 145 from Robertson 
(Khartoum) to Huddleston (Cairo), 2 Dec 1946, FO 371/53262, no 5092). Bevin still being 
in New York, it was decided that SAR should have an audience with Attlee. Attlee 
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commented after this meeting, 'SAR did not show any sign of understanding that the 
sovereignty of the King of Egypt could be anything else than absolute power' (minute by 
Attlee to Sargent, 30 Nov 1946, FO 371/53261, no 5067).] 
After compliments, the Prime Minister invited the Sayed to set out his case. 
The Sayed said that he was grateful to the Prime Minister for this opportunity to 
make the views of the Sudan heard. The Sudan naturally expected to continue the 
status it had previously held when it was a free sovereign country, and since the early 
days of the Sudan Government, whose duty it was to prepare them to manage their 
own affairs. The Sudanese people had helped in this war in the cause of democracy 
and freedom. 
The Sudanese people had had confidence in the promises given the Sudan to have 
self-government. This promise had suddenly been disturbed by the declarations of 
Sidky Pasha in Cairo. The Sudanese people had not seen the proposed Protocol, 
except the version released by Sidky Pasha. This Declaration by Sidky Pasha had 
caused disturbance in the Sudan, and had made the Sudanese think twice of the 
promises which had been given to them. The Sayed had only been able to quieten his 
followers by the declaration by the Prime Minister that Sidky Pasha's disclosures 
were misleading and unimpartial. The Sudan was reassured by the Prime Minister's 
statement until King Farouk had said that the Egyptian Government would work 
towards self-government of the Sudan within the unity of the Sudan and Egypt.1 This 
proved that Egypt denied to the Sudan its right to self-determination. King Farouk's 
declaration was inconsistent with the Governor-General's declaration that the aim of 
His Majesty's Government was to prepare the Sudanese for self-government and 
ultimately for independence and the creation of a democratic Government in the 
Sudan. The Sudanese knew that the aims of the Sudan Government were to start 
representative bodies with a view to a democratic, free Government. Egyptian 
sovereignty was inconsistent with the Sudanese hope of freedom and with their own 
sovereignty. The Sayed assured the Prime Minister that the Sudanese will never 
accept this situation, i.e., Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. The Sayed had not 
seen the Protocol, but if Egyptian sovereignty had been admitted, it meant 
interference with the stable administration of the Sudan. 
If Egypt had any right to sovereignty over the Sudan, it was by right of conquest. 
This conquest was not by Egypt only. It came through British support. The Sudanese 
drove Egypt from the Sudan. Egypt alone could never conquer the Sudan. 
The principle of the unity of the Nile was inconsistent with the right of the 
Sudanese to self-determination. In the 1899 Agreement, the sovereignty of the Sudan 
was not admitted. That Agreement concerned only administration. His Majesty's 
Government had objected to the title of the King of Egypt as King of the Sudan. In 
the 1936 Treaty Revision, Egypt had raised their claim to sovereignty, but this claim 
had been left in abeyance. 
1 In his speech from the throne, 14 Nov 1946, in which Faruq proclaimed, 'With regard to the ... unity of 
Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, the Egyptian Government wished to proclaim that this 
unity has no other object than to safeguard the vital bonds which exist between Egypt and the Sudan. In 
the same way the Egyptian Government wished to affirm that Egypt looks upon the Sudan as a brother. 
One of her first aims would be to assure the well-being of the Sudanese, to develop their interests and 
prepare them effectively for self-government at the earliest possible moment' (letter from R L Speaight to 
Mr Bevin, 12 Dec 1946, FO 371153321, no 5363). 
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The Sudanese had loyally co-operated with the present Sudan Government and 
they regarded the present administration as dear to them, and they wanted to 
preserve this and make it the foundation for their future independence. 
The Sayed said that he would like to mention the part which the Sudan had played 
in this war. When the Sudan was invaded, the Sudan had defended their country 
alone, while Egypt, who had had troops in barracks there, did not raise a finger and 
even objected to the Sudan Defence Force taking any part in the war. 
Self determination was admitted to all nations by the United Nations Organization 
and by the Atlantic Charter. 
The Sudanese did not claim self-determination in the United Nations Organization 
except in the full confidence that His Majesty's Government would advocate the 
Sudan case, and that they would help the Sudan to reach independence. 
Any decision regarding the political status of the Sudan without consulting the 
Sudanese people would provoke complications comparable to those which had arisen 
in Palestine. The Sayed would regret [it] if good relations which had been built up 
through the good work of the British administration were marred by bitterness and 
antagonism. The Sudanese have character, and His Majesty's Government could 
depend on that character. 
The Sayed had said after the Prime Minister's declaration in Parliament that he 
could quieten the Sudanese, but if the Protocol were concluded, he would not be able 
to restrain the Sudanese people from committing excesses. His policy was continued 
friendship with Britain and the hope that the Sudan would gain its freedom through 
England. He wondered why the Sudan, who had joined the war voluntarily, while 
Egypt had only been a spectator, should now be suddenly handed over to Egypt. The 
Sudan defended her borders, helped to liberate Abyssinia, sent a force to North 
Africa, and had thrown all its forces and resources into the winning of the war, while 
Egypt never used a single soldier and sold its resources to the Allies at high prices. 
The Sudan had no emnity towards Egypt and would co-operate with that country. 
They had told Egypt this, but the Egyptians did not believe them. Egypt was seeking 
the help of Great Britain in order to stay in the Sudan with British bayonets. The 
Sudanese were confident that Great Britain, one of the leading members of the 
United Nations Organization, would never help Egypt by force to separate the 
Sudanese from their freedom. 
The Prime Minister thanked the Sayed for setting out the position so clearly. There 
was the deepest interest here in the welfare of the Sudan and the Sudanese people. 
He was very well aware of the way the Sudanese had stood fast in the difficult times of 
the war. He knew, too, that the Sudanese were looking forward to complete self-
government and the complete right to decide their own future . 
The Prime Minister said that we recognised the right of the Sudanese people to 
decide their own future. As the Sayed knew, with the full approval and active 
encouragement of His Majesty's Government, we had been pressing on with 
Sudanese institutions. The Governor General had the full approval of His Majesty's 
Government to go on to further consultations with the Sudanese leaders. 
The Sayed said that this was very good news and he was glad to hear it. This had 
been his own impression in the past, but Sidky had contradicted this. 
The Prime Minister said he was coming to that. The proposed Protocol does not 
make the slightest difference to the present status of the Sudan or to its 
administration. As to sovereignty, this is a legal question. Lawyers will debate for 
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months on the exact meaning of sovereignty. There were people who thought of 
sovereignty as only meaning complete power of a sovereign to do as he pleases. (Here 
the Sayed interposed to say that this is what is meant in the East by Sovereignty). In 
Europe this word has been used to mean very different things. 
The Sayed said that if anybody were given sovereignty, he would use it in his own 
way. He asked, was there any democracy in Egypt. 
The Prime Minister replied that it was for the Sayed to say whether there has or 
has not been Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan. 
The Sayed replied that there had been none. 
The Prime Minister said then there was none now, but lawyers might argue that 
there is this or that position with regard to sovereignty. The actual position, 
however, was that the Protocol made no change from what had existed in those 
years. 
The Sayed said that he had not seen the Protocol, but Sidky Pasha and King 
Farouk said there was sovereignty. 
The Prime Minister said that the Agreement of 1899 remained in force. The 
present system of administration remained except in so far as it was changed 
contrary to the Protocol by the Sudanese people. If there was any direct Egyptian 
administration, this would be resisted. The word "sovereignty" did not appear in the 
Protocol, so there was no need to quarrel about the word. In our view, the Protocol 
could not prejudice the right of the Sudanese at the proper time to achieve their 
complete independence if they so decided, and there was nothing in the existing 
situation which could in any way run counter to the right of the Sudanese people to 
achieve their independence if they so decided. We did not consider that the existence 
of a connection between the two altered the right of the Sudanese to decide their 
future. Therefore we should like the Sayed to collaborate with the Governor General 
to ensure orderly progress of the Sudanese people. Let them disregard misleading 
statements, because this is the position of His Majesty's Government in this matter. 
The Protocol recognised the existing juridical position of the Sudan. It neither added 
to nor subtracted from it and left the existing administration where it was. One last 
point. Whatever might be said by outsiders, we were in the Sudan and we and the 
Sudanese would control the position there. That was the position by treaties. 
The Sayed said that the Sudanese were expecting results from his visit. 
The Prime Minister replied that the Sayed would be able to tell the Sudanese that 
the Protocol makes no difference to the position in the Sudan. 
The Sayed enquired what was meant by the relation between Egypt and the Sudan. 
The Prime Minister replied that it meant the recognition of the fact that in our 
relations with Egypt, the United Kingdom and the Sudan, those three are concerned. 
The Governor General was appointed by the King of Egypt on the recommendation 
of His Majesty's Government. There was also the Egyptian flag. These things were 
merely the recognition of a state of affairs which has not changed by the Protocol. 
The Sayed said that this relation was the cause of their present fear because the 
Egyptians were using it against the Sudanese and against His Majesty's Government 
in the Sudan. Was nothing to be allowed to interfere with this relation? 
The Prime Minister replied that the position was unchanged in this respect. 
The Sayed said that the danger was that King Farouk would be called the King of 
Egypt and the Sudan. 
The Prime Minister said that he had the symbol, we had reality. 
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The Sayed said that he was faithful to the Sudanese and to the British and this 
made him anxious not to deceive either us or the Sudanese. 
The Prime Minister said that ever since 1899 there had been a condominium. 
Egypt had old claims. They had never been denied. We have had the administration. 
The Egyptians had the symbol, and we had the reality. 
The Sayed said that the understanding was that Egypt claimed more than she had 
in the past. 
The Prime Minister replied that Egypt was not getting more than in the past. 
The Sayed said that in the past the only outward sign was the Egyptian flag. Now it 
was intended to give other recognition which they had not had before. 
The Prime Minister said that they had these things before. They do exist. If the 
matter were referred to an international court, the court would say that these things 
exist. 
The Sayed said that under the United Nations Organization the right of the 
Sudanese to freedom would receive wider interpretation than under the old 
dispensation. 
The Prime Minister said that the court would find the facts as they are. They would 
find sovereignty in Egypt and administration in British hands. Those are the facts. 
The Sayed said that the rights of Egypt arose from conquest and were invalid to 
deprive the Sudanese of their freedom. Egypt had no greater right in the Sudan than 
the British had. 
The Prime Minister said that whatever these rights were, they could not contradict 
the right of the Sudanese to do what they wished in the future . 
The Sayed said that they still feared that Egyptian sovereignty would be used for 
propaganda in the Sudan. The King's name would be used in prayers in mosques. 
The Prime Minister asked whether the Sudanese could not themselves look after 
that. 
The Sayed replied that in the past prayers had been in the name of the Turkish 
Caliph up till 1914. Since 1936 Egyptian influence had increased, more troops had 
come into the Sudan. He was afraid for the future. 
The Prime Minister said that we would work together. That was the answer. 
The Sayed replied that they wanted this. There must be a firm foundation. 
The Prime Minister said we already had this in the administration. 
The Sayed said he could not understand the meaning of symbolic sovereignty. It 
would certainly take on the form of the alteration of the status quo. 
The Prime Minister said that was not so. We go no further than what actually 
exists. 
The Sayed said that King Farouk's statement of Egyptian desire to help the 
Sudanese to reach self-government meant more propaganda and interference. The 
Sudanese did not trust the Egyptians. Must he return to the Sudan and say that 
things had changed? 
The Prime Minister said that he had been saying for the last half hour that nothing 
had been changed. The Protocol recognised the right of the Sudanese to choose their 
status and to do what they pleased. There was no going back. 
The Sayed asked whether the Sudanese could decide their future . 
The Prime Minister told the Sayed that he should go back and talk to the Governor 
General and get things moving in this direction. As soon as the Sudanese were ready 
they could do what they wished. 
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The Sayed said that if the Protocol is as has been published, the Sudanese would 
not co-operate. They wanted peace. 
The Prime Minister said that the Protocol expressly provided the right of the 
Sudanese to choose what they wanted. 
The Sayed said that the only thing which could create the Sudan was the Prime 
Minister's word. 
The Prime Minister said there will be a Sudan as it is to-day, working and 
developing. 
The Sayed said that he had confidence in the Prime Minister's word, but the 
Sudanese would say ''What have you got for us?" What should be the reply? 
The Prime Minister replied that he did not think that the Sayed would have any 
difficulty about that. 
The Sayed said that he was staying here for several days and expected assurances 
from the Prime Minister. 
115 PREM 8/1388/3 30 Nov 1946 
[Sudanese self-determination]: letter from Mr Attlee to Sir H 
Huddleston reaffirming the right of the Sudanese to achieve 
independence 
[Attlee's letter giving HMG's interpretation of the Sudan protocol (see 108 & 111) was 
delayed as the letter of understanding to be sent to Sidqi was also redrafted. Attlee's 
original letter to Huddleston authorised him to reassure the Sudanese leaders that they 
had "the right to separate themselves from the Egyptian Crown should they wish to do 
so" (letter from Attlee to Hudleston, 20 Nov 1946, FO 371/53261, no 4906; see 111). This 
was rescinded at Bevin's insistence, on the grounds that 'secession' had never been agreed 
between Sidqi and him, and that the word 'secession' was not used in relation to the 
dominions of the Commonwealth in the Statute of Westminster (inward telegram no 
1918 from Bevin to Sargent, 23 Nov 1946, FO 371/53261, no 4936). The Sudan 
government, however, understood that the Sudanese 'right to secede' was guaranteed by 
the protocol and both the governor-general and the civil secretary pressed hard to be 
allowed to tell Sudanese leaders this (letter from Robertson to Bowker, 16 Nov 1946, 
FO 371/53261, no 4962, and inward telegram no 1746 from Bowker to FO, 25 Nov 1946, 
FO 371/53261, no 4944) . Huddleston complained that the proposed substitution of 
'independence' for 'the right to separate themselves from the Egyptian Crown', was 'quite 
valueless to me' in his dealing with the Sudanese (inward telegram no 1770 from 
Huddleston to Attlee, 27 Nov 1946, FO 371/53261, no 5026). Privately Attlee complained: 
'Sir H. Huddleston is unreasonable. We cannot give the Sudanese any more rights against 
Egypt than already exist' (minute from Attlee to Sargent, 30 Nov 1946, FO 371/53261, no 
5067). To Huddleston, who was still in Cairo, he explained that he could go no further in 
expressing HMG's opinion, until an agreed interpretation of the Sudan protocol had been 
reached with Sidqi. He had, in any case, already assured SAR that nothing prejudiced the 
right of the Sudanese to achieve 'complete independence' (see 114). He therefore urged 
the governor-general 'to do the best you can with the foregoing . . . ' (outward telegram 
no 2038 from Attlee to Huddleston, 30 Nov 1946, FO 371/53261, no 5067) . Huddleston 
promised to do so 'since it is clear complete independence can have no limitation and 
therefore must include the right to separation', and planned to return to Khartoum as 
soon as he received his copy of Attlee's letter (inward telegram no 1795 from Huddleston 
to Attlee, 1 Dec 1946, FO 371/53262, no 5076).] 
In the course of your visit you have informed His Majesty's Government of the great 
anxiety aroused amongst large sections of the Sudanese people by the recent 
statements in the Egyptian press regarding the conversations in London between 
Sidky Pasha and the Foreign Secretary on the subject of the Sudan. You emphasised 
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in particular the fears that had been expressed by the Sudanese that the recognition 
by His Majesty's Government of the existence of a union between the Sudan and 
Egypt represented by a common crown would prejudice their advance towards self-
Government and the right, conceded to them by His Majesty's Government, to be 
consulted before any change was made in the status of the Sudan as a result of the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty. 
In reply I expressed to you my regret that the Sudanese should have been misled 
by partial disclosures; and I gave you an assurance which you are authorised to 
convey to the leaders of the Sudanese people that His Majesty's Government are for 
their part determined that nothing shall be permitted to deflect the Sudan 
Government, whose constitution and powers remain unaltered by the recent 
conversations, from the task to which that Government had applied themselves, viz. 
the preparation of the Sudanese for self-Government and for the task of choosing 
freely what their future status is to be. The Sudan Protocol in fact provides that the 
Sudanese people shall, when they are ripe for self-government, be free to choose the 
future status of the Sudan. His Majesty's Government consider that, in the words 
used by the Egyptian Prime Minister to the British Foreign Secretary, nothing in the 
proposed treaty can prejudice the right of the Sudanese to achieve their 
independence nor bind a people in search of liberty.1 The Egyptian Prime Minister 
pointed out to the British Foreign Secretary that this was a universal principle and 
therefore not a matter for incorporation in a treaty. 
His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that you intend immediately on your 
return to hold consultations with representative Sudanese regarding their closer 
association with the administration, and to submit the resulting recommendations 
to the condominium governments. Meanwhile the present system of administration 
will continue; your authority will be in no way impaired; and the agreements of 1899 
and Article 11 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 remain in force. 
The object of the recent Anglo-Egyptian negotiations has been to conclude a 
treaty acceptable to both parties and to reaffirm Anglo-Egyptian friendship. The 
Sudanese can only benefit from harmonious relations between the British and 
Egyptian Governments; their interests can only suffer as a result of disagreement and 
strained relations between those Governments. 
1 A verbatum quotation from Sidqi (see 88). 
116 FO 371153262, no 5155 2 Dec 1946 
[SARin London]: record by Lord Stansgate of a meeting with SAR 
and advisers 
Persons interviewed are:-
Sir Reginald Wingate, ex-Governor-General. 
Mr. Udal, ex-Sudan Service, Secretary of the Atheneum.1 
Judge Shangetti, Sudan Judge. 
The Mahdi. 
1 N R Udal, SPS, 1906-1915; Education Dept, 1915- 1930; warden of Cordon College, 1927-1930; at this 
time adviser to SAR. 
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Judge Shangetti is very well spoken of by the Sudanese Government. He explained to 
me that at one time in 1924 he was in opposition to the British Government but had 
now come to see that the British Government were their friends. 
Mr. Udal spoke very highly of Shangetti. Shangetti himself seemed an 
accommodating man, anxious to help. 
Sir Reginald Wingate's story of his mission with Rodd in 1898 to Addis Ababa, 
because he had heard that the Abyssinians had sent a letter to the Khalifa. He was 
received by Menelik and French and Russian officers. He secured a copy of the letter 
which had been sent to Khartoum and it was an arrangement, by which, through an 
Abyssinian!Dervish alliance, the French would secure themselves in the Sudan. It 
was part of the plan for which Marchand advanced on Fashoda. 
Wingate described his long argument with Kitchener as to which flag was to be 
flown at Fashoda when they arrived. He convinced Kitchener that they must only fly 
the Turkish/Egyptian flag (red) .2 Marchand had arrived in July, 1898. The incident 
took place in September and Marchand retired in December when both British and 
Egyptian flags were flown. 
Wingate also spoke of his visit to London in 1919. He had a high opinion of 
Zaghlul3 who had offered a firm and permanent alliance in return for Egyptian 
independence. After being kept waiting a fortnight Wingate was received by Lord 
Curzon who looked at the clock and asked him to cut it short. Wingate said he only 
wanted a minute or two. The result was a "firm" declaration by Curzon and all the 
ensuing trouble with Zaghlul. 
Wingate said that Egyptian rule was very bad. He visited an Egyptian fort, where 
all the women and children of the local Sudanese had been collected and were being 
ill-treated until the Sudanese men in the villages consented to pay their taxes. This 
had happened several times that year. 
Wingate said that his complimentary references to Egypt in his book, "Mahdism 
and the Egyptian Sudan"4 were written when he was in the Egyptian service. 
Shangetti said in defence of the Mahdia that Slatin's book was only published as 
propaganda to get the reconquest of the Sudan started. The same could be said of 
Ohrwalder's book.5 
Udal was rather inclined to glorify the Mahdi, who was a good man, whereas the 
Khalifa6 was a tyrant. 
The father of S.A.M. Wingate said was El Morghani, and S.A.M. as a boy had been 
brought to Cairo and placed in hospital there with an English nurse. He had fallen 
under the influence of the Egyptians, (but S.A.M. had signed with S.A.R., letters 
approving the British rule-S.) 
2 See 86. 3 See 107. 4 See F R Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan (London, 1891). 
5 R Slatin, Fire and sword in the Sudan (London, 1896), and F R Wingate, Ten year's captivity in the 
Mahdi's camp, 1882- 1892 (London, 1892). Both Ohrwalder (an Austrian Catholic missionary) and Slatin 
(an Austrian soldier of fortune in Egyptian service) had surrendered to the Mahdi 's forces prior to the fall 
of Khartoum (1885) and had been resident in Omdurman until enabled to escape by agents of Wingate's 
intelligence department. Accounts of their captivity were edited and reworked by Wingate and his 
intelligence staff as part of the propaganda effort to generate public support in England for the reconquest 
of the Sudan. 
6 The Khalifa Abdallah (1846-1899), the successor to the Mahdi and theocratic head of the Mahdist state, 
1885- 1898. 
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Shangetti in an aside said that the educated Sudanese were paying less attention 
to the religious leaders, S.A.M. and S.A.R. As a matter of fact S.A.M. was not really 
behind Ashigga. He explained also that whereas S.A.R. was merely a prophet, S.A.M. 
claimed to be divine. 7 
Wingate said that on S.A.M.'s return he was so popular and had received so many 
gifts that he, Wingate, had to put a stop to it. 
Udal said that he thought the followers of S.A.R. were three quarters of the people 
of the Sudan. S.A.R., himself, in conversation said that 5% only were behind Ashigga. 
Shangetti explained that [the Graduates ') Congress was alright as long as it was 
interested in social welfare but lost its influence when it went in for politics. 
Other personalities were the Khalifa. Three of his sons were with S.A.R., but there 
were 3 who were not. One was insane and lived in Egypt and 2 were officers in the 
Sudan and followed Ashigga. 
Immediate course of action 
Shangetti of course was very much opposed to the declaration of sovereignty and Udal 
thought the Sudanese could not get over it. Shangetti thought that the Treaty itself should 
contain a statement about the necessary steps for the emancipation of the Sudan. 
Wingate and Udal agreed that what was required was a round table conference 
preferably in London. The Governor-General should nominate Sudanese. The 
Egyptians should certainly participate with us and some immediate step was required 
as evidence that we meant business in Sudanese self-Government. All the Sudanese 
parties, including Ashigga, should be invited. This would fulfi l the pledge, which 
Wingate emphasised, that the Sudan should be consulted. The real guarantee was the 
continuation of the Condominium (Wingate did not seem to realise how far opinion 
had moved amongst the Sudanese since his day) .8 
As regards relations with Egypt Shangetti told me that S.A.R. had asked Sidki to 
see him, but no reply had been received. 
In conversation the distinction between the north and south Sudan became very 
clear. Shangetti boasted that the Sudanese had come from Arabia. He spoke very 
contemptuously of Abdel Latif (now in an insane asylum). He said his mother was a 
negress, his father was unknown, and that he, Latif, had at one time collected old tins 
from barracks.9 S.A.R., also, when the South was mentioned indicated that they, the 
7 SAM was a child of about three at the beginning of the Mahdiya (1881). His father, Shaikh Muhammad 
Uthman al-Mirghani (the grandson of the founder of the order) , was the leader of the Khatmiya at that time 
and allied with the Egyptian government in opposing the claims of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi . Both SAM 
and SAR were leaders of religious orders founded by direct ancestors, and both were considered by their fol-
lowers to have inherited the baraka (blessing, or sanctity) of their ancestors. Neither claimed to be divine. 
It is unlikely that Stansgate accurately reported Shinqiti 's claim that SAR was a 'prophet'. Muhammad is 
considered 'the Seal of the Prophets', and it is blasphemy for any Muslim to claim to be a prophet. 
8 Sir R Campbell minuted (9 Dec 1946), 'There seems to me to be a germ of utility in the 3-party 
conference suggestion, which is amenable to a variety of forms and could be combined with the S of S's 
proposal for a joint permanent council to supervise the preparation of the Sudanese for self-govt.' 
9 Ali Abd al-Latif (c. 1892-1948) , a leader of the White Flag League which, in the 1920s, advocated the 
Unity of the Nile Valley and 'Sudan for the Sudanese', was a Sudanese officer of the Egyptian army. He was 
born in Egypt, his father being a Nuba soldier and his mother a Dinka, both of whom had been slaves in 
the Sudan. Shingiti is here expressing contempt not only for Ali Abd al-Latifs non-Arab origin, but for the 
slave status of his parents. It was only much later, following the Free Officers' coup in Egypt in 1952 and 
the May Revolution of 1969 in the Sudan that Ali Abd al-Latif and similar Sudanese officers of Mrican (and 
slave) origin were officially honoured as nationalist heroes. 
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North, could deal with it very satisfactorily. The people in the south were called 
slaves, but Shangetti explained that this term was not much used now and probably 
his sons would never employ it at al1. 10 
Through the conversation with S.A.R. the general theme was that the Sudan 
wanted the help of the world, that if the Sudanese were backed by us, they would be 
very willing to give us any military facilities we required. In the interview with 
Wingate and Udal the term the "Umma are very loyal" was continuously used. S.A.R. 
indicated that rather than be joined to Egypt he would join what he called "Africa." 
Shangetti intimated that the harsh rule of the time of Macmichael, 11 of whom he 
spoke very critically, had been succeeded by a new regime, more in earnest in 
advancing the Sudanese towards self-government. 
In the scheme of associating Egypt with Great Britain in settling the Sudan 
question, a wise step would be to persuade the Egyptians to show a little of their 
lavish courtesy to the Sudanese. The S.A.R. himself on his return might be treated 
with signal honour in Cairo. It might, perhaps, be possible to ask the Egyptian 
Ambassador to show him some special favour in London, but all this must be done 
under Egyptian auspices. 
A second helpful step would be to get the Egyptians, if they would, to join in some 
declaration instructing the Governor-General to call a round table conference in 
which we should all particpate with a view to carrying out the undertakings given in 
the Protocol as to the welfare of the Sudanese and their advancement to self-
government. 
10 Shingiti (who was acting as SAR's interpreter) here seems to be trying to explain away a casual reference 
by SAR to Southern Sudanese as abid (slaves). 
11 Sir H MacMichael, SPS, 1905- 1933; civil secretary, 1926- 1933. 
117 FO 371/53262, no 5303 5 Dec 1946 
[SAR on self-government]: FO record of a meeting between Mr 
McNeil and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi 
After the usual exchange of compliments the Sayed referred to the text of the Sudan 
Protocol which had been published in Egypt. He did not consider that the Protocol 
was in line with Mr. Bevin's declaration of March 26th.1 He considered that it made 
an entire change in the situation, because neither the words "monarch" nor "unity" 
existed in the previous situation. He felt that the co-operation between Great Britain . 
and the Sudan, which in the past had been based on the expectation of the fulfilment 
of British promises, could not continue since the declaration of the Protocol. This 
declaration made the position of himself and his followers impossible if they wished 
to continue co-operation. He asked what guarantees there were that there would be 
co-operation between the British and the Sudanese in the administration of the 
Sudan. 
The Minister of State said that there were no guarantees other than our word and 
the practical operation of the administration. No further guarantees were necessary, 
since there had been no change in the situation. 
1 See 54. 
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The Sayed said that the Protocol and the statement of the King of Egypt did not 
accord with the interpretation that there had been no change. British administration 
during the past fifty years had developed the Sudan, protected the Sudanese people 
and led them towards self-government. What would the British now protect except 
the Egyptian crown? His argument was based on the documents and declarations 
that had been made available. Were there any other documents? 
The Minister replied that since the opening of the Egyptian talks His Majesty's 
Government had always borne in mind that our policy was to develop the Sudan for 
self-government and had never overlooked this. We would not sign a treaty which in 
any way limited that high policy. Whose word did the Sudanese prefer, that of Mr. 
Attlee or that of Sidky Pasha? The Sudanese had 640 friends in the House of 
Commons who were proud of our record in the Sudan. Of course any treaty must 
come before the House of Commons before signature. 
The Sayed said that he was grateful and reassured. His mission however was to 
make clear how people in the east understood things so that in our actions the 
British Government could know how their actions would be interpreted. 
The Minister of State said that what counted were our actions in the Sudan. Sayed 
should not pay too much attention to newspaper reports or to what one man or 
another said. 
The Sayed referred to the 1936 treaty which did not affect the position of the 
Sudan and said that the 1936 treaty was to stand for 20 years. It was now to be revised 
after 10 years. 
The Minister replied that it was provided in the 1936 treaty that it could be revised 
after 10 years. 
The Sayed then referred to the phrase "unity under the common crown of Egypt". 
Although the word "sovereignty" was not mentioned specifically the former phrase 
was mentioned. These words worried him and had brought him to London. 
He was also concerned about King Farouk's declaration that "welfare" and "self-
rule" would be his aims.2 This was not compatible with Mr. Bevin's declaration that 
"self-rule" is a first step towards independence. According to the Protocol as it was 
released His Majesty's Government were not to consult the Sudanese about their 
self-rule but only the Egyptians. 
The Minister asserted that our position and our pledges were quite unshaken. 
The Sayed said that he wanted to proceed to self-government in the Sudan now 
with British support and guidance. This would be a protection against the present 
Egyptian Government, which was a corrupt one. 
The Minister said that this seemed a completely new development; it had not been 
referred to in the Sayed's talk with the Prime Minister,3 and he could not make any 
pronouncement immediately. 
The Sayed then referred to the record of his conversation with the Prime Minister 
in which Mr. Attlee had said that the Governor-General had the support of the British 
Government to consult the Sudanese towards these aims. 
The Minister said that this was not the same thing as giving immediate self-
government. 
2 See 114, note l. 
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The Sayed replied that the Sudanese had now reached the stage when they had 
established local self-government and an advisory council which was now developing 
towards a legislative assembly. This meant that the Sudanese were ready for a further 
step towards self-government. 
The Minister replied that His Majesty's Government were of course anxious to take 
every step that would hasten self-government and it was precisely for that purpose 
that the Governor-General had been sent back to the Sudan. His Majesty's 
Government wanted to take steps to implement our policy in the Sudan and to 
ensure that the Sudanese could eventually be completely masters of their own 
destiny. They would not be parties to any treaty which impeded that policy. 
The Sayed referred to a document which he had brought with him and which he 
then read out. He demanded 
1. complete self-government forthwith; 
2. independence in 10 years; and 
3. that these conditions should be written into the treaty. 
He asked for a written answer to these points before he returned to the Sudan. 
The Minister of State said that this was a completely new departure, and he could 
not comment at this stage, but it appeared to him from what he had heard that there 
were no differences in principle between the Sayed and himself, the differences were 
only those of method. Negotiations for a treaty were now at a final stage, and this 
could not be reconciled with the Sayed's demands, but he could rest assured that in 
its final form the treaty would not conflict with our promises or his hopes. 
The Sayed said that all he wanted was that the Protocol should, when it was made 
public, contain something of solid value for the Sudanese which the Sudanese people 
could seize upon and understand. He wanted to know that he could leave for the Sudan 
confident that his appeal would be met and that he could have something real which 
he could present to the Sudanese people. He would not be happy if he had to return 
without some assurance in his mind that the dangers which he foresaw were averted. 
Egyptian propaganda was already filtering into the Sudan and would increase and 
have a chance of spreading ill-feeling against Great Britain unless he had the 
assurance for which he asked. 
The Minister of State in conclusion said that he would examine the Sayed's 
statement very carefully, but he could now assure the Sayed that nothing would 
conflict with His Majesty's Government's policy of taking all possible steps towards 
self-government. He hoped that the Sayed would be convinced that no person and no 
country had more friends in the House of Commons than himself and the Sudanese 
people, and it was in fact the House of Commons, before whom the treaty must be 
laid, who were the masters, not the Ministers of the Government. 
118 FO 371153262, no 5219 6 Dec 1946 
[Sudan protocol]: aide memoire by Sir 0 Sargent on the 
interpretation of the Sudan protocol handed to Amr Pasha. Annex 
[Extract] 
[Sidqi's problems with his own treaty delegation continued. Many were unconvinced by 
the interpretation of the Sudan protocol which he presented to them (see 99). On 26 Nov 
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seven members of the delegation (including the former and future prime ministers 
Husain Sirri and Ali Mahir) issued a public rejection of the treaty. The version of the 
Sudan protocol agreed between Sidqi and Bevin, they claimed, 'destroys the essential 
features of unity of the Nile Valley, maintains the status quo without promising 
negotiations for its modification, and by giving the Sudanese right to choose their future 
status, opens the way for the separation of the 2 parts of Nile Valley' (inward telegram no 
1946 from Bowker to FO, 26 Nov 1946, FO 371/53318, no 49763). Given this opposition 
Sidqi could not exchange letters of interpretation which would have substantially 
confirmed this criticism (inward telegram no 1779 from Bowker to FO, 29 Nov 1946, FO 
371/53319, no 5059). For his part Bevin in New York reasserted: 'I cannot accept Sidky's 
interpretation of what we agreed in London, namely that the existence of the crown of 
Egypt over the Sudan imposes a limiting factor upon the choice of the Sudanese as to 
their future status' (inward telegram no 2145 from Bevin to FO, 30 Nov 1946, FO 
371/53262, no 5074). At the same time he attempted to find a formula which, while 
affirming the right of the Sudanese to eventually choose independence, also mentioned 
other possible options for continued association with Egypt. He hoped this would mollify 
Sidqi; yet he also felt it necessary to warn Sidqi that failure to agree to an exchange of 
letters could force HMG to issue a unilateral statement of interpretation (inward telegram 
2326 from Bevin to FO, 5 Dec 1946, FO 371/53320, no 5165). Stansgate was critical of 
Bevin's proposal, minuting 'It would be interesting to know when the British 
Government took a decision that the Sudan should have the choice of independence. It 
certainly was never foreshadowed in the Agreements of 1899' (minute by Stansgate to 
Campbell, Sargent and Howe, 6 Dec 1946, FO 731/53321, no 5311).] 
His Majesty's Government would like Sidky Pasha to be reminded of the 
understandings reached in London. His Majesty's Government are now in an 
extremely awkward position as a result of the leakages and Sidky Pasha's one-sided 
interpretations. They have a House of Commons and public opinion which could not 
agree that the Sudanese, far from being placed on the road to self-government, 
should be set one stage back and made subject, so far as their liberty of choice is 
concerned, to the Egyptian Government. His Majesty's Government therefore wish 
for letters of interpretation which in no way prejudice the Egyptian position, in no 
way go beyond what Sidky Pasha agreed in London, but which set out in more detail 
the purpose of the Sudan Protocol as His Majesty's Government understand it. Mr. 
Bevin has been trying to meet Sidky Pasha's difficulty over a letter and has worked 
out a wording which will, he thinks, prove acceptable to him. This text is attached. 
Mr. Bevin would like Amr Pasha to understand, and explain to Sidky Pasha, that if 
His Majesty's Government do not get letters of interpretation he will have to make a 
full statement in the House of Commons at the time of ratification referring to all 
that Sidky Pasha had agreed in London and to His Majesty's Government's clear-cut 
interpretation of the meaning of the protocol. If Mr. Bevin is forced to make a 
statement of this kind it may prove far more difficult for Sidky Pasha than a letter of 
interpretation on the lines of the enclosed draft. 
Mr. Bevin's statement in the House would explain what is at the back of the Sudan 
Protocol, namely, the preparation of the Sudanese for self-government and secondly 
the exercise of their right, when ripe for self-government, to choose their future 
status which includes independence. The House would be told how the phrase 
"under a common crown" had been inserted in the protocol. This was a recognition 
of symbolic sovereignty and was never intended as a brake on the wheel of Sudanese 
progress towards independence. His Majesty's Government could never in this age 
and with the spirit of the United Nations Charter guiding them in their foreign 
policy, accept the idea that the protocol had in some way imposed some check upon 
the Sudanese in the choice of their future status. As regards the present position in 
the Sudan Mr. Bevin would say in the House that the protocol involved no change 
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but merely amounted to an affirmation of the existing status. Under the protocol His 
Majesty's Government would continue to secure the defence of the Sudan with all 
the necessary facilities. 
Annex to 118: draft letter of interpretation 
At the moment of signing the treaty of to-day's date I am happy to place on record my 
understanding of our agreement in regard to the meaning of certain parts of the 
Sudan protocol annexed to the treaty. We are agreed that the provisions of the Sudan 
protocol involve no change in the present status of the Sudan and that the protocol 
in fact amounts to an affirmation of the existing status. There will therefore be no 
changes in the present administration except in so far as this is necessary for the 
preparation of the Sudanese people for self government.1 As to the future, the Sudan 
protocol provides that the Sudanese people shall when they are ripe for self-
government be free to choose the future status of the Sudan. This future status may 
take several forms: the Sudanese people may choose association with the crown of 
Egypt similar to that of the self-governing Dominions with the British crown; they 
may choose some other form of self-governing association with the crown of Egypt; 
or they may choose independence. We are agreed that in the Sudan protocol, a 
completely free choice on the part of the Sudanese people is implied. 
We are also agreed that the Sudan protocol in no way affects the right of the 
United Kingdom to secure the defence of the Sudan with whatever troops and 
facilities they may require .... 2 
1 This sentence was added to Bevin's draft by Attlee (marginal note to inward telegram no 2329 from Bevin 
to FO, 6 Dec 1946, FO 371/53320, no 5168). 
2 Paragraphs dealing with the evacuation protocol are not printed. 
119 FO 371153320, no 5424 10 Dec 1946 
[Sidqi's resignation]: inward telegram no 1844 from R J Bowker to FO 
[The first news of Sidqi's resignation on 9 Dec gave HMG some grounds for optimism. 
Palace sources reported to the embassy in Cairo that the initiative for the resignation had 
come from King Faruq, who had concluded 'that British relations with Sidki Pasha had 
become too strained and Sidki Pasha was too compromised by his various statements 
about the treaty for any furher progress to be made. The King wants to appoint Nokrashi 
since he has steadfastly supported the treaty throughout and kept his mouth shut' 
(inward telegram no 1839 from Bowker to FO, 9 Dec 1946, FO 371/53320, no 5210). 
al-Nuqrashi's first statement on the treaty negotiations did not live up to British 
expectations.] 
Press has published text of Sidky's letter of resignation; Royal Rescript No. 66 
accepting Sidky's resignation; Royal Rescript No. 67 charging Nokrashi Pasha with 
formation of Cabinet and Nokrashi Pasha's reply thereto. 
2. Sidky's letter stated that in view of his prolonged illness he considered it his 
duty to submit his resignation in the interest of the cause which could not be deferred 
and expresses appreciation of His Majesty's satisfaction and the confidence of 
Parliament without which there could be no constitutional Cabinet in a democratic 
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country. It concludes with the hope that his successor will accomplish the heavy task 
of realising the national aspirations of the country. Royal Rescript No. 66 expresses 
regret that the country should be deprived of Sidky's services in the present critical 
circumstances and appreciation of the tenacious efforts which Sidky has made. 
3. Royal Rescript No. 67 addressed to Nokrashi refers to the need for ensuring 
the stability of the country by the realisation of the national aspirations. Nokrashi's 
reply states that the most important thing for the Government is to work for the 
evacuation of foreign troops from Egyptian territory and to realise the will of the 
people of the Nile Valley by the unity of Egypt and the Sudan. It refers to the general 
anxiety resulting from the prolongation of the negotiations and recent signs which 
increase anxiety with regard to the destiny of the Sudan. The natural bond-it 
continues-which unites the two parties of the Valley linguistically socially and 
historically cannot be damaged or broken and Egyptians are resolved to safeguard it. 
Egypt has undertaken to direct the Sudan towards progress in different domains of 
life with a view to attaining self-government within the framework of permanent 
unity with Egypt under King Farouk's crown. The country is unanimous on the 
objectives of evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley. Egypt is anxious to continue 
serving world peace and will always take care that her international obligations 
remain within the limits traced by the United Nations Charter in the letter and the 
spirit. ~ regards internal policy Nokrashi states that he will continue to apply the 
policy proclaimed in the speeches from the Throne of 1945 and 1946. 
120 PREM 8/1338/3 10 Dec 1946 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: note by Lord Stansgate1 to 
Mr Attlee on the question of Sudanese independence and the prospect 
of successfully concluding the treaty negotiations 
The chances of getting the Egyptian Treaty are diminishing unless we can find 
rapidly some compromise. 
Nokrashi is pig-headed, honest and very determined. When Stack was murdered, 
Huddleston took over and Nokrashi stood in the dock. 
If the Cabinet has decided to insist on unqualified independence for the Sudan and 
let the Treaty go, the following points should be considered:-
(1) The bitter and long-standing anti-Egyptian feeling of the Sudan Government. 
(2) The self-seeking motives of the Mahdi. 
(3) Our ignorance of any but Umma opinion. 
(4) The strategic implications of losing Egypt even if we dominate the Sudan. 
A compromise might take the line of Dominion Status or we might suggest 
signing the Treaty and appointing a joint Commission to consider how to implement 
the Protocol. 
So much was achieved by personal contact that the Foreign Secretary might think 
it worth while to ask Hadi, who is Nokrashi's close friend to fly to New York. 
Time is very short. 
1 By this time Stansgate was no longer directly involved in the treaty negotiations. A note attached to this 
document reads 'Found on Cabinet Table; seen by PM'. 
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121 FO 371153262, no 5337 14 Dec 1946 
[Governor-general's statement to the Sudanese]: inward telegram no 
1885 from R J Bowker to FO 
[On 7 Dec, prior to Sidqi's resignation, Huddleston issued his statement based on Attlee's 
letter to him (see 115). Though his additional plea to 'enlightened Sudanese' came very 
close to meeting the demands then being pressed by the Umma Party and the 
Independence Front, 1 it served merely to harden Egyptian opinion, and al-Nuqrashi 
firmly rejected 'the right of Sudan to secede from Egypt' in his meeting with Bowker 
(inward telegram no 1872 from Bowker to FO, 12 Dec, FO 371/53262, no 5278, and 
inward telegram no 1884 from Bowker to Bevin, 13 Dec 1946, FO 371/53332, no 5330). 
Huddleston reiterated his call for a united effort between the Sudanese people and the 
Sudan government in the opening address to the Advisory Council on 1 Jan 1947, when 
he announced the imminent submission of the Administrative Conference's proposals 'for 
the expansion of the Advisory Council into a more representative and responsible 
assembly' (inward telegram no 2 from Huddleston to FO, 3 Jah 1947, FO 371/62939, 
no 52).] 
Following is text of Governor-General's statement. 
Begins. I have just returned from London and Cairo where I have spent nearly a 
month in connexion with the treaty negotiations between Great Britain and Egypt. 
These negotiations are still in progress but whatever the outcome may be, I am 
authorised in writing by Mr. Attlee, the British Prime-Minister, to give the Sudanese 
the following assurance. 
"That His Majesty's Government are for their part determined that nothing 
shall be permitted to deflect the Sudan Government, whose constitution and 
powers remain unaltered by the recent conversations, from the task to which 
that Government had applied themselves, viz, the preparation of the 
Sudanese for self-government and for the task of choosing freely what their 
future status is to be. The Sudan Protocol in fact provides that the Sudanese 
people shall, when they are ripe for self-government, be free to choose the 
future status of the Sudan. His Majesty's Government consider that, in the 
words used by the Egyptian Prime Minister to the British Foreign Secretary, 
nothing in the proposed Treaty can prejudice the right of the Sudanese to 
achieve their independence nor bind a people in search of liberty. The 
Egyptian Prime Minister pointed out to the British Foreign Secretary that 
this was a universal principle and therefore not a matter for incorporation in 
a Treaty". 
There is one point on which all enlightened Sudanese are agreed, that they wish to 
become self-governing as soon as possible. This wish is shared by the Governments of 
both Great Britain and Egypt and there is no reason why the Sudan Government 
should not press on at once towards this goal. I am determined that nothing shall 
1 By mid-December the Umma and Independence Front delegation to London were calling for 'the 
immediate termination of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the restoration of sovereign rights to 
the Sudanese people', along with 'the establishment of a Sudanese interim Government preparatory to the 
establishment of a free, democratic Sudanese Government in the shortest possible time. This Government, 
based on the will of the majority of the people, would determine the form of rule in the Sudan' (Abdallah 
Khalil, Yaqub Uthman, Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, 'The Sudan case and the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations', nd, received 13 Dec 1946, PREM 8/1388/3) 
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hinder the establishment of a: Sudanese Government and I call on all who wish to 
serve their country to co-operate with me and my officials in working out the next 
step towards this end. Only by goodwill among yourselves and by co-operation with 
the Government can you reach the goal of self-government which is desired by all 
sections and parties. I appeal to you, therefore, to lay aside your internal differences 
and unite in a great effort to achieve your aims. The Sudan Administrative 
Conference will forthwith be summoned to consider the recommendations prepared 
by it's [sic] Sub-Committee which dealt with the Sudanisation of the Central 
Government, and I wish the Conference to submit recommendation to me as soon as 
possible. I understand that neither the British nor the Egyptian Governments are 
unfavourably disposed in principle to the recommendation made by the Sub-
Committee, though many points of detail require further consideration before a 
workable plan is evolved. I hope that those who were previously unwilling to join this 
Conference will now give it their support, and that any individuals who have ideas on 
the next steps to be taken will submit them. In conclusion, I again appeal for co-
operation and unity and a determined effort to continue the work we have begun. 
Only if we work unfalteringly and are united can a Sudanese Government be 
achieved quickly and will you be able to take your free decision about the status of 
your country. Ends. 
122 FO 371153321, no 5355 17 Dec 1946 
[Al-Nuqrashi's statement on the unity ofthe Nile Valley]: inward 
telegram no 1904 from R J Bowker to FO 
[Despite al-Nuqrashi 's initial statement (see 119) Bevin remained optimistic that he 
would give a favourable reply to the aide-memoire sent to the Egyptian government 
shortly before Sidqi's resignation (see 118), and instructed Bowker to give a personal 
message to al-Nuqrashi soon after his appointment. 'Mr. Bowker might rub in that the 
protocol in fact commits neither His Majesty's Government nor the Egyptian 
Government on the nature of the future status of the Sudanese', he advised; yet he 
concluded: 'I cannot be put in a position where I can be accused of going against all the 
principles of the United Nations for it to be said that two large nations have prejudiced in 
a treaty the fate of a smaller one who has not been consulted in the treaty' (inward 
telegram no 44 from Bevin to FO, 11 Dec 1946, FO 371/53320, no 5265). Privately 
al-Nuqrashi appeared to want to sign the treaty (inward telegram no 1911 from Bowker to 
FO, 18 Dec 1946, FO 371/53263, no 5372), but partly as a result of Huddleston's 
statement (see 121) he adopted a more uncompromising public position.] 
Following are translations of Press versions of passages in Nokrashi's two statements 
in the Chamber dealing specifically with the treaty situation. 
2. In affirming the permanent unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Crown of 
Egypt we are only expressing the will and desire of the inhabitants of this valley. It is 
moreover a natural desire engendered by unity of interest and language by a 
common existence and by bonds too ancient and too solid to be broken or loosened. 
We shall spare no effort to direct the Sudan towards self-Government, to prepare its 
inhabitants to conduct their affairs and to work for their happiness and prosperity. 
3. As regards the delicate situation in which the country now finds itself I have 
frankly stated the point I have said that we shall follow any way likely to enable us to 
reach our national objectives and that is devoid of any ambiguity. I took charge of the 
Government at the moment when the negotiations had come to a crisis. I 
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immediately considered it useful to make known Egypt's opinion as regards her 
cause, everybody must know that when I say "unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the 
Egyptian Crown" I mean a permanent unity and I hope that the world knows that I 
express the opinion of all Egyptians. This unity derives from the will of the people of 
the valley, the will of the people of Egypt, and that of the people of the Sudan without 
distinction. Our opinion on this subject cannot be interpreted erroneously. Indeed I 
have clearly said that we will spare no effort to lead the Sudan to self-government. 
We do not want domination or colonisation but we will do our best to prepare its 
people to administer its affairs. Nobody should imagine that we want colonisation or 
domination of the Sudan. It cannot be so between two brothers but what there 
should be between them is independent unity bound by the Crown as by the Nile. 
4. I repeat that the unity of Egypt and the Sudan will continue always and that 
no Egyptian could admit the separation of Egypt and the Sudan. I have also clearly 
said that I will follow any way capable of allowing us to attain our objectives that is 
negotiations or resort to the Security Council. In February 1946 I declared in the 
Senate that the Government would take advantage of all the methods authorised by 
the United Nations Charter and that Egypt had the right to refer to the Security 
Council which is competent, in fact the Egyptian Delegation has taken advantage of 
this right to follow its course and has turned it to good account. 
123 FO 371153263, no 5451 23 Dec 1946 
[Appointment of Sudanese grand qadi] : inward telegram no 1940 
from Sir R Campbell to Mr Bevin 
[The position of grand qadi, who supervised the sharia, or religious courts throughout the 
Sudan, had been held by an Egyptian Islamic jurist since the establishment of the 
Condominium. A previous governor-general, Sir John Maffey, had as early as 1931 
declared that the appointment of a Sudanese to the post of grand qadi could no longer be 
delayed. The international situation in 1940, when the appointment of a new qadi was 
next discussed, was such that the Sudan government agreed to appoint Shaikh Hasan 
Mamun for a term of three years, renewable for two years. In January 1946, his contract 
was extended for a further year, so as not to prejudice the forthcoming Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations. With the approaching expiration of Shaikh Hasan's contract in January 
1947 Huddleston proposed to appoint the Sudanese deputy grand qadi, Shaikh Ahmad al-
Tahir, to replace him, and justified this as being in line with the Sudanisation policy 
(inward telegram no 154 from Huddleston to Campbell, 25 Dec 1946, FO 371/53263, no 
5462). AI-Nuqrashi's objections, reported here, were repeated by King Faruq (inward 
telegram no 1954 from Campbell to Bevin, 26 Dec 1946, FO 371/53263, no 5481), and by 
Amr Pasha (letter from Abd al-Fattah Amr to Bevin, 28 Dec 1946, FO 371/53263, no 
5529). Bevin advised that Huddleston extend Shaikh Hasan's contract, a request that 
Huddleston rejected on the grounds that it interfered with his constitutional authority to 
appoint Sudan government oficials (inward telegram no 157 from Huddleston to 
Campbell, 29 Dec 1946, FO 371/53263, no 5508). As the appointment of a Sudanese grand 
qadi had been agreed in the Sudan government's negotiations with SAR and the Umma 
Party leaders to resume cooperation with the government, following the demonstrations 
against the Sudan protocol, Huddleston felt that he could do no more than delay the 
formal nomination of Shaikh Hasan's successor (inward telegram no 159 from 
Huddleston to Campbell, 31 Dec 1946, FO 371/62958, no 8) . Shaikh Ahmad was 
appointed acting grand qadi, and his final appointment as grand qadi was delayed until 
Oct 1947 (letter from Creed to Bowker, 5 Oct 1947, FO 371/62959, no 5014).] 
Before I had requested interview the Prime Minister asked me to call this morning. 
He said that at the request of the Council of Ministers he wished to make urgent rep-
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resentations regarding termination of contract of Grand Kadi Sudan, report of which 
had appeared in this morning's press in a message from Khartoum. He had received 
on December 21st letter from Governor-General dated December 13th (which he 
showed me) reminding him that the Kadi's contract expired (gr.undec. ?in) January 
and stating that he (Governor General) had decided not to renew it but to appoint pre-
sent deputy Grand Kadi (a Sudanese) in his stead. He said in passing that as date of 
expiry was January 2nd notice given was very short (Kadi had been informed on 
December 17th): but he wished to impress on me the effect of this decision on Egyptian 
opinion which at this moment would be "disastrous". Post of Kadi was the only high 
post in Sudan occupied by an Egyptian and to remove an Egyptian at this moment in 
favour of a Sudanese and thus to sever this link with Egypt would be taken as addi-
tional and clear evidence of a British policy to separate the Sudan from Egypt. The 
position and functions of a Grand Kadi moreover had a religious significance strongly 
felt in this country so much so that when a previous Egyptian incumbent had been 
offered the post he had required before accepting that he should receive a mandate 
from Mohammedan ruler and a formula for giving him mandate of King of Egypt had 
been issued. Since then and little by little the position in this respect had in fact been 
modified by policy of Governors-General to constitute themselves exclusive source of 
all appointments in Sudan administration without exception. I said that elimination 
of 1899 agreement surely gave Governor-General this position. The Prime Minister 
admitted it but said that sentiment here over religious significance of appointment 
continued strong. The matter therefore raised both political and religious feelings . He 
begged me to consider what he had said with a view to a modification of decision. He 
hoped announcement of appointment of a successor would be deferred while his rep-
resentations were being considered. He had urged on Governor-General a year ago the 
desirability of continuing Grand Kadi in office beyond the term of contract. Sir H. 
Huddleston had made no commitment of any kind but as Kadi had been continued 
during this year and nothing had been said by Governor-General Prime Minister was 
surprised at this sudden decision without longer warning. He had urged on Mr. Bowker 
recently that there should be no more declarations interpretive [sic ?interpretative] of 
policy but here was something which would universally be regarded here as calculated 
(gr.undec.?action) in implication (sic) of policy of separation. 
2. I told the Prime Minister; firstly I personally had (gr.undec.) matter of 
decision was clearly based on policy agreed in Article 11 of 1936 [treaty] to appoint 
Sudanese where qualified, to posts in Sudan administration. Implementation of this 
policy had become more urgent, point on which I thought Egyptian and British 
Governments was [sic] agreed, as witness Sudan Protocol. I assured him His 
Majesty's Government had no policy of separation. I contested appropriateness of 
regarding post of Kadi as a link between Egypt and Sudan: it was only accidental that 
hitherto an Egyptian in default of qualified Sudanese had held post that constituted 
link. Prime Minister had urged political and moral grounds against Governor-
General's decision to appoint a Sudanese. But there seemed to me great difficulty in 
subjecting Sudanisation to considerations of a kind which were external to Sudan 
and according to his argument belonged to the sphere of Anglo-Egyptian relations. 
The Sudan must know that present Kadi's contract was due to expire and that 
qualified Sudanese was [sic] available for the post and failure to appoint Sudanese 
would raise doubts about sincerity of policy of Sudanisation as a part of programme 
of promoting welfare of Sudan and preparing them for self government. 
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3. Nokrashi Pasha emphasised Egyptians could only rejoice that a Sudanese was 
ready for this responsible post and that Egyptian contact had thus been shown to be 
beneficial, for officials of Sharia Court were pupils of Kadi. But all Egypt favoured 
preparation of Sudan for self government and reports again emphasise political effect 
at this moment of termination of Kadi's contract and religious aspect involved in 
matter. He wondered whether it would not be possible to maintain present Kadi in 
office, create post of deputy Grand Kadi to be filled by Sudan candidate and replace 
latter as Mufti of Sudan by another Sudanese. The Egyptian Government would if 
necessary be ready to shoulder expense of extra post. 
4. I said I could not say that any action would be possible but I would report his 
representations immediately. 
5. It is unfortunate that this incident should coincide with present moment in 
Treaty negotiations when we are trying to get Egyptian Prime Minister to help in 
breaking deadlock and when one of the difficulties is Egypt's fear that His Majesty's 
Government are aiming at permanent separation of Sudan from Egypt. If without 
compromising their position Sudan Government could prolong for say a year the 
present Grand Kadi's contract this would remove a factor likely to envenom 
atmosphere as regards Sudan and I would make as much capital as possible out of 
concession in any further discussions with Nokrashi. 
124 FO 371/53263, no 5458 24 Dec 1946 
[Al-Nuqrashi's position on the Sudan]: inward telegram no 1942 from 
Sir R Campbell to Mr Bevin 
[Campbell's meeting with al-Nuqrashi on 23 Dec lasted nearly one and a half hours. After 
forwarding al-Nuqrashi's views on the Sudan Campbell wrote to Sargent, 'the moment is 
an important one as Nokrashi does need help and evidently puts his hopes in Mr. 
Bevin. . .. What he has asked in connection with the Sudan protocol, would, as far as I 
can see do us no harm, in itself. The possibility of doing what he requests depends 
obviously, on whether the S. of S. can satisfy opinion in Parliament and the Sudan if he 
stands on a position in which H.M.G.'s views on the unfettered freedom of choice of the 
Sudanese have been placed on record and not in any way retracted or modified and in 
which the Egyptian Government have not only failed to express agreement with those 
views but openly published their disagreement. Nokrashi (graciously!) does not seem to 
suggest or hope for any statement on our side to endorse the Egyptian point of view, but 
to be content that the two divergent views should remain without further re-iteration or 
reconciliation. It is conceivable that a willingness on our part to to [sic] the statements 
urged by Nokrashi might dispose and enable him to say something on his part which 
would help us' (letter from Campbell to Sargent, 25 Dec 1946, FO 371/53263, no 5451). 
Scrivener's comment on this telegram was: 'Nokrashi wants the S/S' help to get him out 
of a 'spot' created by his predecesor; and the S/S wants Nokrashi's help to get HMG out of 
a similar spot created by the same predecessor' (Scrivener, minute, 26 Dec 1946, FO 
371/53263, no 5460).] 
When Nokrashi had finished with subject of Grand Kadi (my telegram No. 194W 
conversation easily turned to Sudan issue. I expressed hope that in a general 
statement on Government's policy he was due to make to Senate this evening His 
Excellency would not say anything to make solution more difficult. He said his 
remarks would be on same lines as his speech in the Chamber.2 He felt it right and 
1 See 123. 2 See 122. 
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advisable to state his position frankly and clearly. He did not think chances of 
solution would be prejudiced. I asked whether he was considering means of issue 
from impasse and had any special thoughts. He said he was and that he had indirectly 
and unofficially made some suggestions recently and had rather expected to hear 
how they struck His Majesty's Government. With very little encouragement he told 
me what these had been. They were that His Majesty's Government should state that 
(1) they had no intention of encouraging the Sudanese to separate themselves from 
Egypt and (2) if the Sudanese eventually chose to remain united to Egypt His 
Majesty's Government would place no obstacle in the way and would "be happy" to 
see this happen (compare paragraph 4 of Mr. Bowker's telegram No. 1911).3 He asked 
whether I had seen the Egyptian Ambassador before leaving London. I said 
unfortunately I had not and enquired whether he had instructed Amr Pasha to put 
any suggestions to His Majesty's Government. He said he had and had hoped for 
some response. I reminded him you had only just returned: he said Amr had seen the 
Minister of State and he seems to have hoped for an immediate response. 
2. Nokrashi Pasha urged that after the statement by the Governor General based 
on the Prime Minister's letter the fear of the Egyptians that His Majesty's 
Government were encouraging separation had been greatly intensified (the action in 
respect of the Grand Kadi-my telegram No. 1940-would be regarded as striking 
evidence of such a policy and as the first positive action in ensuring it). He could not 
over-emphasise the Egyptian pre-occupation with this prospect. The Sudan was 
Egypt's life-line. He thought he had the right to ask for a statement such as he 
suggested. It in no way ran counter to the British position as stated. If His Majesty's 
Government could realise the strength of the anxiety here he felt confident they 
would agree to action designed to remove it. His Majesty's Government must (he 
apologised for using the word) do so in the interests of breaking the deadlock. There 
were plenty of people here trying to sabotage a treaty and they were making full use 
of Egyptian fears about separation. He urged strongly his need for material with 
which to answer them. 
3. I said you would no doubt consider his suggestions. Meanwhile certain points 
occurred to me. They did not appear to meet the difficulties in which you had been 
put by the various statements interpreting the Sudan protocol published here. You 
had made these difficulties clear in your personal message to Nokrashi. You would 
have to answer questions in Parliament about the freedom of choice of the Sudanese. 
Beginning with the conversations with Sidky Pasha you had consistently stated your 
position. You could not either on particular grounds connected with the Treaty nor 
on general grounds be put in position of apparently endorsing a denial of the right of 
self-determination. Nokrashi, I said, had told me the Egyptian Government 
proceeded and must proceed on the assumption that the Sudanese wished to remain 
united to Egypt. Even if this assumption was correct it might be disproved after the 
passage of years. Could he not make clear that though Egypt hoped and expected that 
the Sudan would choose to remain in association, should they do otherwise Egypt 
would not oppose? He was suggesting that you should help him to remove a 
3 In which it is reported that Nuqrashi reiterated his refusal to concede the Sudan's right to secede and 
said there was no question of an exchange of letters of interpretation (inward telegram no 1911 from 
Bowker to FO, 18 Dec 1946, FO 371/53263, no 5372). 
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suspicion (for which I could assure him there was no justification whatever): could 
he not help you on his side? (I said this because he had given no indication of an 
intention to make any statement at all on his side, as prognosticated by Amr-
compare your telegram No. 2134.) 
4. Nokrashi Pasha said that no Egyptian could say anything admitting Egyptian 
readiness to see the Sudanese separate themselves from Egypt. He could not say in 
advance he was willing for his leg to be amputated. The very life of Egypt depended 
on the Sudan through which the Nile flowed. I then spoke in the sense of the first 
part of paragraph 8 of Sir 0. Sargent's memo of December 17th4 and went on to say 
that it was obvious that safeguards for Egypt's water would have to be devised and 
established if the Sudanese should choose independence, and that this should not be 
too difficult. If it were done, would it not remove the Egyptian Government's 
difficulty? Nokrashi replied that it was not juridical or paper safeguards that Egypt 
required-other countries might be tempted to flirt with an independent Sudan to 
the detriment of Egypt's vital interest. 
5. In further discussion in which he again emphasised strength of Egyptian 
feeling over this life-line and influence of this on Egyptian Government's attitude in 
present impasse, Nokrashi Pasha said he had great faith in you and that if only you 
could fully realise the depth of the sentiment here he felt sure you would understand 
and meet his point of view. You represented the new age. I said this lent point to your 
statement that you could not appear as going against all the principles of the United 
Nations Charter. When he said that His Majesty's Government had made their 
position clear I replied that the two Governments could hardly figure as signing a 
treaty which each understood differently. In giving continued thought to ways of 
solving the impasse (which he had promised to do) would he not take this into 
account? Nokrashi said we must both do our best. For the moment there seemed 
complete deadlock, and he hinted at possibility that only solution would be found in 
"a new formula" (for the protocol) even though this would mean fresh discussions 
from beginning and all that that involved and was therefore to be deprecated. I was 
discouraging on this hint (since any new formula acceptable to Egyptians must 
almost certainly be detrimental to our ideas). 
6. At one moment His Excellency recalled that in autumn of 1945 it was he who 
had persuaded Council of Elder Statesmen in favour of a Treaty: many had been 
opposed or indifferent. He considered this a feat on his part and still believed his 
stand had been right. He had been surprised and hurt then at receiving a slap in the 
face in the shape of Mr. Attlee's letter and Governor General's statement. I said I 
4 
'It is suggested that we should test Noqrashi's attitude and as a first step say to Nokrashi that we note the 
Egyptian attitude as endorsed by his statement; that we assume that the only grounds on which the 
Egyptian Government can base itself in figuring before the world as desiring to deny to the Sudanese in 
perpetuo the right of all peoples to eventual self-determination is that it is so deeply anxious about Egypt's 
vital interest in the Nile Waters; that we well understand this anxiety and indeed our consciousness of it 
had prompted appropriate proposals which we put forward during the negotiations in our ' draft Sudan 
protocol; that we now wish to take the matter up with the Egyptian Government again with a view to 
devising safeguards and machinery for securing safeguards for Egyptian interests; that this ought surely 
not to be very difficult and that we anticipate that once it is accomplished the Egyptians will cease to find 
difficulty in admitting that a right of the Sudanese to choose their future status includes the possibility of 
their choosing (and being given) complete independence' (Sargent to Attlee, memo, 17 Dec 1946, FO 
371/53262, no 5275). 
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thought you would think this a curious description of action which had only been 
necessitated by declarations made here. You had consistently expressed your point of 
view to Sidky Pasha. 
7. I finally urged him to go on thinking of ways out of present difficulty and he 
said he would do so. I added that though Egyptians seemed unwilling to admit that 
there were large numbers of Sudanese who feared that their freedom of choice was 
being fettered, His Majesty's Government were satisfied that there were and that the 
fact must be taken into account. I begged him, in his deliberations, to give due 
weight to this factor. 
8. Conversation was friendly throughout and Nokrashi Pasha more 
communicative than I had anticipated. 
125 FO 371/53263, no 5481 28 Dec 1946 
[Restatement of HMG's position on the Sudan]: outward telegram no 
2170 (reply) from Mr Bevin to Sir R Campbell 
[Al-Nuqrashi very quickly rejected this renewed proposal for an exchange of letters or jointly 
agreed statements. He instead urgently pleaded for a statement from Bevin alone, along 
the lines of his request in 124, as a way of relieving tension in Egypt and opening the way 
to 'further conversations' in which he might propose a new Sudan protocol (inward 
telegram no 1966 from Campbell to Bevin, 30 Dec 1946, FO 371/53262, no 5512).] 
I have now studied the telegrams on Sudan issue ending with your telegram No. 
1954,1 and should like you to restate my position once again in the hope that 
Nokrashi will, in the discussion with you, arrive at an agreement which will solve 
this problem. I must reiterate that this trouble was caused by Egypt as a result of 
Sidky Pasha endeavouring to saddle upon me interpretations to which I had never 
agreed. The present Egyptian Government cannot escape from the effect in this 
country of Sidky's action. 
2. My objective all through has been to deal with this matter on a basis of co-
operation and not antagonism and finally remove the legacy left by the events of 
1924. This legacy causes the Egyptian Government to see in every act of the Sudan 
Government an attempt to separate the Sudan from Egypt; and causes the Sudan 
Government likewise to view Egyptian activities in the Sudan with suspicion. We 
cannot be a party to a situation calculated to lead to a repetition of 1924 and 
therefore it was definitely understood in London that there should be no interference 
by Egypt with the Sudan administration, and no change in the status of the Sudan as 
fixed by Treaty. This position, I now understand, is accepted by the Egyptian 
Government. At the same time-and particularly because we take an economic as 
well as a political view of the question-! fully understand the danger to Egypt of a 
hostile Sudan and I am ready to direct British policy in a way that will not endanger 
Egypt's safety from this point of view. What we must do now is to live down the past 
and act honestly by each other and direct our own respective policies accordingly. 
1 Reporting King Faruq's concern that Britain was pursuing an 'opportunist policy' in the Sudan, and that 
Egypt 'would not contemplate the possibility of the Sudan becoming "a belligerent nation"' (inward 
telegram no 1954 from Campbell to Bevin, 26 Dec 1946, FO 371153263, no 5481). 
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3. The wording of the Sudan Protocol was devised for this purpose, on the one 
hand to establish the symbolic association of Egypt and the Sudan; on the other to 
ensure the steady and undisturbed development of the Sudanese. No one can foresee 
now precisely whither this development will lead: the answer largely depends on 
what occurs in the interim. The essential is that both Governments should work 
honestly for the welfare of the Sudanese, and prepare them for self-government; then 
the Governments and the Sudanese will consult together and arrive at a decision in 
the interests of the Sudanese. At this stage the Sudanese must have this freedom of 
choice. They have many possible choices, and if they choose union with Egypt His 
Majesty's Government will be perfectly content. But I must again make it 
unmistakably clear that His Majesty's Government cannot directly or by implication 
involve themselves in a compact, in defiance of the whole spirit of the United Nations 
Charter, to deny the possibility of Sudanese free choice. At the same time His 
Majesty's Government will bear in mind, I repeat, the necessity of safeguarding the 
position of Egypt and particularly in relation to its life-line. 
4. If the present difficulties can be removed by exchange of letters or by 
statements (which must be jointly and mutually agreed) then the way would be clear 
for the era of co-operation for Sudanese welfare and the removal of all antagonisms. 
5. I have spoken to Amr in very general terms on these lines, and prefer to deal 
with Nokrashi through yourself. You should see Nokrashi and point out to him that I 
am willing to consider any proposals that may emerge from your discussions and 
which are in the spirit of the discussions which took place in London and with which 
you are familiar. 
126 FO 371162960, no 56 2 Jan 1947 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: inward telegram no 12 from Sir 
R Campbell to Mr Bevin [Extract] 
[An impasse having been reached with al-Nuqrashi, the FO began considering the 
likely repercussions of a complete breakdown in negotiations. Sargent outlined what 
he thought would be the positive aspects in the Sudan: 'In the Sudan the effects of a 
rupture on the Sudan issue would be wholly beneficial from the point of view of the 
Sudan Government. Faith in His Majesty's Government would be fully restored, and 
the Governor-General could carry on his Sudanisation plans in a much more 
favourable atmosphere than at present. It is doubtful whether the Ashigga party could 
make much trouble, though they would certainly try' (memo from Sargent to Bevin, 1 
Jan 1947, FO 371/62960, no 86). On his return to Egypt Campbell considered the 
wider implications.] 
. . . 2. In accordance with my instructions I have on my return to Cairo explored 
the situation with a view to finding some compromise on the Sudan issue, of a 
nature to safeguard the right of the Sudan to develop towards self-government and, 
if they wish it, independence. The result of my explorations has been to show that 
there is no likelihood of the Egyptians committing themselves to any compromise 
on these lines, and their intention is clearly to get control of the Sudan for them-
selves sooner or later.1 It is for this reason that, as I explained in my telegram 
1 All words in italics underlined in original by Scrivener. 
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under reference (tel no 11, analysing present situation and implications), I think we 
must now face the probable necessity of making a stand. The form of that stand 
should I suggest be, that His Majesty's Government should make a firm and unam-
biguous communication to the Egyptian Government to the effect that His 
Majesty's Government cannot sign any treaty which does not make clear the right 
of the Sudanese to opt for independence after they have reached the stage of self-
government. In the statement His Majesty's Government would add that if however 
the Sudanese should opt for continued attachment to Egypt, His Majesty's 
Government would be quite agreeable thereto and that it is not their intention or 
policy to encourage them to separate. 
3. We must realise that the results of such a statement will be at least a tem-
porary and possibly a final breakdown of Treaty negotiations, perhaps an appeal 
by Egypt to U.N.O. or/and anti-British turbulencies and disorders encouraged by 
the Government on familiar lines e.g. Sidki Pasha's organised manifestations in 
Cairo and Alexandria in February and March last and perhaps worse. On past 
form however, if we stand firm and react strongly to any attacks on British lives 
and property, the situation will eventually evolve through successive crises into 
the form of regime which would be more sensible as far as we are concerned. An 
unpredictable factor would be the result of an appeal to U.N.O. Evolution during 
the past twelve years and appearance on the scene of Communist under-ground 
activity may have modified the accuracy of the last prognostication to a certain 
degree. 
4. If owing to considerations connected with manpower or our economic posi-
tion or the moral effect of physical embroilment in Egypt, we cannot afford to 
stand up to the Egyptians in this way, then the sooner we yield to them the better. 
The present discussions have become un-real and the longer they continue the 
greater the danger of more demands from the Egyptian side, in each case leading 
to African mass hysteria and oriental auto-suggestion. But if we are going to yield 
on the question of principle now at stake we should realise quite clearly what that 
means. It is not only a question of our losing the Sudan as a military base or pas-
sage; but our position in other parts of the Orient and Africa might be greatly 
affected. 
127 FO 371162939, no 128, CC 2(47)8 6 Jan 1947 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: Cabinet conclusions on Mr 
Bevin's decision to risk a breakdown in treaty negotiations over the 
Sudan's right to self-determination [Extract] 
The Foreign Secretary informed the Cabinet that no means had yet been found of 
overcoming the difficulty which had arisen over the Sudan Protocol to the 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The Egyptian Government were seeking to persuade him to 
agree to a proposal which would in effect deprive the Sudanese, when at some future 
date they were ready for self-government, of their right of self-determination. He had 
no alternative but to resist this, even though the result was a breakdown of the 
negotiations for the Treaty .... 
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128 FO 371162939, no 10 15 Jan 1947 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: letter from Sir R Howe to Sir R 
Campbell on the distinction between 'self-government' and 
'independence' in HMG's colonial policy [Extract] 
[Towards the end of 1946 Campbell reported to Howe that the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Mfairs had referred to the precedent of the British delegation at San Francisco insisting on 
the substitution of the term 'self-government' for 'independence' in the UN charter. 'I have 
a feeling that what we said is true, and seem to remember that the late Government was 
insistent on care being had to use the word "self-government" as the object of a renewed 
liberal policy for the colonies, and never the word "independence". We may get this point 
flung at us and perhaps we should be ready with an answer both on the facts and, if they 
are correct, on the argument. ... Perhaps you would consider this and give us ammuni-
tion' (letter from Campbell to Howe, 27 Dec 1946, FO 371/62939, no 10).] 
. .. We have consulted the Colonial Office and others concerned, with the following 
results. 
United Kingdom Delegations have always taken the line that to lay down the 
principle that independence was the objective of all colonial policy was misleading. 
While independence in the sense of control of the external as well as the internal 
affairs was clearly appropriate for India, it would not have been appropriate for e.g. 
St. Helena. It is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to dissolve the British 
Empire into a series of completely independent states, however small. United 
Kingdom Delegations have always drawn a distinction between freedom in the sense 
of implementing the four freedoms (or self-government) and national independence. 
Consequently, it was important to avoid inclusion in the Charter of any general 
statement of principle which would have bound all members to promote or agree to 
the independence of any unit of territory however small if the members of that unit 
had demanded it. The United States Delegation took a similar line very strongly. The 
Chinese proposed the insertion of independence in the draft of the Charter, but Dr. 
Wellington Koo was eventually induced to take it out. 
On the other hand, Article 73 (b) of the Charter lays on nations responsible for the 
administration of non-self-governing territories the obligation "to develop self-
government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to 
assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions 
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their 
varying stages of advancement". 
Thus the text of the Charter itself carries our views exactly into effect. A colony etc. 
is to be developed to self-government etc. and according to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of 
advancement. Then, as regards the future, account has to be taken of the political 
aspirations of the peoples and again of the particular circumstances and the stage of 
advancement. St. Helena could never be independent, though it might be self-
governing. Another territory might be self-governing but its political aspirations 
might not turn towards independence but to something else. A third territory might 
be self-governing and its political aspirations would turn towards independence, and 
where this is so and where the other particular circumstances of the case do not 
exclude it, viz. very small size etc., it seems to us that the real meaning of the Charter 
is that it should become independent. This third case covers in one [?our] view the 
future of the Sudan. 
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129 FO 371162942, no 723 8 Feb 1947 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: letter from Lord Stansgate to 
Mr Bevin, forwarding a memorandum on the current state of the 
Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations [Extract] 
Minutes by D M H Riches, D Scott Fox1 and W E Beckett 
[Stansgate had been released from the treaty negotiations, partly because it was felt he 
had been too inclined to concede points to the Egyptians. His own feeling, expressed in 
this memo to Bevin, was that the terms he had earlier negotiated with Sidqi were 
essentially the same that Bevin eventually obtained, but that the delay caused by Bevin's 
intervention contributed to the hardening of the Egyptian attitude generally to the 
negotiations. This retrospective look at Anglo-Egy~tian relations placed on record his 
scepticism about the government's Sudan policy. The attached minutes follow the 
paragraph numbers of the covering letter and memo.] 
... 3. Nokrashi wants to help, but is facing a very strong and united Egyptian 
opinion on the Sudan. That is the chief difficulty. 
4. We might get over this obstacle by adhering to the Protocol as agreed and 
making a joint submission for an interpretation of the meaning of the words in 
dispute (choice of future status) . We could promise to abide by the decision given.3 
5. This plan would give the necessary cover to Nokrashi and might enable him to 
conclude the Treaty as he earnestly wishes to do. 
6. As soon as Huddleston's term is up we should consult King Farouk and select 
a successor really congenial to the King. 
7. We should remember that for many reasons Egypt and the Sudan are bound to 
be linked by federation, union or unity and our part should be that of honest broker 
in helping this consummation. 
8. The alternative-a fortified British Sudan and a hostile Egypt-is strategically 
unsound. 
Memorandum with 129 
... 12 .. . My own view is that we have been too much inclined to think that the 
Prime Minister of the moment was being obdurate and that a little pressure would 
bring him to reason. The fact is that both Prime Ministers, and particularly Sidki, 
have been doing their best to persuade their public opinion to come to agreement. 
Sidki might have been the more helpful. We made much of his indiscretions and so 
discredited him and, perhaps, contributed to the King's decision to dismiss him, but 
in point of fact the first indiscretion, that is to say, the first declaration, in recent 
time, of independence for the Sudan was made by the Governor-General in his 
speech to the Advisory Council in April, where being a servant of both parties he 
declared his policy without consulting Egypt, thus going, as the Egyptians say, 
outside his proper function. His speech, of course, angered them and was the subject 
of complaint to me by the King. Sidki, who, by his indiscretions, was striving to 
1 Egyptian Dept (ex-Italian colonies). 
2 For an extract from the same document on the defence aspect of the treaty negotiations, see BDEEP 
series B, vol 4, J Kent, ed, Egypt and the defence of the Middle East, part I, 92. 
3 Marginal note by Bevin: 'We hope U.N.O. will do this.' 
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defeat his opponents and come to an agreement with us, was destroyed and Nokrashi 
took his place. The whole episode, for which Sidki was only partly to blame, was 
disastrous ... 
The Sudan 
19. I feel that we have never taken the measure of the Egyptian feeling about the 
Sudan. In 1884 Cherif was dismissed for refusing to agree to the withdrawal; Boutros 
was assassinated for, among other reasons, signing the Agreement of 1899; Zaghlul 
never disguised the strength of his feelings. It is not entirely a question of water, 
although that is the main element. The Cairo Government feels about the South 
exactly as we felt in the days of the occupation, and you will find in the writings of 
Cromer, Milner and especially Churchill the strongest assertion of the essential unity 
of the Nile Valley. 
20. The Egyptians believe that the autonomy which we have created in the 
Sudan is a preparation for secession. There is something to be said for their fears. We 
prevented the King by an ultimatum from assuming the title of "King of Egypt and 
the Sudan".4 When Egypt was declared independent in 1922 we, ourselves, made 
plans to transfer the allegiance of the Egyptian Army in the Sudan from the King of 
Egypt to the Governor-General. Later on, when Sir Lee Stack was murdered we 
presented an ultimatum threatening to reduce their water supply (this ultimatum 
was much disapproved at the time and quickly abandoned); we expelled their 
nationals, created the S.D.F. and until the Treaty of 1936 ran the Sudan as a 
monopoly. This monopoly, which was greatly to the advantage of the Sudan, is the 
basis of the argument that we favour secession or colonisation. 
21. What the Egyptians ignore is the growth of Sudanese Nationalism. On this 
question they are particularly pig-headed. They know little about the Sudan and they 
certainly have no experience of the growth of Dominion status, as understood by us 
or the Dutch. 
22. On our side I must say I would have been glad to have more information on 
this subject. We do know that there are two parties, the Umma and the Ashigga, both 
demanding independence, but both agreed that union with Egypt in some form is 
ultimately desirable.5 Their differences would appear to be those of tactics, the Umma 
thinking that if they can be declared independent under our guarantee they can 
make better terms with Egypt, and the Ashigga that if they can use Egypt to get rid of 
us they can then deal with the Egyptians in their own strength. The demand that, as 
soon as possible, the Condominium should cease and we should evacuate the Sudan, 
appears to be a common principle of both parties. 
23. I think we made a mistake once the Sudan was determined to be heard in 
London, in not attempting to hear both sides. The representative of Ashigga was 
available, but was not received. On the other hand, it appeared that our influence was 
to be placed entirely behind the Mahdi and Umma, thus, again lending support to 
Egyptian suspicions of secession. One of the results of this will be that if the case 
goes to U.N.O. our right to speak for the Sudan will be challenged by a Sudanese 
speaker who will assert that he represents a majority in his own country. 
4 Marginal note by Bevin: 'We have now agreed to unity of Egypt & Sudan & common crown'. 
5 Marginal note by Bevin: 'No'. 
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24. Looking forward a little the situation would appear to be shaping as follows: 
25. A British administration in the Sudan supported by solid elements, such as 
the Mahdi, a very rich man, and the sheikhs, and the subject of constant pressure by 
the young politicals. Any differences between Ashigga and Umma are likely to be 
merged in a common demand for the immediate evacuation of the British. And this 
demand, of course, will be supported fully by Egypt as it was in 1924 with the cry 
"Sudan for the Sudanese". Egypt has great advantages of common religion and 
language and geography and wealth. We may find in the end that we are left with 
only the support of an interested and influential party in opposition to what will 
appear to be a National Movement. 
26. I have said nothing about the South Sudan, nor have I any information as to 
how an independent Sudan, even with British guidance, is to incorporate the South, 
where fears of the slavery of the Mahdia are still common. 
Sudan policy 
27. It may well be that for the moment we cannot reach an understanding, but 
the policy we should have in mind, I think is clear. The day is over when the 
Condominium means that the Governor-General's appointment is signed by the 
King of Egypt and his policy run either by himself alone or from Whitehall. We must 
go back to what Cromer originally intended, namely, that the Sudan policy (though 
not administration), should be a joint affair. I have already suggested to you, but the 
Egyptians have not accepted it, that there should be held a conference (as 
recommended by U.N.O.) to lead up to the creation of a three-party Council to watch 
the execution of Sudan policy. In a word the real solution of the Anglo-Egyptian-
Sudanese question is regional and does not lie in the direction of the creation of a 
petty independent state. A good part of this the Egyptians would accept. They merely 
stipulate that the development of Sudan "independence" should start from the basis 
of the existing sovereignty, and that, in a word, is the sole issue between us. 
Minutes on 129 
4.6 This evades the issue. We agreed to the Sudan protocol on our interpretation 
of it. If an international body gives an interpretation differing from our 
understanding then presumably we want the protocol changed .... 
6. I agree that other things being equal it is obviously preferable to have a 
Governor-General friendly to King Farouk. But our primary objective must be to find 
a good administrator acceptable to the Sudanese and capable of enforcing a policy of 
rapid sudanization. 
7. I entirely disagree. What are the reasons for this statement? If it is the 
common Nile then Uganda, the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Ethiopia are 
also bound to federate with Egypt. If a common language and religion then it applies 
only to the N. Sudan and Egypt will eventually be federated with all Arab states; if 
history and conquest, Mohammed Ali and Ibrahim's conquests extended through 
Palestine and Syria and the Hejaz & Somali land, as well as into the Sudan. 
6 4-8 of Riches's minute refer to paragraphs in Stansgate's letter; 21-27 refer to paragraphs in the memo. 
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8. The alternative is rather an independent Sudan leaning on us for protection 
against an imperialist Egypt. ... 
21. This is only too true. 
22. The Umma do not favour union with Egypt in some form though they were 
inveigled into something very like this when they joined, very temporarily, Azhari's 
delegation to Cairo when the treaty talks opened. In any case they have very much 
recanted since. 
23. Azhari was not received in London because he did not approach the Secretary 
of State through the Sudan Agent as was suggested to him. 
25. The young politicals at present number some 5-10,000. The only national 
movement likely to appear in the Sudan is a recrudescence of Mahdi-ism which 
would result from too much Egyptian infiltration. I agree that Egypt has great 
advantages of religion etc.; but she has also great disadvantages in previous history, 
her contemptuous attitude towards the Sudanese, and the fact that her imperialism 
is on the upswing while ours is very obviously on the downgrade. 
26. This is a real problem which will require considerable investigation and 
thought in the next few years. 
27. I agree that we shall probably have to bring the Egyptians more into the 
policy side of the government of the Sudan in future. This, like sudanization, will 
mean a deterioration in the administration and will have to be done in the teeth of a 
good many British officials who are rightly proud of what they have contributed 
towards building up in the Sudan .. . 
D.M.H.R. 
15.2.47 
. . . it is difficult to see how a U.N.O. decision which went some way towards depriving 
the Sudanese of their right to choose freely their future status would be any more 
palatable to the Sudanese nationalists than would a bilateral Anglo-Egyptian 
decision in that sense. If we are to promise to abide by U.N.O.'s decision, it would be 
the logical corollary that we should warn U.N.O. that a decision in favour of the 
Egyptian thesis would lead to trouble in the Sudan and that U.N.O. should at least 
share in the responsibility for dealing with the trouble caused by their decision. Such 
a warning might give the U.N.O. pause before deciding against us, but the logical 
conclusion of such an argument would be that troops from other members of U.N.O. 
should help us deal with the resultant disorders and that would hardly suit us . . . 
D.S.F. 
17.2.47 
Paragraph 12. Without in any way endorsing most of what Lord Stansgate says, I 
have myself felt that, in some recent cases, the Governor-General of the Sudan has 
made pronouncements which would better have been made by a Minister of the U.K. 
Paragraph 19. The Egyptians have a way of assassinating ministers. Unless I am 
mistaken, the minister who agreed to the Suez Canal concession was also 
assassinated. 
Paragraph 27. Cromer's intention that the Sudan policy should be a joint affair 
is, of course, rather a debating point than a real point. After all, Cromer ruled Egypt 
really, and therefore we know what he meant by a "joint affair". 
Paragraph 27, last sentence. This is hardly right, seeing that the existing 
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Protocol certainly starts from the basis of an existing Egyptian sovereignty and the 
split came not on this point but on the question whether the Sudan could ever 
achieve complete independence or not. 
W.E.B. 
28.2.47 
130 PREM 8/1388/3 3 Mar 1947 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: inward telegram no 557 from 
Sir R Campbell to Mr Bevin giving text of al-Nuqrashi's statement on 
the breakdown of the treaty negotiations 
[In late January Bevin proposed a new draft of the Sudan protocol which pledged both 
Egypt and Britain to the preparation of the Sudanese for self-government, and (after 
consultation with the Sudanese) the free exercise of choice of future status of the Sudan 
'in accordance with the principles of the charter of the United Nations concerning non-
self-governing territories' (outgoing telegram no 173 from Bevin to Campbell, 23 Jan 
1947, FO 371162941, no 3781). Al-Nuqrashi objected to this, asserting that there was no 
need for an explicit statement about freedom to exercise choice. Failure to reach an 
agreement, he further warned, 'meant reference to U.N.O. and though we would no doubt 
both agree to go to U.N.O. in an amicable way ... one could never be sure of what people 
would say in stress of discussion and he feared the possibility of heated language' (inward 
telegram no 226 from Campbell to Bevin, 25 Jan 1947, FO 371/62941, no 402). In 
expressing his own disappointment over al-Nuqrashi's response, and fully anticipating the 
breakdown of negotiations, Bevin instructed Campbell: 'on one point you should disabuse 
Nokrashi 's mind at once, i.e. that we shall go to U.N.O. as friends if he decides to go there. 
This issue involves two parties to the chief sec, fundamental right of a third under the 
United Nations Charter; and this point is so vital that British opinion will compel its 
representatives to express themselves openly and forcefully' (outward telegram no 191 
from Bevin to Campbell, 25 Jan 1947, FO 371/62941, no 402) .] 
At 4.30 Today the Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha held a press conference. He issued 
the following statement. The negotiations between Egypt and Britain began in April 
1946 and lasted ten months during which the Egyptian side earnestly tried in every 
way to come to an agreement. This was clearly demonstrated by the journey 
undertaken by the Egyptian Prime Minister to London for the purpose of personally 
contacting Mr. Bevin. The final breaking off of these negotiations may be attributed 
only to the inability of Egypt to obtain satisfaction on the following two essential 
points, which are claimed by the Egyptian people. 
1. Evacuation of British troops from Egypt. This evacuation must be immediate, 
complete, and not conditioned by a treaty. 
2. Maintenance of the unity of Egypt and the Sudan, self Government for the 
Sudanese and restoration to Egypt of her rights in the administration in the Sudan 
in order to further the preparation of the Sudanese for self Government. The unity 
of Egypt and Sudan is the will of both Egyptians and Sudanese. Whereas the 
British policy is directed towards inciting the Sudanese to secede from Egypt. As 
for self government, had Egypt not been forcibly deprived of her rights in the 
administration of the Sudan, the preparation of the Sudanese for self government 
would not be so delayed. Egypt is in a better position and is more anxious than 
Great Britain to prepare for self government a people of the same race, the same 
language, same religion and dependent for their very existence on the Nile. Egypt 
wants the Sudanese to be able as soon as possible to express their views freely, 
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which can be accomplished only when British troops have evacuated the Sudan. 
The two preceding points are fair application of the principles of the United 
Nations charter. For that reason, after exceptionally prolonged negotiations, the 
Egyptian Government, regretfully convinced that direct discussions held no hope 
of success, decided to appeal to the Security Council. This decision has received 
the enthusiastic endorsement of the entire Egyptian people. Egypt has abiding 
faith in United Nations and is absolutely confident that justice will be accorded to 
a small nation which has always firmly upheld the principles of the supremacy of 
international law. 
131 FO 371162943, no 1533 [31 Mar] 1947 
[Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations]: minute by Sir R Howe on Mr 
Bevin's provisional instructions for an approach to King Faruq 
[The retirement of Huddleston and his replacement by Howe as governor-general of the 
Sudan offered the FO the opportunity of renewing its approaches to the Egyptian 
government through one of their own number who had been intimately involved in the 
earlier stages of the treaty negotiations. Bevin was anxious to create a better atmosphere 
in Egypt, and while in Moscow (for a meeting of foreign ministers) he suggested that this 
might be achieved by allowing Egyptian administrative officers into the Sudan, and 
proposed that Howe raise this, and other possibilities, with King Faruq when they met on 
Howe's way to Khartoum (inward telegram no 325, 25 Mar 1947, from Bevin to FO, 
FO 371/62943, no 1409, and inward telegram no 448, 29 Mar 1947, from Bevin to FO, 
FO 371/62943, no 1533). Howe responded with the following criciticism. The gist of his 
argument was relayed to Bevin through Sargent, and Bevin eventually agreed that Howe 
should not 'dangle a tempting series of concessions before King Farouk. All I suggest is 
that the new policy in the Sudan, which we shall need to follow, not in the interests of a 
settlement in Egypt, but in our own world interests, should be present in Sir R. Howe's 
mind as the background of an exploratory talk with the King' (inward telegram no 524, 
1 Apr 1947, from Bevin to Sargent, FO 371/62943, no 1553).] 
The policy which the Secretary of State proposes to follow in the Sudan as set out in 
this telegram can be summarised as follows:-
( a) Nothing should be allowed to prejudice the right of the Sudanese to self-
determination. 
(b) Nothing must be done to interfere with the Sudanisation of the administration 
of the Sudan. 
In order to give effect to this policy the Secretary of State wishes to propose to 
King Farouk the following measures to be taken now. 
(c) The institution of a kind of Supervisory Council composed of Egyptians, 
British and Sudanese whose duty would be 
(i) to supervise the preparations of the Sudanese for Sudanisation 
(ii) to report to both British and Egyptian Governments on the progress being 
made in this field 
(iii) to recommend measures to speed up Sudanisation. 
(d) To bring more Egyptians into the Sudan administration. 
(e) A special body to control the utilisation of the Nile waters. 
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The Secretary of State further proposes to re-affirm the unity of Egypt and the 
Sudan under the Egyptian crown, which previously he was only prepared to concede 
as the price of an agreement. 
(f) A customs and currency union. 
It seems to me that if I am going to propose all these things to the Egyptians we are 
going to do precisely what we have agreed would be the worst possible thing for us to 
do at this juncture. We are all agreed that it is futile to make further proposals on the 
question of the Sudan to the Egyptians because they will inevitably regard it as a sign 
of weakness on our part and as constituting further concessions to their point of 
view. From the tactical point of view, therefore, it seems to be all wrong. 
Furthermore, as regards (a) Nokrashi has said that Egypt will insist on the 
permanent unity of the Sudan with Egypt and we shall only provoke this rejoinder by 
telling the King that nothing should be allowed to prejudice the right of the 
Sudanese to self-determination. 
As regards (c) we have already proposed to Nokrashi the institution of this kind of 
body and the Egyptians have rejected it. The proposed Council would presumably sit 
in Cairo and there might be some advantage in having a body of this kind, whose 
duty would be to agree on the interpretation of the Condominium Agreement so that 
the eo-domini could give agreed instructions to the Governor-General. On the other 
hand, if it is going to function in the Sudan, it seems to me that it would cut across 
the functions of the Governor-General. It would be contrary to the Condominium 
Agreement which lays down that the Governor-General is the supreme executive and 
legislative authority. It would be inconsistent with the new constitutional proposals 
of the Sudan Government which aim at setting up in the near future a legislative 
council for the Sudan. 
As regards bringing more Egyptians into the service, this proposal needs very 
careful consideration in view of the 1936 Treaty which lays down that qualified 
Sudanese are to have the first opportunity. To give a pledge regarding more 
Egyptians without first seeing whether qualified Sudanese are available would 
prejudice our policy of Sudanisation as well as running contrary to the 1936 Treaty 
which says that qualified Sudanese are to have the first opportunity. It seems to me 
that on this point it would be necessary to examine carefully the position in the 
Sudan before giving a blank cheque on this score. We don't want a repetition of 1924. 
As regards the control of the Nile waters, this is all provided for in the Nile Waters 
Agreement. It does not seem that any further special arrangements need be 
considered at this stage. See also S/S's proposal to Sidky in the Nile waters in the 
event of Sudan choosing independence. 
As regards (f) there is already a customs union between Egypt and the Sudan 
under Article 7 of the Condominium Agreement, while the currency is the same in 
both countries. 
I think that the line for me to take with the Egyptians in Cairo is to say that it 
would be my duty as Governor-General to see that Egyptian interests in the Sudan 
are safeguarded, that the policy of the Sudan Government shall not in any way be 
directed against those interests and that I shall hope to have the fullest and frankest 
cooperation with the Egyptians in carrying out this policy, that I shall keep them 
informed of all developments in the progress of the Sudanese towards self-
government and that I look to them to give me their fullest support in this task. 
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Finally in proposing all these things to the Egyptians now we should be giving 
away in advance those things we might have to concede in return for a treaty, if & 
when negotiations are resumed. 
132 FO 37112944, no 2002 27 Apr-28 May 1947 
[Southern Sudan]: minutes by D M H Riches and D W Lascelles 
[The future of the Southern Sudan was still not a major concern for either HMG or the 
Sudan government, but there had been increasing signs that northern Sudanese 
nationalists were making the matter an issue, and some concerned voices were beginning 
to be raised in England. H M Medland (Lab MP for Drake Division of Plymouth 
1945-1950), forwarded to the FO a letter from one of his consitutents, Major PM Larken,l 
a former district commissioner in the Southern Sudan, expressing horror at the news 
that the South was to be 'handed over to the [northern] Sudanese', which he condemned 
as 'a shameful betrayal of our trust. To my mind, there is not the least doubt that they 
would be exploited, or at the best, neglected' (Larken to Medland, 22 Apr 1947, FO 
371/2944, no 2002). The internal discussion concerning the best way to answer this letter 
was not part of any formulation of policy, but it reveals that the Foreign Office was still 
open to posibilities which had already been ruled out in Khartoum.) 
It is perfectly true that the Southern Sudanese are entirely different on all counts to 
the northern Arab Sudanese; and that they fear exploitation by the latter. 
It is a common Egyptian cry that we are seeking to accentuate & play on these 
differences with the object of separating the South & annexing it to Uganda. 
(A) I Obviously such separation could only be effected with the consent of Egypt. 
Such consent would never be given. Equally obviously we must press on with 
Sudanization. The only ways therefore to safeguard the South are by (a) 
(B) I affording equal opportunities for education etc. in the South. This the Sudan 
Govt are trying to do; & (b) by instilling into Sudanese Arab administrators 
some idea of public service & devotion to the welfare of the southerners whom 
they may have to administer. 
I suggest that the reply to Mr Medland might be on the lines that 
(a) The Sudan is a Condominium & HMG cannot take unilateral action to 
separate the South from the Sudan. 
(b) The achievement of self government by the Sudanese will take some time in 
the view of H.M.G. & it is premature to speak of the south being handed over 
immediately to the Arabs of the north. 
D.M.H.R. 
27.4.47 
I don't altogether agree with Mr. Riches' minute above. As regards the passage which 
I have marked (A), it is not true that Egypt will never consent to the separation of 
southern from northern Sudan. Admittedly she will never consent to this as long as 
the Sudan remains an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. But it will not remain that 
1 P M Larken, SPS, 1910-1932, served exclusively in the Southern Sudan, sixteen years in the Zande 
districts of Tembura and Yambio alone. 
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indefinitely if the United Nations fulfil their role. At some stage they will be called 
upon to judge whether the Sudanese people have reached the stage at which they will 
be entitled to control their own destinies; and if their judgment is favourable, Egypt 
will not be able to prevent its execution. 
2. Nevertheless the problem raised by Major Larken is a real and difficult one. 
Despite (B) of Mr. Riches' minute, the Sudan Government have not shone as 
promoters of education in the black and primitive South. Even if they were to go all 
out now, the South could never hope to catch up on the North; and consequently it 
would be bullied by the North in an independent Sudan, whatever the theoretical set-
up might be as regards proportional representation, etc. 
3. The only safeguard would seem to be for us to endeavour to take the question 
of Sudanese independence by stages, inducing the U.N. (which would presumably be 
the final arbiter) to confirm the political maturity of the North, and hence its right to 
chose independence, before it does the same for the South. The South would thus 
remain longer under the Condominium arrangement, and would have time to 
mature. Eventually it could be declared politically mature and given the same liberty 
as the North to choose its own fate. It might elect to join up with the North, or to 
become an independent entity. Either way, our moral obligation would be 
discharged. 
4. Major Larken wrongly assumes that the Sudan is going to achieve 
independence in the immediate future . If he had not assumed this, he would 
probably have raised another awkward point: we are committed to a policy of 
Sudanisation of the administration on wide and unassailable grounds of principle, 
but this policy means an increasingly raw deal for the South while we are still in 
( co-) charge of the country. There is no escape from this. 
5. The Sudan Agent's letter to me, attached at Flag A,2 suggests a form of reply to 
Mr. Medland. If I were in Major Larken's position, I should regard this reply as a piece 
of heartless official humbug. Mr. Mayall tells me that Major Larken, though rather 
fanatically "pro-South", is an honest man who could be trusted not to quote or 
misquote us if we had a talk with him. (Obviously we cannot afford to be too frank on 
paper) . I think this would be the best solution provided that Mr. Medland would not 
feel slighted or short-circuited.3 
D.W.L. 30.4.47 
I saw Major Larken to-day, and he went away quite happy. 
D.W.L. 28.5.47 
2 The Sudan Agent had proposed as a possible answer to Larken a statement that there is no intention of 
handing over the peoples of the South to the Northerners, money from the North's economic growth was 
going to be used to develop the South, the South may be included in the administrative reorganisation 
being carried out in the North, and that Southerners would have an equal voice with the Northerners in 
choosing their political future (letter from Mayall to Lascelles; 29 Apr 1947, FO 371162944, no 2002). 
3 McNeil sent a letter to Medland, reassuring him that the problem, while serious, was not urgent, as the 
Sudan would not be likely to achieve independence in the near future, but inviting Larken to meet 
Lascelles for a personal discussion. 
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133 FO 371163053, no 2409 20 May 1947 
[Egypt and the Sudan]: despatch no 440 from Sir R Campbell to Mr 
Bevin on the dilemma of excluding Egypt from the administration of 
the Sudan while admitting sovereignty 
There was enclosed with Mr. Speaight's letter to Mr. Lascelles 364/67/47 of May 3rd a 
series of notes prepared by the Civil Secretariat at Khartoum illustrating the 
practical difficulties of co-operation with the Egyptians in the administration of the 
Sudan and, in particular, the virtual impossibility of introducing more Egyptian 
officials at a high level in the administration without grave danger of wrecking the 
whole machine. These notes, and other evidence furnished by the Sudan 
Government of the dangers of Egyptian influence (for example, Mr. Robertson's 
letter CS/SCR/97.H.6 of April 7th, a copy of which was sent to Mr. Butler) all help to 
emphasise one of the fundamental problems with which we are faced in the Sudan: 
namely the need to ensure that the welfare of the Sudanese continues to be the 
primary object of the administration while, at the same time, satisfying the Egyptians 
themselves and world opinion that the legitimate interests and rights of Egypt in the 
Sudan are not being ignored. In the following paragraphs I attempt to give a brief 
statement of the opposing points of view and my suggestion for what seems to me 
the best means of steering round the dilemma. The facts are of course already well-
known but it may help to clear our minds at this stage if I recapitulate them. 
2. If the long term interests of the Sudanese could be considered in a vacuum, 
the future course would be clear. Egypt has no real interest in the welfare of the 
Sudanese and no serious contribution to make to its future development, either in 
the material or spiritual sphere. In the early days of the condominium, Egyptian 
officials were useful at the lower level of the administration, because both they and 
the Egyptian Government itself were under British control. But a stage has now been 
reached where, with the exception of a few technical posts, the Sudanese themselves 
are capable of filling any post not still occupied by a British official. Their standard of 
efficiency may be below that of the better type of Egyptian official, but the difference 
is certainly not great enough to justify favouring Egyptians at the expense of the 
Sudanese. As regards the higher posts still in British hands, there are very few, if any, 
of these which could be handed over to the Egyptians without grave prejudice to the 
efficiency of the administration, constant friction within the administration and an 
out-cry from all politically conscious Sudanese, including even the Ashigga Party, 
whose conception of union with Egypt does not extend to direct government by 
Egyptian officials. It is thus easy to demonstrate that the Sudanese neither want, nor 
would profit by, any increase in the Egyptian share in the administration. Indeed, 
one can go further and maintain that, since Egypt has shown herself incapable of 
exercising the duties of a colonial power in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations, the interests of the Sudanese would be best served by bringing the 
condominium to an end and placing them under British trusteeship until such time 
as they were able to stand on their own feet. 
3. But unfortunately there is also the Egyptian side of the picture. The present 
Egyptian Government claim-and we must assume that any other Egyptian 
Government will make the same claim-that they are entitled to a greater, if not a 
predominant, share in the administration of the Sudan. In justification of this claim 
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they maintain that Egypt and the Sudan form a geographical and economic unit and 
that Egyptian interest in the upper waters of the Nile is vital; that the condominium 
agreement implies a joint Anglo-Egyptian administration which has never been 
realised; and that the Sudan is under Egyptian sovereignty. We can meet to some 
extent the first and second of these arguments but there is no getting away from the 
claim to sovereignty which was admitted, at least by implication (though in the more 
or less symbolic form of a personal union), in the Bevin/Sidky draft Sudan protocol 
and which the Law Officers of the Crown consider to be on the whole wellfounded. 
Moreover, apart from Egypt's legal claims, Egyptian political opinion has worked 
itself up to such an extent over the Sudan that Anglo-Egyptian relations can never 
run smoothly until some accommodation has been reached over this problem; and it 
might be said that Anglo- Egyptian relations, of great importance to His Majesty's 
Government, cannot fail to have an effect also on the Sudan. 
4. Here then is the dilemma. If we not only insist on giving Egypt only the 
shadow and denying her all the substance of sovereignty, but at the same time deny 
her any but the most tenuous share in the administration of the Sudan, we 
permanently bedevil Anglo-Egyptian relations and make it easy for Egypt to prove at 
U.N.O. that we have gone back on our Treaty obligations by refusing her her share in 
the condominium. If we let more Egyptians in, we cause chaos in the administration 
and disillusionment amongst the Sudanese, and give the Egyptians an opportunity, 
which they are unlikely to neglect, of undermining our whole position in the Sudan, 
and bringing about a repetition of the 1924 crisis. In other words, we have got to give 
a semblance of reality to a condominium administration which since 1922 has never 
yet functioned satisfactorily on a condominium basis. Up to 1922 British influence in 
Egypt was sufficient to enable us effectively to control the Egyptian as well as the 
British side of the condominium. Between the declaration of Egyptian independence 
in 1922 and the murder of Sir Lee Stack in 1924, the Egyptians set themselves to 
wreck the joint administration and came within measurable distance of succeeding. 
From 1924 to 1936, we deliberately deprived the Egyptians of all share in the 
condominium. Since 1936 the Egyptians have again embarked on their wrecking 
tactics, although owing to the war it is only in the last two years that the impact of 
these tactics has been seriously felt. 
5. There can be no quick way out of the dilemma. The only real solution is the 
long term one of doing everything possible to expedite the political evolution of the 
Sudanese so that they can dispense with the administrative supervision of both eo-
domini. This, however, will take a number of years and during the interim period I 
can see no practicable alternative to attempting to continue the condominium 
agreement and trying to work it in such a way that the Egyptian Government can at 
least give the impression to the Opposition of the day and to the public that they are 
playing their full part, and yet are not put in a position to make mischief. Egyptian 
interest in the Sudan, however real in some important respects, has, in respect of 
the claim for participation of a greater number of Egyptians in the administration, a 
large element of "window-dressing" in that no Egyptian official will willingly rele-
gate himself to such distant parts if he can find an excuse for remaining in Cairo. It 
may not be impossible in these circumstances to achieve an uneasy working 
arrangement on the lines suggested above. Our policy should, I submit, be to regu-
larise as far as possible our (official) position under the condominium agreement 
(see, for example, my despatch No. 321 of 17th April, 1947) and for the Sudan 
264 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [134] 
Government to be firm in the face of Egyptian provocation in the Sudan wherever 
their case is a good one. 
6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor-General of the Sudan. 
134 FO 371/63052, no 2096 29 July 1947 
[Representation of the Southern Sudan]: recommendations by J W 
Robertson on the first report of the Sudan Administration 
Conference. Annex: resolution of the Governor-General's Council 
[Extract] 
[The Sudan Administration Conference, under the chairmanship of the civil secretary, sub-
mitted its first report on 31 Mar 1947. The conference had been divided into two sub-com-
mittees: the central government sub-committee (sub-committee 'A'), and the local 
government sub-committee (sub-committee 'B') . The first report dealt entirely with the 
work of sub-committee 'A' on the steps to be taken for 'the closer association of the 
Sudanese with the Central Government' and its recommendations for the establishment 
of a Legislative Assembly and an Excutive Council to replace the Advisory Council for the 
Northern Sudan and the Governor-General's Council. On the matter of the future of the 
Southern Sudan the report stated: 'we are of the opinion that the future of the Sudan 
depends on welding together the people of the whole country. The Southern Provinces, 
though not Arab in origin (in common with many areas of the Northern Provinces) must 
look to the rest of the Sudan for economic and social development. Through the repre-
sentation of the Southern Provinces on a Legislative Assembly responsible to the whole 
country the unification of the Sudanese peoples will more quickly be achieved and it is on 
this that the welfare of all Sudanese ultimately depends. We are fully aware of the relative 
backwardness of the peoples of the Southern Provinces and of the advances which they 
must make before they can reach the degree of civilisation attained by many of the peoples 
of the North. But at the same time a decision must be made, and made now, that the Sudan 
should be administered as one country ... . ' (Sudan Administration Conference. First 
Report, para 13, p 4). No Southern Sudanese had been appointed to the sub-committee, 
and the South was represented by B V Marwood, governor of Equatoria, who was invited 
to attend only the last meeting of the conference. Between the submission of the report 
and its presentation to the governor-general in council, Robertson convened a conference 
in Juba (12-13 June) which canvassed the views of a few junior Southern Sudanese offi-
cials. It was on the basis of their agreement to participate in the Legislative Assembly that 
Robertson made the following recommendations concerning the representation of the 
South. His comments on the other recommendations of the report were confined to pro-
cedural matters and minor re-wording of clauses.] 
Paras. 12 & 13. Representation of the South 
One of the main problems of the Report is its recommendation that the Southern 
Sudan should send representatives to the Legislative Assembly and for better or for 
worse become wedded to the Northern Sudan which on its part will have to endow 
the South with much of its worldly wealth. The Southern Sudan is inhabited by 
tribes of non-Arab origin, and owing to their primitive and pagan nature, and to the 
distance and inhospitable nature of the country in which they live, they have not 
made the same progress towards civilisation as the Northern Sudanese. 
Furthermore, owing to the scanty resources of the Sudan Government, it has not 
been possible until lately to find the money necessary to push ahead with the 
educational and economic development of these provinces. 
It has however, been generally accepted in the last few years that the South is 
historically, geographically and economically connected inextricably with the 
Northern Sudan. 
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If the primitive inhabitants are to be persuaded to cooperate with the Government 
peaceably, it will be necessary for some time to come to protect their tribal customs 
and their personal laws regarding marriage, inheritance etc., from too sudden a 
shock by the impact of Northern ideas, and I think that they must be safe-guarded by 
law from too sudden interference in these matters, if they are to develop 
progressively along indigenous lines. This view was confirmed at a meeting which I 
held in Juba in June 1947 when a representative body of Southerners endorsed the 
view that they should not be administered separately from the Northern Sudan, but 
emphasised their backwardness and their fears of Northern domination and 
infiltration. 
In my opinion the South must be administered as an integral part of a united 
Sudan: it must be encouraged to set up organs of local government speedily, with 
Province Councils, which initially until the Southerners have progressed far enough 
for elections to be held, should select representatives to the Legislative Assembly. 
The proposed Legislative Assembly and Executive Council should administer the 
Sudan as a whole, but I recommend that power should be reserved to the Governor-
General in cases where legislation or administrative action appears to him to have 
possible unfortunate results in the South to order that such legislation or 
administrative action should not be operative until the Southern Province Councils 
have been consulted about it. A further safeguard which I recommend is that a senior 
official with long experience of Southern tribes and customs should be summoned 
when necessary to advise the Executive Council on the implications of any proposed 
policy on the South. 
I feel that the appointment of Southern members to the Legislative Assembly will 
have excellent results in widening the outlook of the Southern Sudanese, and will 
help to hasten the closer unification of the Sudan. 
Fears have been expressed that too close contact with the North will lead to 
exploitation and domination of the South by the North. There is this danger but on 
the other hand it must be pointed out that progress in the South is dependent upon 
the Northern taxpayer, and it is surely not unjust that if the Northern Sudan is 
paying some L.E. 900,000 in 1947 to make up the deficit on Southern revenues it 
should have some say in how this money is to be spent. 
The Southern semi-educated and clerical classes are keen for motives of self-
interest, better pay and prospects etc., to come in to the same administrative system 
as the North. They are inclined to blame the Sudan Government, rather than the 
accidents of history and geography, for the backwardness of the South. I am 
convinced that should Southern representation in the Legislative Assembly be 
delayed, or should the Legislative Assembly not be allowed to deal with the Southern 
Sudan, agitation would be aroused in both North and South, and the Government 
would be accused of segregating the Southerners in a sort of human zoological park. 
I believe it is to the ultimate welfare of the South to be opened up and have a 
chance of development and cohesion with the North. It will then be able to play its 
part in the advancement of the country as a whole . .. . 
Annex to 134 
The Civil Secretary submitted the first report of the Sudan Administration 
Conference with his recommendations regarding its implementation. 
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Council approved the following resolutions:-
!. That the First Report of the Sudan Administration Conference regarding the 
development of the Advisory Council into a Legislative Assembly and the proposed 
evolution of the existing Governor-General's Council into an Executive Council be 
noted, and that its main proposals be accepted in principle. 
2. That the proposal that the Legislative Assembly should be representative of 
the whole Sudan and that its scope should not be limited to the Northern Sudan be 
accepted, but that safeguards be introduced into the legislation setting up the new 
constitution, which will ensure the healthy and steady development of the Southern 
peoples. 
3. That the proposal for the appointment by the government of members of the 
Legislative Assembly as "Under Secretaries" in the principal departments be 
approved: that instructions be issued for these members to be given proper 
administrative responsibility in the departments concerned, and that measures be 
taken forthwith to work out the implications of this step: that such members should 
represent their department in the Assembly. 
4. That the proposal to set up an Executive Council of 12 members composed 
of:-
(1) Three Secretaries and Kaid 
(2) Six Sudanese "Under Secretaries" to be chosen by the Government from 
among the "Under Secretaries" 
(3) Two members to be nominated by the Governor-General 
be agreed to. 
5. That these proposals should be submitted to the British and Egyptian 
Governments for their consideration. 
135 FO 371162947, no 36997 30 July 1947 
[SAR]: record by the secretariat, Khartoum, of a meeting between Sir 
R Howe and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. Annexes 
Minutes by C Howson1 and D M H Riches 
[Howe's initial telegraphic summary of his meeting with SAR caused some disquiet in the 
FO. Howe reported SAR's concern about the apparent weakness of the Sudan government 
in relation to Egypt, the increasing pressure being exerted on him by Egyptian Muslims 
(including Hasan Banna, leader of Muslim Brothers) to support the unity of the Nile 
Valley, the independence parties' disillusionment with HMG, and the demands being 
raised by them for the termination of the condominium and formation of a Sudanese 
government (inward telegram from Howe to Bevin no 120, 30 July 1947, FO 371/62947, 
no 3586). Bevin commented: 'We had better look at vigorous counter-measures in this 
case.' The action recommended, after receipt of these minutes, was improvement of 
public relations in Khartoum in order to publicise British actions more widely (letter 
from Sargent to Howe, 8 Aug 1947, FO 371/62947, no 3586.] 
Mter the usual opening gambits concerning the weather, etc., Sayed Abdel Rahman 
set the ball rolling by saying that he had asked for an interview with H.E. this evening 
1 African Dept, FO, 1947-1949. 
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in accordance with H.E's request at their last meeting that Sayed Abdel Rahman 
should always feel free to come and see him about anything that was worrying him. 
Two things at the moment were uppermost in everyone's mind: the Sudan case at 
U.N.O. and the Legislative Assembly. 
With regard to the first Sayed Abdel Rahman said he thought it had been a mistake 
not to consult nor to inform any Sudanese before sending the Sudan Government 
Delegation. He said his party were not sending representatives largely for fear that if 
they did so the Egyptians would encourage Azhari also to go, but as no Sudanese 
were going he could only hope that the British Government would carry out their 
duties as trustees for the Sudan to the best of their ability. In particular, he hoped, 
that they would make it clear to U.N.O. that the intervention by Egyptians in the 
administration of the Sudan had, in the past, always been to the Sudan's detriment, 
and that no future penetration by Egypt should be allowed. 
H.E. said that Sayed Abdel Rahman had touched upon the fundamental issue now 
at stake. Egypt's complaint at U.N.O. was based on her claim that the Sudan 
Government refused to allow her to participate in the administration and 
development of the Sudan; Sayed Abdel Rahman was now asking us to do this very 
thing. There seemed to be considerable misunderstanding among many Sudanese as 
to the exact functions and powers of the Governor-General. He was merely the agent 
of the two Co-domini and was bound legally to carry out any instructions which the 
two powers in agreement might give him. 
Sayed Abdel Rahman said he realised this, but he, and many other Sudanese, 
thought that the Governor-General could exercise far greater independence in 
internal affairs than he had in fact exercised in the past. The 1899 Treaty gave him 
the supreme military and civil command in the Sudan, and in the 1936 Treaty the 
two Co-domini had agreed that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan 
must be the welfare of the Sudanese. Both Co-domini had expressed at one time or 
another their desire that the Sudan should have self-government. In his view, 
therefore, the Governor-General had full constitutional powers to take any steps 
leading to the grant of self-government to the Sudanese. 
He then raised the second point which was worrying him-i.e. the delay in the 
setting up of the Legislative Assembly. This delay was responsible for implanting 
doubt in the minds of many of his friends and followers with regard to the real 
intention of the Sudan Government. His Excellency had stated that any legislation 
which might be passed would have to be referred to the two Co-domini. Apart, 
therefore, from the delay in drafting the legislation, the Government by referring it 
to Egypt was incurring a very grave risk of the whole project being held up. He did 
not see why Egypt should be consulted. 
H.E. replied that the Advisory Council had only considered the proposals some two 
months ago; since then H.E. had been touring the South in order to formulate his 
views as to the part which the South should take in the Assembly. There had, 
therefore, been no unavoidable delay. The Government was as anxious as the 
Sudanese themselves to see the Assembly established. As for the question of 
submitting the legislation to Egypt, this was unavoidable. In the introduction to the 
Governor-General's Council Ordinance, 1910, the approval of the two Co-domini is 
specifically recorded, and as the Executive Council would be replacing the Governor-
General's Council their approval would also be necessary for the two new 
constitutional bodies. 
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The Sayed accepted this, saying he was not a legal expert, but merely regarded 
these matters from a common sense point of view. He emphasised, however, the 
prime importance, during the interim period before the Legislative Assembly had got 
going, of consulting Sudanese opinion (and in particular himselO before taking any 
important action. The Government, like all alien governments, were too prone to 
make their decisions in vacuo. In the present difficult circumstances they could not 
afford to make mistakes, and the best way of avoiding these was to consult leading 
Sudanese of experience and judgement. 
Sayed Abdel Rahman then talked about the effects of Egyptian propaganda and 
Egyptian pressure. He said that he had recently received messages from Ahmed 
Hussein and Saleh Harb2 in which they appealed to him as a fellow Moslem to join 
his cause with that of Egypt. These messages had been given wide publicity 
throughout the Middle East. Moreover, the flood of Egyptian propaganda continued 
to pour into the Sudan and inevitably weakened both his own personal position and 
the control which he exercised over the political views of his followers. The 
Government seemed content to do nothing at all to stop this propaganda. The 
Egyptian press had a very baleful influence in the Sudan. He also instanced the 
Ramadan preachers, Egyptian students, etc. 
H.E. replied by saying that this type of propaganda was a new thing in the Sudan. 
The British, however, had had long experience of it and it had been proved in the past 
that propaganda based on false premises always recoiled on the people who spread it. 
H.E. had no doubt that this would be the eventual fate of Egyptian propaganda in the 
Sudan. 
The Sayed agreed that this might be so, but said that this was a long term view; if 
nothing was done soon to stop it it would have the effect of removing him and his 
influence from the political scene. 
H.E. said that in these days of newspapers and wireless it was virtually impossible 
to stop this sort of propaganda; the only defence was to take a firm stand and show 
high moral courage. 
The Sayed said that this might be so, but he felt that the Government could do 
more than it had been doing (e.g. it could instruct its Province officials to give the 
"pro-Government party" a fair wind in any matter affecting it's [sic] relations with 
the pro-Egyptian party). He would continue to take a firm stand, but it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to do so. 
As an instance of the difficulty he was having in restraining his followers and in 
persuading them to adopt loyally a policy of co-operation with the Government, he 
gave H.E. a letter3 addressed to him (Sayed Abdel Rahman) by the Independence 
Front, which, he said, he had just received. H.E. said that he would read it at his 
leisure. 
Finally the Sayed said that he had taken up his present attitude in the knowledge 
that he had had promises by the British to support him. H.E. asked which promises 
he was referring to. The Sayed said that they were many, but instanced in particular 
his conversation with Sir Hubert Huddleston in Cairo last year when the Sayed was 
on his way to England to see Mr. Attlee. The Sayed asked Sir Hubert what he should 
2 Ahmad Husain and Salah Harb were two Khatmiya shaikhs. 
3 Reproduced here as Annex 1. 
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do about meeting the Egyptian authorities. He had addressed a request to Sidky 
Pasha for an interview but had had no reply. Sir Hubert said that he should not worry 
his head about the Egyptians, that the British highly appreciated his action in going 
to England, and that he could rely on their support. The Sayed also referred to a 
conversation with the late Sir Douglas Newbold in which the latter had said that 
although he could not prophesy what reward the Sudan would be given as a result of 
the allied victory, he was sure that the Sudan would get its share, and that the Sayed 
would have his share of that share. 
H.E. replied that the Sayed had of his own choice taken up a certain position; this 
position must inevitably bring him into conflict with a certain party. He must, 
therefore, expect and accept the opposition of that party and must face it with 
courage. The British Government would give him what support they could, but in 
the nature of things they could not shield him from every attack. 
The Sayed said that he gratified to know that he would have the continued support 
of the British, and this was what he had really come to H. E. to find out. He was going 
down to Aba in a week's time, but before he left he hoped to be able to issue a 
message to his followers. 
H.E. thanked him for coming and said that he would always be glad to discuss any 
question with him. 
Sayed Abdel Rahman then left, the interview laving [sic]lasted some two hours. 
Later: note by J S Owen, deputy assistant civil secretary 
Next morning Sayed Abdel Rahman rang me up to ask if I would go round and see 
him as he had some afterthoughts which he wished to have conveyed to H.E. 
He first referred to the letter from the Independence Front which he had given 
H.E. He now had had time to read it and he thought that possibly the English 
translation given to H.E. was incorrect in certain details. He also thought that the 
letter could have been more happily phrased. He, therefore, asked me to retrieve it 
when I got back to the office, for correction. 
Sayed Abdel Rahman then elaborated his point about co-operation and 
consultation prior to any new major decision by the Government. If the Government 
always consulted him before taking any important step he could ensure that his 
followers would support the Government's action, otherwise he could not. (I 
commented here that his papers were among the first to denounce the dangers of 
individual consultations.). He also referred to the failure of our many efforts to gain 
the support of Sayed Ali el Mirghani, who, he alleged, had recently received 
£E.15,000 from the Egyptians. He could not understand the Government's attitude 
to this man; they had allowed him to hold the holia4 of Sayed el Hassan lasting 15 
days, whereas they would only allow him (Sayed Abdel Rahman) two days for the 
opening of the Mahdi's tomb; they had even helped Sayed Ali el Mirghani to put up 
his tents in Abbas Square by giving him prisoners to help him. There was a certain 
Governor (no names, no packdrill) who declared that he was an adherent of the 
Khatmia. The Government must surely realise by now that Sayed Ali was its enemy 
and that it must withdraw any semblance of official support from him, otherwise it 
weakened the faith of those loyal to the Government. 
4 Hulia: 'joy after sadness', a religious celebration in honour of a saint. 
270 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [135] 
I asked him what practical steps he could suggest the Government might take. 
He said that he did not really know, but he thought that the Government should 
from now on studiously ignore Sayed Ali, while, at the same time, it, should instruct 
its officials to help on the party loyal to the Government. In this connection he said 
that Sir Hubert Huddleston had said to him in Cairo that he was writing to Mr. 
Robertson, the Civil Secretary, to tell him to ensure that Province Authorities 
encouraged adherents to Sayed Abdel Rahman's party. 
I expressed surprise at this, and said I had never seen any such letter. 
The Sayed started to take up the attitude that his position was a very weak one and 
that unless the Government gave him its full support he was unable to do anything. 
I pointed out to him that this was inconsistent with his claim that his followers 
constituted the majority in the country. 
He admitted the inconsistency of this but said that he was worried about the 
outcome of the elections to the Legislative Assembly. He thought the Government 
should take steps to rig the elections and ensure that a pro-Government majority will 
be returned. 
I expressed my surprise at this undemocratic suggestion, and asked him what 
steps he thought the Government should take. 
He said that in the rural areas where indirect elections were to be held the 
Government should make it perfectly clear to the local authorities which candidates 
the Government wished to be returned. In the urban areas his candidates never had a 
chance because his followers were on the whole in the lower strata of society and 
were, therefore, disenfranchised by the Rates qualification. The Government should, 
therefore, lower this qualification or even introduce adult male suffrage into the 
towns. The Sayed appeared to be genuinely concerned about the danger of a pro-
Egyptian majority in the Assembly. 
Before I left I told the Sayed that though the Government knew that he felt 
strongly that they should take more definite action in certain directions, they had 
not yet received from him any concrete suggestions as to how this action should be 
taken practically. 
The Sayed said that he would give this his consideration and let us know if he had 
any suggestions to make.5 
Annex 1 to 135: copy of a translation of a letter to El Sayed Sir Abdel Rahman el 
Mahdi Pasha from the Independence Front, July 1947 
The Sudanese have a natural right to independence supported by the role they played 
in the second world war for freedom and secured by the Atlantic Charter. The Sudan 
that asks for its sovereign right is opposed by Egypt and Great Britain who 
administer it on the strength of the 1899 Agreement and 1936 Treaty. Egypt denies 
the Sudan the right to independence and view its just demand with a hostile attitude 
that made understanding with it impossible. It accepts nothing short of sovereignty 
over the Sudan, and so-called unity is but a veiled imperialism. 
As for Great Britain it promises the Sudan self-government and did not deny it the 
5 See Annex 2 for suggestions received in the Governor General's Office on 31 July. 
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right of self-determination but it does not consider that the Sudan reached a self-
governing status. [It] did put forward a detailed programme for a definite time limit. 
On your return from England last December you emphasised to us the point of 
view of the Government of Great Britain and requested us to co-operate with the 
Sudan Government on the basis agreed upon between the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain and you namely:-
(a) The Government of Great Britain supports the Governor-General of the Sudan 
in developing the Sudan to a self-governing country. 
(b) The Sudan shall have self-determination free from any influence and may ask 
for independence. 
On your assurances we did our part in the co-operation with the Sudan 
Government and brought to an end the state of unrest and disturbance which nearly 
wrecked everything the Sudan Government had done. But the Sudan Government 
did not do its part in the co-operation with us, the thing that made us to reconsider 
the situation. Whatever our opinion of the Sudan Government be, it is impossible for 
us to continue on this co-operation with it so long as it failed to fulfil the agreement 
on which co-operation was based. Indeed the Sudan Government gave in, in many 
instances, to the wish of the elements that oppose the interests of the Sudanese and 
let them free to prison [? poison] the thoughts of the people and retard the progress 
of the Sudan. 
We did not co-operate with the Sudan Government to prolong the condominium 
rule which is opposed by everyone. But our co-operation was aimed at the setting up 
of the Sudanese self-government. An initial step to complete independence from 
both Egypt and Britain. 
The steps taken by the Sudan Government in the way of realising self-government 
did not meet the approval of anyone. The proposed Legislation [sic] Assembly is still 
far from reality, and it is incomplete in itself and will not assure the setting up of self-
government until it provides for the appointment of Sudanese Ministers with 
portfolios who will take charge of the affairs of the country. We have our potential 
fears. The slow policy that dominated in the past and in the present is a (danger?) to 
us and to our case which is now before the Security Council, while there is no 
recognised Sudanese to voice the point of view of the people. The dispute will be 
between Egypt and Britain over their rights of conquest, the important parts in the 
dispute is not heard. The Sudan Government in a pamphlet recently published about 
the progress of the Sudan stated that the Southerner shall have the rights of self-
determination vis-a-vis the Northern Sudan.6 It is a queer logic and it is just as if 
Wales is given the right of separation from England. A spokesman on behalf of the 
British Foreign Office stated that Britain will never leave the Sudan until it is ready 
6 The Sudan, a Record of Progress, 1898-1947 (Sudan government, n.d.), which was prepared by the 
Sudan government and the Foreign Office as part of the United Kingdom's case to the UN. Referring to the 
the accentuation of the division between North and South, and the Northern Sudanese fear that the 
country would ultimately be split, it suggested that such a question might be considered by an 
international commission in the future. 'Meanwhile, the present Government . . . is developing local 
government institutions on the lines which have proved successful in the north and, while doing nothing 
to prejudice the issue, is proposing to associate sympathetic northern Sudanese with the implementation 
of a·policy which aims at giving the south the same chances of ultimate self-determination as have been 
promised to the north' (pp 13-14). 
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for self-government, but how and when no-one made any such statement. This 
means prolonging the Condominium rule indefinitely. The Premier [sic] of the 
British to keep the power and remain in the Sudan for the longest possible period is 
the source of all troubles and will lead to bad results which the country will suffer. 
The situation needs urgent and decisive action to save the country. We shall not 
continue to co-operate with the Sudan Government except on these clear 
grounds:-
( a) Termination of the Condominium rule which has become unsuitable. 
(b) Formation of a Sudanese Government which will have the confidence and 
support of the country. 
The formation of the Sudanese Government is an easy matter and agreed upon by the 
two Co-domini, who both agreed that the Sudan shall have self-government. It need 
not be referred for sanction by either of them. 
The way of self-government is the setting up of the Legislative Assembly at once 
and the appointment of Sudanese Ministers responsible to the Assembly. 
(c) The Sudan Government being responsible for public security in the Sudan and 
for its administration should request the Security Council to postpone the Sudan 
question until the Sudanese self-government is set up to speak for the Sudan. 
Your Excellency knows very well that a revival of Bevin/Sidky Protocol or any 
prolongation of the Condominium rule will mean that the British shall govern the 
Sudan for th_emselves and Egypt by force, if this time is suitable for government by 
force. It will be a going back by Britain to her promises and principles and the Sudan 
will be compelled to adopt the method fit for the realisation of its aspiration. 
We rely on your wisdom and good handling of matters to find a way out from this 
situation. 
Annex 2 to 135: Suggestions submitted by Sayed Siddik on behalf of his father, Sayed 
Abdel Rahman, as to the policy that should be adopted by the Sudan government 
1. Permission should be granted to the followers of the Sayed and to the Umma 
Party to visit all parts of the Sudan. 
2. The Government should change its policy which, up to the very recent past, it 
has adopted towards the Sayed and his followers (a policy which was laid down under 
the conditions existing at the time of the re-conquest) and it should openly show its 
support to the tribal leaders of the Sayed and the policy which he has adopted with 
regard to the future of the country. 
3. The Government should support the Sayed and his followers on every suitable 
opportunity and should increase his prestige as a true patriot in the eyes of the public 
so that they may co-operate with the Government in her policy which she is adopting 
for the good of the country. 
4. The Government should oppose the opponents of the Sayed in the West by 
means of propaganda by the Sayed. This will lead to the spreading of true knowledge 
about the Mahdist Creed which calls for virtue and which assists in the keeping of the 
public peace. This propaganda to be carried out without hurting the feelings of the 
non-Mahdists. 
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5. The Government should advise the tribal leaders and encourage them to adopt 
the policy of the Independence Party which is the policy of the Government and of 
the Sayed. It should consult the leaders of the Independence Party so as to give them 
the opportunity of drawing up a policy in common which can be defended by the 
Independence press. 
6. As it is the Sayed who is financing the Independence movement, the 
Government should give him every possible help to improve his financial position, 
i.e. by enabling him to increase the areas of cultivation and also to assist him to 
strengthen his social position as a political leader who is supporting the 
Government. 
7. The policy which the Government had adopted during their 50 years in the 
country has resulted in a creation of a certain class of persons in the towns (i.e. the 
supporters of Sayed Ali) . In order to counter their influence and also in accordance 
with democracy the Rate qualification for voters in the towns should be lowered so as 
to increase the franchise which will increase the number of supporters of the 
Government. 
Minutes on 135 
It may perhaps be important to note that the Sayed A.R.'s followers stand less chance 
of success in local elections, owing to their being below the rate qualification, than 
those of S.A.M. who are, on the whole, wealthier. If, therefore, S.A.R's. statement is 
true, some widening of the franchise might be advantageous to the Umma party & 
indirectly to HMG. 
For the rest, S.A.R. seems to be filled with a rather querulous & overt self-interest. 
C.H. 
7.8.47 
This gives me a much more reassuring impression than did the telegraphic 
summary. 
D.M.H.R. 
7.8.47 
136 FO 371162947, no 3886 8 Aug 1947 
[Condition of the Sudan]: letter from Sir R Howe to Sir 0 Sargent, 
relaying his first impressions of the Sudan [Extract] 
... 2. I have been trying for some time to get off a letter to you, but the job of 
learning to administer this colossal country does not leave much spare time. Also it 
has been one of the worst summers on record. Cordon said no European could live in 
Khartoum in the summer. Cordon was right. In addition to temperatures running 
around 115 we have had some of the worst sandstorms on record. 
3. There have been a lot of goings to and fro recently between the leaders of the 
National Front (the Ashigga plus Congress) and the Independence Front (composed 
chiefly, of course, of the Umma). It was strongly rumoured a couple of days ago that 
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agreement had been reached for a common front on the basis of (a) abolition of the 
Condominium and (b) immediate set-up of a Sudanese Government. The negotia-
tions finally broke down because the National Front would not agree on the eventual 
right of the Sudanese Government to a free choice of their future and because the 
Umma party would have nothing to do with any kind of unity with Egypt. In fact 
Sayed Abdel Rahman was heard to say that if the Sudanese agreed to anything in the 
way of unity or to anything which would bring the Egyptians back to the Sudan he 
would declare a "Jehad". I think the old boy is quite capable of doing it. He has 
recently been making a lot of enquiries about the numbers of Egyptian soldiers in 
the Sudan and their armament. I also hear that the National Front were persuaded 
from agreeing to the inclusion of the Sudanese right to final self-determination in 
the joint programme only by the strong efforts of Abbas Bey Abdel Hamid, the 
Egyptian Chief Staff Officer who you will remember caused all the fuss last 
December over his right of entry to the Garden Party in honour of King George at 
the Palace. 
4. Since my arrival I have had a number of talks with the higher and better types 
of Sudanese officials and leaders, none of whom want the end of the British 
connection. It is not so easy to get in touch with the Effendia among whom is a 
considerable ferment of half-baked ideas. They all talk about the end of 
Condominium rule but they have not thought of what is going to take its place. The 
more Sudanisation we have, and consequently the fewer British officials, the more 
difficult it is going to be to keep contact with this section of Sudanese opinion. 
5. The approval by the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan of the proposals 
for self-Government put forward by the 1946 Committee made it necessary for me to 
find out what the feeling was in the South on the question of union. I have only just 
got back from a six weeks tour of that part of the Sudan. It is an odd world and one 
which makes nonsense of the Egyptian claim that the Sudanese are of the same race, 
religion and language as the Egyptians. The desert North ends as though cut with a 
knife and you come into the great Nile swamps inhabited by Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk, 
the three big Nilotic tribal blocs. The Dinka particularly are fascinating people, most 
of the men stand about seven feet high and are completely naked. They made me a 
Dinka tribal chief with the name of Red Mouthed Fish Eagle, and presented me with 
an enormous bull. Fortunately I was able to hand this back and thus avoid an 
embarrassing commitment. 
6. The South are generally agreed on the necessity of union with the North, and 
of sending representatives to the proposed Legislative Assembly, but since very few of 
them talk Arabic or anything beyond their tribal languages we shall have to insist on 
safeguards for the South in the new constitutional set-up. The trouble, of course, is 
that the South is at least a generation behind the North largely due to the fact that in 
1935 it was decided to put the South on a care and maintenance basis, and it was only 
two years ago that the Sudan Government woke up to the necessity of getting a move 
on with progress and development. I think that we shall find it difficult to avoid some 
very hard criticism of our policy in the South at the hands of any Commission which 
went fact-finding on the Sudan. Union of the South is bound to mean the spread of 
Arabic and Islam in the South, and we shall be up against the Christian missionaries 
who have till now been largely responsible for education of the Southern native. In 
the last two or three years the Government have been taking an increased share in 
education, and there is a big five-year development plan for the South. As the whole 
[136) AUG 1947 275 
cost of the South comes out of Northern revenues it is difficult to deny the claim of 
the North for a unified Sudan. 
7. I was appalled at the low standard of life among the Southern natives. The 
diseases with which man and beast are afflicted are frightful. In the native run 
dispensaries and in all the Sudan Medical Service hospitals cases are legion of 
tropical ulcer, leprosy, yaws, sleeping sickness, and horrible worms which burrow 
their way through the body .1 
8. Our development schemes are running us into about two million pounds, for 
bush schools, elementary schools, intermediate schools, teacher training classes, 
more hospitals, more dispensaries, agricultural settlements, technical and trade 
schools. 
9. I wonder what will come out of New York. I imagine that we shall find it rather 
difficult to resist a U.N.O. Commission. If one does come it is essential that they 
spend sufficient time to visit the South as well as the North. For climatic reasons 
they could hardly come before the end of the year, and I hope by that time we shall 
have got our Legislative Assembly and Executive Council going. I think that is the 
most important thing to get on with, and will go a long way towards keeping the 
political temperature down. In the absence of a constitutional advance of this kind I 
do not think the present position can be held much longer. Egyptian propaganda 
here in the Sudan is completely subversive of Condominium rule and the Sudan 
Government is like the child of divorced parents neither of whom can agree on the 
up-bringing of the infant. 
10. Every Egyptian official in this country openly preaches the overthrow of 
"British Colonial Imperialism" in the Sudan and the Unity of the Nile Valley. Our 
Sudanese friends cannot understand why we do not throw these people out of the 
country, or at any rate give them the same facilities for their propaganda as the 
Ashigga get from Cairo. Sayed Abdel Rahman always harps on this whenever I see 
him. 
11. You will remember that when I was appointed to the Sudan the Secretary of 
State's idea was that we should initiate unilaterally a new policy of a greater Egyptian 
share in the Condominium. I am quite convinced that any such policy in the present 
circumstances is quite out of the question. Every Egyptian official in this country is 
now a spearhead of Egyptian anti-British propaganda and would in fact get short 
shrift on his return to Egypt if he refused to play this role. 
12. I am not sure how far our Egyptian friends were responsible for the strike in 
the Railway workshops at Atbara. I think they had a hand in it, but I am inclined to 
think that other causes were predominant. There has been agitation for some time 
now in the Railway workshops for some representation of labour, but the trouble is 
that the men themselves do not know what is the most suitable form of labour 
organisation, nor do I think the Railways administration was any better fitted to 
provide it. I think it might be a very good thing if we could get a good Trade Union 
1 Howe's first impressions of administration in the Southern Sudan were in direct contradiction with the 
image which had been fostered by the Sudan government and the embassy in Cairo. Earlier in the year 
Howe had been present when Bowker briefed Bevin on the Sudan. Bowker had assured Bevin that in the 
South 'there were good medical services and hospitals . Sleeping sickness had been practically eliminated' 
('Record of the secretary of state's talk with His Majesty's minister at Cairo on 17th February [1947]', FO 
371/62942, no 839). 
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leader from home to come out and advise the men on what they ought to set up and 
how they ought to work it. 
13. Generally speaking I have the impression that not only the Governor-General 
but the Sudan Administration are living in ivory towers. We must break down this 
remoteness from the people, and as I said before increased Sudanisation only makes 
the problem more difficult. The proposed constitutional developments may help in 
this respect, and there are certain archaic social customs that I am going to do away 
with. What I am convinced of is that the British connection is the best possible thing 
for these people in their present stage of development. I cannot see any UNO 
trusteeship being any better. 
14. This summer has nearly finished me off, and I accordingly propose to leave, 
UNO permitting, for England about the end of this month. I hope I shall see you in 
London. 
137 FO 371/62947, no 3933 16 Aug 1947 
[Sudan case at the UN]: record by D W Lascelles of a conversation 
with the Umma delegation to the Security Council 
The Umma Delegation, consisting of Sayyid Siddiq, Abdullah Khalil Bey, and Messrs. 
Shingeti and Mahjoub, called on Sir Waiter Smart and myself to-day by arrangement 
with the Sudan Government Delegation. 
It had been explained to us that the main object of the visit was to allow the 
Sudanese to blow off steam. This they did. They made it quite clear that their 
intention was to demand from the Security Council the termination of the 
condominium and complete and immediate independence. The line we took was 
that, if they did this, they would seriously hamper the United Kingdom Delegation in 
the immediate and essential task of securing the defeat of the Egyptian appeal. The 
attention of the Council would inevitably be deflected from the present issue, namely 
the validity of the 1936 Treaty, and the whole business would be hopelessly fogged. 
The only members of the Council who would be really pleased would be the Russian 
and the Pole. 
Mr. Mahjoub, who did most of the talking and is a lawyer obviously not very well 
disposed towards us, had evidently been encouraged by the Polish representative's 
speech, and held forth at length to the effect that the Security Council could not do 
otherwise than grant the Sudan immediate and complete independence since both 
the Egyptians and the British were in the Sudan by virtue of the obsolete right of 
conquest alone. He also expounded at considerable length a version of that legal 
theory, with which we are already familiar, according to which Egypt has no case in 
law for claiming sovereignty over the Sudan, even on the assumption that rights 
gained by conquest are still valid, since her conquest of the Sudan was during the 
period when she was not herself independent and at the period when she did obtain 
her independence from us we did not give her the Sudan. We pointed out that an 
argument on these lines was open to challenge and could be countered by arguments 
on quite different lines which the highest legal authorities of H.M.G. were inclined to 
regard as at least equally cogent. There was in fact at least a 50% chance that, if the 
whole question of sovereignty were taken before the competent international 
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tribunal, i.e. the Hague Court, it would go in favour of Egypt. For the Umma 
Delegation to provoke such a development was therefore in our view extremely risky 
and not at all in their own interests, and if the Umma Delegation did clamour for 
immediate independence this would be the inescapable result. Egypt, having 
everything to lose if the Security Council received the Sudanese demand favourably, 
would obviously see to it that the sovereignty case was referred to the International 
Court. As regards the theory that rights acquired by conquest were no longer valid in 
the eyes of the United Nations, we would merely point out that, if this theory were 
literally upheld, the whole map of the world would undergo extensive alteration. The 
alteration, moreover, would to a very large extent be to the detriment of a 
considerable number of the members of the Security Council. In short, as we saw it, 
the Umma and the Sudanese people who thought like them, had the following choice 
before them: on the one hand, action which constituted a very serious risk of their 
losing all hope of future independence and being tied to Egypt for good and all; on 
the other, a period of waiting-which admittedly is irksome to them-followed by 
independence secured by the good offices of H.M.G. If the Umma were prepared to 
take our advice and to let us tackle one thing at a time, the immediate practical 
result would be that the administration in the Sudan would go on much as it had in 
the past, under predominently British guidance and with steady progress towards 
Sudanisation and self-government. If, on the contrary, the Umma put a spoke in our 
wheel by taking the line which they proposed to take, not only would they endanger 
their whole future status for the reasons given above, but the immediate and 
practical result would be that Nokrashi would probably not lose his case; and that 
would mean at the best a large influx of Egyptian officials into the Sudan 
administration, since one of the Egyptian grievances was the present lack of parity. 
The members of the party other than Mahjoub (who continued to declare rather 
truculently that he did not care which side won if the claim for immediate 
independence was not made now) appeared to be rather shaken by what we had said, 
explaining that they had not realised before that we should regard the making of this 
claim as a spoke in our wheel. They said that they would think the whole matter over 
again in light of what we had told them, and would keep in touch with us. 
138 FO 371162948, no 4183 2 Sept 1947 
'Egypt and the Sudan': draft Cabinet paper by Sir 0 Sargent to Mr 
Bevin, recommending action in the Sudan in anticipation of the 
Security Council's decision on the Anglo-Egyptian dispute1 
The following paper has been prepared as a result of discussion between the 
Secretary of State and the Governor-General of the Sudan. 
In spite of the farcical and inept manner in which the Anglo-Egyptian dispute has 
hitherto been conducted in the Security Council, it seems likely that the proceedings 
will shortly terminate in the passage of a resolution recommending the resumption 
of direct negotiations between the two parties. 
1 Initialled without comment by Bevin and sent to the Defence Office for distribution to the Defence 
Committee (10 Sept) . 
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2. It is inevitable that such negotiations will have to cover the Sudan as well as 
Egypt, but is difficult to see on what basis they could be conducted. As regards Egypt, 
the abortive Bevin-Sidky treaty of last November represented pretty well the limit to 
which His Majesty's Government could go as regards mutual defence arrangements, 
though we might perhaps make a further concession by advancing the date of 
evacuation of our troops from the Canal Zone. 
3. But even if there may be some slight room for manoeuvre on the purely 
Egyptian part of the dispute, there seems to be no possible compromise whatever 
over the Sudan. The Bevin-Sidky Protocol on the Sudan was the result of very hard 
bargaining and represented the limit to which either side would agree. But even that 
Protocol is no longer possible, for any revival of agreement between Egypt and Great 
Britain on the "unity of Egypt and the Sudan" or on the "common Crown of Egypt" 
would, in view of what has passed since, in all probability blow the Sudan wide open. 
Thus any concession in regard to the Egyptian claims over the Sudan would alienate 
our friends in the Independence front and enable them to turn the whole country 
against us. 
4. If we are not careful over this we may find ourselves pushed out of both Egypt 
and the Sudan, whereas if we leave Egypt we must at all costs maintain our 
predominant position in the Sudan. 
5. Meanwhile, Egyptian subversive propaganda in that country, which is 
virulent, widespread and backed by unlimited money, continues. It is the definite 
policy of the present Egyptian Government to subvert the Sudanese from their 
loyalty to the Administration and to the Condominium. Nokrashi has indeed 
informed the Sudanese Independence Delegation in New York that the Egyptian 
Government intend to continue and intensify their propaganda in the Sudan. We are 
rapidly approaching the situation which the Egyptian Government created in 1924 
when, as a result of similar Egyptian intrigues, the Governor-General was 
assassinated and Sudanese troops mutinied. 
6. It is necessary therefore that we should try and consolidate our position in the 
Sudan generally and take steps to prevent a possible disaster there. It is important 
also that we should do this in advance of any renewed negotiations about the Sudan 
so as to be able to play our hand from strength and not from weakness. 
Recommendations 
(i) Firm action against Egyptian intrigues in the Sudan would strengthen the 
Administration and the position of His Majesty's Government more than any other 
step. What would be desirable would be a declaration at the appropriate moment 
by His Majesty's Government similar to that made by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald in 
1924 (text attached),2 to the effect that they will not tolerate the continuation of 
these activities by the Egyptians in the Sudan. 
(ii) It would be desirable to strengthen the present two British battalions by the 
addition of some armoured force and a few light bombers. 
(iii) We should press on with the constitutional proposals and inaugurate without 
delay the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council. These proposals have 
already been submitted to the Co-Domini. 
2 Not printed. 
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(iv) In reviewing the situation in the event of our being deprived of the use of 
Egypt and possibly Palestine and Cyrenaica as a base for our defence arrangements 
in the Middle East, it should not be forgotten that the Sudan came to our help in 
the last war with thirty thousand first-class fighting men, and that her seven 
million people might be a useful reservoir of manpower, which might in part 
compensate for the loss of the Indian manpower on which we shall now no longer 
be able to draw. It is for consideration therefore whether we might not build up 
the Sudan Defence Forces again to war time strength. 
(v) We must maintain the quality of the British recruits for the Sudan 
Government Service. This is being looked into. In view of the Sudanisation of 
Government services, which is now the policy of the Sudan Government, we shall 
only be able to recruit men of the requisite qualifications if we can guarantee them 
their pensions and a continuation of their careers in corresponding branches of 
service under His Majesty's Government, if and when their Sudan posts are 
Sudanised. 
(vi) The Sudan Government should also improve the quality of its publicity 
among the Sudanese, and steps to achieve this are under consideration. 
139 FO 371/62949, no 5234 29-30 Oct 1947 
'Sudan constitutional reform': minutes by D H M Riches concerning 
the Egyptian government's rejection of the proposed changes in the 
Sudan's constitution [Extract] 
On September lOth the Government of the Sudan presented to His Majesty's 
Government and to the Egyptian Government, as Codomini, the decisions of the 
Governor-General's Council on the report of the Sudan Administration Conference 
on Constitutional Reform in the Sudan. The letter to the Egyptian Government in 
which this was conveyed was drafted in a manner which allowed the Egyptians to 
comment if they wished to do so, while not inviting their comments; nor admitting 
specifically that the approval of the Egyptian (or British) Governments was necessary 
before the proposals could be implemented; and expressing the conviction that the 
reforms would be welcomed as in conformity with the publicly expressed policy of 
the Codomini to forward constitutional advance in the Sudan. 
On October 14th we sent a despatch to H.M. Ambassador at Cairo informing him 
of our agreement with the reforms and saying that H.M.G. had no comment to make 
beyond welcoming them as a step in the progressive development of self-government 
in the Sudan. This despatch instructed Sir R. Campbell to convey this information to 
the acting Governor-General of the Sudan and to send a copy of his communication 
to the Egyptian Prime Minister. 
Simultaneously with the receipt of our despatch in Cairo, the Egyptian Prime 
Minister replied to the acting Governor-General in a letter in which he claimed that 
the proposals had only reached him while he was in New York, and that the Egyptian 
Government had had inadequate time to comment on them. The letter made various 
charges that the reforms had been elaborated by the British and Sudanese only 
without Egyptian participation and without consulting some of the political parties 
280 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [140] 
in the Sudan (in fact those of Egyptian sympathy). The letter added that the Egyptian 
Government would need time in which to study the proposals and that their rights 
were not confined to ·approvalor rejectiot1 but included.the right of initiative (this 
·presumably implies thattheywill make proposals oftheir own). 
In view of this letter; Sir R Camp hell sent a despatch to the acting Governor-
General in the terms of otir instructions, but asked that it should not be regarded as 
officially delivered until we confirmed that we wished this done. The Egyptians 
meanwhile published Nokrashi'sletter. 
Whatever the future action to be taken it seems obvious that our views; which 
· were. not controversial and which we had a perfect · right to . put on. record, should be 
delivered without delay: It is unfortunate indeed that we did not get them in before 
. the Egyptians made their own comments; We have therefore telegraphed urgently to 
Cairo asking them to cariy on with the delivery. of the despatch and the 
comm\mication of a copy of it to the · Egyptian Government. 
The question of whatreply the. Sudan Government should return to the Egyptian 
letter has been discussed with:Sir R. Howe, who proposes to send us a draft on his 
return to Khartoum at the end ofthis week. Our preliminary feeling is that the reply 
should be restricted to acknowledging receipt and expressing . the hope that any 
comments which the Egyptian.Government wish to make will not belong delayed. 
D~M.H.R. 
29.10.47 
This question was considered by Sir 0. Sargent and the Governor-General on the 
29th October. · Mr. Robei:tson; the Civil Secretary to. the Sudan Government and Mr 
Grey were also present. .. . Sir It Howe said that the proposed legislation and his. 
plans generally would· not be ready until the end of the year. If the Egyptians then 
produced substantial counter~proposals they could be put to the Sudanese (for 
· rejection.) · . · . . 
D.M.H.R. 
30.10.47 
140 FO 371/63047, no 5856 24 Nov 1947 
[Sudan case at the UN]: report from SPIS no5 for Aug-Oct on the 
Sudanese reaction to the Anglo~Egyptian dispute at the Security 
Council . · [Extract) 
Introduction 
140. The last review of this series carried the story up to the time when the 
Egyptian case was about tO be discussed at the · Security Council. This report deals 
with the period starting with the departure of the various delegations to U,N.O. and 
· ending with their return. 
Loc(ll reactions to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute at U.N.O. 
141. . The news that the Sudan Government was sending a "delegation" composed 
entirely of British, gave rise to considerable criticism in the, Press and elsewhere, and 
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was one of the reasons which caused the Independence Front to .revise their earlier 
decision not to send representatives to America. Their delegation, which was 
financed mainly by Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi was composed of Mohammed 
Ahmed Mahjub and Abdulla Bey Khalil (the Secretaries of the Independence Front 
and the Umma party respectively) who left by air for New York on 9th August, to be 
followed shortly afterwards. by Sayed Siddiq Abdel Rahman el Mahdi and Mohammed 
Saleh Eff. Shingeiti. The latter is a High Court Judge and his participation in a 
political mission of this nature has caused widespread criticism although by 
punctilious observance of the proprieties he avoided · any specific charge of political 
activity; he took the line that he was merely taking his annual leave in New York as a 
spectator of the proceedings at the Security Council. There is, however, no question 
but that he provided the real brains of the delegation and that Sayed Abdel Rahman, 
of whom he is a personal friend, had sent him in order to keep Mahjub under control. 
142. As soon as the Unionists heard that the Independents had left they arranged 
to send Is mail el Azhari, Ibrahim el Mufti and Dardiri Ahmed Ismail (all members of 
the so-'called Sudan delegation in Cairo) together with Tawfiq el Bakri (a Sudanese 
journalist domiciled in Cairo). Hamid Bey Saleh and Sayed Omar Eff. el Khalifa, 
(S.D.F. Officers on pension) followed later. This delegation was apparently financed 
by the Egyptian Government, and appeared in New York .as . part and parcel of the 
official Egyptian delegation. Efforts to colkct money inside · the Sudan for their 
expenses produced negligible results. It is known that Nokrashi Pasha was reluctant 
. to allow Azhari and the others to go to America as he thought their presence in the 
Council Chamber could do the Egyptian case little good. · . 
143 .. The proceedings at Lake Success went on for almost a month before ending 
in deadlock. In general they evoked surprisingly little interest in the Sudan except 
among the small circle of politically-conscious intelligentsia in the . larger towns, 
many of whom thought that Egypt would be enabled to increase her' share in the 
administration of the Sudan and that the days of the British were rapidly drawing to 
a close. The absence of the leaders of the various parties had however a quietening 
effect and interest was diverted from events of purely locql significance, though 
owing to the numerous motions, amendments and counter-amendments proposed 
by the members of the Security Council, and also owing to the haze of words whieh 
obscured the real points at issue, the public were quickly befogged as to what was 
really happening. Russian support of the Egyptian demand for the evacuation of 
British troops was acclaimed by the Unionists, who failed to hotice that she had 
carefully abstained from expressing any opinion on the Sudan issue. However Russia 
was popular, momentarily, among the vocal sections of Egyptian public opinion and 
this popularity was echoed unthinkingly by the pro-Egyptians here. Pro-Russian 
slogans have been a feature of some recent processions and meetings. 
144. When deadlock was reached and the Security Council adjourned any further 
consideration ofthe dispute sine die, the public. generally interpreted this as arebuff 
to Egypt whose demands had been rejected. This had the following result on public 
opinion:-
(a) It increased British prestige, both because of the way inwhich she presented 
her case and also because it is generally held that she "won" hands down. Many 
Sudanese had previously been led to believe, by the press and by the apparent 
supineness of the British in the face of Egyptian provocation, that Britain's power 
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had waned and that she was a bankrupt nation incapable of standing up for herself 
in international politics. This theory is now out of fashion. 
(b) By the same token, Egyptian prestige slumped. She failed, and the East has 
little respect for failure. 
(c) Sir A. Cadogan's statement in which he was quoted (not quite accurately) by the 
press as saying that the British would never leave the Sudan until the Sudanese were 
ready for self-determination has probably had, on the whole, a steadying effect, 
though it has upset some wishful thinkers on both sides. At all events it has helped 
to counter the idea sedulously put about by the pro-Egyptians during recent 
months that the British are about to pull out of the Sudan almost immediately. 
(d) The rather naive faith of many Sudanese that international organisations were 
bound to give them their independence has been shattered. An increasing number 
of them have come to realise that their only hope of survival as a nation is to have 
a great power such as Britain in close and friendly relations with them. 
145. The effect on particular sections of public opinion is briefly as follows:-
( a) The Independence Front 
They were delighted at the defeat of Egypt, and although they are disappointed at 
their failure to achieve an independent Sudan under British tutelage they feel that 
solid progress has been made in that all the delegates stressed the right of the 
Sudanese to self-determination and that the world in general is at last more or less 
Sudan-conscious. They are however fearful that the continuance of the 
Condominium with the Co-domini at loggerheads will mean obstruction of 
progress to self-government and an intensification of Egyptian propaganda, and 
they are pressing for more power to be given to the Sudanese so that they may com-
bat it without inhibition. Should it prove impossible for the Sudan Government to 
take what they consider effective steps in this direction there is a possibility that 
they may swing into opposition but this is not, at the moment, likely to occur. 
(b) The Unionists 
Most of these have begun to see the danger of linking themselves too closely with 
Egypt, in whom they have lost faith; they have also lost faith in their pro-Egyptian 
leaders. An influential section wish to break away from the Khatmia whom they 
regard as being only half-hearted in their opposition to the Sudan Government. In 
this connection, Sir Ali el Mirghani's wire to U.N.O .... with its studied omission of 
support for the Unionist cause has had considerable effect. The leaders are now 
thinking of cutting loose from direct dependence on Egypt, and of concentrating 
their efforts towards becoming the focus of a nationalistic anti-Government move-
ment, for which there will always be support in a non-self governing territory. 
(c) The Khatmia have also seen the danger of linking themselves too closely with 
Egypt, and many of them are now anxious to re-establish good relations with the 
Sudan Government and to break away from the Ashigga party for whose leaders 
they have little respect. 
(d) The non-vocal majority, are longing for the Government to adopt a definite 
line and stick to it. They have been unable to understand the Government's 
inaction during the past two years, and now that the case before U.N.O. appears to 
be moribund they expect the Government to re-establish public tranquillity as 
quickly and as firmly as possible. The events of the last few weeks have done much 
to reassure them. 
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146. At the beginning of September, with the delegates still away in America, the 
various political parties were perplexed and undecided what to do next. His 
Excellency the NGovernor-General's1 proclamation on September 13th came 
therefore at a time when it was most effective. 
In it he stressed the determination of the Government to press on with its plans 
for a Legislative Assembly, to allow no interference with its policy of Sudanising the 
Civil Service, and to maintain law and order in the meantime. The Egyptian Press, 
which does not understand the difference between "Sudanisation policy" and the 
proposals for constitutional reform, interpreted the proclamation as a "hands-off' 
notice to the Egyptian Government, and took violent exception to it, although the 
Acting Prime Minister had sent a telegram on August 29th expressing his anxiety lest 
there be disturbances in the Sudan. Nokrashi himself adopted a more cautious line 
and contented himself with a despatch in which he "assumed" that the NGovernor-
General had no intention of denying the Royal Egyptian Government's powers to 
approve or disapprove the proposed constitutional legislation and hinted at detailed 
amendments to follow. 
The local effect of the proclamation was considerable. The majority of Sudanese 
was glad that the Government showed signs of tightening its hold on the reins, 
though many reserved judgment until they could determine how far it was proposing 
to put its words into practice. Others, particularly those holding anti-Government 
views, regarded the proclamation as a threat of retribution and retaliation. 
Subsequent events such as the appointment of a Sudanese Grand Kadi, the banning 
of the return of the Farouk School Headmaster, the dismissal of Hammad Tawfik and 
the prosecution of two newspapers and the Secretary of the Republican party have all 
tended to re-establish confidence in the Government's determination to continue 
governing. The proclamation is now generally regarded as marking the end of a 
chapter and the beginning of another. 
1 Acting governor -general. 
141 FO 371163055, no 5846 25 Nov 1947 
[Sudan Administration Conference] : letter from Abd al-Fattah Amr 
Pasha to Mr Bevin, transmitting a note on the recommendations of 
the conference embodying the results of the study made by the 
Egyptian government [Extract] 
[The governor-general conveyed the full text of the recommendations of the Sudan 
Administration Conference to the Egyptian government on 22 Aug 1947. On receiving 
this reply Lascelles minuted: 'This development, though by no means unexpected, is 
embarrassing. The Egyptians have made out a very able case against the Sudan 
Government's proposed constitutional reforms, and its cogency is not really lessened by 
the fact that the Egyptian Co-Dominus has never before evinced the slightest interest in 
the progress of the Sudanese towards self-government. The motive, viz. the desire to 
outbid us, is obvious enough; but it is excellent pro-Egyptian propaganda for all that' 
(minute by Lascelles, 29 Nov 1947, FO 371163055, no 5846).] 
These recommendations do not fulfil the objectives envisaged by them, namely 
closer association of the Sudanese with the Central Government. It is stated in the 
report prepared by the Sudan Administration Conference that "the Sudanese will not 
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be able to govern themselves unless they have previously been trained in the art of 
government, and this, in turn, can be learnt only through the assumption of 
responsibility. This responsibility, at any given time, should be sufficiently great to 
extend fully the capacity of the Sudanese to shoulder it successfully, in this way their 
training will proceed at the greatest possible rate." 
These premises are in conflict with the conclusions reached by the conference in 
its proposed system. The new system does not allow for the proper and full 
representation of the Sudanese, nor does it admit their participation, in a measure 
due to them, in the responsibility of self-government despite the declaration avowed 
in the conclusion of the report that the proposals "aim at taxing the capacity of the 
Sudanese to the full." 
2. That the proposed system does not allow for the proper and full representation 
of the Sudanese is evidenced by the manner in which the Legislative Assembly is 
composed. It is composed of seventy members of whom ten are nominated by the 
Governor-General and the remainder are elected. The method of election, however, 
is nearer to nomination rather than to proper election. The representatives of the 
Southern Provinces are frankly to be appointed by the Provincial Governors. In the 
Northern Provinces the method of election in rural districts is not clearly defined; it 
may vary in different areas. No definition is given of electors nor of the various units 
comprising electoral areas. These were altogether left to the discretion of Provincial 
Governors. It can, therefore, be clearly seen that election in rural districts will, to a 
considerable extent, be subject to the influence of administrative authorities. If we 
add that civil servants may be permitted to sit as members of the Legislative 
Assembly while retaining their posts, we may well enquire to what extent will the 
Legislative Assembly-such being its composition-be removed from the influence 
of the executive authorities even within the bounds of its limited jurisdiction? It is 
essential in this fundamental question that an electoral law allowing for the full 
representation of the Sudanese be definitely drawn up. 
3. That the proposed system does not admit the participation of the Sudanese, in 
a measure due to them, in the responsibility of self-government is evidenced by the 
limited powers vested in the Legislative Assembly and by the wide powers given to 
the Governor-General and his four assistants who are considered members ex officio 
of the Executive Council and who are all British. 
4. The Legislative Assembly is only given limited powers. This may be seen from 
the following:-
(a) The Assembly has a purely consultative voice as regards legislation submitted 
to it. Should a legislation be rejected by the Assembly this would not necessarily 
entail the non-adoption of that legislation, nor even its postponement. If it be 
argued in this connexion that the Sudanese have not as· yet been trained in 
governing themselves, and that they will gradually develop through this system, in 
the limited period, towards self-government, it could be answered that one of the 
first stages of development in self-government is that the rejection by the 
Assembly of a legislation should have a material effect on suspending that 
legislation. Again, if it be argued that it may be premature for the Legislative 
Assembly to give a decisive opinion on legislation, the least that can be done 
should be to postpone a rejected legislation until the next session. This power is 
regarded as one in the first stages of constitutional powers. It is not too much for 
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the Sudanese to have their Legislative Assembly given that limited power. If at the 
end of those three years set for the new regime, . the experiment proves successful, 
the expansion of those powers should then be proceeded with. 
(b) The Legislative Assembly, though having no more than that purely 
consultative voice cannot examine all legislations before their being put into 
effect. There are those urgent legislations which cannot be considered by the 
Assembly until they have become effective laws. Nor is that all, they are to be dealt 
with not in a special session, but in the next ordinary session. If we observe that 
the session of the Legislative Assembly lasts for only four months in each year, we 
would realise that so many legislations will be labelled urgent. These are the 
legislations called for during the remaining eight months and they will become 
effective laws before being considered by the Legislative Assembly, and the time for 
their consideration will thus drag on. There are even ordinary unurgent 
legislations which are promulgated while the Assembly .is in session without being 
considered by the Assembly. These are legislations which the Business 
Committee-after consultation with the Executive Council-finds that the 
Assembly has too short a time to consider. Thus will the principal function of the 
Assembly, i.e., giving their opinion on legislations before their promulgation, be 
suspended on account of too short a session. This session should, in the opinion of 
the Egyptian Government, be of no less than six months' duration in each year. 
The Assembly should, moreover, be entitled to special sessions to be held as need 
may arise. 
The prolongation of the session cannot be objected to by the argument that 
certain members of the Assembly are civil servants, and that if they are absent too 
long a time from their posts, Government work will inevitably be retarded in 
consequence. The combining of a Government post with the membership of the 
Assembly is, as already pointed out, inadmissable. The shortness of the session-
which is an obvious defect of the system-should in no way be a justification for 
further defect. The conference's report, however, after stating that "as long as the 
sessions of the Assembly last for no more than four months in each year, a 
Government servant who is a member of the Assembly may still be able to retain 
his post," could not deny the anomaly existing in combining a Government post 
with the Assembly's membership, and predicted the quick elimination of this 
defective system by pointing out "that the time is fast approaching when the 
Sudanese, who have received the benefit of education, must make up their minds 
whether they wish to make the civil service or politics their career." 
(c) As to the budget-including taxation-there is no explicit provision in the pro-
posed system to render the Assembly's opinion decisive in matters connected there-
with. We can even find in the report of the sub-committee certain explicit texts 
showing that the Assembly's opinion on those matters is purely consultative. As to 
the report of the conference, it is vague on this point. On one occasion it says that 
the Financial Secretary will submit the budget to the Assembly "in the same way as 
other Government Bills." This conveys the idea that the Assembly's opinion is just 
as consultative on matters pertaining to the budget as it is on other Bills. On other 
occasions it says that the Assembly will have authority to reduce all items of the bud-
get, from which it may be understood that the Assembly's opinion is decisive on 
reduction. It may also be understood that the Assembly is competent to give an 
opinion on reductions in budget items to the exclusion of increases, and that the 
286 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [141] 
Assembly's opinion on reductions is still as consultative as it is on all other matters. 
The conference's report is at any rate explicit in that the Assembly have no author-
ity to increase any budget item even though such item be connected with so vital a 
subject as education. It is essential that explicit provisions giving the Assembly a 
decisive opinion on the approval of the budget and introducing modifications by 
reduction or increase, should be made. In any case, the Assembly should at least be 
given the authority, as from now, to approve taxation in accordance with the well-
known principle of "no taxation without representation." 
(d) Members of the Legislative Assembly cannot take the initiative of directly 
submitting to the Assembly draft laws. According to the proposed system it is 
necessary that these draft laws should pass through the Business Committee 
which, after consultation with the Executive Council, will submit to the Assembly 
only those laws it approves of. This constitutes an unwarranted restriction on the 
right of members to propose laws which they deem necessary for the development 
and welfare of the Sudan. Members of the Legislative Assembly should have the 
right to submit directly to the Assembly any draft laws of their own, and it is then 
incumbent upon the Assembly to consider them. 
5. Too wide a power is given in the proposed system to the Governor-General. He 
has absolute authority to approve or reject legislation. Should he reject a legislation 
after being passed by both the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council no 
other higher authority can control his decision. This power is unparalleled in consti-
tutional systems. Should the Governor-General give his consent to a legislation, it has 
to be submitted to the Egyptian Government for approval. This is a fundamental prin-
ciple in the present regime which should be clearly provided for in the text. 
It should, therefore, be established in this connexion-so long as the present 
regime in the Sudan remains in force-that the Governor-General cannot approve or 
reject a legislation passed by the Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council 
unless the two Governments concerned have ratified its rejection or approval. Also, 
the Governor-General cannot promulgate a legislation on which the Executive 
Council and the Legislative Assembly are at variance unless the two Government's 
[sic] ratification has been obtained. 
6. The four assistants of the Governor-General, who are considered members ex 
officio of the Executive Council, are given in the proposed system supreme authority 
over the Council. It is they who will have the final decision in the choice of the 
Sudanese Under-Secretaries from whom the six Sudanese members of the Executive 
Council are chosen. Thus, they will have-all of them being British-the last word in 
a Council in which they only form a minority. No single Sudanese member of the 
Executive Council assumes first-rank responsibility, since one and all of the six 
Sudanese members are subordinate to British chiefs. Their ostensible duty is to act 
as media between the British chiefs and the Legislative Assembly and to face the 
questions and discussions that may be raised by the Assembly. It is essential that the 
Sudanese should have a share of the key positions in the Executive Council and 
should also have all the other posts in the Sudan Government. This would afford 
them real training in assuming the responsibilities of government and would pave 
the way for their filling all key positions after the expiration of the three years set for 
the trial period. 
7. The proposed system-despite its avowed aim being the training of the 
[141] NOV 1947 287 
Sudanese in self-government-lays the full responsibility on the British side. There is 
not a single provision to give Egypt any share in this responsibility. Without preju-
dicing the right of the Sudanese to share in the key positions in the Executive Council, 
Egypt should undertake an important part in this responsibility during the three 
years' trial period so that it may help the Sudanese in training in self-government. 
8. The proposed system has omitted even a mere reference to constitutional 
freedom. This is a matter of vital importance to the Sudan. The Sudanese are on the 
threshold of a social and political awakening. It is essential that the regime under 
which they live should ensure for them respect of personal freedom, freedom of 
opinion, freedom of faith, freedom of meetings, freedom of the press and all other 
freedoms without which they cannot live free men and cannot feel secure unless they 
are ensured for them. These freedoms have to be regulated by law. The Sudanese 
should not be at the mercy of the Administration in their meetings, their press and 
their personal freedom in its variegated forms. It is essential that all this should be 
provided for in the proposed system, otherwise this system will be no more than 
modifications of administrative type dealing with but a few scores of Sudanese 
officials and members of the Legislative Assembly who may easily become a tool in 
the hands of the Central Government. 
We may point out in this connexion that legislative assemblies, even though of 
limited powers, are instrumental in checking the arbitrary action of the 
Administration. This is not the case with the Sudan, where an absolute form of 
government exists, considering the wide powers assigned to the Governor-General 
and the retention by British officials of key positions without any control whatsoever. 
Should the proposed reforms be applied within the framework of the present 
autocratic regime, they will lack the importance which these constitutional laws 
seem to endow, and it will be difficult for nationalists wishing to voice their 
aspirations and those of their countrymen-unless they are given full and free 
exercise of public freedom-to strive against the domination of an all-powerful 
Administration having at its disposal all means of authority and pressure. 
9. The defects already pointed out in the proposed system, which are, in our opin-
ion, cardinal defects, are attributable to the fact that the conference which examined 
the question and reported thereon has lacked certain elements whose presence was 
essential for the satisfactory discharge of the task entrusted to it. The conference was 
composed of thirty members, of whom twenty-five were Government officials, and 
comprised not a single Egyptian among its members. It could not even be claimed that 
it was fully representative of the Sudanese people. Several political parties in the 
Sudan, including the Graduates' General Congress itself that represents the educated 
class, which should be the first to be consulted on constitutional reforms and for 
whom the road should be cleared for the assumption of the responsibilities of gov-
ernment, nominated no representatives on the conference. 
It was not, therefore, surprising that the conference's recommendations fell short 
of giving a true expression of real public opinion in the Sudan. 
Members of the Sudan Administration Conference themselves have realised this 
fact when they frankly expressed this view in the conclusion of their report: "We are 
very conscious of our limitation as an instrument for laying down the foundations of 
a new system of administration. The members of the conference are all busy men, 
distracted by the necessity of carrying on their normal duties, and with little or no 
experience of similar work in the past." 
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10. It was not surprising, also, that we should receive a note from the Sudan 
delegation which is held in high esteem by Sudanese public opinion, rejecting the 
conference's recommendations. This note was duly communicated to both the 
British and the Sudan Governments. 
The Royal Egyptian Government therefore cannot agree to these 
recommendations unless the modifications, herein outlined, are introduced. 
142 FO 371163130, no 5878 28 Nov 1947 
[Nile Waters: Lake Tsana]: despatch no 818 from D W Lascelles to Sir 
R Campbell on the importance to the Sudan of HMG's participation in 
the Lake Tsana negotiations 
[The uncertainty over the strength of the Sudan's case for reopening discussions 
concerning its share of the Nile waters reinforced the importance of the Lake Tsana 
project as the most likely scheme to provide water to meet the country's anticipated 
needs (see 32 and 45). The disagreement between the UK and Egypt over the sovereignty 
issue introduced new complications into the tripartite negotiations, raising questions not 
only about the Sudan's participation in any talks, but HMG's negotiating status as well. 
Prior to the war both HMG and the Sudan government were actively involved in 
discussions at various levels with Ethiopia and Egypt over the cost and design of the Lake 
Tsana scheme, as well as the allocation of waters produced by it (see 27). Mter the failure 
of the Sidki-Bevin negotiations such arrangements could no longer be taken for granted.] 
In your despatch No. 546 (445/38/47) of the 20th June, Your Excellency expressed 
doubts as to the expediency of approaching the Egyptian Government regarding the 
Lake Tsana scheme at a moment when the political atmosphere was vitiated by the 
preparations being made for the Egyptian appeal to the Security Council. 
2. At that time I shared your view that the moment was exceptionally 
unpropitious, and that it would therefore be well to delay the proposed approach to 
the Egyptian Government at any rate until after the Egyptian case had been disposed 
of at Lake Success. Nevertheless I must emphasize that the legitimate interest of His 
Majesty's Government in the Lake Tsana scheme is considerably greater than would 
appear from your despatch under reference. In the first place, their status as eo-
dominus gives them an indisputable right to interest themselves in any development 
which tends to affect the welfare of the Condominium. I can see no reason to conceal 
the fact that His Majesty's Government do, in virtue of that status, intend to take an 
equal part with Egypt in all international discussions concerning the control of a 
river which is in large measure the Sudan's life-blood as well as Egypt's. In any case 
the fact cannot be concealed even if it were desirable that it should be: so long as the 
administration of the Sudan remains in British hands, no-one either in Egypt or 
elsewhere can be expected to believe that in regard to so important a question the 
Sudan Government had hitherto acted otherwise than in close consultation with His 
Majesty's Government. Secondly, it is clear that, in respect of the next and really 
international phase of the negotiations, the direct participation of His Majesty's 
Government is not merely justified, but also legally essential if the project is to be 
pursued at all. The annex to Article 11 of the 1936 Treaty, which lays down the 
method of adherence of the Sudan to international conventions and hence by 
implication the general international status of the Condominium, shows that any 
negotiations with a foreign State must be undertaken on behalf of the Sudan by the 
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two Co-domini acting in concert. Thirdly, His Majesty's Government are directly 
concerned in any negotiations regarding the Nile waters by virtue of the veto which, 
under the 1902 Treaty, they have the right to exercise over the construction of any 
new works. In addition, His Majesty's Government have had since 1941 a special 
relationship with the Government of Ethiopia.1 
3. For these reasons I do not consider that the Egyptian Government could have 
made during the debates before the Security Council, or could make now, any 
damaging capital out of such proof as we might then have provided, or may now 
provide, of the direct interest taken by His Majesty's Government in this matter. That 
is not to say, however, that the present moment is necessarily propitious for 
approaching the Egyptian Government. The Lake Tsana scheme would, it is true, be 
of considerable material benefit both to Egypt herself and to the Sudan; and 
consequently it would be against the Egyptian Government's true interest for them 
to refuse to concert with His Majesty's Government in an approach to Ethiopia. 
Nevertheless, so long as Nokrashi Pasha remains Prime Minister there seems some 
reason to fear that he would in fact subordinate his country's true interest to his 
doctrinaire attitude of non-cooperation with the British Co-dominus in all matters 
affecting the Sudan. It occurs to me that if there is any considerable likelihood of 
Nokrashi Pasha's being replaced in the fairly near future by another Prime Minister, 
it might be worth our while to await this event before making any approach to the 
Egyptian authorities. It would clearly be easier for the new Prime Minister to take a 
sensible and cooperative line with us in this matter if we had given his predecessor 
no opportunity to take up an official stand based on Egypt's theoretical repudiation 
of the Condominium Agreement. It is true that the proposed approach to the 
Egyptian Government, without which no progress can be made towards the 
realisation of the scheme, has already been much delayed. But it may be that, for the 
reason I have suggested above, a slight further delay in making the approach would 
conduce to the ultimate progress of the scheme by enabling us to overcome an 
obstacle which might otherwise prove insuperable. 
4. I shall be glad, therefore, if Your Excellency will consider carefully, in the light 
of the local political factors of which you are of course the best judge, whether or not 
such further delay is advisable. Should you decide that it is not, the approach can 
now be made to the Egyptian Government in the terms of draft note "B" enclosed in 
your despatch under reference. (I presume that it was not your intention to include 
the phrase in brackets in the second paragraph of that draft.)2 
5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Governor-General of the Sudan, 
whose views on the question of timing I shall also be glad to receive by telegraph, and 
to His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Addis Ababa. 
1 See 27. 
2 The draft paragraph read: 'I am now instructed to inform Your Excellency officially that H.M.G. endorse 
the action of the Governor-General in approving these agreements, and I shall be glad to learn whether the 
Egyptian Government for their part also approve them, (with the implication that they, too, endorse the 
action of the Governor-General), so that, if they do, arrangements may be concerted between our two gov-
ernments for negotiations with the Ethiopian Government on the lines so approved. In the view of H.M.G., 
representatives of the Sudan Government should be present at the negotiations as technical advisers to the 
delegations of H.M.G. and the Egyptian Government, and the rights and requirements of the Sudan 
Government should be clearly specified either in a prior agreement between our two Governments or in the 
agreement which it is hoped will result from the propoposed negotiations with Ethiopia.' 
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143 FO 371163137, no 6300 9 Dec 1947 
[Sudan's borders: Ilemi Triangle]: letter from J W Robertson 
(Khartoum) to J D Rankine (Nairobi) on the inclusion of part of the 
Ilemi Triangle in the administration of Kenya. Minute by I W BelF 
[The Sudan's southeastern border with Ethiopia, agreed in 1902 and demarcated in 1903, 
created a permanent administrative problem for the Sudan by cutting through the 
eastern settlements of both the Nuer and Anuak peoples. In the aftermath of the war the 
Sudan government proposed to reopen the question of the transfer of the Baro salient 
from Ethiopia to the Sudan, last discussed with an Ethiopian government in 1932, so as 
to include the entire populations of both the Nuer and the Anuak under one 
administration. Howe considered the rectificaiton of the Baro frontier as next to the Lake 
Tsana project in importance in the Sudan's dealings with Ethiopia, but not worth 
pursuing if it would worsen the Sudan's position in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
negotiations or jeopardise agreement over the Lake Tsana scheme (inward telegram no 
204 from Campbell to FO, 22 Jan 1947, FO 371/63133, no 387). In proposing that 
Ethiopia agree to the Sudan's incorporation of all Nuer and Anuak within a single 
boundary, Howe considered ceding land to Ethiopia further south along the Boma 
plateau (outward telegram no 8 from Howe to Addis Ababa, 4 Mar 1947, FO 371/63133, no 
1115). The Sudan's negotiating position was complicated first by Egypt's assertion of its 
sovereignty over any adjustment of the Sudan's borders (inward telegram no 803 from 
Campbell to FO, 28 Mar 1947, FO 371/63134, no 1489), and then by Ethiopia's expressed 
interest in a rectification of the 'Ilemi Triangle' boundary in the far southeastern corner 
of the Sudan, affecting Kenya as well as the Sudan and Ethiopia. The official southern 
boundary in this area had been fixed in 1914 as a straight line. An agreement to extend 
Kenyan administration over Turkana grazing grounds north of this line, contained within 
an administrative boundary called the Red Line, was reached in 1931. For many years it 
was unclear whether the Red Line was meant to be a provisional administrative boundary 
or to become the international frontier. 2 Ethiopia's interest in advancing its own borders 
closer to the Triangle caused a reaction from Mitchell (governor of Kenya) who impressed 
upon the FO (with the full concurrence of the CO) the undesirability of even 
contemplating cession of any part of the Ilemi Triangle to Ethiopia (outward telegram no 
1073 from FO to Cairo, 3 June 1947, FO 371/63135, no 2360). This view was reiterated in 
a detailed despatch from Mitchell to Creech-Jones, referred to below (Mitchell to Creech-
Jones, 24 Nov 1947, FO 371/63137, no 5914). J D Rankine, chief secretary of Kenya, also 
proposed to the civil secretary a further expansion of Kenyan administrative 
responsibilities to include an area north of the Red Line contained within a new boundary 
called the Blue Line (letter from Rankine to Robertson, 24 Nov 1947, FO 371/63137, 
no 6300).] 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Secret letter No.S/A.XAF.3-2/III/5 
of November 25th and of the copy of Kenya Secret despatch of November 24th from 
the Governor of Kenya to His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies 
which was enclosed therewith. 
2. I should like first to thank you for stating the Kenya requirements so clearly 
and in particular for the readiness of the Kenya Government to take over the 
administration of the areas of the Ilemi Triangle which are necessary to them. I also 
express the appreciation of the Sudan Government of the Kenya Government's great 
help in sending Mr. Reece and Mr. Turnbull3 here for discussions on the proposed 
frontier in the Ilemi Triangle. The discussions were most valuable to us, and they 
have saved a great deal of correspondence which would otherwise have been 
1 FO, 1946; first secretary, 1947. 
2 !an Brownlie,African boundaries: a legal and diplomatic encyclopedia (London, 1979) pp 917- 921. 
3 G Reece, provincial commissioner, Northern Province, Kenya; R G Turnbull, Kenya secretariat (former 
district commissioner, Turkana) . 
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necessary. I attach a record, which was seen by Mr. Turnbull in draft, of the more 
formal meeting held on November 27th.4 
3. The Sudan Government agree that the proposed Blue Line would make a very 
satisfactory administrative boundary between the Turkana and the Tapotha and 
Nyangatom. 
4. During the discussions held last June in Addis Ababa with the Ethiopian 
Government for the rectification of the Sudan frontier in the Baro Salient, it became 
abundantly clear that the Sudan Government had no hope of obtaining the area 
required there for the proper administration of the Nuer and Anuak unless another 
area could be offered to the Ethiopian Government in exchange. The only area which 
the Sudan Government can offer in exchange is in the Ilemi Triangle; part of the 
triangle is however required for the Tapotha, and the remainder available for 
exchange is now still further reduced by the reservation of the portion south of the 
Blue Line for the Turkana. Furthermore the area which seems available adjacent and 
south of the Boma plateau is little known, and there may be good reasons why we 
should not dispose of it to Ethiopia, even in order to obtain the sorely needed 
rectification of the Baro Salient frontier, the Sudan Government cannot come to a 
final decision until further information has been obtained. 
5. With this in mind now that the Kenya Government are willing to take over the 
Ilemi Appendix south of the Blue Line for the Turkana, and if the Sudan Government 
in fact decides to go ahead, our two Governments should co-operate in arriving at a 
settlement with the Ethiopians and that our respective proposals should be based on 
the same principle, particularly as the Ethiopians will undoubtedly regard such a 
settlement as a "settlement with the British", whether in fact the area under 
discussion affects the Sudan or Kenya. The principle on which the Sudan 
Government wish to rely in arriving at a settlement is that the new frontier should be 
satisfactory both from a geographical and from an ethnological point of view; in fact 
that the territory of a tribe should not be cut in half by the international frontier. 
6. The discussions in Khartoum have made clear that the most difficult question 
in arriving at a satisfactory ethnological boundary in this area is likely to be the 
future of the Merille. Not only have the Merille traditional grazing rights west of the 
Gwynn and Maud Lines and north-west of Lake Rudolf, in the Lorienatom and 
Lomogol areas, but they have similar rights south of the Kenya-Ethiopian frontier 
and east of Lake Rudolf also. Mr. Reece undertook to investigate the possibility of 
making them a concession in the latter area. Mr. Reece also stated that he wished to 
make the new frontier with Ethiopia east of Lake Rudolf a "closed" frontier, and to 
make any Merille south of the frontier opt either for Ethiopia or for Kenya after 
which individuals would not be allowed to move from one side of the line to the 
other. The Sudan Government share Mr. Reece's wish for a "closed" frontier with 
Ethiopia, but believe that this will only be attained if the frontier is based on the 
principle stated in the previous paragraph. 
7. The Sudan Government have experience in the Baro Salient area of an 
international frontier which cuts arbitrarily across tribal territories, and have found 
it almost impossible to administer, particularly with the Ethiopians on the other 
side. It is in fact to avoid this very difficulty that the Sudan Government are so 
4 Not printed. 
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anxious to see all Nuer and Anuak in the Baro Salient territory included within the 
boundaries of the Sudan. While conditions east of Lake Rudolf are obviously very 
different from those in the Baro Salient similar difficulties might, it is felt, result if 
the Merille remain divided between Kenya and Ethiopia. I therefore wish to ask that 
every consideration be given to the suggestion that any area over which the MeriHe 
may be found to have legitimate rights should be earmarked for surrender to 
Ethiopia as part of a general settlement. If, by such a surrender, a satisfactory tribal 
boundary, between the Merille on the one hand and the Gabra and Rendile on the 
other, could be arrived at, the commitments of the Kenya Government in this area 
might perhaps be reduced. 
8. From the point of view of the Sudan Government of course this suggested 
concession to the Merille east of Lake Rudolf could, should you agree to it, be used as 
a . counter in the bargaining with the Ethiopians over the .Baro Salient. I therefore 
hope you will agree that if, after the investigation Mr.Reece has undertaken to make, 
it should prove that there is an area east of Lake Rudolf which could be allotted to the 
Merille,. this area should be so used in view of the concession to the Turkana of the .. 
area which this Government has promised to earmark for them south of the Blue 
Line, and which you have signified the willingness of the Kenya Government to 
incorporate within the boundaries of Kenya. 
9. · The situation may I think now be described in short as follows:-
( a) The Sudan Government wish to obtain the Baro Salient from Ethiopia by 
exchange ofterritory. · 
(b) The Kenya Government cannot allow the . area of the Ilemi Triangle South of 
the Blue Line from the Sudan to be transferred to Et\1iopia~ 
(c) These requirements are both based on the necessity to settle the boundaries 
finally on satisfactory ethnological lines. · . 
(d) The Sudan Government can only hope to obtain the Baro Salientby offering to 
Ethiopia as nearly equivalent an area of territory as possible. 
(e) The only area of the Sudan available to be offered to Ethiopia is the Ilemi 
Triangle less the ethnological and tribal requirements oftheTapotha (Sudan) and of 
the Turkana (Kenya). This is almost certainly insufficient to satisfy the Ethiopians. · 
(f) There is however an area of Kenya east of Lake Rudolf over which the Merille 
tribe (Ethiopia) have grazing rights. If this could be offered to Ethiopia as .well as 
the available portion of the Ilemi Triangle and were accepted, then 
(i) the Merille tribal boundary would leave them and their grazing grounds in 
Ethiopia, in accordance with (c) above. 
(ii) the combined extent of the two areas might secure Ethiopian agreement to 
exchange them for the Baro Salient. 
(g) Therefore it will I hope be agreed by our Governments that in order to attain 
their respective desiderata they should act as one vis a vis the Ethiopian 
Government, and offer the two areas described in exchange for the .Baro Salient, to 
ensure, so far as Kenya is concerned a final and satisfactory boundary between the 
Tapotha, Nyangatom and Merille tribes and the Turkana. 
(h) I shall be most grateful to have your views on this. 
10. Settlement of the Kenya-Sudan boundary between Zulia and Makonnen 
Cherosh raised by Captain King in paragraph 19 of the Record appears to be purely a 
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question between our two Governments;5 but I suggest that it is advisable that the 
mapping and final demarcation of this part of the frontier should be undertaken 
sooner rather than later in view of possible political developments · in the Sudan 
which might make a settlement more difficult in the future. I shall be grateful to 
know whether on this you also agree. 
Minute on 143 
The Sudan Govt. appear to have accepted Kenya's special position in the Ilemi 
Triangle and to have agreed not to offer the Ethiopians any territory south of the 
blue line on the map on J5914 (i.e. the new frontier proposed by the Govt. of Keriya).6 
In return, the Govt of Kenya seems to be contemplating concessions to Ethiopia east 
of Lake Rudolph. This would appear to involve some modification of the new 
. Kenya-Ethiopia frontier agreed upon on the 29th September last. 
I cannot help feelingthat this is unwise from Kenya's point of view since, in return 
for a concession to Ethiopia which may last indefinitely, they obtain the 
administration of an (admittedly large) area ofSudimese territory only as long as our 
administration of the Sudan lasts-unless we can get the Egn. gqvt's. agreement at 
some stage. 
Furthermore, I can forsee considerable complications in negotiating with Ethiopia 
(a} jointly with Egypt on behalf of the Sudan and (b) alone on behalf of Kenya, both at 
the same time. 
LW.B 
28.12.47 
5 G R King (district commissioner; Eastern District, Equatoria Province, Sudan), proposed ·only a minor 
adjustment in the Sudan-Kenya boundary close to the junction of the international boundaries of the 
Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. It was agreed at the meeting on 27 November 'that in view of possible political 
developments in the Sudan it was most desirable to get this cleared up as soon as possible~ Egypt might 
. easily raise difficulties and any boundary adjustments required were likely to become increasingly difficult 
to put through in future' ('Record of a meeting held in the civil secretary's offi()e Khartoum, on· November 
27th 1947, to discuss possible frontier rectifications in the Ilerhi Triangle', FO 371/63137, no 6300). 
6 See map on p vii. 
144 FO 371/62949, no 6364 9 Dec 1947 
'Egyptian reaction to Sudanization programme': minute. by D W 
Lascelles to Mr Bevin on the proposed constitutional reforms1 
[Extract] 
It will be remembered that it was felt necessary for Sir R. Howe to submit to both the 
Codomini the decisions taken by the Governor-General's Council on the report of the 
Sudan Administration Conference regarding constitutional reform, the Governor-
General having no power under the Condominium Agreement to introduce major 
constitutional changes on his own. · 
1 Lascelles comments in this minute on the recommendations in 141. 
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2. His Majesty's Government replied briefly and without comment, concurring 
in the proposals; and their reply was in due course published. The Egyptian 
Government, on the other hand, have now sent the Governor-General a long and 
critical note, the gist of which is that they cannot concur in anything so half-hearted: 
Sudanisation must be far more radical. This reply also has been published in 
Egypt. . . . z 
4. It was inevitable that the Egyptians should have reacted in this way. They do 
not, of course, wish to promote genuine Sudanisation (though they would no doubt 
like to promote self-government if they could pack the legislative body with their 
own adherents); but they cannot afford to estrange their supporters in the Sudan by 
turning down the scheme on the ground that it goes too far. Consequently they had 
to outbid us by saying that it does not go far enough. 
5. We have asked for, and are awaiting, Sir R. Howe's comments and suggestions. 
Meanwhile it is clear that this Egyptian move is potentially very embarrassing. There 
are, indeed, a number of minor points which are open to counter-criticism, and there 
is one major point: item (4) above,3 which complains of the Governor-General's 
retention of the power to approve or reject legislation, makes it clear that the 
Egyptian Government want to get this power for themselves, not to give the Sudan 
legislative body freedom from outside control. Nevertheless the Egyptian note, taken 
as a whole, will probably impress a great many Sudanese, including sections of the 
Umma party, as a noble document advocating complete emancipation. 
6. The real answer is of course that the Sudanese are not yet ripe for anything 
like complete self-government and must be initiated gradually. But this answer, 
apart from the fact that it would estrange our own supporters in the Sudan, is largely 
anticipated in the Egyptian note, which emphasises that a system under which the 
Assembly would not have the final word in budgetary and fiscal matters, and could 
not even secure a delay in the rejection by the Governor-General of legislation 
submitted by it for his approval, can hardly be called even a beginning. 
7. One obvious counter-measure would be to arrange for the Egyptian proposals 
to be examined by the Sudan Administration Conference and rejected by it. As, 
however, the Egyptian note lays great stress on the insufficiently representative 
nature of the Conference and the extent to which it was directly and indirectly 
packed and controlled by the British, this would not provide the perfect propaganda 
answer. 
8. Another course might conceivably be to hold a referendum on the Sudan 
Government's proposals and the Egyptian counter-proposals, taking care to make it 
clear that the latter would involve an influx of Egyptians into the Administration 
(item (6) in para. 3 above) and Egyptian control over all Sudanese legislation (item 
(4), already referred to) . Emphasis on these two points would no doubt be enough to 
ensure rejection of the Egyptian proposals in any impartially-managed referendum; 
but so long as the administration is British we cannot hope to convince anybody 
outside the Sudan that a referendum would in fact be impartially conducted. 
8. [sic] The Egyptian note is careful to safeguard the position of principle 
adopted by the Egyptian Government in respect of the Condominium Agreement. It 
says in effect that although the Egyptian Government no longer regard that 
2 Paragraph 3 of Lascelles's minute summarises paras 1- 10 in 141. 
3 A reference to para 5 (on the governor-general's power) in 141. 
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agreement as in force, they are nevertheless consenting to discuss the question as 
though they were merely one of two Codomini, and are doing this solely with the 
practical object of getting ahead with self-government for the Sudan. We cannot, in 
view of this explicit reservation, make capital out of the Egyptian note as a proof that 
Egypt still recognises the 1899 Agreement when it suits her to do so. 
9. Further consideration of this awkward problem may be easier when we get Sir 
R. Howe's comments. 
145 FO 371/62949, no 6364 14 Dec 1947 
[Constitutional reform]: letter (reply) from Sir R Howe to Sir 0 
Sargent giving the Sudan government's response to the Egyptian 
government's rejection of their proposed constitutional reforms1 
In accordance with paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 240 of 11th December, 1947, I 
set out below my detailed comments on the points raised in the Egyptian 
Memorandum. The numbering of the paragraphs is that of the Memorandum. 
1. The Sudan Government has accepted the principles of the Sudan 
Administration Conference Report, though not necessarily all its details, as a first 
step towards self-government, but it has to look considerably further forward if 
constitutional upheaval every few years is to be avoided, with the inevitable claim by 
the Egyptian Government to a decisive voice in these changes. To this end the new 
legislation which is now being drafted, in addition to setting up the Assembly and 
Council, is to be wide enough to allow for the progressive development of the 
political machinery which will be necessary in the final stage of fully responsible self-
government. It will allow for the evolution of the Under-Secretary into a responsible 
Minister and of the Executive Council into a Cabinet, thus anticipating the Egyptian 
criticism that the proposals do not go far enough. 
2. No decision has yet been reached as to electoral methods and so the Egyptian 
criticism is premature, but it is proposed to provide in the Ordinance for a wide 
variety of procedure in the first instance to meet the various conditions throughout 
the country, and to allow for future adjustments on the initiative of the Assembly 
itself. Full use will be made in country areas of the existing democratic Arab methods 
of election which it is thought will throw up more genuinely representative members 
than the Western ballot box. 
The Sudan Government has discussed and re-discussed the question of admitting 
Civil Servants to the Assembly, and fully supports the principle that ideally they 
should take no public part in politics; but in the Sudan, at present, the vast majority 
of educated men experienced in administration are in Government service, and 
progress will be hardly possible and certainly very slow if they are all excluded from 
the Assembly. Their admission will be a temporary expedient. 
3. The Assembly has in fact very wide powers as emphasised below under 
paragraph 4, but until the final stage of fully responsible self-government is reached, 
the ultimate power must remain where the ultimate responsibility is, with the 
Governor-General. 
1 See 141. 
296 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [145] 
4. (a) It is quite wrong to say that the Assembly will be an entirely consultative 
body. Even though its decisions may be over-ridden, it will be a statutory 
legislative body to which all normal legislation will have to be presented, which 
legislation it will have the right to debate, amend, or reject. It will also have the 
right to question any acts and policy of the Government, and to pass resolutions. It 
will not be possible for its decisions to be lightly or frequently set aside without 
alienating those moderate Sudanese whose goodwill it is so essential for the 
Government to retain. 
(b) It is not the Government's intention to lay down the length of a session, which 
will last as long as there is business to occupy the Assembly. Provision for the 
passing of urgent legislation during a recess will include the right of ratification or 
rejection by the Assembly when it meets. Legislation of this kind is expected to be 
rare, and will consist of minor amendments. 
(c) The Egyptian view that the Assembly should have complete financial power 
cannot be accepted, but it is intended that the Assembly will have full opportunity 
to discuss and recommend alterations in the Budget provided its equilibrium is 
not thereby upset. As taxation in the Sudan is imposed by Ordinance, the Assembly 
will have power to impose or increase taxation when such Ordinances are laid 
before it. 
(d) It is proposed that private members shall be given full facilities for the 
introduction of bills, except money bills and bills on reserved subjects, subject 
only to the leave of the Assembly. 
5. The Governor-General's veto must be retained in order to accord with Articles 
Ill and IV of the 1899 Condominium Agreement, and to enable him to discharge his 
responsibilities under them. 
Under Article IV of the Condominium Agreement, the Governor-General's power 
to make laws is specified as subject only to the condition that he shall inform the 
British and Egyptian Governments as soon as the law has been passed. The 
Egyptian Government's proposal that all laws should be approved by them is con-
trary to the Agreement and to the 1936 Treaty; the proposal is retrograde, unwork-
able, and inconsistent with their expressed desire to accelerate Sudanese 
self-government. 
7. [sic] The appointment of four senior Civil Servants to the Executive Council is 
necessary at present until Ministers can be appointed. The fact that these positions 
are at present held by officials of British nationality does not give the British 
Government control over the administration of the country, for they are Sudan 
Government officials, and in due course the posts will be held by Sudanese. 
The other points in the Memorandum, namely, paragraphs 6, 8, 9 and 10 are 
presumably included as political propaganda. The freedoms mentioned in paragraph 
8 are at present secured by law and are more liberal than in Egypt. It was not the 
Sudan Government's fault that some political parties in the Sudan refused to accept 
an invitation to attend the Conference. 
The new Ordinance to set up the Assembly and Council with the necessary 
standing orders and rules of procedures is now in draft and as soon as it has reached 
a more final stage, will be sent to you for your information. 
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146 FO 371169209, no 117 6 Jan 1948 
[Anglo-Egyptian negotiations]: inward telegram no 29 from EA 
Chapman-Andrews1 to Sir R Campbell reporting Sir R Howe's stance 
on further negotiations with Egypt 
[Howe's proposal to present the Advisory Council with draft legislation for approval, and 
the Egyptian criticisms of the Sudan Administration Conference for rejection, did not 
meet the threat of a possible Egyptian veto on any constitutional changes within the 
Sudan. Campbell suggested that such a veto could be avoided only by resuming talks with 
Egypt ostensibly on constitutional reform, but as a means of reopening the question of 
the Sudan as a whole (outward telegram no 329 from the FO to Howe, 27 Dec 1947, FO 
371/63055, no 6280). Howe resisted this, and also initially declined an invitation to join 
Campbell in discussions at the FO early in the new year. Prior to departing for London 
Campbell argued: 'Neither I nor, I feel sure, the Egyptian Government can regard as of 
purely parochial concern, the matter of compromise constitutional reform. All major 
questions in regard to the Sudan, including projected constitutional reform, are now 
regarded by the Egyptians as in the main political arena. They substantially affect 
Anglo-Egyptian relations and I submit that we ought not to allow these, with their highly 
important strategical angle, to be perpetually vitiated, by the possibility of disorder 
caused by political factions in the Sudan' (inward telegram no 4 from Campbell to FO, 1 
Jan 1948, FO 371/69155, no 21). Howe was persuaded to come too only when the FO 
suggested that in his meetings with them Campbell would no doubt raise 'the possibility 
of soothing Egyptian susceptibilities by, e.g., giving them a greater share (or at least a 
greater appearance of sharing) in the Administration' (outward telegram no 1 from FO to 
Howe, 1 Jan 1948, FO 371/69155, no 7). Howe stopped off at Cairo on his way to London, 
and Chapman-Andrews reported to Campbell (by now already at the FO) on his state of 
mind.) 
I am afraid you will find Howe uncompromising. I had a long talk with him last 
night. Line he takes is that whereas Sudan Government might have just got away 
with Bevin!Sidki Pasha protocol at the time it was initialled they could not do so to-
day. Indeed, unless existing administration in Sudan can be left alone to lead Sudan 
to full self-government (i.e. without any interference whatever on the part of Egypt) 
there will be trouble. By trouble he means complete non-cooperation of Sudanese in 
Government services and possibly the raising of tribes and rekindling of old Mahdia 
fanaticism. As Howe sees it, it is question either of leaving present administration a 
free hand or of"our losing the Sudan". By this he means that Sudan would be denied 
to us utterly for military purposes because there would be widespread and 
uncontrollable disorder. 
2. His opinion is, therefore, that we should tell Egyptians "hands off Sudan". If as 
a result Egyptians cut up rusty that is too bad. Facilities in the Sudan are, he said, 
according to C.I.G.S.2 more important to us than those in Egypt. C.I.G.S. told him 
the other day there was no reason why we should not clear out of Egypt but we must 
stay in Cyprus, Cyrenaica and the Sudan. Howe thought that if in time of war we had 
to come back, Egyptians would probably be only too thankful, treaty or no treaty and 
would welcome us. If, on the other hand, we had to force our way back we need not 
be put off by the fear we should find no (repeat no) Egyptians to co-operate with us. 
They would co-operate when it was question of their bread and butter. We could if it 
came to it, coerce Egyptians but we could never coerce Sudanese owing to the vast 
area of the Sudan, the fact that population was very scattered and because the 
1 Then minister in Cairo. 2 Lord Montgomery. 
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fanatical Sudanese warrior was an altogether different proposition from the 
Egyptian. Not that it would come to coercing the Egyptians. He thought the 
Egyptians were now more anxious to reach agreement because they were frightened. 
This was not the moment to make concessions to them therefore. In fact he thought 
that if someone with sufficient weight and authority, for instance the C.I.G.S., were 
to come out and see King Farouk and explain the military needs of the situation we 
need not discount our getting Egyptians to agree to our retaining troops here even in 
peace time. 
3. On subject of the 1899 agreement Howe said that though doubtless valid as a 
legal document it was a dead letter in the political sense. Not a single Sudanese, not 
even Ashigga, accepted it. It was unrealistic therefore to refer to it. Times had 
changed since 1899 and since 1924; for that matter even since 1936 and October 
1946. A document to which Sudanese were not a party but which settled their 
political status nearly 50 years ago after suppression by the British of their rebellion 
against Egyptians was quite unacceptable to them to-day. Above all they would not 
concede having Egyptians, for whom they did not conceal their contempt, brought 
into the picture. 
147 FO 371169155, no 549 6 Jan 1948 
[Constitutional reform]: letter from Sir R Howe to Mahmud al-
Nuqrashi Pasha responding informally to the Egyptian note on the 
Sudan Administration Conference. Enclosure: 'Aide Memoire' 
[Howe was instructed by the FO to pay a courtesy call on ai-Nuqrashi and to give him an 
interim written reply to the Egyptian note, as long as it was non-controversial. Due to 
aircraft delays the draft of Howe's text arrived in the FO late, and contained over-
conciliartory remarks in the covering letter, and apparently controversial points in the 
enclosure. A telegram was despatched to Howe, already in Cairo, to forestall the delivery 
of the text. 'This is considerably more controversial than anything we had envisaged. 
Enclosure, for instance, covers highly controversial question of your powers under 
Condominium Agreements and Egyptian claim to control all Sudanese legislation'. After 
requesting modifications to the letter, the FO went on to suggest, 'If it is not too late, we 
should much prefer that you should give Nokrashi the covering letter only' (outward 
telegram no 22 from FO to Howe, 5 Jan 1948, FO 371/69155, no 119). The final text, 
though backdated to 4 Jan in the FO copy and 5 Jan on the copy presented to the Egyptian 
government, was amended as requested and delivered to Nuqrashi on 6 Jan.] 
I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's despatch No. 92-3/27 of 26th 
November, 1947, enclosing copy of the note which Your Excellency has transmitted 
to the British Government about the recommendations of the Sudan Administration 
Conference.1 
2. I have considered very carefully the points made in Your Excellency's despatch 
and Note. The general support and encouragement2 of the Royal Egyptian 
Government to the proposed advance of the Sudanese towards self-government is 
warmly appreciated by the Sudan Government and by the great majority of the 
Sudanese, and I trust that Your Excellency will agree that the Ordinance which I 
1 See 141. 2 This originally read 'general approval' but was changed at FO instructions. 
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hope shortly to submit to Your Excellency in draft will meet most of the 
modifications3 suggested in Your Excellency's Note. 
3. I am confident that Your Excellency will find that the main criticisms of the 
proposals of the Sudan Administration Conference's report have been answered in 
the draft Ordinance. As Your Excellency is aware, the Sudan Government accepted 
the Report of the Sudan Administration Conference in principle, but in preparing the 
Ordinance have already anticipated many of the points made in Your Excellency's 
Note. 
4. I propose to lay the draft Ordinance before the Advisory Council for the 
Northern Sudan at its next meeting for their views, but it will if necessary be made 
clear to them that the comments of the British and Egyptian Governments upon the 
draft have still to be received. 
5. I am sending a copy of this letter to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in 
Cairo. 
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my 
very high consideration. 
Enclosure to 147 
1. The anxiety of the Royal Egyptian Government to give greater responsibility to 
the Sudanese than is visualised in the Report of the Administration Conference is 
shared by the Sudan Government, and the new Ordinances will go substantially 
further than the Report. It is the wish of the Sudan Government to give the Sudanese 
now as much responsibility as they can undertake without imperilling good 
government. As stated in its Report, the Conference considered only the next steps 
towards self-government, but the legislation now being prepared will provide not 
only for these first steps, but for the progressive assumption of further 
responsibilities by the Sudanese as and when they are able to shoulder it. 
2. The Report did not define the methods of election and criticisms of the 
Egyptian Government have been anticipated by the Sudan Government. A Schedule 
to the Ordinance will lay down electoral constituencies and define the qualifications 
of electors and the methods of election. It is proposed to hold direct elections in 
urban constituencies and, for the present, indirect elections in the rural area of the 
Northern Sudan. This form of election has already been tried successfully in Local 
Government and has been found to provide a suitable method in a sparsely populated 
country. 
In the Southern Sudan Provincial Councils are now being set up which will elect 
representatives for the Assembly until the people have advanced far enough to make 
a more direct method of election possible. 
The Sudan Government shares the desire of the Royal Egyptian Government to 
make the Assembly as representative as possible in the circumstances of the country, 
and at least sixty of the Members will be elected. 
3. Under the existing constitution of the Sudan, the Governor-General has been 
invested by the Co-domini with very wide powers of administration, and the 
3 This originally read 'will meet the modifications' but was changed at FO instructions. 
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Governor-General is informed by his legal advisers that under the terms of the 1899 
Agreement he cannot divest himself of them. It is legally necessary, therefore, to 
ensure in the new legislation that the Governor-General retains the right to exercise 
his constitutional powers even though it is expected that, in fact, these powers will 
seldom, if ever, be used. 
The Sudan Government shares the dislike evinced by the Royal Egyptian 
Government of allowing Government Officials to be Members of the Assembly, but in 
the circumstances of the country to debar such a large proportion of the educated 
classes would delay progress. It is intended that participation by officials should be 
only temporary, and that judges, army and police officers, and certain administrative 
officials should not be eligible for membership. 
4. (a) It is felt that the Royal Egyptian Government's fears that the Legislative 
Assembly will be no more than a consultative body are groundless. It will be the 
statutory legal body to which all legislation will have to be presented and which 
will have power to debate, pass amend or reject it. It will also have powers to 
question any acts or policy of the Government and to pass resolutions thereon. 
(b) It is not intended to lay down the length of Sessions, which will last as long as 
is necessary to complete the business before the Assembly, and there is no 
provision in the present proposals that routine or unimportant legislations should 
not be submitted to the Assembly before enactment. It is only urgent measures 
which may have to be enacted without the prior consent of the Assembly, but, even 
so, these will be submitted for ratification to the Assembly at the earliest 
opportunity. 
(c) It is proposed to allow the Assembly full powers to put forward its views before 
the budget is framed and to discuss the budget itself and certain alterations 
needed, provided that, at that stage, its equilibrium is not upset. As taxation in the 
Sudan is imposed by Ordinance, the Assembly will have power to impose or 
increase taxation when such Ordinances are set before it. 
(d) Private Members will be given full facilities for the introduction of Bills 
subject only to a few limitations and to the leave of the Assembly being obtained 
for their introduction. 
5. As explained in paragraph 2 above, so long as the present regime remains in 
force, the Governor-General cannot divest himself of the basic powers which he 
exercises under the 1899 Agreement. Article IV of this Agreement invests him with 
the power to make laws and thereafter to notify them to the British and Egyptian 
Governments. To introduce into the new Ordinance a provision for the previous 
submission of all legislation would therefore be at variance with the existing 
constitution. Furthermore, it would impose a serious limitation upon the self- . 
governing powers of the Assembly which the Royal Egyptian Government is anxious 
to increase, and the inevitable delay in the issue of legislation would constitute a 
grave administrative inconvenience. 
6. . Until Sudanese of sufficient administrative experience have emerged, it is 
necessary for the good government of the country to retain seats on the Executive 
Council for senior members of the administration, but it is hoped that before long 
Sudanese Ministers will be appointed, and that the Executive Council will gradually 
· evolve into a Council of Ministers. The Ordinance will contain provision for such 
evolution and in the initial stages will afford training for Sudanese in quasi 
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Ministerial work. The Sudan Government fully shares the desire of the Royal 
Egyptian Government to give Sudanese executive powers as soon as possible, and will 
spare no efforts in hastening the time when substantial power is in their hands. 
7. It is true that at present the three Secretaries are British by nationality, but 
they are Sudan Government servants and in no way responsible to the British 
Government, and they are being appointed to the Executive Council solely in that 
capacity, by virtue of the official position which they have achieved through their 
long service in the Sudan and their knowledge of the people and its problems. 
8. "Personal freedom, freedom of opinion, freedom of faith, freedom of meetings, 
freedom of the press, and the other freedoms without which man cannot be free", are 
already ensured in the Sudan by law and conditions compare very favourably with 
those in most other countries in the world. It will furthermore be in the Assembly's 
power to review the laws under which these freedoms are secured, and to amend 
them should they feel it necessary. It has already been emphasised in para. 4(a) 
above, that the Assembly will have full power to question, debate and criticise the 
Executive actions of the Government. The allegations made in certain quarters about 
the lack of freedom in the Sudan are illfounded. 
9. The recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference have 
generally had a favourable reception in the Sudan and itis expected that all save a 
small minority will take part in the elections for the Assembly. This minority, though 
invited to take part in the original Conference, refused to do so, and it and the so-
called Sudan Delegation do not now represent real public opinion in the Sudan on 
this matter. 
148 FO 371169209, no 143 7 Jan 1948 
[Anglo-Egyptian negotiations]: inward telegram no 34 from E A 
Chapman-Andrews to Sir R Camp bell reporting on Sir R Howe·'s 
meeting with al-Nuqrashi Pasha 
Following personal for Sir R. Campbell from Chapman Andrews. 
After Howe had seen Foreign Office telegram No. 221 he fell into a more pensive 
mood of which I took the advantage to remind him that there was an Egyptian angle 
which the Egyptians were fully . entitled to ask to be taken into account. We then 
glanced together at the preamble to the 1899 agreement,2 I emphasising that from it 
we British derived the right "to share-in future working and development-of 
administration and legislation". I emphasised the word "share" and the ever~present 
evidence throughout the Sudan of the Egyptian flag flying side by side with our own 
to prove the continued existence of Egyptian share. I said that while it may be true 
that there was not a single Sudanese who to·day accepted the 1899 agreement it was 
also tr11e that many if not most of the Egyptians also professed to want to do away with 
it in order that they might recenter into what they regarded as their inheritance. I sug-
gested it was in our British interests · to uphold the 1899 agreement as it had been 
upheld in the 1936 Treaty and in the 1946 protocol. It was from this agreement that 
1 See 147, note. 2 See Appendix, part I. 
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the Governor General derived the constitutional powers referred to in the memoran-
dum accompanying his draft note to Egyptian Government on constitutional reform 
(to which Foreign Office telegram 22 refers). Howe took the point. 
2. I ended by suggesting that it was at least doubtful whether the Sudanese were 
on this matter unamenable to reason and as potentially fanatical as some would have 
us believe and that if so the question [grp. undec.] resolved itself into a choice 
between "losing" either the Sudan or Egypt and it was up to us to find a way of 
keeping both, which I thought could be done if such form of words as we might be 
able to agree upon with the Egyptians were backed up with the right sort of 
explanatory propaganda to the Sudanese. It was not as though they were in 
imminent danger of being taken by Egypt as an Egyptian province. We had got over 
that difficulty and we knew that Egypt appeared to be now prepared to drop 
completely their former claim that the Sudan was and must for ever remain an 
integral part of Egypt. I told him of your talk with Khashaba Pasha and showed him a 
copy of your despatch reporting on this.3 He described the latter as "all very 
unrealistic" but seemed more inclined than he was at the beginning to admit the 
existence of a legitimate Egyptian point of view. 
3. On the following morning Howe saw Nokrashy with whom he stayed over an 
hour. He told me afterwards that he had presented reply amended in accordance with 
Foreign Office telegram No. 22 but that after discussing at some length with 
Nokrashy the whole problem of constitutional reforms he had left also with him 
memorandum amended in accordance with Foreign Office telegram No. 22 as a 
separate document in the form of an aide memoire of what he had actually said 
during conversation.4 He told me that Nokrashy had not appeared very much 
concerned about the problem of constitutional reform over which he skated very 
lightly. What had concerned him was the Sudan Government's attitude towards 
Egyptian school masters. He had spent an hour trying to get the Governor General to 
agree to the return of former director Abdel Hadi. The Governor General however 
had not given way though he might have been inclined to consider it had the Prime 
Minister not stated that he regarded it as the sacred duty of every Egyptian in the 
Sudan to propagate his belief in unity of Nile Valley. I asked Howe whether it was 
regarded as necessarily seditious to do this in the Sudan. Surely there was a political 
party there whose avowed object was to achieve the unity of Egypt and Sudan. He 
replied that such speeches as Abdel Hadi had made caused student demonstrations 
(in favour of unity of the Nile Valley); that demonstrations led to strikes and 
disorders which it was the duty of Sudan Government to prevent. I said I thought it 
was most important that a clear distinction should be drawn between sedition and 
incitement to disorder on the one hand and free expression of political opinion 
however distasteful such opinion might be to the Government in power on the other 
hand. He said Nokrashy Pasha professed to refuse to believe there was free expression 
of political opinion for Egyptians in the Sudan to-day to which I replied one could 
hardly blame the Egyptians for not knowing what was going on in the Sudan when so 
3 In which Khashaba Pasha proposed that the text of the old Sudan protocol be retained, with a note added 
to interpret it, but in which he also stated that the right of the Sudanese to choose their future status 'was 
so obvious both on principle and from a practical point of view, and it was so comparatively far in the 
future that it did not seem to need mentioning' (despatch no 2 from Campbell to Bevin, 2 Jan 1948, FO 
371/69209, no 66) . 
4 See 147. 
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many obstacles were put in the way of their people going there. To this Howe replied 
that they had a battalion of the Egyptian army and the Director General of the 
Irrigation Department as well as schoolmasters, who could if they wished keep the 
Egyptian Government accurately informed. Nevertheless papers this morning stated 
that the conversation between Howe and the Egyptian Prime Minister was "cordial" 
and this is confirmed by Quilliam who, waiting in ante room, heard shouts of 
laughter constantly coming from within. 
4. Meanwhile rumour here is rife to the effect that there are fundamental differ-
ences between you and Howe about the Sudan and that you were thinking of resign-
ing. I also hear that there are rumours in Khartoum to the effect that there is to be an 
Egyptian Deputy Governor-General. We here have taken the line that rumour mon-
gers are a nuisance and that for the time being and perhaps for a long time to come 
there will be no official announcement simply because there is nothing new to be said. 
149 FO 371169192, no 276 8 Jan 1948 
[Anglo- Egyptian negotiations]: notes by G L McDermour of an FO 
meeting to discuss the position of the Sudan in treaty negotiations 
[Extract] 
A meeting was held in Mr. Wright's room on the 8th January, to discuss Egypt and 
the Sudan. Mr. Wright presided for the first half, and Mr. Lascelles when he had to 
leave. Sir R. Campbell, Sir R. Howe, Mr. Speaight and Mr. McDermott attended. 
The Sudan Government's constitutional proposals 
It was agreed that a reply should now be drafted to Nobrasky's [sic] letter enclosing 
the Egyptian Government's comments. We should assume in reply that their 
suggestion that all Sudanese legislation should be submitted to the Egyptian 
Government (our gloss on this should be "to the Co-Domini") could not have been 
intended to cover routine legislation on internal matters, and that we could not 
accept a complete abolition of the Governor -General's right of veto, which was his by 
virtue of the agreements regulating the condominium. We should however go on to 
say that we understood that the draft ordinance which the Governor-General was 
about to lay before the Advisory Council, as he had told Nobrasky [sic] Pasha, would 
go far to meet the Egyptian Government's proposals; and in particular that it would 
enumerate those subjects on which legislation could not be initiated at all by the 
Legislature [sic] Assembly and therefore the Governor General's right of veto did not 
arise-viz. questions affecting the constitution, nationality etc.-and on which the 
Governor-General consequently had no right of veto. Further, that we understood 
the Governor-General was about to lay the draft Ordinance before the Advisory 
Council with the explanation that it was also being submitted to the Co-domini. We 
would therefore suggest to Nobrasky [sic] that the draft Ordinance should form the 
subject of Anglo-Egyptian discussions in Cairo. (N.B. In a subsequent discussion on 
January 9th it was agreed to leave the venue unspecified.) Further details could be 
worked out in due course. 
1 First secretary, FO, 1948. 
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The proposed discussions 
The Governor-General said that he was anxious to convene the Advisory Council very 
soon, as its discussion of the draft ordinance was publicly known to have been 
postponed for some months already. The Sudan Government were of course not 
bound to accept its findings. It was agreed that there would be no harm in the 
Advisory Council's being convened, and considering the draft ordinance, provided 
that His Majesty's Government's reply to Nobrasky [sic] had been sent in i.e. the 
proposed discussions between the Co-Domini need not actually have begun first 
though there would be advantage if they could have done so. It was agreed that the 
discussions would probably have to be merely Anglo-Egyptian, with the possible eo-
option of (British) experts from the Sudan Government service when required, as 
although Arbigga [sic: Ashigga] members might be prepared to attend and voice pro-
Egyptian sentiments, respectable Independence parties representatives would 
probably decline to attend meetings which they would feel could only lead to an 
increase of Egyptian influence in the Sudan. (Sir R. Howe thought it might 
nevertheless be possible to get the Advisory Council to appoint a representative to the 
discussions.) But the discussions should be useful, if only as an approach to an 
agreement with the Egyptian Government on Sudanese questions. Unfortunately, a 
comprehensive agreement probably could not be reached without excessive 
concessions to the Egyptians. 
Increased Egyptian participation in the administration of the Sudan 
It was agreed that the Egyptians wanted political as well as technical posts, some of 
them at the top. (As a debating point, but no more, it could however be pointed out 
that in the Egyptian Government's comments on the Sudan Government's proposals 
they did not demand this but only the right to train more Sudanese. At Lake Success, 
however, Nobrasky [sic] had demanded increased Egyptian participation in the 
administration). The Governor-General was quite definite that this could not be 
conceded (e.g. an Egyptian deputy Governor-General, Egyptian members of the 
proposed Executive Council) because it would conflict with the Sudan Government's 
pledges regarding Sudanisation and Mr. Attlee's assurances to Saiyid [sic] Abdul-
rahman el-Mahdi (and in Parliament)2 that the present system of administration 
would not be altered, and would disrupt the administration. But possible concessions 
in this direction might be:-
( a) the notices published in the English and Egyptian press asking for experts for 
technical posts under the Sudan Government could in addition be communicated 
direct to Egyptian government departments; 
(b) a joint tripartite commission-'-British, Egyptian, perhaps under neutral 
chairmanship-might be appointed by us and the Egyptians (not by UNO because 
this might let the Soviet bloc in), consisting of independent non-officials, to be in 
permanent session and render periodic reports to the eo-domini on the progress of 
the Sudan towards self-government, as had been proposed by us in the treaty 
negotiations and rejected by Sidky; definition of the commission's functions would 
be necessary; 
(c) a similar commission might watch the elections to the proposed Legislative 
2 See 114. 
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Assembly, so that the Egyptians could not very well claim afterwards that the 
Assembly was wholly unrepresentative. 
The Sudanese question and the treaty 
The Governor-General said that the Sudanese would not accept references to 'unity' 
and/or 'the common crown' at any price: their objections had been strengthened by 
their impressions of unanimous inter-national support at Lake Success. (Even the 
British members of the administration would probably resign if such references were 
inserted). They would not be particularly gratified by a mere cutting out of all 
reference to 'unity', which they had never acknowledged anyway; even less so if as a 
counter-concession to the Egyptians we were to cut out, say, all reference to 'self-
determination' for the Sudan. But in any case the Egyptians showed no signs of 
readiness to abandon all reference to 'unity' and/or 'the common crown'; and this the 
Sudan Government could no longer accept, though H.M.G. could state publicly that 
they would have no objection to the Sudan's eventually uniting itself with Egypt if it 
wished to. The Egyptians however would retort that we should take good care that it 
would not wish to do so when the time came. 
The Egyptian Government might agree-as they had proposed during the last 
negotiations-to shelve the Sudan question on the basis that the 'common crown' 
was acknowledged. The Governor-General said that the Sudanese would never accept 
this. 
The Egyptian Government would no doubt refuse, as Sidky had done, to accept any 
arrangements similar to those made under the Statute of Westminster in connexion 
with Dominion status. The Egyptian government might just conceivably agree to 
shelve the Sudan question without any stipulation if this were part of an otherwise 
comprehensive treaty agreeable to them; but not, for instance, as part of an 
arrangement in which Article 7 of the 1936 treaty was still in force i.e. a scheme such 
as that recently under consideration in London for the reduction of our forces in 
Egypt to 1,000 on condition that re-entry rights were guaranteed, etc. We should be 
faced with the need of finding a way of plausibly explaining away our retreat from our 
comparatively more favourable attitude in 1946 (the Sidky-Bevin protocol). 
There might just be a way round if a reference could be included, in any agreement 
reached on other matters, to the Sudan questions being already under discussion. 
Other suggestions were:-
( a) Mr. Beckett should be asked to find a form of words to get round the difficulty; 
(b) a form of words such as 'national community of interests between the 
inhabitants of the Nile Valley'; 
(c) a frank approach to King Farouk on the lines that if he wanted a treaty he 
must make a concession in connexion with the Sudan: it was thought that, 
although His Majesty was increasingly afraid of the U.S.S.R., he was not yet 
sufficiently so to give way on this; 
(d) a commission of the eo-domini plus a neutral to report when the Sudanese 
were politically mature enough to make a choice, whether the Sudanese really 
wanted to join Egypt or no; 
(e) a UNO commission: this would let the Soviet bloc in; and although some 
Sudanese wanted such a commission, this was really only in the hope that it would 
report in favour of complete independence for the Sudan immediately ... . 
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150 FO 371169192, no 255 10 Jan 1948 
'Egypt & Sudan': FO minutes of a discussion with Mr Bevin on 
constitutional reform [Extract] 
The S. of State had before him the paper on the Sudan constitutional reform 
question and the draft reply to Arnr Pasha. He said he did not disagree with the 
course of action suggested, but he was anxious to get ahead with the general 
negotiations with Egypt. If we failed to bring off a settlement before next March he 
felt that we should probably never bring one off at all. The political situation was 
boiling up in Palestine, Greece and Germany. The Egyptians were showing increased 
willingness to reach a settlement, and anxiety over the international situation played 
a part in this. 
Sir 0. Sargent pointed out that it was a question of what we could get in the way of 
a settlement and how much we should have to pay for it. These things might be 
clearer once the Palestine problem was out of the way and we were safely installed in 
Cyrenaica. 
The S. of State did not agree that we should wait. We might not get Cyrenaica, and 
might lose Egypt also through waiting. He would like to have the bird in the hand 
and the bird in the bush. 
Sir 0. Sargent observed that the Egyptians wanted a settlement even more than 
we did, and had been brought to this state largely by our policy of sitting tight. 
The S. of State repeated that the time to settle was now. Soviet policy might before 
long become less intolerable to the world in general, and if that happened people 
would begin once more to run after them. He had discussed the Egyptian problem 
with the Prime Minister, who agreed with him. As for the price of a settlement, there 
was no reason to pay anything. 
As regards the Sudan, he considered that the line of approach suggested was the 
right one. We should confine our negotiations in regard to the Egyptian side of 
the problem to the question of withdrawal of troops. We could not go back to the 
Bevin-Sidky agreement, and in particular we could not go back to the sovereignty 
formula in that agreement. 
Sir R. Campbell said that the Egyptians undoubtedly wanted that formula to be 
incorporated in any new agreement about the Sudan. That was one of their two main 
desiderata. The other was that they should be given at least the appearance of a share 
in the Administration. The second point was largely a matter of face-saving. What 
they had actually proposed was that there should be an Egyptian Deputy Governor-
General and an increase of Egyptians in the technical branches of the 
Administration. 
The Secretary of State said that the course proposed in the paper on constitutional 
reform was as far as we could go for the present. He was still prepared to go back to 
the offer he had made to Sidky Pasha, that the Sudan question should be held over 
while the Egyptian side of the overall settlement was negotiated and got out of the 
way, and that as regards the Sudan there should be a tripartite supervisory body. In 
its original form, this body was to have been an "occasional" one, i.e. it would have 
made an investigation into, and reported on, the state of progress towards self-
government every three years or even every five years. He was now quite prepared 
that it should function continuously once Egypt had agreed to the creation of the 
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Legislative Assembly. The Assembly would provide the means whereby the Sudanese 
people could express their point of view. He was not prepared to treat the Sudanese 
as a subordinate people on whom the wishes of the British Co-Dominus could simply 
be imposed, and he did not see why the Egyptians should claim the right to do so 
either. 
Sir R. Howe agreed. 
Sir R. Campbell thought that the Egyptians might also agree, but that they would 
insist, in any formal treaty, on a re-statement of the formula about unity with Egypt 
under the common crown. 
The S. of State said that he could not go back to that. The programme should be as 
follows: 
First, the Legislative Assembly should be created, thus giving the Sudanese a voice in 
their own affairs; 
Second, we should create a tripartite body (with the Sudan as a member on an 
equal footing) to supervise the development of the Sudan towards self-government 
and to report at intervals to the Co-Domini; 
Third, large-scale economic development schemes for the Sudan should be set in 
train, again on a tripartite basis. The Egyptians were rich-the sterling balances 
would have to be released by gradual stages-and their money would come in useful 
for such schemes; 
Fourth, the Sudan should be brought into the general scheme of defence for Egypt 
and the Middle East as a whole. (In the initial stages the member for the Sudan on 
the Joint Defence Board would have to be a representative of the Governor-General 
and British, as no Sudanese of sufficient calibre was available, but this need not be so 
indefinitely-the Sudan, like Ceylon, would develop gradually towards 
Commonwealth status). This last point in the programme would provide a guarantee 
of Egypt's own security and would thus give her far more than any formula about the 
common crown. 
As regards the creation of the tripartite body mentioned in the second item above, 
this would place Egypt in a minority in so far as the British and Sudanese members 
were likely to work together, and we should have to guarantee that her interests in 
the Nile waters and in economic matters generally were not prejudiced. 
The Secretary of State reiterated that he could not go back to the formula 
regarding the Sudan in the Bevin-Sidky Agreement. Egyptian misrepresentations 
had rendered this quite impossible. The creation of the Legislative Assembly would 
put the Sudan on a proper footing as regards representation, and henceforth she 
must be treated as an equal. Only so could he defend our policy before Parliament 
and the United Nations. 
As regards immediate tactics -
Sir R. Camp bell thought that the Egyptians might regard the exchange of views 
between the Co-Domini on the question of constitutional reform as providing the 
means of exploring the wider problem, and that, once discussions on the subsidiary 
question had been started, they might be prepared to negotiate an agreement on the 
Egyptian side of the problem, for it could then be said that negotiations concerning 
the Sudan "were in progress". But they would certainly try to get us committed at 
this point to a reaffirmation of the "common crown" formula. 
The S. of State ruled this out: King Farouk and the Egyptian Government had 
better be told frankly at the outset that there could be no going back to this formula. 
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His plan, as outlined above, would benefit both Egypt and the Sudan. To the former it 
would give economic and military advantages; to the latter, an equality of status such 
as the Bevin-Sidky Agreement had not provided. He was anxious to get the whole 
matter out of the hands of the politicians and into the hands of fair-minded people. 
Sir 0 . Sargent asked for confirmation that the Secretary of State approved the 
Foreign Office plan regarding the Sudan constitutional reform question, i.e. that the 
Governor-General should go ahead with the reform notwithstanding Egyptian 
objections. 
The S. of State confirmed this. It was brought out in the discussion that, on the 
basis of the programme elaborated in our talks with Sir R. Camp bell and Sir R. Howe 
we should in fact be giving the Egyptians the opportunity to comment on the draft 
ordinance, and that meanwhile the Governor-General would not promulgate the 
reform scheme .... 
151 FO 371169155, no 283 15 Jan 1948 
[Constitutional Reform]: letter from D W Lascelles (for Mr Attlee) to 
Abd al-Fattah Amr, responding to Egyptian criticisms of the Sudan 
Administration Conference1 
I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's Note No. 4179/8-1/14 of the 25th 
November last,2 in which you were good enough to acquaint me with the views of the 
Egyptian Government regarding the administrative measures which the Governor-
General of the Sudan proposed to take in order to give effect to the recommendations 
of the Sudan Administration Conference, and with which you enclosed a 
memorandum enumerating the points on which your Government considered that 
the proposed measures should be modified. 
2. With regard to the third paragraph of the Egyptian Government's 
communication as quoted by Your Excellency, I need only say here that the views of 
His Majesty's Government regarding the continued validity of the Condominium 
Agreements are also on record and were expounded to the Security Council. 
3. Sir Robert Howe informs me that he has already explained to the Egyptian 
Prime Minister the views of the Sudan Government on the various points raised in 
the Egyptian memorandum,3 and has assured His Excellency that a number of these 
points will be covered by the ordinance enacting the administrative reforms which 
will shortly be submitted in draft form to the two Co-Domini. I understand that the 
draft ordinance will also be laid before the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan 
at its session next month, but that it will be made clear to the Council if necessary 
that the views of the Co-Domini on this ordinance are still outstanding. In order that 
the achievement of this eagerly-awaited step towards Sudanese self-government 
should not be unduly delayed, His Majesty's Government consider it important that 
the Co-Domini should seek to reach agreement at an early date on any amendments 
which they may jointly consider it desirable that the Governor-General should 
introduce into the ordinance so as to ensure that its provisions are truly in the 
1 This letter is based on a draft provided by Campbell, as amended following the discussion minuted in 150, 
and signed by Lascelles on Attlee's behalf. 
2 See 141. 3 See 147. 
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interests of the Sudanese people and that it affords them the maximum degree of 
self-government consistent with their present stage of development. His Majesty's 
Government therefore proposes that as soon as they receive the text of the proposed 
ordinance the two Governments should appoint representatives to meet forthwith, in 
a place to be determined later, for the purpose of examining together its provisions, 
in consultation with technical experts of the Sudan Government and taking into 
consideration representative Sudanese opinion, and of thereafter making 
recommendations to the Co-Domini. His Majesty's Government suggest that these 
representatives should be non-official persons who are recognised authorities on 
constitutional practice. In order that no time may be lost, it is suggested that Sir 
Ronald Campbell should discuss with the Egyptian Government on his return to 
Cairo the detailed procedure for the appointment of these British and Egyptian 
representatives and for the hearing of evidence. 
4. As the Egyptian Government are aware, His Majesty's Government have 
already signified to the Governor-General their approval of the general principles of 
the proposed reforms as notified to the Co-Domini. Pending receipt of the text of the 
ordinance, they do not intend to comment in detail on all the points raised in the 
Egyptian memorandum. They consider it expedient, nevertheless, to record their 
view on the contention in paragraph 5 of the memorandum that the Governor-
General should obtain the prior consent of the Co-Domini before approving or 
rejecting the legislation passed by the Legislative Assembly and the Executive 
Council. His Majesty's Government assume that it is not the intention of the 
Egyptian Government to seek to curtail the Governor-General's executive powers for 
the enactment of legislation concerning only the internal affairs of the Sudan, since 
clearly this would so limit his authority as to make it impossible for him adequately 
to fulfil his obligations towards the Co-Domini for the good administration of the 
Sudan. On the other hand His Majesty's Government recognise that, by virtue of the 
terms of the Condominium Agreement of January 19th, 1899, the Governor-General 
cannot, without the consent of the Co-Domini, promulgate legislation materially 
affecting the constitution or international status of the Sudan. They understand that 
a definition concerning this limitation of his powers will be included in the text of 
the ordinance which will in fact contain a list of reserved subjects. For the rest, this 
question could naturally be included if necessary amongst those to be examined by 
the British and Egyptian representatives appointed as proposed in paragraph 3 above. 
152 FO 371169235, no 975 5 Feb 1948 
'Note on Sudan railways strike January 26th-29th, 1948': note by the 
Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum 
[At the end of the first rail strike in August 1947 (summarised below), the civil secretary 
noted, 'the settlement of the Railway Strike has meant the establishment of what is 
virtually a Trade Union amongst good authority employees who have little or no idea of 
the method of running the Union. Furthermore we have no Trade Union legislation on 
the statute books' (inward telegram no 1688 from Robertson to the Sudan agent, London 
(5 Aug 1947). He requested that someone with trade union experience be sent out to 
advise both the Atbara workers on the running of their committee and the government in 
drafting its trade union legislation. Before such an adviser could be sent out, however, a 
further confrontation over pay began.) 
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Background 
1. In settlement of the Railway strike in July, 1947 it was agreed between the 
Management and Workers that there should be set up representative Departmental 
Committees in each of the five departments, and a Workers' Affairs Association, 
composed of three elected representatives from each of the Departmental 
Committees. This Association would represent the whole body of railway employees 
and would meet from time to time jointly with the Management. 
2. The first such meeting was held in October, when a number of demands were 
presented by the Workers' Affairs Association to the Management for transmission to 
the Central Government. The principal of these demands were:-
(1) A general increase in non-classified workmen's wages varying between 50% 
for lower categories and 25% for higher, the average increase being 40%. 
(2) A general increase in the amount of annual leave for all employees. 
(3) A large extension of the privilege of second class travel on railways. 
(4) A reduction of working hours from 8 to 6)-f hours daily. 
(5) The revision of arrangements for compensation in case of accidents. 
(6) The revision of scales of payment for overtime. 
The Association requested that the reply of the Central Government should be given 
within 20 days. 
3. In an interim reply the Financial Secretary pointed out that the increases of 
pay demanded for some 15,000 workers would cost LE.470,000 a year in the Railways 
alone, that similar increases to other Government employees would be inevitable and 
that the total additional cost might well be in the neighbourhood of LE. 1 million a 
year, without reckoning the possible effect on the rates of pay of classified officials. 
Such an increase would be beyond the financial resources of the country and could 
not be justified. 
Full and careful consideration of the Association's demands was promised but no 
undertaking could be given to reply finally within the time stipulated. 
4. The Workers' Affairs Association, in a further letter, challenged the argument 
that the financial resources were inadequate to meet the additional cost, elaborated 
its demands and submitted a number of individual budgets, which were, however, 
clearly inaccurate and inconsistent in many respects. 
5. On 31st December, the Financial Secretary sent a further reply. While main-
taining that the burden to the whole country of a general increase in wages could not 
be justified, he agreed to increase forthwith the minimum basic starting rate of wage 
to 180 PT. per month, which, with cost of living allowance added, ensured that no 
adult male worker could earn less than 306 PT. per month. He announced the setting 
up of an independent Committee to review, against the conditions in other types of 
employment, the findings of a Committee already set up by the General Manager to 
investigate the scales of pay of all railway employees: it was hoped that the indepen-
dent Committee would complete its work by the end of February. He also undertook 
to give sympathetic consideration to various alleged grievances about leave, travel 
privileges, working hours, compensation for injuries and rates of pay for overtime. 
The strike. 
6. The Financial Secretary's letter of 31st December, did not satisfy the Workers' 
Affairs Association and the question of a strike in token of their dissatisfaction was 
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raised. During the first three weeks of January rumour on the subject was rife and 
there was great activity amongst the workers on the part of a few of the leaders. The 
chief of these are Suleiman Musa, the President of the Association and a chargeman 
in the Mechanical Department, Tayed El Hassan, a pattern maker and Gasim el Amin, 
an electrician, both also in the Mechanical department. The two latter are the most 
powerful amongst the Workers' leaders. There is reason to believe that the two 
religious leaders, Sayed Ali el Mirghani and Sayed Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, used their 
influence during this period against the proposal to strike, and there is no evidence 
that the political parties encouraged the workers to strike. 
7. There was considerable uncertainty as to whether a strike would be called, 
and, if it was, to what extent the workers would respond. However, on 22nd January, 
the Workers' Affairs Association posted notices in Atbara and at other main railway 
centres calling on all employees to strike for three days from the morning of 26th 
January. At the same time, a letter was sent to the Governor-General giving the 
reasons for the strike and stating that if their demands are not met in full by the end 
of February, another stand will be made and "a different attitude" adopted. It was 
stated that copies of this letter had been sent to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain 
and Egypt. 
The strike was almost fully effective among employees and they were joined by a 
number of classified staff. All railway traffic was brought to a standstill and power 
stations in Atbara and Port Sudan were affected. 
There was no picketting [sic] and there was little evidence of any intimidation of 
workers, and although many of them were doubtless bewildered as to the object of 
the strike there can be no doubt about their solidarity with the Workers' Affairs 
Association. 
The strike ended punctually on the morning of 29th January, and traffic was at 
once resumed. 
9. [sic] The strike was notable for the following features:-
(a) there was no disorderliness of any kind. 
(b) there was no evidence of intervention or influence on the part of the political 
parties. 
(c) the organisation was very much more effective than would normally be 
expected: this suggests that the organisers may have been supported by political 
agencies outside the Sudan, but there is as yet no definite evidence of this. 
10. The Public and the local press were restrained in their expressions of 
opinion. While inclined to deprecate the use of the strike weapon as a threat to the 
prosperity of the country, they showed some sympathy with the workers in their 
desire to improve their conditions. There was however little attempt to relate these 
demands to the general financial position of the country. 
The aftermath 
11. The strike has proved the present power of the leaders of the Workers' Affairs 
Association to influence the whole body of railway employees. The threat, mentioned 
in para. 7 of a further and possibly less peaceful strike at the end of February must 
therefore be taken seriously. 
12. All classified officials who joined the strike are to be dealt with and fined 
under the Officials' Discipline Ordinance. All employees will lost [sic] their pay for 
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the days not worked. Legally all the strikers could be prosecuted under Section 143 
of the Sudan Penal Code. It has, however, been decided not to take such action on 
this occasion, but to take steps to ensure that in future every worker will be aware of 
the legal position regarding strikes and of the penalties to which strikers are liable. 
13. Everything possible will be done to publicise the Sudan Government's point 
of view in this dispute and the independent committee mentioned in para. 5 will 
begin work as soon as possible. Should a further strike occur early in March, the 
issues will thus be clear cut and there will be no doubt in the minds of the workers 
and their leaders as to the legal position. The Government would then have no 
hesitation in taking action to break the strike. 
14. In the meantime, all essential preparations to meet the possibility of another 
strike will be made. 
153 FO 371/69156, no 1247 17 Feb 1948 
'Executive Council and Legislative Assembly Ordinance': explanatory 
note by Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum. Minute by G L McDermott 
The draft of the Ordinance, which will be considered at the eighth session of the 
Advisory Council, is submitted for the consideration of Members, together with the 
relevant correspondence between the British and Egyptian Governments. 
In most respects the Ordinance follows fairly closely the lines recommended by the 
Sudan Administration Conference whose report was debated by the Council at its 
seventh session, but there are some important differences. 
The most important difference is that whereas the Conference said (section 8 of 
the report) "we have tried to confine our recommendations to the next steps which 
should be taken in any particular function of government", the Government, in 
preparing the legislation, has looked much further ahead. At present there is no 
political machinery for working a democratic form of self-government but it must be 
brought into existence. The Ordinance is designed to allow for, and to encourage, the 
progressive development of self-governing institutions, stopping short only at the 
final step, which is the transfer of the ultimate responsibility from the Governor-
General to the elected representatives of the people. When that stage is reached a 
new constitution will of course be required. 
The advantages of such a method of approach are many. It enables the country to 
feel its way forward, to try experiments, to progress rapidly in directions where 
things go well undelayed because in another direction things are proving more 
difficult. The speed of advance is governed, not by a series of paper constitutions but 
by the availability of men capable of filling adequately the posts to be created, the 
ability of Sudanese to assume genuine, as opposed to nominal, responsibility and the 
degree of cooperation of all concerned. The situation will, in fact, be under 
continuous review and advances will not have to await the laborious preparation of 
fresh legislation. 
It will be noticed, for instance, that the Ordinance provides for the appointment of 
fully responsible Ministers. It is not proposed to appoint Ministers at the outset, as it 
is intended that potential Ministers should first gain experience and prove 
themselves as Under Secretaries. It will not necessarily be that the holder of any 
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Under Secretaryship will himself later be appointed a Minister-in fact if he is a 
Government Servant he cannot be, unless he resigns to take up a political career-
but experience of the working of the post will be of value when someone who is a 
potential Minister is available. 
For this reason the Government has not accepted the recommendation of the 
Sudan Administration Conference that Under Secretaries should be chosen by the 
Assembly. If he is to develop into a Minister the Under Secretary must be appointed 
in the same way as a Minister, that is to say by the Government. No Prime Minister 
under any constitution would consent to have his Ministers chosen for him, and in 
practice such an arrangement could not possibly work. The Under Secretary would 
be in an entirely false position and the experiment would lead nowhere. 
The Assembly as now proposed is rather larger than the body suggested by the 
Conference. The elected members have been increased from 60 to 65 in order to fit 
the proposed constituencies. There are still10 nominated members but there is also 
provision that all members of the Council and all Under Secretaries should, if not 
already elected or nominated, be ex-officio members, so that the Assembly will in 
practice number about 90. 
This virtually raises the proportion of nominated members above that 
recommended by the Conference, and one reason for this is the provisional decision 
not to allow Government Servants to stand for election. If there were no nominations 
apart from the Under Secretaries etc. the largest and most influential section of 
educated opinion would be barred from the Assembly except as holders of office. 
The vexed question of the part to be played by Government Servants under this 
Ordinance has, subject to Administrative Regulations, been provisionally decided 
thus. In general they are barred from taking part, but as a temporary measure the 
Governor-General may make exceptions. The position will then be that a 
Government Servant:-
1. cannot be a Minister, 
2. can be an Under Secretary, a member of the Council or a nominated member of 
the Assembly, provided that if he holds one of the offices in schedule I he shall 
cease to exercise the functions of that office, 
3. cannot stand for election to the Assembly. 
The electoral system is of great importance and is the subject of a separate note as it 
is one on which the Government wishes to take the advice of the Council. 
Various criticisms have been levelled at the proposals, in particular it has been said 
that the over-riding power of the Governor-General reduces the Assembly to a 
consultative body with no more power than the Advisory Council. This is very far 
from being the case, as is explained in the Aide Memoire handed by the Governor-
General to the President of the Council of Ministers para 4(a), and its power and 
responsibility in day-to-day government is virtually unaffected by the fact that an 
over-riding power exists. It should be noted that the provisions with regard to the 
budget give the Assembly considerably wider powers than were proposed by the 
Conference, while the provisions suggested by them for exempting from the scrutiny 
of the Assembly legislation of minor importance (section 32(a) of the Report) have 
been rejected. 
With regard to the Governor-General's powers, apart altogether from the legal 
necessity of retaining the powers granted to him under the 1899 agreement so long 
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as that agreement remains in force, it is essential that the ultimate power lies in the 
same hands as the ultimate responsibility. 
The proposal as a whole provides a very real administrative advance from the 
beginning, with provision for steady progress on the road to self-government, a 
progress the speed of which depends on many unpredictable factors, but chiefly on 
the extent to which the members of the Assembly and Council, the office holders and 
the public at large cooperate wholeheartedly in working it. 
Minute on 153 
As is stated in the explanatory note, the draft Ordinance goes a good deal further than 
the proposals of the Sudan Administration conference, and this is all to the good. The 
draft Ordinance has been drawn up with the advice of several distinguished British 
experts and this is hardly the place to criticise its form in detail . . . A reasonable 
critic would, I think, say that it is on the whole a good compromise between the 
autocratic system with a powerful Governor-General at its head, which will still be 
essential for the Sudan for some years to come, and the institution of representative 
government in its first stages. 
G.L.M. 
23.2.48 
154 FO 371169156, no 1696 11 Mar 1948 
[Constitutional reform]: letter from G G Fitzmaurice1 to Sir H 
Shawcross2 asking advice on whether the Sudan government can 
unilaterally introduce constitutional reforms [Extract] 
Minute by W E Beckett 
... 2. The point at issue is, briefly, whether the Governor-General of the Sudan 
has, in the last resort, the power to introduce certain constitutional reforms even 
though one of the two condominium Powers (namely ourselves and Egypt) objects 
to, or anyhow refuses to give its assent to, these reforms . . .. 
19. The specific points on which we should be grateful for your advice might be 
put as follows:-
(1) Could it, with reasonable prospects of success, be contended that even if the 
Condominium Agreement must be interpreted as precluding any substantial 
change in the powers of the Governor-General without the prior assent of the two 
Condominium Powers, nevertheless the present draft Ordinance is not in fact 
inconsistent with the powers of the Governor-General as laid down by that 
Agreement, and does not involve any fundamental departure from the Agreement. 
(2) Assuming the answer to the first question to be in the affirmative, could the 
Egyptians successfully argue that the proposals are nevertheless of a 
1 2nd legal adviser, FO. 2 Attorney-general. 
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constitutional character relating to the Governor-General's powers and that, in 
accordance with a tacitly accepted practice, such proposals must be submitted to 
the condominium Powers for their prior assent. It may be that, on the basis of the 
correspondence (see for instance enclosures 2 and 5), we ourselves are committed 
to that view, but it is not so certain that the Governor-General is. Could he argue 
that there is a practice by which constitutional proposals are submitted to the 
condominium Powers in advance of and not merely simultaneously with 
promulgation, but that the object of this is merely to enable them to comment, 
and that it does not in the last resort affect his power to promulgate his proposals 
as law after considering their comments. The nearest any Governor-General seems 
to have got to committing himself in this matter was a rather unfortunate 
statement by the Acting Governor-General in communicating the 
recommendations of the Sudan Administration conference to the Egyptians (vide 
paragraph 9 above) that the eventual legislation embodying these 
recommendations would be submitted to the condominium Governments "for 
their approval" (copy enclosed as Enclosure 8); but in fact when the Ordinance was 
eventually submitted it was simply "submitted" and nothing was said about assent 
or approval. 
(3) If the answer to the first question is in the negative, could it be successfully 
contended that, the Condominium Agreement is to be interpreted as not 
forbidding or rendering ultra vires a divestment or delegation on the part of the 
Governor-General of some of his legislative powers. 
(4) If the answer to the preceding question is in the negative and it has to be 
accepted that the Condominium Agreement, taken by itself, does not permit of 
such action by the Governor-General without the consent of the condominium 
Powers, could it be argued that the Egyptian Government have in fact consented 
at any rate to the principle of a delegation of powers on the part of the Governor-
General, so that, although they may retain the right to comment on his proposals, 
they cannot in the last resort block them on the ground that they do not go far 
enough. Alternatively are they, as it were, now stopped from alleging that a 
delegation of powers is in principle inconsistent with the Condominium 
Agreement. 
Minute on 154 
This question was discussed this afternoon at the House of Commons with the 
Attorney-General. The Governor-General, Mr. Sandars from the Sudan, Mr. 
Chapman-Andrews from Cairo, Mr. Michael Wright and myself were present. 
The Attorney-General stated that his view was that the Governor-General had no 
right to enact this ordinance without the assent of the two eo-domini, but that he 
would reply in writing to Mr. Fitzmaurice's letter. The view expressed by the 
Attorney-General was the same as that I had myself tentatively expressed at an 
informal meeting in my room this morning .... 
W.E.B. 
16.3.48 
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155 FO 371169157, no 1773 11 Mar 1948 
[Constitutional reform]: letter (reply) from A Shawqi, charge 
d'affaires, Egyptian embassy, to Mr Bevin, communicating the text of 
the Egyptian government's rejection of the Legislative Assembly and 
Executive Council Ordinance [Extract] 
I am instructed by His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers to make 
to you, on behalf of the Royal Egyptian Government, the following communication: 
"1. I have received Your Excellency's letter dated 15th January, 19481 in which 
you proposed that the Egyptian and British Governments should appoint 
representatives to meet forthwith, in a place to be determined later, for the purpose 
of examining the provisions of the draft ordinance enacting the reforms proposed for 
the closer association of the Sudanese with the Central Administration of the Sudan. 
2. Sir Robert Howe, Governor-General of the Sudan came to see me in Cairo on 
his way to London and handed me a letter dated 5th January, 1948,2 in which he 
referred to the modifications suggested by the Egyptian Government in connection 
with these reforms and in which he pointed out that the Ordinance he is preparing 
and which he hopes to submit to me in draft "will meet most of the modifications 
suggested." I was therefore astonished, on receiving the project dated 17th February, 
1948,3 to find that none of the modifications suggested was included in the draft 
Ordinance. 
3. The Egyptian Government wish to call attention to the fact that they have 
already explained that they consented to participate in these reforms-while fully 
maintaining their position which had been clearly defined before the Security 
Council namely the necessity of terminating the existing regime in the Sudan-only 
because they desired that the delay in settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute will not 
retard the progress of the Sudanese on the road to self-government. The Egyptian 
Government, have, therefore, noted that the modifications they have asked to 
introduce into the proposed regime were such as to provide for the Sudanese 
effective steps on the road to self-government; but the project, as already pointed out, 
fails to achieve that purpose . . .. 4 
10. The essential object envisaged by the modifications which the Egyptian 
Government wished to introduce into the proposed regime is that it should 
constitute-both in its basic principles and objectives-a transitional regime lasting 
no more than three years during which the Sudanese may be trained in self-
government through the assumption of certain key posts and through shouldering a 
part of the responsibilities of government helped along by a few Egyptians while 
Sudanese public opinion representing the elite of freely elected Sudanese who are 
truly representative of their country exercise supervision over them. Thus they will 
all effectively co-operate in directing government affairs until the transition period 
has expired, on which the Sudanese shall take over the full responsibilities of 
administration together with all government posts under the common Crown and 
within the unity of the Nile Valley. 
1 See 151. 
3 See 153. 
2 See 147, note. 
4 Paragraphs 4-9 restate the criticisms in 141. 
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We find, however, that the project fulfils none of these. Indeed, it tends, in toto 
and in detail, to extend the Governor-General's authority farther afield and stretch 
it even beyond the provisions of the 1899 Agreement; also it surrounds the 
Governor-General with mere formal bodies, without real power and bereft of any 
authority to decide on any matter. Moreover, the project has deliberately removed 
Egyptians from all touch with Sudanese affairs and excluded them from shoulder-
ing any responsibility as if they were complete strangers who care nothing about 
the Sudan. Indeed the project came to no more than to create certain posts of lim-
ited authority to be given to a number of Sudanese chosen by the Governor-
General. Thus the project falls lamentably short of the desired reforms as envisaged 
by our proposals. , 
11. The Egyptian Government have, furthermore, noted that it can be elicited 
from the preamble of the draft Ordinance that the Governor-General of the Sudan in 
Council, by virtue of the powers vested in him by the 1899 Agreement, may enact the 
proposed regime. Doubtless this is absolutely wrong for it is obvious that the 
Governor-General has no authority in this respect. 
In as much as it is certain that the 1899 Agreement does not create any separate 
international status for the Sudan as distinct from that of Egypt, it is also certain that 
this Agreement does not permit the Governor-General taking any measure affecting 
the administrative regime or legal status of the Sudan. 
12. It may be seen from the above that the project in question does not fulfil the 
principles enunciated by the Egyptian Government and does not eliminate the 
defects pointed out by them, nor does it include the essential modifications without 
which the Egyptian Government, as clearly stated before, cannot agree to the 
recommendations. On the contrary the project shows a definite tendency in certain 
provisions towards restricting the recommendations of the Conference, small 
though they may have been, and aims at extending the Governor-General's authority 
even rendering it absolute. 
13. The Egyptian Government wish to place on record in this connection that 
while they are anxious that the Sudanese should be accorded the maximum possible 
share of self-government preparatory to their assumption in the near future of full 
responsibility, the project submitted by the Sudan Government does not provide for 
the Sudanese effective steps on the road to self-government. 
14. The Egyptian Government cannot therefore, find in the proposed draft a 
suitable basis for discussion. They cannot concede to the request made by the British 
Government of calling together representatives of both Governments for the purpose 
of examining the provisions of this project. The meeting of representatives will not 
be productive-as already pointed out in our communication of 1st March-unless 
the principles enunciated by the Egyptian Government are recognised by the British 
Government. 
Finally the Egyptian Government wish to make it clear that their participation in 
drawing up this provisional regime must not be taken to mean an acceptance of the 
existing regime in the Sudan but on the contrary they fully maintain their viewpoint 
of the necessity of terminating this regime." 
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156 FO 371169193, 1872 12 Mar 1948 
'Egypt and Sudan': FO note of a meeting between Mr Bevin and Sir R 
Howe1 [Extract] 
[Other events in the Middle East (notably in Palestine) continued to press in on the FO 
throughout the controversy over constitutional reform in the Sudan, leading Camp bell to 
observe, 'a fundamental difficulty which confronts us when we tackle this problem is that 
Egypt is affected by events throughout the Arabic speaking world including the Sudan 
whereas the Sudan itself remains largely unconcerned by outside happenings. From the 
point of view of the Sudan Government it is a comparatively simple problem of 
administration which has to be solved. Their purpose is to ensure that solution reached is 
the best from the point of view of good administration and helping the Sudan to achieve 
self-government. It is not their business to worry about the effect on our position in 
Egypt and still less about the effect elsewhere in the Middle East. His Majesty's 
Government however have to bear these wider considerations in mind, for what happens 
in the Sudan is a vital factor in Anglo-Egyptian relations and these in turn affect our 
relations with every other Middle Eastern State. In fact position at present seems that we 
cannot settle with Egypt without some agreement on Sudan and that we cannot settle our 
position in the Middle East (satisfactorily at least) without Egypt' (inward telegram no 
315 from Campbell to FO, 5 Mar 1948, FO 371/69156, no 1618). 'We thus have the usual 
double deadlock: between the Co-Domini, & between Cairo & Khartoum', McDermott 
minuted. 'The only hope seems to me to discuss these matters personally with the Gov.-
Gen. & Mr. Chapman-Andrews later this week' (minute, McDermott, 8 Mar 1948, ibid) . 
Before that meeting could take place the Advisory Council accepted the draft ordinance in 
principle, 8 Mar, and the Egyptian note (see 155) was received.] 
The Secretary of State said that he was very much concerned about the Sudan 
question. Whatever suggestions he put to the Egyptians they turned down and as he 
had told the Egyptian Ambassador, he had had enough of it. He did not see how we 
could make any progress with King Farouk or Nokrashy. Nokrashy was hopeless. As 
regards the ordinance, he would welcome information on the question of timing. 
Sir R. Howe said that there was no fixed date for the promulgation of the 
ordinance but the Northern Advisory Council had pressed the Sudan Government to 
promulgate soon. He could possibly hold it up for one month. In the answer to the 
Secretary of State's question, he explained that the Northern Advisory Council 
consisted entirely of Sudanese except for the Chairman who was the Civil Secretary 
and the British nominated member. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews said that the Egyptians claimed that it was a packed 
assembly. 
Sir R. Howe explained in detail how the members of the Northern Advisory 
Council were freely appointed by the Provincial Councils, consisting entirely of 
Sudanese and how in the last resort the system was based on free elections in 
accordance with old tribal customs except that in the towns there were direct 
elections of members of the Council. In the towns, everybody paying six Egyptian 
pounds a year in rent was qualified to vote, and this covered a very large proportion. 
The Egyptians appeared to want direct elections everywhere. 
The Secretary of State commented that the Egyptians no doubt wanted elections 
as corrupt as their own. 
Sir R. Howe pointed out that the Sudan Government had offered to allow a 
. supervisory body, including Egyptians, to observe the elections. 
1 Those also present included: G E R Sandars, M R Wright, E A Chapman-Andrews, F K Roberts, D W 
Lascelles, and G L McDermott. 
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The Secretary of State emphasised the importance of this point. 
Sir R. Howe explained that the draft ordinance had been given to the members of 
the Council over a fortnight before the Council meeting of March 3rd; they had 
discussed it for four days in assembly; and they had proposed various amendments 
which would be incorporated in the ordinance. He said that copies of the ordinance 
as amended would be sent to the codomini. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews said that the Egyptians claimed that the text of the draft 
ordinance which was known to be unsatisfactory to them had been deliberately 
withheld from them while we tried to get them to negotiate an agreement on 
strategic questions etc. 
Sir R. Howe denied that there had been any such trickery. The memorandum 
which he had given to Nokrashy on January 5th2 had explained in detail the extent to 
which the Egyptian suggestions would be met in the draft ordinance. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews thought that there was room for doubt as to how far the 
draft ordinance really went to meet the Egyptian suggestions and indeed his 
impression was that it did not go very far. But admittedly, many of the Egyptian 
points which had not been met were the more unreasonable ones such as the 
insistence on the prior submission of all legislation to the codomini. 
Mr. Lascelles pointed out that H.M.G. too had made it clear that as a codominus 
they could not accept this point. 
The Secretary of State pointed out the Egyptian note just received3 again insisted 
on Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews admitted that this was contrary to the idea discussed with 
the Egyptians that this issue should be shelved. 
Sir R. Howe showed the Secretary of State a detailed list of the Egyptian 
suggestions with an account of the extent to which each one had been met in the 
draft ordinance. He suggested that they had been met to a very great extent. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews said that the crux of the matter was that the Egyptians felt 
that they should be treated as a codominus in practice, e.g. over questions such as 
representation in the Executive Council, which would enable them to play a real part 
in guiding the Sudanese. 
The Secretary of State said that matters would be different if we were dealing in 
Egypt with a decent government which really wanted to work with us. Three years 
had passed since the scheme for democratization in the Sudan had first been 
drafted, and this was a long time. The House of Commons would be asking him 
questions. The Egyptian note which had just been received was complet[e]ly 
unhelpful. 
Mr. Roberts said that the Minister of State had asked him to make the point that 
any concessions to the Egyptians at the expense of the Sudanese would be badly 
received by the House of Commons. 
The Secretary of State thought that as soon as there was a reasonable government 
in Egypt matters would improve. The objections raised by the present Egyptian 
Government were merely designed to prevent any progress. They were well aware 
that the Sudanese were not yet ready for self-government. On the supposition that 
there were a reasonable government in Egypt, what would be necessary to bring 
about an agreement? 
2 See 147. 3 See 155. 
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Mr. Chapman-Andrews thought that even with the present Egyptian Government, 
we should try one last offer: we should put it to them that if they would accept the 
ordinance, two Egyptians should have places on the Executive Council. He 
considered that Nokrashy was bound to go if we rejected the latest Egyptian note. 
The Secretary of State said that we should certainly not accept its suggestions. But 
was not King Farouk just as bad as Nokrashy over this question? 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews thought not. He thought that King Farouk was as sick of 
Nokrashy as was the Secretary of State himself. He thought that for instance Abdul 
Hadi4 might form a government and would be better than Nokrashy. The King's 
representative had told the Embassy that the sovereignty issue could be shelved 
provided that the Egyptians could have a share in the government of the Sudan, as 
was their right under the condominium. He suggested that in addition we might 
repeat the offer of the proposed tripartite Supervisory Commission. 
Sir R. Howe agreed. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews was not hopeful that the Egyptians could be persuaded to 
accept this bargain. 
The Secretary of State said that he was not prepared to do any persuading. The 
Egyptian Government had recently behaved almost like an enemy government, for 
instance in the influence they had exerted on the other Arab Governments in 
connection with treaty questions. He himself had been very patient and had even 
gone to the Anglo-Egyptian Society's dinner in unpleasant circumstances. If there 
were a chance of the Egyptians accepting the ordinance on the proposed terms, he 
would advise the Governor-General to agree on the two points mentioned. He did not 
proposed to go further than this. 
Sir R. Howe said that some Sudanese in the Northern Advisory Council had 
expressed the view that they would not object to the inclusion in the Executive 
Council of Egyptians already in the Sudan service. Mter some discussion by the 
meeting as to whether this would be preferable to the inclusion of two Egyptian 
outsiders or not the conclusion was reached that the Governor-General might 
appoint, for instance, the Egyptian Director General of Irrigation (who was, on 
occasions, already eo-opted on the Governor-General 's Council) and the Egyptian 
Town Planning Expert. 
The Secretary of State said that he was not prepared to give way to the Egyptians 
any more or to make any new offers. But if the Embassy, in conversation with the 
Egyptian authorities, could put across the proposed bargain, then the Embassy could 
agree to put it up to H.M.G. in the knowledge that it would be accepted by them and 
by the Governor-General. The Egyptian Government was one of several which 
appeared to think that Britain was down and out and could be harassed with 
impunity and the Secretary of State was not prepared to put up with this any longer. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews said that a principal Egyptian complaint was that there 
was a date in the ordinance (he thought, June 30th) by which certain nominations 
were to be made and that this looked to the Egyptians like an ultimatum. In reply to 
a question by the Secretary of State, he said that he thought it would take two or 
three weeks to see whether the new proposal would be accepted by the Egyptians. 
2 Foreign minister in Sidqi's government. 
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The Secretary of State said that this would be satisfactorily rapid, particularly if it 
implied that Nokrashy would be out of power by that time. He did not want to run 
the risk of being taken to the Security Council before we had given up the Palestine 
Mandate i.e. May 15th. He would like the Governor-General to fit in with this timing. 
Egypt would have other matters to worry about after May 15th. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews did not think that the Egyptian Government were likely to 
go back to the Security Council on the Sudan issue on which they had met with little 
success last time. 
The Secretary of State said that nevertheless the Soviet Government might 
encourage them to do so. He did not want to delay the ordinance much beyond May 
15th. 
Sir R. Howe said that he might be under great pressure by the Sudanese to 
promulgate before that date. 
The Secretary of State said that the ordinance should in any case be held up for 
three weeks at the end of which we could see how matters had developed in Egypt 
and whether for instance Nokrashy had gone. There was of course no question of 
reviving the offer of an Anglo---Egyptian Committee to consider the ordinance since 
the Egyptian Government had turned it down. 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews said that the Embassy would do their best but might well 
fail. 
The Secretary of State said that it would be a shock to him if they succeeded. 
Sir R. Howe specified that the Tripartite Committee, which was to be mentioned in 
the new offer to the Egyptians was the one first mooted two years ago and again 
mentioned in the Secretary of State's Four-Point Programme.5 
Mr. Chapman-Andrews thought that the Egyptian Government might take the 
question to the Hague Court though, as he had said, probably not to the Security 
Council. He suggested that the opinion of the Attorney General for which the 
Foreign Office had asked, 6 should be awaited. 
The Secretary of State did not think that the Egyptian Government would take the 
matter to the Hague court. If they did the ordinance could still be put into force 
provisionally. 
Mr. Lascelles suggested that the Foreign Office could help the Governor General 
to find reasons for delay by informing him, when they received the ordinance, that 
while they regarded it favourably in a general sense, they required some time to 
consider it in detail. 
Sir R. Howe said in answer to a question by the Secretary of State that if it had 
been a question of going straight ahead in accordance with normal procedure he 
would expect to be promulgating the ordinance in about one month from now. 
The Secretary of State said that the Governor General should not commit himself 
definitely to promulgation in a month; in about three weeks' time, we should be able 
to see the situation more clearly . . . . 7 
5 See 150. 6 See 154. 
7 For the remainder of the document, concerning the defence treaty, see BDEEP series B, vol 4, J Kent, ed, 
Egypt and the defence of the Middle East, part 1, 115. 
322 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [157] 
157 FO 371/69157, no 1963 17 Mar 1948 
[Constitutional reform]: letter (reply) from Sir H Shawcross toW E 
Beckett concerning restrictions on the governor-general's ability to 
institute constitutional reform under the condominium agreement 
In the light of our consultation on Tuesday/ I have given further thought to the 
question how far the Governor General of the Sudan is entitled, under the 
Condominium Agreement of 1899, to introduce constitutional changes in the Sudan 
in spite of the objection of one of the two Condominium Powers. I regret, however, 
that I have not been able to reach a conclusion differing from the one I tentatively 
formed on Fitzmaurice's letter. 
The language of Article 4 of the Condominium Agreement2 is no doubt wide, but 
regard must be had to the expressed purpose of the Agreement, which was to enable 
the two Condominium Powers to share in the future government of the Sudan, and I 
think also to the general circumstances, of which one is that legal sovereignty 
probably still resides in Egypt. 
In my view the intention and effect of the Agreement was to create a delegation of 
legislative functions from the Sovereign Power (Egypt), with the concurrence of the 
Power which had assisted in the reconquest of the territories (Great Britain), to an 
officer who was acceptable to both of them. There would no doubt have been strong 
objection to giving legislative powers to any representative assembly at the time the 
Condominium Agreement was entered into, and it is difficult to think that either of 
the Condominium Powers contemplated that the officer to whom they were 
delegating legislative authority would, without their concurrence, have power 
himself to delegate to a representative Assembly. I think the true view is that the 
Agreement is subject to an implied term that the Governor General may do nothing 
inconsistent with its own provisions, and that the Condominium Powers having 
provided that legislative powers should vest in him, the Governor-General has no 
authority to vest them in someone else, to share them or to fetter his own exercise of 
them. 
To accord to the Governor General a power to make fundamental changes of a 
constitutional nature seems to me to be inconsistent with the expressed terms of the 
Condominium Agreement and contrary to its intention of enabling both 
Governments to share in the development of the Government of the Sudan. Once, 
however, that view is conceded, one is faced by the dilemma that either the present 
proposals do give some effective legislative powers to the Assembly which it is 
proposed to set up, in which event they derogate pro tanto from the powers vested in 
the Governor General, or they do not, in which case they are illusory and hardly 
justify the precipitation of a dispute with the Egyptian Government in which that 
Government will, indeed, contend that that is their very objection to the proposals. 
I think the true view is that the proposals are not wholly illusory. Their effect is 
that so long as the proposed arrangements continued in operation, Government 
legislation will normally be initiated by the council and passed by the Assembly 
before coming to the Governor General for his assent. The combined result of 
1 See 154. 2 See Appendix, part I. 
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Articles 19 and 50(6) is no doubt that the Governor General retains a power to 
legislate without the concurrence of either the Council or the Assembly, but this he 
can only exercise if and when one or other or both the two bodies have failed to pass 
legislation which he considers ought to be enacted. The proposed machinery does, in 
my view, therefore, effect a substantial delegation of powers which under the 
Agreement are vested in him alone to a tripartite legislature of which he is only one 
part, albeit the most powerful. Nor do I think that the Governor General's right 
under Article 63(1) to resume the exclusive exercise of legislative power greatly 
affects the matter. Whatever the legal position may be, the political implications of 
giving a share in legislative powers to a representative Assembly are considerable. 
Once such powers are given, they cannot easily be taken away, and their existence 
forms a severe fetter on the otherwise restricted discretion of the Governor General. 
I do not consider that the willingness of the Egyptian Government to concur in 
more far reaching proposals affects the legal position. The Egyptian Government is 
entitled to say that, whilst rejecting the present proposals as inadequate and likely, 
once established, to retard the establishment of full self government, it would be 
prepared to concur in a more complete delegation or in the emancipation of the 
Sudan. The making of a more far reaching counter offer does not in law involve any 
acceptance of the original proposal. The maxim that half a loaf is better than no 
bread is not one which has any legal recognition in these circumstances. 
I am fortified in my view as to the construction of the 1899 Agreement by the fact 
that on the 14th November, 1909, Sir Eldon Gorst,3 in a letter to the Foreign Office 
which may or may not be available to the Egyptians, conceded that the prior assent of 
the Egyptian Government was required in respect of a less significant constitutional 
change then proposed, and that on the 15th January of this year the Foreign Office, 
in a letter to the Egyptian Ambassador about the present proposals, expressly stated 
that the Governor General could not promulgate them without the consent of the 
Condominium Powers.4 It would be highly embarrassing if the British Government 
had to resile from the position taken up in these letters, to the latter of which at least 
the International Court would be entitled to look in arriving at a proper 
interpretation of the Treaty. 
My conclusion on the whole matter is, therefore, that, in the event of the proposed 
ordinance being promulgated by the Governor General, the Egyptian Government 
would be entitled to raise the matter in the Security Council, and that if it were 
eventually referred to the International Court (as the Security Council may well 
recommend), the probability (although the contrary view is by no means 
unarguable) is that that Court would come to the conclusion that the Egyptian 
Government's interpretation of the powers of the Governor General under Article 4 
of the Condominium Agreement was correct, in which case we should find it difficult 
to avoid agreeing to the termination of his appointment. 
I must therefore answer the specific questions put to me in Fitzmaurice's letter as 
follows:-
1. I do not think that this argument would be successful. 
2. I think it could be argued that, even if the Governor General had powers to 
make constitutional changes, a practice had arisen binding the two Condominium 
3 HBM's agent and consul-general to Egypt, 1907-1911. 4 See 151. 
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Powers that such changes would be the subject of prior agreement between them. 
Although the Governor General might not himself be bound by this practice, the 
fact that His Majesty's Government had concurred in and supported his action, 
which would hardly be unknown, would involve a breach of this practice and no 
doubt give rise to a dispute in the Security Council. 
3. I do not think that the argument in favour of the existence of power to delegate, 
although possible, would succeed. 
4. No. 
158 FO 371/69251, no 2299 21 Mar 1948 
[Railway strike]: SPIS series 1948, no 2, report for Feb- Mar [Extract] 
[Shortly after the January strike ended (see 152) Robertson warned that another strike 
was imminent and outlined the military and disciplinary measures being prepared to 
meet it (inward telegram no 9 from Robertson to Sudan agents, 14 Feb 1948, FO 
371/69235, no 1148). He also noted confidentially: ' . .. we think there is outside influence 
behind our labour troubles because we don't think the Sudanese could run such a show 
themselves: we suspect British communists [among the British railwaymen at Atbara], 
have no evidence, but are trying to get it' (letter from Robertson to Mayall, 14 Feb 1948, 
FO 371/69235, no 1227). The Foreign Office took a different line on the Sudan's labour 
troubles and advised: 'To be frank, it looks from here as though more rapid action to meet 
worker's grievances as far as possible might be well worth while in the long run even if it 
costs money now. Conversely, military action and prosecution of strikers might have 
regrettable long-term effects even if their immediate results appeared good. As you know 
there are many people in Egypt and elsewhere ready to misrepresent the Sudan 
Government's actions' (outward telegram no 53 from Lascelles to Robertson, 27 Feb 
1948, FO 371169235, no 1148). Robertson explained the delay in setting up an 
independent committee: 'In the absence of labour machinery we had to give management 
reasonable time to enquire into grievances before setting up Independent Committee' 
(inward telegram no 55 from Robertson to Lascelles, 2 Mar 1948, FO 371/69235, no 
1519). On 1 Mar the WAA announced a strike beginning on 16 Mar if their demands were 
not met in full .] 
General situation of the country 
27. It is clear that the next six months will be as difficult as anything we have 
had to put up with since the end of the war. The proposed cuts in the Sudan's quota 
of heavy oils will hit all sections of the community, and will have a grave effect upon 
the economic position of the country as a whole. The main consumers of heavy oil 
at this time of year are the Syndicate ginning factories and mechanical ploughing 
machines, and any cuts made there will have an obvious effect, the first immediate 
and the second on the future productivity of the land. Cuts on pump scheme con-
sumption will cause financial loss to owners and to their tenantry and labour, as 
well as reducing cash crops and food crops, and probably involving heavy purchase 
of grain for the Northern Province. In addition the closing down or reduction of 
output in minor industries, which has already begun, will cause unemployment and 
distress. 
These cuts will therefore produce a situation in which public discontent is more 
likely to contribute to general unrest than at any previous time. 
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The railway strike 
28. With this prospect ahead, the country has now been plunged, quite 
unnecessarily, into a Railway strike. There seemed at one time to be every hope that 
moderate counsels would prevail. The Workers' Mfairs Association agreed to 
postpone their proposed strike in February and to co-operate with the Independent 
Committee which was set up to investigate their grievances. The sympathetic 
attitude adopted by this Committee appears, however, to have encouraged the 
hotheads to imagine that their grievances could be met in full without further delay, 
and in spite of pressure from public opinion, voiced not only in the press but by a 
series of unofficial delegations to Atbara, the Association decided at the eleventh 
hour to strike on March 16th, a fortnight before the Committee's report could be 
presented, after which the Government had promised its decision within 10 days. 
Public opinion has condemned the strike as being unnecessary and this 
condemnation may prove valuable as the price of food-stuffs and other necessities 
rises. It is a clear advantage that the blame for the hardship which is to be inflicted 
on the community should rest fairly and squarely upon the head of the workers and 
not upon the Government, who have demonstrably done everything possible to avert 
it. 
29. In spite of this, however, sympathetic one-day and two-day strikes have been 
staged by workers of the Sudan Irrigation Department and the Public Works 
Department. The Atbara Conservancy men wished also to come out but were asked to 
stay at work by the Workers' Mfairs Association . . . . 
159 FO 371169251, no 3106 19 Apr 1948 
[Railway strike ]: SPIS series 1948, no 3, report for Mar-Apr [Extract] 
[The strike was not resolved until after the independent committee's report was presented 
and acted upon. Even though earlier allegations of communist influence among the 
railway workers proved unfounded, the government insisted that full blame for the strike 
rested with labour: 'The Government has possibly been slow off the mark in dealing with 
railwaymen's demands for representation. Labour here has, however, as yet no experience 
of conciliation machinery and present labour organisation has not yet discovered how to 
negotiate or even discuss their problems in a reasonable way' (inward telegram no 80 
from Howe to Bevin, 30 Mar 1948, FO 371/69251, no 2228).] 
. .. The Railway strike lasted for a month. Public opinion, while recognising that to 
strike before the Independent Committee had been able to produce its report was an 
act of folly, has none the less tended to put the major portion of the blame upon the 
central government, on the grounds that it delayed so long its investigation of the 
railwaymen's grievances. The Committee's report and the concessions granted have 
confirmed the feeling that the grievances were legitimate. This is important because 
the W .A.A. showed throughout the strike that they were very sensitive to public 
opinion, and public opinion regards the government's award as being fair on the 
whole. It would not therefore have countenanced a continuation of the strike, but 
neither would it have countenanced action on the government's part to punish those 
responsible, other than by routine disciplinary action for breach of administrative 
regulations . ... 
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160 FO 371/69159, no 2682 19 Apr 1948 
[Constitutional reform]: outward telegram no 506 from FO to EA 
Chapman-Andrews relaying the text of Abd al-Fattah Amr's letter 
proposing Egyptian participation in Sudanese constitutional reforms 
[The attorney general 's opinion (see 157) left few options open other than to play for time 
until May, when the ending of Britain's mandate in Palestine was likely to preoccupy 
Egypt and the Security Council. In early April al-Nuqrashi's government was further 
shaken by strikes among police cadets and junior officers and disorders in Alexandria and 
elsewhere, raising the possibility that al-Nuqrashi would soon resign, but also that a new 
initiative to resolve the Sudan issue might make some headway (inward telegram no 418 
from Campbell to FO, 5 Apr 1948, FO 371/69158, no 2358). In the meantime Chapman-
Andrews had taken the occasion of Amr Pasha's temporary return to Cairo to begin 
informal and unofficial discussions with the Egyptian ambassador, exploring a possible 
formula which Egypt could present to Britain as a way out of the diplomatic impasse 
(letter from Chapman-Andrews to Amr Pasha, 28 Mar 1948, FO 371/69158, no 2427). 
Both Amr and Chapman-Andrews agreed a text, and even though it was an 'unofficial' 
letter, Amr sought and obtained the approval of the minister of foreign affairs, the chief of 
the Royal Cabinet, and the rest of the council of ministers beforehand. Al-Nuqrashi alone 
was reported to be holding out (inward telegram no 438 from Campbell to FO, 8 Apr 
1948, FO 371/69158, no 2427). The final text, which was reported to be harsher in tone 
than that originally read to Chapman-Andrews in Cairo (inward telegram no 493 from 
Campbell to FO, 22 Apr 1948, FO 371/69160, no 2768), was delivered to the FO after Amr 
returned to London.] 
Following is text of letter from Amr Pasha to Chapman Andrews dated 17th April 
about the Sudan. Original is being sent to you by air bag. 
Begins: I thank you for your letter of the 28th March in which you were good 
enough to set out your views on the present Anglo-Egyptian situation regarding the 
Sudan, in the light of your visit to London. 
2. This letter, like yours to me, is also personal, confidential, quite unofficial and 
equally inspired by the same spirit of cooperation and friendship. 
3. I can assure you that the Egyptian Government never meant by their last reply 
to close the door of understanding against the establishment of free institutions in 
the Sudan, to ensure the speedy progress of the Sudanese towards self-government. 
The Egyptian Government's policy is founded on the basis of the unity between 
Egypt and the Sudan under the common Crown of Egypt, with the Sudanese 
undertaking full self-government within that unity, and with every effort being made 
for their attaining that stage at the earliest possible opportunity. The Egyptian 
Government had no other object in view when they sent their modifications to the 
British Government. The Egyptian Government expected that the Governor-
General's draft ordinance would meet these modifications, as already promised by 
him, but on finding out that he failed to meet even the most essential of these 
modifications, they sent their reply of 11th March/ not to close the door of 
understanding, but to put matters in their proper perspective. 
4. The Egyptian Government are still of the opinion that the Anglo-Egyptian 
dispute on the Sudan Question should not retard the progress of the Sudanese, for 
any period, on the road to self-government. 
5. I feel that the suggestions set down in your letter may be regarded as a step 
1 See 155. 
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forward in response to the Egyptian modifications. I have no doubt that this step 
from the British side will be met with due consideration on the Egyptian side. 
6. This step is summed up in the following three proposals:-
( a) The Governor-General will agree to nominate two Egyptians already serving in 
the Sudan to the Executive Council. 
(b) There should be an Anglo-Egyptian committee to supervise the elections. 
(c) There should be an Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese standing committee to 
supervise the development of the Sudanese towards full self-government. 
7. While I do not wish to minimise the value of these proposals, I must not 
conceal from you that they have given rise to several remarks which I feel anxious to 
point out to you, personally, confidentially and unofficially. 
8. The problem at the moment is that the Egyptian side does not feel that it is 
being permitted to play a full part in the progress of the Sudan. All those with whom 
I discussed this question feel that it is not sufficiently appreciated in Great Britain 
how vitally the Sudan Problem affects Egypt and how powerfully it influences the 
minds of the Egyptian people as a whole, a fact which no Egyptian Government is in 
a position to ignore. 
9. Apropos the first proposal in your letter, I cannot but welcome the principle of 
Egyptians participating in the Executive Council. It is natural that they will have the 
same standing and number as the British on the said Council, in order to give effect 
to the Egyptian Government's responsibility for preparing the Sudanese for self-
government. And, since they will have that standing and will be serving under the 
Sudan Government, I do not think that there will be any objection to their being 
nominated by the Governor-General who is appointed by a Royal Egyptian Decree for 
the Administration of the Sudan. 
10. I am also in favour of the idea of setting up an Anglo- Egyptian Committee to 
supervise the elections. I am sure that its composition and competence will provide 
an adequate guarantee for the proper representation of Sudanese public opinion. 
11. There is one important point which has particularly attracted my attention. 
It is stated in your letter that for the proposed constitutional regime in the Sudan, 
His Majesty's Government have in mind something nearer twenty-five years than 
three years. I should like to be perfectly clear on this point in order to obviate the 
possibility of any misunderstanding in the future. This regime is naturally meant to 
be a provisional regime under which the Sudanese may progressively govern 
themselves, not a dual regime which may be interpreted as an agreement between 
Egypt and Britain to govern the Sudan for as long as possible. Egypt, on her part, 
does not wish to govern the Sudanese but, on the contrary, she looks forward to the 
first opportunity of handing over the responsibilities of government to the Sudanese. 
She has, therefore, made it as basis of her policy to speed up the training of the 
Sudanese in self-government so that they may go through this stage in the shortest 
possible time. In the estimation of the Egyptian Government, three years are just 
about ample to achieve this purpose. Should the first experiment of the system 
agreed upon prove successful, it would be possible on the expiration of the three 
years period to reconsider the extension of the powers of the free institutions which 
are now being set up, with a view to securing fuller responsibilities of self-
government for the Sudanese. 
12. I do not wish, on the other hand, to conceal from you that the Egyptian 
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Government hope for a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute regarding the 
Sudan in the course of these three years, for they believe that a settlement of this 
dispute would be certain to drive away the clouds overshadowing the relations 
between the two countries. 
13. I am bound to stress the point that any regime set up for the Sudan can only 
be a provisional one and can in no way affect the substance of the dispute between 
Egypt and Britain regarding the Sudan. 
14. I am also of the opinion that the proposals outlined in your letter pave the 
way for submitting a draft ordinance of the proposed reforms for the association of 
the Sudanese with the Central Administration of the Sudan to the joint Committee 
of Egyptian and British representatives to which His Majesty's Government have 
referred in their note of 15th January last,2 for considering the said draft and making 
recommendations in connexion therewith to the Egyptian and British Governments. 
15. It would be possible when this committee is held to submit to it the question 
of the safeguards of public freedoms and the question of legislations enacted by the 
Governor-General, which of these legislations need be approved by the Egyptian 
Government before being promulgated and which of them need no such measure. 
16. As the British Government have not as yet stated their views concerning the 
draft ordinance of the constitutional reforms, I believe that, should the proposals 
outlined by you be incorporated in His Majesty's Government's reply, it would afford 
the Egyptian Government an opportunity to announce their readiness to send 
representatives to the joint committee for the above purpose. 
17. I am thoroughly convinced that, with good faith and as long as the interest of 
the Sudanese themselves is the object of the two Governments, nothing can stand in 
the way of agreement. I earnestly hope that the cloud which cast a shadow on the 
relations between the two countries will soon be dispelled, leaving a clear 
atmosphere for them to regain those happy relations which formerly prevailed, and 
pave the way before them to complete agreement. Ends. 
2 See 151. 
161 FO 371169160, no 2972 1 May 1948 
[Constitutional reform]: letter (reply) from Mr Bevin to Abd al-Fattah 
Amr, welcoming Egyptian participation in Sudanese constitutional 
reform 
[Prior to the receipt of Amr's letter (see 160) Campbell had advised that HMG's official 
reply to the 11 Mar note (see 155) should avoid giving a detailed counter-proposal (inward 
telegram no 418 from Campbell to FO, 5 Apr 1948, FO 371/69158, no 2358). In the 
knowledge that a new, and probably more favourable proposal was being drafted, even 
Khartoum advised that HMG's reply 'should be couched in general terms' (inward 
telegram no 90 from Robertson to Lascelles, 10 Apr 1948, FO 371/69159, no 2486). The 
text of Amr's letter, when it arrived, was a disappointment. Clutton commented: 'In short, 
what has happened is this. We proposed to the Egyptians that if they accepted the draft 
Ordinance, we would see that two Egyptians were nominated to the Executive Council, 
and set up an Anglo-Egyptian Committee to supervise the election to the Legislative 
Assembly and an Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Commission to supervise Sudan progress 
towards self-government. The Egyptians have replied to this that if these three 
concessions are granted to them in a manner much more favourable than we proposed 
(e.g. four Egyptians and not two on the Executive Council), they will agree that an 
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Anglo-Egyptian Committee should study the draft ordinance and such other matters as 
what legislation enacted by the Governor-General should be referred to the Egyptian 
Government for its consent' (minute by Clutton, 24 Apr 1948, FO 371/69160, no 2768). 
Despite British dissatisfaction with certain 'objectionable passages' in Amr's letter, 
Bevin's reply followed the initial advice of both Cairo and Khartoum in keeping to 
generalities.] 
I have given most careful consideration to the views contained in the Note of the 
Egyptian Charge d'Mfaires in London of March 11th. It is the earnest desire of His 
Majesty's Government to reach an agreement with the Egyptian Government on this 
issue. I am happy to learn that it is not the intention of the Egyptian Government to 
close the door of understanding. I am writing to Your Excellency now in the same 
spirit, and with the confident hope that a happy solution will be reached which will 
be acceptable to both our governments. 
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Governor-General has 
carefully re-examined the terms of the proposed Ordinance in the light of the views 
expressed by the Egyptian Government. The Ordinance in its final form embodies a 
number of amendments specially intended to meet the criticisms by the Egyptian 
Government of the original proposals. 
It has been suggested that the effect of the Ordinance would be to confer upon the 
Governor-General powers which he does not at present possess. I am able to assure 
Your Excellency that this is not the intention or meaning of the Ordinance. I hope 
that this assurance that the Ordinance does not, as had apparently been understood, 
involve any enlargement of the Governor-General's powers will help to bring our 
views closer together. 
His Majesty's Government have given special thought to the desire of the Egyptian 
Government, as expressed in paragraph 8 of the Note of March 11th from the 
Egyptian Charge d'Mfaires in London, that Egypt should undertake an important 
part in preparing the Sudanese for self-government during the transition period. His 
Majesty's Government have certain suggestions to make in response to the wishes of 
the Egyptian Government. 
His Majesty's Government are happy to learn that the Egyptian Government are in 
agreement that a committee should be set up forthwith, which will consist of one 
Egyptian and one British representative, with the object of reaching agreement on 
the question of the Ordinance. The committee may also talk over suggestions which, 
as stated in paragraph 4 above, His Majesty's Government have had it in mind to 
discuss. His Majesty's Government are also glad that the two governments are in 
agreement that the committee should conclude its work within a very short time and 
not later than three weeks. 
162 FO 371169166, no 3915 2 June 1948 
'Anglo-Egyptian conversations on the Sudan': minute by G L Clutton 
on constitutional reform 
[Following Amr's letter (see 160) and Bevin's reply (see 161) Campbell entered into 
negotiations with Khashaba Pasha to obtain Egyptian approval for the draft ordinance. 
The impending Arab-Israeli war, following the declaration of the state of Israel in May 
meant that Khashaba's time was fully occupied with the Palestine crisis and he was 
unable to press the Sudan case in Cabinet or overcome al-Nuqrashi's opposition. The 
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crisis strengthened al-Nuqrashi's domestic position, at least temporarily, and Britain 
could no longer hope for his removal (inward telegram no 803 from Campbell to FO, 7 
June 1948, FO 371/69166, no 3947). Britain kept extending its deadline to Egypt for a 
response, but pressure in both the Sudan and the House of Commons meant that a 
decision to promulgate unilaterally had to be taken. Bevin made a statement in the House 
on 14 June, in answer to a written question, permitting the governor-general to begin the 
procedure of promulgation. The ordinance was passed on 15 June and published in the 
Sudan Gazette on 19 June.] 
Conversations have been proceeding in Cairo since May lOth between His Majesty's 
Ambassador and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Mfairs in an attempt to secure 
Egyptian approval of the draft Ordinance for constitutional reform in the Sudan. In 
return for Egyptian approval we were prepared to offer:-
(i) two nominated Egyptian members on the Executive Council; 
(ii) an Anglo-Egyptian Committee to supervise the elections to the Legislative 
Assembly; 
(iii) an Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Committee to supervise the Sudan's progress 
towards self-government. 
In view of the agitation in the Sudan for the early introduction of the proposed 
constitutional reform, His Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to report success or 
failure by May 24th. Just before this date Sir Ronald Campbell reported that he 
thought agreement could be reached on all points except the number and status of 
the Egyptian members of the Executive Council. The Egyptians were pressing hard 
that the Egyptian members should have the same status as the four British members, 
i.e. that they should be heads of departments inside the Sudan administration. This 
we could not agree to because we are pledged to the Sudanese not to introduce 
Egyptians into the actual administration, i.e. the Civil Service. In an attempt to meet 
the Egyptian point of view Sir Ronald Campbell was authorised as a last resort to 
offer in addition to the two nominated members of the Executive Council a third seat 
for the senior Staff Officer of the Egyptian Forces in the Sudan who would attend 
meetings of the Council whenever defence matters were discussed. It was stipulated, 
however, that as the British members retired from the Council in measure as 
Sudanese replaced them, the Egyptian members, after equality of numbers had been 
reached, should retire pari passu with the British. 
This last offer was put to the Egyptians on May 28th and on May 30th the Minister 
for Foreign Mfairs stated that he accepted the offer and that as far as he was 
concerned full agreement had been reached. On the other hand, his agreement was 
subject to ratification by the Egyptian Cabinet. 
The Egyptian Minister for Foreign Mfairs has been canvassing his colleagues and 
we have information to show that agreement on the lines reached with Sir Ronald 
Campbell has the support of the majority of the Cabinet. Nokrashi Pasha, the Prime 
Minister, has, however, shown himself opposed to the agreement because it does not 
give the Egyptian members of the Executive Council identity of status with the 
British. We cannot meet him on this point, firstly because of our pledge to the 
Sudanese, and secondly because any attempt to do so would lead to the complete 
boycotting of the reforms by the Sudanese themselves and therefore land us in chaos. 
In the meantime the Minister for Foreign Mfairs has gone to Amman and Sir 
Ronald Campbell has been authorised to extend the time-limit for the final Egyptian 
reply up to 48 hours after his return to Egypt. In view of Nokrashi Pasha's opposition 
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it is, however, quite on the cards that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be 
repudiated. In this case we shall probably have to authorise the Governor-General to 
promulgate the Ordinance without Egyptian approval. This, in the official opinion of 
the Attorney-General, would be an illegal act on his part. On the other hand, our case 
in equity would be a strong one and in view of the importance of British friendship to 
Egypt at the present juncture it seems unlikely that the Egyptians would take the 
case to an international body, and they would most likely only register a protest. 
163 FO 371169232, no 4348 22 June 1948 
[Nile Waters]: FO minutes of an inter-departmental meeting 
[Following requests for clarification of Egyptian proposals for projects in the Nile 
headwaters (see 55, 62, 63), inter-governmental meetings were held at Nairobi, 25 Nov 
1947, and Entebbe, 17 Feb 1947, to discuss Nile control and Lake Victoria. The East 
African governors gave preliminary consent to Egyptian proposals to raise Lake Victoria's 
level by three metres (letter from W G Wilson (CO) to G L McDermott (FO), 11 Mar 1948, 
FO 371/69231, no 1763). Uganda and Egypt were considering two projects: a hydro-
electric power scheme of either 90,000 or 120,000 kilowatts at Owen Falls, and the raising 
of the level of Lake Albert to act as a storage reservoir for increased water from a raised 
Lake Victoria. Egypt was reluctant to participate in the full 120,000 kilowatt hydro-
electric scheme, but had agreed to pay Uganda compensation for loss of power if it 
implemented the lesser scheme (minute by Alien, 'Nile Waters', 4 May 1948, FO 
371/96231, no 3182) . The Sudan was directly concerned with Egypt over a variety of Nile 
Waters issues, including proposals to construct the Jonglei Canal (see 29, 41, 45) and a 
dam at the source of the Blue Nile at Lake Tsana (see 24, 27, 32, 39, 45). Negotiations 
with Ethiopia over the latter had been stalled by Egypt's objections to the Sudan's 
participation (see 142). The Sudan government was particularly anxious that their 
satisfactory relations with the Egyptian government on technical matters not be 
disturbed by entangling Nile Waters negotiations (especially concerning Lake Tsana) in 
the existing Anglo-Egyptian dispute (Chick to Clutton, 10 May 1948, FO 371169231, no 
3308). All these proposals required Britain's mediation of conflicting needs between 
Uganda and the Sudan, as well as co-ordination of negotiations with Egypt and Ethiopia. 
Clutton commented: 'I am not wholly clear in my mind how far the Victoria-Albert 
project, plus the Jonglei Canal, will give the Sudan an extra water entitlement. This is a 
point on which we require clarification. In any case I think the days have really passed 
when one territory in Africa can consider its interests alone. Our policy today is to 
develop Africa as a unit to relieve not our but Europe's dependence on dollar imports. The 
Uganda Government must therefore, when necessary, subordinate her particular 
interests to the common good' (Clutton, minute, 17 June 1948, FO 371/69232, no 3625).] 
Mr. Galsworthy1 said that a new despatch had just been received from Uganda 
reporting that the Egyptians were backing out of the agreement to compensate 
Uganda. The Colonial Office also expected another despatch recommending that 
Uganda should go ahead with the full120,000 kilowatt scheme. 
Mr. Allan2 said in reply to a question that the Sudan was closely concerned in both 
the Equatorial and Lake Tsana projects. The Equatorial combined scheme for storage 
and power would imply that, in Egypt's interests, parts of the south and central 
Sudan would be alternately flooded and uncovered, and that some 600,000 
inhabitants and 1,000,000 cattle would have to be installed elsewhere. There would 
also be occasional excess floods in the Sudan. That was why she needed excess flood 
1 AN Galsworthy, assistant secretary, CO, head of International Relations Dept. 
2 See 39, note 1. 
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storage in Lake Albert up to 18.5 metres at Butiaba, which even so was only just 
enough but could be accepted subject to review in twenty years time. Egypt, like the 
Sudan, would have preferred 20 metres but Uganda could not agree. Egypt would 
have to pay compensation to the Sudan for the resettlement of the displaced 
population. The Sudan felt strongly that the Nile Waters question must be treated as 
a whole, or at any rate that no measures must be taken which did not safeguard the 
Sudan's interests (as well as Uganda's-compare paragraph 27 of the Governor of 
Uganda's despatch No. 2 of the lOth May). The Sudan would benefit by the long term 
improvement of conditions in the south Sudan, although for tactical reasons this 
should not be emphasised at present. Mr. Allan felt that the right tactics to follow 
were to base all discussions on the Nile Waters agreements and to suggest the 
necessary supplementary agreements rather than fresh agreements replacing the 
original ones. In reply to a question he said that it was possible for the Egyptians to 
delay all progress but they for their part could not carry out works in the Sudan 
without the agreement of the local authorities, and this was a bargaining point on 
our side. He agreed that the Lake Tsana scheme was not really of any benefit to the 
Sudan without extra entitlements in the wet season. 
Mr. Glutton commented that the important point was that the whole question, 
including Lake Tsana, must be dealt with comprehensively, as the Sudan's position 
might otherwise be prejudiced. 
Mr. Allan said that it would be physically possible for the Sudan to draw the 
necessary water even if no agreement with Egypt were reached on Lake Tsana, but 
that this would be very unsatisfactory. 
Mr. Galsworthy pointed out that we must eventually get Ethiopian agreement on 
Lake Tsana and that the Ethiopian Government were likely to use this as a 
bargaining counter in connexion with the ex-Italian Colonies.3 
Mr. Glutton agreed that this would be so, at any rate until the General Assembly of 
the United Nations in December, but he thought that the Ethiopian attitude would 
change for the better after that. 
Mr. Galsworthy feared that the Ethiopian Government might continue to be 
obstructive as long as the question of the ex-Italian Colonies was in the balance. 
Although he understood why the question of the Nile Waters must be treated 
comprehensively, it seemed that Uganda's interests must suffer as a result. 
Mr. Allan said that in practice it would be very difficult to get results on all aspects 
of the question at once. Our object should be to enable Uganda to go ahead soon but 
without prejudicing the comprehensive scheme. 
This was generally agreed. 
Mr. Allan suggested that Uganda might be able to carry out the larger, combined, 
scheme but only operate the smaller scheme until Egypt had agreed to come in. The 
difficulty was that this would cost Uganda, at a rough estimate, £200,000 extra, 
although Egypt would be called on to pay this eventually if she came in. Certain 
Egyptians opposed schemes situated very far from Egypt and proposed schemes in 
the Sudan instead, on the grounds that Egypt could have closer control of them, but 
in fact there was no satisfactory substitute for the Equatorial projects which were 
3 Proposals for the disposal of the Italian colonies, including Eritrea and Somali land, were in the process of 
being decided by the UN. See BDEEP series A, vol 2, R Hyam, ed, The Labour government and the end of 
empire 1945- 1951, part 3, 283- 318. 
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necessary for the full development of the Nile basin. Both Egypt and the Sudan really 
needed the Lake Tsana scheme most. 
Mr. Grawforcf said that if His Majesty's Government or Uganda took any type of 
unilateral action the Egyptians would make a tremendous fuss about it. 
Mr. Allan said that the smaller Uganda scheme had been discussed with the 
Egyptian technicians and they had never complained that it was contrary to the Nile 
Waters agreement. 
Mr. McDermott said that Egyptian politicians might nevertheless do so on the 
grounds that it was obstructing or delaying the larger scheme which would be of 
benefit to Egypt. 
Mr. Allan said in reply to a question that the Sudan would not agree that action 
should now be taken on the lines suggested in the Governor of Uganda's despatch of 
the lOth May and the Colonial Office's letter of the 18th June because adequate 
safeguards would not be provided for the Sudan. Khartoum would be wanting to 
comment. 
Mr. McDermott suggested that it was necessary to await Khartoum's comments 
and the new Uganda despatch before making any approach to the Egyptians. 
This was agreed. 
Mr. Glutton emphasised that Uganda should not take any action liable to upset the 
Nile Waters arrangements as a whole either technically or politically. 
Mr. McDermott said in reply to a question that it could be said that Uganda was 
called on to spend an extra £200,000 in order to make it easier for comprehensive 
Nile Waters arrangements to be made. He suggested that a case for a contribution by 
H.M.G. might be put to the Treasury. 
Mr. Allan volunteered the personal opinion that the Sudan might contribute. He 
pointed out that Egypt would not benefit from the proposed new arrangements until 
she agreed to pay her share. 
It was agreed that the Colonial Office would telegraph to the Governor of Uganda 
asking for his latest views. 
Mr. Glutton said that the Belgian Government should be brought in at the earliest 
possible stage though this did not mean immediately since the present position was 
confused. The Foreign Office would investigate the question whether the Belgian 
Government had any special treaty rights to intervene in Nile Waters arrangements. 
4 W F Crawford, head of British Middle East Development Division, FO, 1948-1960. 
164 FO 371169233, no 6258 17 Sept 1948 
[Nile Waters]: FO minutes of an inter-departmental meeting with Sir 
J Hall and Sir R Campbell 
[The Uganda government's opposition to linking negotiations over the Equatorial Nile 
Project with the Lake Tsana scheme hardened, citing their fear that Egypt, having already 
started a quarrel over the latter, would refuse to agree to the former (record of FO 
meeting, 14 Sept 1948, FO 371/69233, no 6224).] 
A meeting to discuss the desirability or otherwise of presenting the Equatorial Nile 
and the Lake Tana Projects jointly in our proposed approach to the Egyptian 
Government was held at the Foreign Office on the 17th September ... . 
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Sir John Hall stated that the Government of Uganda and the Colonial Office 
considered it undesirable that the two schemes should be linked in our approach to 
the Egyptian Government for the following reasons:-
(a) The Egyptians had already raised the Sudan constitutional issue in connexion 
with the Lake Tana Project and therefore if the two schemes were considered 
together it was likely that the disagreement which already existed would prejudice 
the chances of obtaining Egyptian agreement to the Equatorial Nile Project. 
(b) It was possible that agreement on the Lake Victoria hydro-electric scheme 
could be reached on the technical level and that the political aspect of the problem 
might be obscured. 
(c) It was vital to the industrial development of Uganda that the schemes for the 
generation of electricity should go ahead and in order to synchronise the 
establishment of the various industrial installations the Government of Uganda 
required to know how much electric power would be available at any given time. It 
was not therefore in the interests of the people of Uganda either that Egyptian 
agreement to the Lake Victoria scheme should be prejudiced by political 
arguments or that its execution should be indefinitely delayed by an 
Anglo-Egyptian political wrangle. 
Mr. Clutton summarised the Foreign Office point of view that both schemes 
should be considered together as follows:-
( a) He agreed with the Sudan Government that the development of the use of the 
Nile Waters could only be achieved successfully if the various schemes were 
treated as a whole since the water which the Sudan Government required to 
receive from one branch of the Nile depended on the quantity of water which it 
was to receive from the other. 
(b) Precisely the same political difficulty existed in the Equatorial Nile Project and 
if the Egyptians wished to make an issue of it they would certainly do so. If on the 
other hand they considered that the combined scheme had practical advantages 
they might be prepared to submerge the political arguments and if they were 
prepared to do so in connexion with the Equatorial Nile Project they might be 
prepared to do so in connexion with the Lake Tana Project. 
He then asked what the Uganda Government had to lose if we did present the 
schemes to the Egyptian Government as a whole. It seemed to him that the Uganda 
Government should go ahead now with the 90,000 kw scheme since it did not 
contravene the Nile Waters Agreement; if the Uganda Government wished to put the 
150,000 kw scheme into operation they were faced with two alternatives. Either they 
could seek Egyptian agreement or they could act unilaterally and in case of need take 
the matter to arbitration. He realised, however, that both alternatives might involve 
considerable delays. He also wished to know how soon the Uganda Government 
would require the extra 60,000 kw if the 90,000 kw scheme were begun immediately. 
In his view the potential loss to the Uganda Government of the extra 60,000 kw must 
be balanced against the loss of water which the Sudan would incur if we did not link 
the schemes in our negotiations with the Egyptians. 
Mr. Allan1 said that the Sudan's desire for a comprehensive settlement was not 
1 See 39 and 163, note 2. 
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new having been set out in Khartoum despatch No.2 of 3rd January, 1946.2 He 
estimated that the Sudan would ultimately require its 50% share in the benefit of 
Lake Tana, and also a share of approximately 15% in the water which would become 
available as a result of the Equatorial Nile project. Since it was imperative that the 
Egyptian Government be informed that some such share was required by the Sudan 
when the Equatorial Nile Project was presented to Egypt, it was inevitable that the 
question of the Sudan's ultimate share in Nile Waters as a whole would be raised, 
whether the schemes were taken together or one by one. It had to be borne in mind, 
moreover, that at this stage in the Sudan's development any approach on behalf of 
the Sudan must have the support of the Sudanese themselves. There was already a 
keen interest in Nile Waters amongst the Sudanese, and he thought that the whole 
question would almost certainly rank high on the agenda for the new Executive 
Council and Legislative Assembly. He inquired whether Uganda's industrial 
development would be limited if it were found necessary to build a series of 90,000 
k.w. power stations at the various sites on the river instead of a lesser number of 
larger stations. If not, it would appear that the difficulty to Uganda would be largely 
one of cost, whereas on the Sudan side it was a matter of securing supplies of water 
which were vital to her economic development. He also pointed out that, of the 
participants in the various projects, the Sudan was the only one whose people and 
territories would be exposed, as a result of their development, to serious dangers and 
losses in periods of excessive floods, unless adequate protective and remedial 
measures were taken. These measures could only be properly ensured as a result of a 
comprehensive settlement. 
Mr. Wright then asked whether the Uganda Government would be prepared to 
proceed with the 150,000 kw scheme at Owen Falls without financial or any other 
assistance from Egypt. 
Sir John Hall replied that they were prepared to do so. The fact that there was no 
provision for water storage in the 150,000 kw scheme weakened the Uganda 
Government's case against the proposed scheme at Nimule. 
Mr. Wright then said that the position as he saw it was that if we approached the 
Egyptian Government on the Equatorial Nile Project alone and they refused to co-
operate, the Uganda Government would then go ahead with the 150,000 kw scheme 
and would be prepared if necessary to submit their right to do so to arbitration; and if 
on the other hand a combined scheme were put forward and the Egyptians again 
refused to co-operate the Uganda Government's tactics would be the same. 
Sir John Hall agreed that this was so but there was the difficulty that without 
Egyptian agreement the Uganda Government would have no intermediate stage 
between the 90,000 and 150,000 kw schemes.3 
In answer to Mr. Clutton's question as to whether the Uganda Government 
required the extra 60,000 kw soon or not, he said that the industrial schemes which 
were contemplated in Uganda were all either dollar-earners or dollar-savers and that 
they were therefore urgent; it was hoped that they would be in the productive stage 
in 1950 or 1951. In answer to Mr. Clutton's other point that the same constitutional 
2 See 45. 
3 The 90,000 kw scheme at Owen Falls would have used the natural flow of the river and would have 
required no storage. The 120,000 kw scheme did require storage, and therefore needed Egyptian 
agreement. 
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issue would arise whether the schemes were taken together or separately, he 
suggested that the fact that the Lake Tana Project required His Majesty's 
Government and the Egyptian Government to approach a third party might make 
this issue more apparent in the Lake Tana Project. 
Mr. Poynton4 thought that the Egyptians would have little incentive to raise the 
Sudan issue in the case of the 120,000 kw scheme since the Egyptians would then be 
wanting to receive something from Uganda. 
Sir Ronald Gampbell considered that it was not a case of Egypt wanting something 
from Uganda but of Uganda trying to avoid contravening the Nile Waters Agreement. 
While he saw the force of Sir John Hall's argument that the political issue in the 
Equatorial Nile Project might be sidestepped he considered that Egyptian ingenuity 
was capable of finding a means of raising the issue if it were so desired. There would 
be no safeguard that the matter would not be raised if the schemes were considered 
separately and he thought that since the Egyptian Government had already started 
an argument over the Lake Tana Project they were likely to do so if the Lake Victoria 
scheme alone were discussed. He did not think that the fact that a third party was 
involved in the Lake Tana Project affected the issue since Nokrashy Pasha would find 
a means of raising the Sudan question if the internal situation in Egypt demanded 
that he should. 
From a general political point of view and from the point of view of the joint 
development of the Sudan, he thought that there was a great advantage in dealing 
with the Nile Waters schemes as a comprehensive whole. He was not convinced in 
any case that the constitutional issue had arisen permanently in connexion with the 
Lake Tana Project since the Egyptians were quite capable of forgetting what they had 
said previously if it were convenient for them to do so. He would much prefer to 
negotiate with the Egyptians on a comprehensive basis and considered that he would 
have greater chances of success if he did so. 
Mr. Glutton pointed out that the Foreign Office had it in mind that preliminary 
soundings would be made before the note mentioning the two schemes together was 
communicated to the Egyptian Government; the note would in fact, be the 
crystallization of previous discussions. 
Mr. Wright then said that the Governor of Uganda had clearly stated his views and 
that they merited the closest attention. He pointed out, however, that Mr. Bevin 
wished these schemes to be linked in our approach to the Egyptians for the following 
reasons: 
(a) Agreement with the Egyptians on an important matter such as the various Nile 
Waters schemes would make it easier to reach agreement on other very important 
matters. 
(b) It was in our interest that Egypt should have more water and greater food 
production. 
(c) It was also in our interest that the Sudan should have more water so that 
further development could take place. 
Mr. Glutton then mentioned that there was a third way in which our approach to the 
Egyptian Government might be made. This would be based on an oral agreement 
1 A H Poynton (KCMG 1949), assistant under-secretary of state at the Colonial Office, 1946-1948; deputy 
under-secretary of state at the Colonial Office, 1948- 1959, 
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with the Egyptians that the constitutional issue would not in any circumstances be 
raised; notes would be exchanged between the Egyptian Government, the Sudan 
Government, the Ethiopian Government and His Majesty's Government in such a 
way that the question of a representation of the Sudan's interest would not arise. 
Mr. Wright then mentioned that the Egyptian Government were sending a strong 
delegation to attend the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris and he 
considered it desirable that Mr. Bevin should be clearly briefed on this matter in case 
the Egyptians should raise it. 
Mr. Poynton agreed but he made it clear that the Colonial Office point of view was 
that Uganda's interest should not be prejudiced either financially or by undue delay if 
the approach to Egypt were made on the basis of the two schemes. 
It was agreed that the question should in the first instance be discussed by Mr. 
Bevin and Mr. Creech-Jones in order that Mr. Bevin could be briefed on the method 
in which this question should if necessary be presented to the Egyptians in Paris. 
165 FO 371169251, no 6992 20 Oct 1948 
[Elections to the Legislative Assembly]: SPIS series 1948, no 8, report 
for Sept-Oct [Extract] 
Primary elections 
142. It is a pity that the first election results to be published are from the 
Northern Province where conditions combined to produce a very low attendance at 
the polls. 
Jaaliin and other Gellaba1 are disgruntled at the loss of the Black Market owing to 
removal of controls and therefore present a particularly easy field for propaganda by 
the organizers of the boycott. Nor does it appear that the people of Shendi district, in 
particular, are contented with their present local government set-up. Here and 
elsewhere, (in Nahud for instance), the public has been shown to be apathetic and 
bored with elections in general and a heavy poll is unlikely anywhere in the absence 
of keen party rivalry. Many too have taken the line that the Nazir was bound to be 
elected anyway so why should they bother. Others announced that they disapproved 
of the speed at which the Government is going and refused to vote on the grounds 
that they prefer the old system of direct administration. This is the line which Sayed 
Ali himself has taken and his influence is, of course, very strong in the Northern 
Province. 
There can be little doubt that the various delegations of Khatmia who have been in 
to Khartoum North to visit the Sayed were given instructions to boycott the 
elections. The Sayed has denied this and it is true that in various parts of the country 
Khatmia have voted and are standing for elections, but in general the Sayed has been 
discouraging. The ostensible reasons for this go back to the Mahdist majority on the 
Advisory Council and the Sudan Administrative Conference, but in point of fact the 
1 Jallaba (Ar.), traders. The Jaaliyin from the Dongola area of Northern province provided one of the 
biggest networks of traders throughout the Sudan. 
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Sayed's true motives are: (1) his determination not to have any truck with any 
institution favoured by Sayed Abdal Rahman, and (2) desire to keep on good terms 
with Egypt. For this reason he was bound to raise objections and there is no reason 
to suppose that his present pretext; that there are not enough direct elections, would 
not have been replaced by some other objection had it been met. The Sayed was 
asked by the Civil Secretary last April to put down his objections to the new 
constitution in writing and he refused to do so. When therefore indirect approaches 
were made to the Government at the beginning of September, intimating that if the 
number of direct elections were increased from ten to fifteen, the Sayed might 
abandon his non-committal, or rather his obstructive attitude, it did not appear 
likely that any such concession would in fact produce a change of attitude. On the 
contrary it was clear from conversations with members of his entourage that his next 
step would be to ask for a postponement in order to enable him to get his electoral 
machine working. Any such postponement would, of course, have had disastrous 
results on public opinion and would have quite possibly resulted in a boycott by the 
Independence Front, which would have reduced the whole project to absurdity. 
143. The situation in Kassala is peculiar because there the assumption by the 
Khatmia Sayeds of a leading role in the boycott has resulted in Sayed Ali's supporters 
adopting a more co-operative attitude than elsewhere. The ancient quarrel between 
their father Sayed Ahmed and his brother Sayed Ali has never died and in recent 
years Sayed El Hassan and Sayed Mohammed Osman have been persecuting 
Bimbashi Osman Ali Keila and others of Sayed Ali's adherents .... 
144. The attitude of the authorities towards the organisers of the boycott has 
been less severe in the Three Towns, where the opposition is strong and the public 
innured [sic] to political activity, than in the Provinces, where a less sophisticated 
population is not prepared to accept with equanimity seditious attacks upon the 
Government's policy. Steps are however being taken to tighten up control in the 
Three Towns and the police throughout the country are doing their best to obtain 
evidence against the League of National Liberation, a body with a strong Communist 
tinge which has been deluging the towns with posters and circulars of a violently 
seditious nature. 
145. In the absence of any second chamber in the new constitution, a number of 
Nazirs are putting themselves forward as candidates and although many of them will 
be valuable members of the new Assembly, their action is obviously open to 
objections in that it makes it very difficult for reasonable men to stand against them. 
El Sherif Ibrahim Yussef el Hindi is, for example, reluctant to stand as a candidate in 
the Butana because of the inevitable subsequent friction with the Abusin family. 
Elsewhere, as has already been noted, the result has been an increasing apathy 
amongst the electorate .... 
166 FO 371169233, no 7198 3 Nov 1948 
[Nile Waters and the Sudan question]: minutes by G L Clutton, M R 
Wright and Mr Bevin 
The Secretary of State recently saw the Colonial Secretary when they discussed the 
question of Nile waters and the development schemes for Lake Tsana (Blue Nile) 
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and Lakes Victoria and Albert (White Nile). It is understood that the Colonial 
Secretary said that whenever the Colonial Office put forward a proposal for develop-
ment schemes in regard to Uganda they come up against Foreign Office objections 
based on the existing Nile Waters Agreement. The Secretary of State feels that 
schemes so obviously for the social and economic benefit of the inhabitants of the 
Nile Valley should not be held up by Egyptian obstinacy about the Nile Waters 
Agreement and that even if Egypt took us to the United Nations on such an issue 
we could defend ourselves. He asked that a paper should be prepared for the 
Cabinet on the subject. 
The real obstacle to progress in the plans for the development of both the Blue 
Nile and the White Nile is not primarily the Nile Waters Agreement but the Sudan 
question. Progress regarding Lake Tsana is held up because the Egyptians have 
refused to admit our right to join with them in negotiations with the Ethiopians or 
to have any voice in guaranteeing the Sudan her extra water allocation. We fear that 
if an approach is made to the Egyptians on the political level to put into execution 
the plans for the development of the White Nile the same issue will be raised. It is, 
however, vital from the Sudan's point of view that her rights and interests in this 
scheme should be safeguarded. 
The Department have not despaired of finding a solution to these difficulties and 
have had a whole series of discussions on the matter during the past months with the 
Governor-General of the Sudan, His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, representatives 
of the Colonial Office and the Governor of Uganda. Further progress has however 
been held up by a most unfortunate interdepartmental dispute. The Department, the 
Governor-General of the Sudan and His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo are in 
agreement in believing that the problem should be treated as a whole. Their idea is 
that with the Egyptians putting out feelers for a settlement with us we should seize 
the opportunity to point out that here was a matter the importance of which to all 
parties was obvious where there might be useful Anglo-Egyptian co-operation 
leading to co-operation in yet more important matters. We would point out further 
that this co-operation could be easily achieved if both sides agreed to evade the 
constitutional issues and that the method of doing so could be discussed around a 
table together with final arrangements putting into execution plans already approved 
on a technical level. The Governor of Uganda and the Colonial Office consider that 
the approach to the Egyptian Government should be confined to the scheme for the 
White Nile in which Uganda is interested on the grounds (which we believe to be 
erroneous) that this would not raise any political question. This dispute is set out in 
a minute which will be found at Flag C and which it was decided to postpone 
submitting to the Secretary of State for a few weeks owing to his absences in Paris 
and the pressure of work on him. 
If the Secretary of State approves the lines suggested by the Department and can 
secure the Colonial Secretary's agreement then there would be no need to take this 
matter to the Cabinet and we could send Sir Ronald Campbell instructions at once. 
The question of the Nile Waters Agreement would only arise if our approach to the 
Egyptians failed. Here, however, it would be necessary to consult again His Majesty's 
Ambassador in Cairo and the Governor-General of the Sudan whose views when last 
consulted were that any action on our part violating the Nile Waters Agreement 
should at all costs be avoided. 
If, nevertheless, the Secretary of State would like a Cabinet paper prepared the 
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Department would be grateful to know if he would like this done during his absence 
or held over until his return. 
I agree. 
G.L.C. 
3.11.48 
The recommendation is that the Secretary of State should ask the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to agree (as explained in greater detail at Flag C) that H.M. 
Ambassador at Cairo should now approach the Egyptian Government on both the 
scheme for the Blue Nile and the scheme for the White Nile. 
If the Egyptian Government refuse again we shall have to choose the most effective 
means of proceeding without their consent. 
M.R.W. 
3.11.48 
I will see Col Sec before I leave today. I do not understand why it has been delayed by 
our interdepartmental disputes. These disputes should be brought to me for 
settlement at once. 
E.B. 
[nd] 
167 FO 371/69195, no 7852 30 Nov 1948 
[Anglo-Egyptian settlement]: letter from Sir R Campbell to M R 
Wright accusing the Sudan government of creating obstacles towards 
an Anglo-Egyptian settlement 
We are agreed that in the past King Farouk has failed to show persistence in putting 
over on his Government even things which he felt pretty certain were needed. He has 
now been told by Amr and by me that if he has decided that a military arrangement 
with us is necessary, he will really have to be persistent and go through with it. He 
has told his Royal Cabinet, Amr Pasha, his Prime Minister, and also myself (on more 
than one occasion, of which the last was his visit to me, undertaken not least for this 
purpose at Amr's suggestion) that he intends to do so. He has asked that, if he does 
so, we should not let him down, and that we should avoid making difficulties for him. 
All this is a very satisfactory development, which we could hardly have expected, 
and provides a glimmer of hope. But such a development of King Farouk's attitude 
must in any case be a delicate seedling, and you will have seen that the Secretary of 
State agrees with me that we shall have to do all we can to encourage its growth into 
a sturdy plant able to stand up to the weather. 
Therefore I am really distressed over the hooroosh1 that has arisen over the Sudan, 
a matter over which Egyptians are sensitive and excitable and which closely affects 
the King of Egypt. The hooroosh originated out of action by the Egyptians, but it is 
nevertheless awkward and might possibly, as I suggested in a telegram, force the 
King off his position, or at any rate back into his shell. So far he seems to be behaving 
1 Arabic meaning quarrel. 
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sensibly over it and not letting it cloud the main issue for him. I am told, though, 
that he considers that the Sudan Government might have managed things more 
cleverly and spared us and him some embarrassment. But it would be rash to bank 
on this mood continuing if the hooroosh should continue and grow, or be fed by 
further incidents, and we should not try him too highly. His present attitude to this 
Sudan matter makes him more vulnerable to a charge which is already being made 
in Wafdist quarters, namely, that if he is now turning to the British, it is merely for 
the sake of preserving his own position. 
The difficulty is that the Sudan Government are inclined to react rapidly, and 
sometimes perhaps hastily, about actions of the Egyptians, without regard to 
repercussions in the wide political field. This is all right from their point of view, and 
perhaps proper, since in principle their only concern is the welfare of the Sudanese, 
and law and order in the Sudan. In fact their job is really a purely administrative one. 
This would be all right if, in the past, the Sudan Government and His Majesty's 
Government had really suited their policy and actions to the existence of the 
Condominium; but for the last twenty-four years they have not done so, while of later 
years the Sudan Government have almost abandoned, even in outer forms, (except 
the most minor ones) the pretence of doing so. 
Somewhere in the late 1920's the thread of policy seems to have got broken. 
Cromer's idea always was that the creation of policy (not only external but even 
major internal administrative policy) was a matter in the first place for the two eo-
domini, and its execution was the task of the Governor-General and his staff. But 
somewhere after the Stack murder we lost sight of this and allowed separatism to 
grow up unchecked in the outlook and actions of the (British) Political Service. 
Paradoxical as it may seem, ease of communications has accentuated a schism 
between the Sudan administration and Egypt, rather than acting as a binding force, 
for routes that avoid Egypt are now available. As I said in the Foreign Office while I 
was on leave, the officials no longer come to Cairo, even on their way to and from 
leave (that is any officials of consequence) and it is clear that they omit to do so by 
design, as a matter of policy. The Governor-General himself journeys direct between 
Khartoum and London, making only exceptional, and even then very brief, visits to 
Cairo. This is not the way to keep up a fa~ade, and so to give some excuse to the 
Egyptians to acquiesce in the position. Nor is it the way to forestall or explain away 
suspicions and misunderstandings of the Sudan Government's actions and measures. 
It can be said that the Governor-General, within the terms of the Condominium 
Agreement, must act independently of both Governments, and this is right, but our 
policy of the last quarter-of-a-century has been such that he has acted very largely as 
a British official. This has not gone unnoticed here. If one puts onesself [sic] in the 
place of the Egyptians, one can see that it must be quite hard for them not to believe, 
on the record, that we really do mean to separate the Sudan from Egypt. (I hope that 
neither the Sudan Government nor His Majesty's Government do mean to do so, for I 
think it would be dishonourable, and one pays dearly for any dishonourable action. Is 
not the Condominium in present world circumstances the only solid ground for our 
presence in the Sudan?) There is not only this neglect of Egypt by Sudan officials, but 
the Sudan (British) Government openly backs S.A.R., the head of a fanatical 
movement which in its earlier form was instrumental in the ejection of Egypt from 
the Sudan, and which now openly advocates immediate independence. Thus the 
experience and events of twenty-four years have been too much probably for the 
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Egyptians to induce a belief that our offer in the agreement with Khashaba concealed 
no arriere-pensee and that, in view of the process which had been going on since 
1924, it covered sufficiently what they feel is their due to regain. The result is that 
the Sudan Government, in Egyptian eyes (quite apart from the fact that the Political 
Service is manned by British subjects) is a British government. Everything done by 
the Sudan Government, therefore, is, for the Egyptians, a "British" action, to which 
the Egyptians attribute His Majesty's Government's instigation, or at least 
endorsement. We are, therefore, really reaping where we have sown, and I submit 
that we must accept the consequences to this extent, at least, that we insist on 
greater control over the Sudan Government and the Governor-General. That is what 
is necessary. Until lately this control, in the interest of the Egyptian eo-dominus and 
of His Majesty's Government's Egyptian and general policy, was exerted from this 
mission. Now it is the job of the Foreign Office. His Majesty's Government must, it 
seems to me, require to be kept punctually informed of developments that may occur 
in the Sudan, and be given an opportunity, in the interests of their wider policy, of 
guiding the Governor-General in his treatment of issues that arise between him and 
the Egyptian Government, or matters which may raise an issue. We cannot divest 
ourselves in Egyptian eyes, or, if it comes to that, in fact, of responsibility for his 
actions. It may seem anomalous that His Majesty's Government, as one member of a 
partnership, should singly give instructions to a servant of both members. But we 
have allowed, if not encouraged, a position to develop in which this is necessary, and 
I see no way out of it, if worse is not to befall. 
I will not say that the Sudan Government could or should have taken a different 
stand on the points of principle recently raised (though the reason for refusing 
permission to the Egyptian lawyers to plead, when it was open to the Legal Secretary 
to give it, did not strike me as terribly strong.2 It seems to me that if the Governor-
General had placed himself on the ground of the danger to law and order it would 
have been better. The danger was a real one.) I do, however, consider that with 
greater wisdom or awareness they might have done what they did differently, and 
that at any rate they should have given you time to consider matters and direct them. 
I do not for a moment suggest that the Egyptians aren't quite unconscionable in 
Sudan matters, and no doubt recent disturbances during the Sudan elections may, as 
the Sudan Government claim, have been due to a measure of Egyptian instigation, or 
perhaps to their use of Sudanese fuel which was already lying about. But in the 
period preceding 1924, as in the years preceding the present time, there had no 
doubt been, on our side, actions which seemed to go outside the strict provisions, 
and even the spirit, of the Condominium Agreement, seemed to neglect the Egyptian 
part in the Condominium, and hurt Egyptian nationalist sentiment, without which 
the urge for subversive propaganda would have been considerably less, if not absent. 
I do wish that the Governor-General and the members of the Administration could 
be persuaded to pay some deference to the fact that they are half servants of the 
Egyptian Government, and I earnestly hope that what was discussed and decided 
upon as desirable at our meeting in your room with Bob Howe and Robertson will be 
insisted upon and put through. Is it not rash in the extreme to give colour to the 
2 Egyptian lawyers hired to defend Sudanese arrested and charged with sedition late in 1947 were denied 
entry into the Sudan. 
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Egyptian view that the Governor-General is first and foremost a British official 
(besides being a British subject) and, if at all an Egyptian official, only one secondly 
and lastly-and a very poor second and last, at that? A moment's reflection will, I 
think, show that it is extremely rash. If our intentions are honest, we must want to 
make the Condominium work, to prevent an issue on which we must break. What 
then about the choice of the next Governor-General, if we allow a situation to 
continue in which the Egyptians can hardly look on him as anything but an 
exclusively British official? There is a great fuss in the press over the latest 
developments in the Sudan, and some agitation amongst the students, who had been 
quiescent for quite a long time. If, in the face of all this, King Farouk's recent 
initiative as regards Anglo-Egyptian relations in general, and a military arrangement 
in particular, with all that this might lead to, were to prove still-born, I would regard 
it as a real tragedy. 
Meanwhile I am telling Egyptians that all this is the result of their own futile 
statesmanship. His Majesty's Government had shown their desire to meet them and 
enhance their participation in the guidance of the Sudan. They could have had an 
Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Committee in permanent being to watch over Sudan 
constitutional development etc. It was not for them to cast doubt on the elections, 
and they are in no position to do so, not having been there; but they could have had a 
special Anglo-Egyptian Committee to supervise them. His Majesty's Government 
had agreed to all this, and the nomination of two Egyptians to the Sudan Executive 
Council, but they had rejected it, etc. etc. etc. I am also saying that there is no 
difficulty about Egyptians going to the Sudan on ordinary and legitimate business, 
but that by and large the only ones who seem occasionally to want to go are those 
whose object is a political stunt to embarrass either the Sudan Government, the 
British Government, the Egyptian Government or some other Egyptian political 
party or personage. It is indeed lamentably true that the Egyptians behaved like 
complete nitwits, and worse. Unfortunately that does not get us out of our difficulties 
and the embarrassments which this flurry has created. 
As for the internal situation in the Sudan, I have not sufficient material or close 
acquaintance to deal with it; but from here it does not seem to me to be particularly 
reassuring for His Majesty's Government. I have always thought it showed a mistaken 
spirit to speak of S.A.R. and his followers as "our friends" and the party "loyal" to us, 
and of the Ashigga people as "disloyal". Moreover, the "loyalists" seem determined on 
complete independence almost immediately. The Sudan Government and S.A.R. him-
self may very much like, and no doubt rightly, the prospect of being independent of 
Egypt at once, but is it a good bargain for us that this should happen, if the price is 
almost immediate independence from us also? S.A.R. may have been told that early 
independence is moonshine, and we may have statements from him and his followers 
and from members of the less articulate masses that they will want to be in alliance 
with us and have British advisers; but when it comes to the aspirations of dependent 
peoples for independence, this sort of thing does not often work out according to 
schedule; and we have to remember the existence of the Legislative Assembly. 
Further, is it not a bit odd, in the light of history, for us to be backing the son of 
the Mahdi and his party, which ultimately must mean that the Sudan Government 
governs on his sufferance? 
The present flurry may well die down and be chased from the front page by some 
other event. But the incidents will have sunk into the Egyptian consciousness, and 
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may arise later to plague us in connection with any military arrangement or any 
general settlement. It may force or encourage King Farouk to say later that a military 
arrangement must be accompanied or immediately followed by a political 
settlement. 
I have of course painted only part of the picture. There is much that could be put 
in to correct the colour and make it more representative of the whole truth. But I 
have tried to depict the scene as the Egyptians wilfully or blindly or emotionally see 
it, and the causes of the degree of distortion there is in their vision. It is this 
distortion and the reasons for it which we have to deal with in the interests of our 
wider policy: and I hope they may be given mature consideration. What we need is to 
realise that, in our own interest, the Sudan question requires honest thinking and 
cool statesmanship. We m.ust get rid of partisan feeling, · and put distrust of Egypt; 
disapproval of the corrupt influence of Egyptians, etc. etc. in their proper 
perspective. However awkward to everybody the Egyptian connection may be, 
however ideal in some people's judgment it might be to isolate the Sudan from Egypt 
and give the Sudanese complete shelter from undesirable Egyptian influences, we 
must see things as they are. We must realise that Egypt,. whether we like it or not, is 
by geographical circumstances and ·by diplomatic agreement, a factor which can 
never be ignored. Further, the Sudan cannot be isolated any longer from the winds 
blowing.aboutthe world, so that the idea of isolating the Sudanese children from all 
outside . influences is no longer possible, even if such a policy had ever been wise . 
. · (Most parents have learned that itis both impossible and unwise). 
Forgive this terribly long letter, but I really • feel strongly that the moment has 
come when we cannotdelayto stop, look and listen. 
168 FO 371/69172, no 8064 · 14 Dec 1948 
[Sudanese Executive Council}: minutes by G L Clutton and M R Wright 
Under the proposals made during the Campbell-Khashaba conversations last 
summer, the Governor General of the Sudan agreed to nominate Egyptians to two 
out of the three nominated seats on the propo. sed Executive Council. The third was to 
. . . . 
be Sudanese. The Executive Council was thus to have in the first place twelve 
members so that there would be six Sudanese, four British and two Egyptians. A 
balance of fifty-fifty would thus be struck between . the . Sudanese and the non-
Sudanese on the Council (the membership of the Executive Council on occasions of 
the senior Egyptian staff officer in the Sudan can be left out here). 
When owing to protracted ahd deliberate delays on the part ·of the Egyptians, 
H.M.G. no longer felt able to stand in the way of the Governor General promulgating 
the Constitutional Ordinance, it was · always understood that the Governor General 
would keep open two vacancies on the Executive Council for the Egyptians as long as 
he could, in the hope that the Egyptian Government would after an agree to 
cooperate with us on the basis of the Ordinance. This was implicit in the 
supplementary answersto the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State's statement of 
the 14th June (see flag A).1 
1 References in flags not printed. 
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The Sudanese elections have taken place and the Legislative Assembly is to meet 
on the 23rd December. On the 19th December the Governor General proposes to 
complete the Executive Council by nominating the Sudanese Ministers and Under-
Secretaries and by filling the three nominated vacancies. He proposes to nominate 
one Sudanese (the Speaker of the Assembly) and two British officials whose names 
we do not know. By so doing he will preserve the original balance of the Executive 
Council where there will be six British and six Sudanese. 
H.M. Ambassador at Cairo (see Cairo telegram No. 1698 of the 9th December, flag 
B) has urged strongly that the Governor General should reconsider his decision and 
the Governor General has replied in his telegram No. 295 of the 12th December (flag 
C) giving the reasons why he considers he . should carry out his proposed action. 
Briefly, the arguments and counter arguments are as follows: 
Case of H.M. ambassador 
(1) H.M. Ambassador points out that to appoint all three Councillors in this 
manner is to slam the door at a critical moment in Anglo-Egyptian relations and 
he asks that the two seats originally allocated to the Egyptians should be kept 
vacant. 
(2) H.M. Ambassador at Cairo considers it would be most advisable that there 
should be a majority of Sudanese on the Council since filling up two vacancies to 
create equality would make fuel for Egyptian propaganda that the whole Sudanese 
set-up was British rigged. He claims that the two British appointments are being 
made mainly because they are British. 
Case oft he governor general 
(1) The Governor General points out that the Egyptians have been given six 
months since June to make up their . minds whether to cooperate with us or not 
and that they have shown no signs of doing so but have continued to do their 
utmost to prevent the constitutional Ordinance coming into force. To keep the 
nominations open would arouse intense Sudanese opposition to no avail because 
his action would not ameliorate Egyptian opinion. 
(2) The Governor General thinks it is unwise to allow too big a proportion of 
Sudanese on the Council to begin with since it would be embarrassing for him to 
over-ride decisions of the Council in matters of vital importance, and from an 
administrative point of view the Governor General does not think that a Sudanese 
majority on the Council would be advisable. The two Councillors are not being 
nominated solely because they are British but because their presence on the 
Council will be useful. 
On balance, the Department feel that the decision in this matter must be left to the 
Governor General whose attention has been drawn to the desirability, in view of the 
proposed Anglo-Egyptian military talks, of damping down all controversial issues. 
Their feeling is that this is mainly an administrative matter on which the Governor 
General feels strongly and in which it would be difficult to intervene since the 
Governor General promulgated the Ordinance on his own authority as part of the 
measures he was taking for the good Government of the Sudan. The point he 
makes that in the initial stages of this experiment in self-government it would be 
unwise to risk a situation where he well might have to over-ride his Executive 
Council is very cogent, and it must be remembered that once the balance on the 
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Executive Council was in favour of the Sudanese that balance could not in practice 
be altered except in the direction of further Sudanisation. Moreover, as the 
Governor General points out in the last paragraph of his telegram, he is entitled to 
make fresh appointments to the Council at the beginning of the first session of 
each new Assembly, i.e. every three years. There is therefore nothing to prevent 
him from appointing Egyptians to replace the two British nominated members at 
some later stage. The two British members could also be asked to retire if need be 
to make place for two Egyptians. 
Recommendation 
The Department recommend that the Governor General should be allowed to go 
ahead as he proposes subject to the understanding that if the Egyptians show 
themselves willing to cooperate with us in the Sudan, he will be asked to nominate 
two Egyptians to the Council in the place of the two British nominated members. 
A draft telegram is submitted. 
G.L.C. 
14.12.48 
This is an awkward dilemma, which, as usual, comes at a particularly difficult 
moment. But the Governor General(']s arguments are very strong, and I do not think 
we should be justified in seeking to overrule him.2 
2 Bevin commented: 'I agree'. 
M.R.W. 
14.12.48 
169 FO 371/69209, no 8221 15 Dec 1948 
[Dr Muhammad Adam Adham and the Black Bloc]: note by the Civil 
Secretary's Office, Khartoum 
[One legacy of slavery in the Sudan was the presence in northern towns of substantial 
numbers of ex-slaves and their descendants of non-Arab (mainly Southern Sudanese) 
origin. Many had served in the Egyptian army during the reconquest, and the native 
officer corps of Sudanese units in the Egyptian army prior to World War I was drawn 
almost entirely from this group. Classed as 'de-tribalised' natives by a Sudan govern-
ment which administered the country increasingly on tribal lines, the old officer corps 
was gradually eased out of the army as new units were raised in the Northern Sudan 
and the old Sudanese battalions were disbanded. The White Flag League and the 
mutiny of 1924 confirmed to the government the dangerous divided loyalty of 'de-trib-
alised' officers, such as Ali Abd al-Latif, and speeded the demise of the Sudanese battal-
ions and the further reduction of their numbers in the officer corps of the new Sudan 
Defence Force. But the White Flag League's nationalist slogan of 'Sudan for the 
Sudanese' was an ambiguous one, not only was it potentially aimed externally at the 
eo-domini, but also internally at the displacement of the true 'Sudanese' (i .e., the black 
Mrican ex-slave class) from positions in the administration and army by 'Arab' 
Northern Sudanese who now formed the government's main clients and allies. 
Dissatisfaction with their inferior status was expressed by some remaining Sudanese 
officers in the 1930s, and a 'Co-operative Union of Blacks' (also known as 'Hisb el 
Zinuj') was formed, mainly as a social organisation, in 1945 (SPIS, no 53, report for 
Sept 1945, FO 371/45972, no 3693). The formation of the 'Black Bloc' was reported in 
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Sept 1948, when it was also noted that the Ashiqqa party was trying to enlist ex-
Sudanese officers married to Egyptian wives to organise pro-Egyptian counter-propa-
ganda (SPIS no 7, report for Aug-Sept 1948, FO 371169251, no 6523). Dr Muhammad 
Adam Adham was elected by direct election to represent the Omdurman South con-
stituency in the Legislative Assembly (1948-1953).) 
Dr. Mohammed Adam Adham is of negroid origin, about thirty-eight years old, and 
son of a retired Sudan Defence Force officer who lives at El Obeid and is himself an 
active member of the Black Bloc. Dr. Adham is a graduate of the Cordon Memorial 
College and a diplomate of the Kitchener School ofMedicine. In 1936 he joined the 
Sudan Medical Service as a medical officer, but his career was not successful and on 
several occasions he was tried by a board of discipline for drunkenness and 
negligence in the performance of his duties. Finally, unable to mend his ways, he was 
compelled to resign. With financial assistance from his family he then opened a 
private clinic in Omdurman, gave up drinking and made a success of his new 
venture. His reputation both as a doctor and as a citizen now stands fairly high. He is 
also owner and editor of a fortnightly journal called 'Mrica' which devotes itself to 
social and cultural subjects. 
2. Dr. Adham formed the Black Bloc in September 1948 in the towns of 
Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman. Its members, who are said to number 
about four thousand are of Southern Sudan origin and its aims have been defined as 
follows:-
(1) The strengthening of the Nation by national reforms to achieve a strong 
national unity. 
(2) Social betterment, improvements of conditions amongst the poor, reduction 
of crime etc. 
(3) Elimination of social distinction.1 
(4) The institution in the Sudan of a free democratic Sudanese government which 
will maintain social justice and equality and develop the country in all respects. 
(5) A strong army equipped with all modern weapons. 
3. The Bloc has supported the setting up of the Legislative Assembly and two of 
its leaders have been elected members of the Assembly for constituencies in 
Khartoum and Omdurman. 
4. Propaganda on behalf of the Bloc has been conducted at Wad Medani, El Obeid 
and Juba, the principal line being a demand for economic and social equality for 
southern Sudanese in the northern Sudan. 
5. The Bloc has so far worked in harmony with the Umma Party and has thereby 
incurred the hostility of the Unity Parties. Some of the Umma, however, regard the 
movement with caution and are not yet convinced that it will not develop into a 
movement for separation of the southern Sudan from the North. It is expected that 
its leaders will try to make close contact with the representatives of the Southern 
Sudan in the Legislative Assembly. 
1 An earlier report of the Bloc's platform listed this point as the 'elimination of racial distinction ' (SPIS no 
7, report for Aug-Sept 1948, FO 371/69251, no 6523). 
348 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [170] 
170 FO 371/73472, no 343 4 Jan 1949 
[SAR]: letter from Sir R Howe to Sir 0 Sargent. Enclosure: 'Note on 
Sayed Abdel Rahman's interview with His Excellency at the palace, 
Khartoum, on Tuesday, 28th December, 1948' 
Minute by G L Clutton 
[In his reply Sargent expressed sympathy for the problem of SAR alienating traditional 
government supporters, but he suggested a policy along the lines of Clutton's minute 
(letter from Sargent to Howe, 18 Feb 1949, FO 371/73472, no 343).] 
I send you herewith a note of a conversation I had on the 28th December with Sayed 
Abdel Rahman el Mahdi, who recently asked for an interview. 
2. I think you will find this record of some interest. It confirms two impressions 
which have been growing in my mind for some time. These are:-
(a) That S.A.R. is anxious to get the Sudan Government committed heart and soul 
to his side-anxious in fact to get what he described as a vote of confidence, and 
(b) That he is now definitely committed to the pursuit of his ambition to set 
himself or his son on a Sudanese throne. 
These two desires are not identical, but (b) would hardly fail to be greatly 
strengthened by (a). 
3. During the last few years since the Sudan Government decided to go for the 
first step in their aim of self-government for the Sudanese, S.A.R. has thrown the 
whole weight of his admittedly great influence on the side of the Government. It was 
inevitable that he should regard himself and be regarded in the country as the 
Government's and H.M.G's man. The first step in self-government has now been 
accomplished. The Legislative Assembly has come into being and the Sayed, without 
doubt, is realising that the weight of the Sudan Government's support has shifted its 
focus from him to the Assembly. 
4. Now the Assembly, it is true, contains a goodly number of S.A.R's 
Independence Party, viz.-the Umma, but, and it is a very important 'but', the 
Assembly also contains a pretty solid bloc of country members, the Nazirs, etc., who 
for solid reasons are loyally attached to the Government and are not interested in 
'Independence', still less in Kingship. These people represent a kind of centre party, 
although the name has not yet appeared publicly. 
5. The above of course leaves out of consideration the Khatmia who to a great 
extent boycotted the elections, are opposed to S.A.R. and the Umma, and have 
withdrawn their support of the Sudan Government over the Legislative Assembly, 
even though they may be still in the main loyal to the Government; simply and solely 
because they hate and fear the very idea of a Mahdist revival of power such as would 
be exemplified by King S.A.R. 
6. The appointment of Ministers and Under-Secretaries who are generally recog-
nised as being the best talent available has had a good effect and has served to reas-
sure the Khatmia a lot. I hope that with time this effect will increase and lead the 
Khatmia to modify their attitude towards the Assembly and lead them to co-operate 
in its working. Nevertheless we are faced with a situation in which a large and solid 
bloc of traditional Government support is being withheld and the only way or at any 
rate the most effective way of restoring their confidence in Government and bring-
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ing them back into the fold would be to remove their fear of S.A.R's kingly ambi-
tions. 
7. It has been suggested that this could best be done by an announcement in 
categorical terms by the Government that they will not lend their countenance to 
any attempt at planning or setting up a Sudan Kingdom, or alternatively that H.M.G. 
in the U.K. should make such an announcement at an appropriate moment. It is 
argued that such a positive step would have a good effect internally and would 
effectively serve to protect many people here who are at present inclined to fall 
victims to Egyptian propaganda which exploits the deep-seated fear of Mahdism 
among the Khatmia. 
8. Another line of policy is to run a centre party both in the Legislative Assembly 
and in the country based on local notables such as the Nazirs who constitute the 
loyal backbone of the country. This idea is already in the air here. 
9. S.A.R. fears that the centre party is already emerging in the Legislative 
Assembly-hence, I think, his appeal to me on the 28th December for a vote of 
confidence in him. 
10. Any such positive steps such as those outlined above would doubtless 
provoke a crisis in our relations with S.A.R. and the effects of which I am not yet able 
to assess; they might be serious. But I have felt it desirable to let you know the 
currents which are stirring as we might sooner or later be compelled to act on these 
lines. 
11. A good way out would be to induce S.A.R. to retire gracefully from public life, 
and announce that he was no longer concerned with politics. He did in fact mention 
this possibility some time ago, but his attitude when I saw him on the 28th was not at 
all consistent with retirement. Financially of course he has benefitted heavily from 
his close connection with the Government. 
12. I am sending a copy of this to Ronnie Campbell. 
Enclosure to 170 
1. The Sayed's arguments were not always clear or consistent, but the 
underlying motif was as follows:-
( a) The present situation was satisfactory and he regarded it as the joint result of 
the efforts of H.E. and of Sir Hubert Huddleston and of his own consistent line of 
policy beginning with his interview with Mr. Attlee in 1946.1 The outlook for the 
future was, however, anxious, and His Majesty's Government's future policy had 
not been made clear. If they waited until1956 when the present Treaty expires the 
Egyptians might quote the Bevin-Sidky protocol and obtain from U.N.O. the grant 
of sovereignty over the Sudan. If H.M.G. did then succeed in obtaining for the 
Sudanese the right to determine their own fate there was a grave danger that in 
the interval Egyptian propaganda, which he admitted to be ineffective at present, 
would have succeeded, in some way which he did not explain, in winning over 
Sudanese opinion until they opted for some form of union with Egypt. 
(b) To counteract this he asked for:-
1 See 114. 
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(1) A vote of confidence from His Excellency and an assurance of support from 
the British Government and the Sudan Government such as H.E. had given him 
on a former occasion and enabled him to carry on up to the present. He also 
wanted some form of recognition of his status as the right-hand man of the 
Government. He did not mean by this any special office or decoration for himself 
or for his son, but the opposition were already making use of Sayed Siddik's non-
appointment as Leader of the Assembly to argue that the Sayed had been rebuffed 
and that the Government, having used him, proposed tacitly to drop him. He had 
had many ups and downs since the Government first admitted him to its confi-
dence in 1917, but he could not now afford any downs. He wanted it made clear 
to the Sudan that he stood at the Government's right hand. 
(2) A line on the Government's policy during the next three years so that he 
could keep in tune with it. 
(3) The fixing of an early date for independence and strong discouragement of 
those time-servers who profess to be loyal to the existing regime and ask for a 
brake on the wheels of progress, when their real object is to keep the door open 
for Egypt through the retention of the Condominium regime. 
The Government had identified itself once and for all with the policy of swift progress 
towards independence and anybody who pretended to be a supporter of the 
Government while opposing the Government's policy could not call himself a loyal cit-
izen. The Government must realise by now that independence as envisaged by him and 
his supporters did not mean the severance of the British connection or the departure 
of the British official on which and on whom the country would rely for years to come. 
These time-servers and the supposed Centre Block of "loyal" opinion were more 
dangerous than the Khatmia, because the Government had learned by experience 
how hopeless it was to try and get Khatmia collaboration and were now toying with 
this new idea of a pro-Government party. 
In this connection he said that he felt that by continuing to make approaches to 
the Khatmia leaders after so many rebuffs the Government was losing face and 
putting itself into a most undignified position. 
2. His Excellency's reply to (a) was that there need be no fear whatever that the 
future of the Sudan could now be settled without the Sudanese themselves being 
consulted. The time for any such contingency had passed. Their present verdict was 
clear on the recent elections. The only considerable body of opposition to the 
Assembly had as its motive not a desire for union with Egypt but fear of the Sayed's 
own personal ambitions. 
The Sayed declared that there was no real fear in the country. He was liked and 
respected by the vast majority of the population. What alternatives had these patriots 
to suggest? If Sayed Ali el Mirghani had been capable of anything he would have built 
up so strong a position during many decades of Government support that he, S.A.R., 
would never have been able to get anywhere at all. No-they wanted Egypt, and only 
Egypt. At the same time he belittled their strength and reverted to his fear Jest it be 
increased in the years to come, by Egyptian propaganda. He made no attempt to deny 
his ambitions and implied that the Government had no alternative but to support them. 
In answer to his para. (b) above His Excellency assured him that the Government 
would continue to support his efforts for the progress of the Sudan. It was not, 
however, possible to fix a date for independence or for the next step towards self-
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government because no-one could say how these things would work out in practice. 
Much-if not all-would depend on the success of the new Assembly, and it was the 
Government's policy to co-operate with and support that Assembly to the utmost. It 
also naturally hoped and would work for the inclusion in the Assembly of all other 
shades of opinion. 
The Sayed expressed his full agreement with this last object provided that the 
ostensible agreement of fundamentally disloyal and pro-Egyptian elements should 
not be bought at the expense of the Government's true friends. He quoted a proverb 
of roughly the same sense as the fable of the dog with a bone in its mouth and hinted 
that if the Government alienated him all its efforts would come to nothing. 
Minute on 170 
This is not an entirely satisfactory letter but I think it is clear that Sir R. Howe is not 
asking for any decision on the various suggestions mentioned. He is just telling us 
how the winds are blowing in the Sudan. 
Our "alliance" with S.A.R. always had its dangers, namely that this probably most 
powerful single personality and influence in the Sudan would alienate other and prob-
ably steadier influences. This has happened in the withdrawal of support from the 
Government of the Khatmia. It is quite easy to understand the Governor-General's 
reluctance to be entirely dependent on S.A.R. and I am quite certain that an adminis-
tration based solely on him would be bound to run into difficulties. It is not, however, 
our job to tell the Governor-General precisely how he is to find the extra support he 
requires. We can only give him guidance in form of general principles. 
It is quite obvious that any question of a Kingship of the Sudan under S.A.R. would 
not merely wreck our relations with Egypt, but would also split the Sudan. A Mahdist 
regime would be bitterly opposed by large parts of the Arabic speaking country and it 
would be a disaster for the non-Moslem south. Nor is there any call for the Sudan 
Government so to speak to pass a vote of confidence in S.A.R. It is more usual for 
political parties, etc. to pass votes of confidence in Governments. Moreover, I do not 
think S.A.R.'s position is all that strong. The Umma party do not regard him as a 
political but as a religious leader, and it is probably this knowledge, and the fact that 
it was by the will of the Umma party leaders that Sadik his son was not elected leader 
of the Assembly, that S.A.R. is now seeking to re-gain his position by calling in the 
support of the Government. It also has to be remembered that S.A.R. is very much 
dependent on the Government financially (cotton). 
It would, moreover, it seems to me, be equally wrong to go as far as is suggested in 
paragraph 7 of this letter and make a public declaration either at Khartoum or here 
about Kingship. This would surely prejudice a free decision about the future of the 
Sudan, which it is our policy to keep open until such time as the Sudanese 
themselves are capable of making a decision. Surely our consistent policy in the 
Sudan should be that the Government should hold the ring while the various 
elements in the Sudan develop organically without help or hindrance from us until 
the day comes when the Sudan can decide for herself her future international status. 
This is the policy set out admirably in the last paragraph of the political summary 
(No. 1 of 1949) in J682/16. 
G.L.C. 
29.1.49 
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171 FO 371173613, no 704 3-4 Feb 1949 
[Nile Waters]: minutes by G L Clutton and Sir 0 Sargent 
[The FO and CO having resolved their disagreement over the best strategy of approaching 
Egypt about the Nile waters projects (see 164 and 166), Campbell found that political 
conditions within Egypt were not opportune for initiating discussions. Concerned by this 
continued delay both the CO and Khartoum urged the FO to renew its efforts so that talks 
could soon begin.] 
On December 8th instructions were sent to Sir R. Campbell to approach King Farouk 
about the Nile Waters (see J 7189/518/16 at flag B). As apparently no action had been 
taken on this despatch, the Department enquired just before Christmas how matters 
stood, and Sir R. Campbell replied that the form of the approach he had been 
instructed to make was a matter of great delicacy, particularly in the circumstances 
then prevailing when Egyptian feeling had been roused by the disturbances which 
accompanied the elections in the Sudan. The situation still further deteriorated with 
the assassination of Nokrashy and the debacle in Palestine. Sir R. Campbell has now 
written to the Secretary of State (see J 786 at flag A) saying that although he is 
prepared to take action at once, his strong inclination is to wait at least another week 
or two in the hope of a turn of the tide bringing with it a real chance of success. In 
the meantime, the Colonial Secretary has naturally become somewhat disturbed by 
the delay and has written to the Secretary of State urging immediate action (see his 
letter of the 31st January at flag C).1 
The Department quite understand Sir R. Campbell's difficulty and they are certain 
that at any rate until very recently, it would have been foolish to have tried to 
approach King Farouk. As the Ambassador himself has pointed out on more than one 
occasion, Egyptian thoughts were so pre-occupied with the question of the supply of 
arms that it would have been 75% certain that the approach would have been met by 
a request for such supplies. The situation has somewhat changed, however, and a 
sign of this was the friendly reception given in the Egyptian press to the Secretary of 
State's statement on Palestine in the House of Commons. Such a reception would 
not have been of any significance in any other Arab country, but it is of significance 
in Egypt where for years the press has been consistently hostile to anything we have 
done. Moreover, if we approach King Farouk about Anglo-American planning in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East, this occasion would be very propitious for also 
talking to him about the Nile Waters. The military planning contemplated represents 
the military measures it is intended to take against Communist infiltration into the 
Middle East. The development of the Nile Waters represents the social and economic 
measures to be taken against this danger. 
The Department do not feel that there is really any alternative in this question to 
an approach to King Farouk either now or in the very near future. Unilateral action 
on our part has been considered time and time again but it represents no satisfactory 
solution. As far as the irrigation side of the two schemes is concerned, such action 
would precipitate a really first class crisis in our relations with Egypt and in any case 
would lead to little practical result since Egyptian participation in the schemes is 
essential for their success. It is a case of the uselessness of taking a horse to the water 
1 In which Creech Jones expressed his anxiety that the political issues concerning the Equatorial Nile 
project and Lake Tsana be settled quickly (Creech Jones to Bevin, 31 Jan 1949, FO 371/73613, no 1118). 
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if you can't make it drink. As regards the hydro-electric side of the scheme, Uganda's 
immediate needs are satisfied by the power station now being erected at Owen Falls, 
which does not require Egyptian consent. The subsequent stages (the 120,000 and 
150,000 kilowatt stations) are later developments to take place in several years' time. 
The 120,000 kilowatt station would require Egyptian agreement and is an integral 
part of the irrigation scheme. In the case of the 150,000 kilowatt station, there is an 
arguable case that it does not infringe the Nile Waters Agreement and therefore 
require Egyptian consent.2 If, therefore, the Egyptian Government refuse to play, it 
may be necessary to skip the second stage. In any case, before we can usefully even 
consider unilateral action, we must approach the Egyptians and be in a position to 
say that they have definitely refused to participate in a scheme of development for the 
benefit of the whole of the Nile Valley. 
In his letter Sir R. Campbell makes two points. He questions the desirability of 
stipulating that the works at Lake Kyoga in Uganda should be entrusted to British 
contractors. This concession has already been agreed by the Egyptians at the 
technical level, and it seems a reasonable stipulation by the Uganda Government for 
general security reasons. Otherwise they would have no control over what was going 
on in their own territory. The second point is that the Egyptian Government should 
be allowed to take the lead in negotiations with foreign Governments regarding the 
schemes. This seems reasonable provided, of course, that it does not involve any 
sacrifice of the Sudan's interests or questions of principle about the sovereignty over 
the Sudan. It should be quite possible to avoid all these dangers. The Governor-
General (see Khartoum telegram No. 15 to Cairo in J 704, flag D)3 seems to be 
making undue objections on this point and the subject has been dealt with by the 
Department separately. 
Recommendation 
The Department recommend that Sir R. Campbell be instructed to approach King 
Farouk as soon as possible, preferably on the same occasion as he takes up the matter 
of Anglo-American planning if such a demarche is finally agreed. 
Drafts are submitted. 
I agree. 
G.L.C. 
3.2.49 
It was the Colonial Office and the Governor of Uganda whose delay for several 
weeks meant that we lost the opportunity of taking this up with the Egyptians in 
November. 
2 See 164, note 3. 
O.G.S. 
4.2.49 
3 In commenting on Campbell's 14 Jan letter to Bevin, in which Campbell suggested ways to avoid 
constitutional issues being raised along with the Nile Waters question, Howe proposed that the pre-
requisites to allowing the Egyptians to be the sole negotiators with Ethiopia (about Lake Tsana) and with 
Uganda and Belgium (about Equatorial Nile project) would be Egyptian ratification of the technical 
agreement on sharing benefits and costs of Lake Tsana project; an agreement on sharing the benefits and 
costs of the Equatorial Nile project; a revision of the Nile waters agreement (inward telegram no 21 from 
Howe to FO, 27 Jan 1949, FO 371/73613, no 704). 
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172 FO 371173613, no 1130 9 Feb 1949 
[Nile Waters]: despatch no 89 from EA Chapman-Andrews to Mr 
Bevin on the reopening of Nile Waters discussions with Egypt.1 
Enclosure: translation by FO of Egyptian aide-memoire (7 Feb 1949) 
I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 212 of 8th February on the subject of 
the Nile waters' projects, and to transmit herewith the English translation of an aide-
memoire handed to me by the Minister for Foreign Mfairs on the evening of 7th 
February. You will see that the position of the two committees which have been 
formed to study this question is not entirely clear. It appears, however, that the 
technical committee of senior officials of the Ministry of Public Works submitted 
their report with seven recommendations; subsequently a three-man committee, 
consisting of eminent engineers who were also ex-Ministers of Public Works, was 
formed and they apparently recommended that the Lake Tana dam should be 
constructed as a matter of urgency, and that Egypt should participate with the 
Uganda Government in the Owen Falls scheme. It is not clear from the aide-memoire 
whether the Egyptian Government wish to participate in the construction itself or 
whether they intend to limit their participation to financing the work. On the other 
five recommendations of the technical committee the three-man committee has not 
yet given its views but hopes to do so within three months. There is, therefore, a 
small error in the third sentence of paragraph 1 of my telegram under reference, 
where the words "technical committee" should be substituted for "committee of 
three experts." 
2. The next point which I think needs further elucidation is the insistence of the 
Minister for Foreign Mfairs, which was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister, that no 
unilateral action should be taken by the Uganda Government on the Owen Falls 
project until the Egyptian Government have had time to declare their intention to 
co-operate in this scheme. I suspect that the reason for this insistence was that 
neither the Minister for Foreign Mfairs nor the Prime Minister had fully understood 
from my note of 19th January that the plans for the construction for which orders 
have already been placed by the Uganda Government would not prejudice, and indeed 
contemplated, the larger scheme, which would benefit Egypt as well as Uganda. The 
Minister for Foreign Mfairs told me that three or four Egyptian Ministers had 
expressed a desire for further review and discussion of this scheme in view of the 
considerable expenditure which Egypt would be asked to bear, and it seems likely 
that he feared that unless he could prove there would be a direct advantage to Egypt, 
these Ministers might oppose the whole scheme. I managed to persuade the Minister 
for Foreign Mfairs that he had nothing to fear on this score. The Prime Minister, 
when I assured him in the same sense, accepted what I said but nevertheless repeated 
his plea for temporary suspension of action by the Uganda Government. I told his 
Excellency that I did not know whether a delay was possible since power was most 
urgently needed for the benefit of the inhabitants of Uganda. He said he wished to be 
able to demonstrate that the two Governments were working together from the 
beginning. I think he is sincere in this. It is, of course, probable that Abdul Hadi 
1 This is the ambassador's despatch, submitted by Chapman-Andrews, who was officiating in Campbell's 
absence. 
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Pasha is also afraid of missing the chance of giving a demonstration to the world that 
Egypt is capable of co-operating in progressive schemes for the benefit of the peoples 
of Uganda, Sudan and Egypt, and also of missing the opportunity to gain 
considerable prestige for himself and his Government by participating in these 
works. 
3. As regards the Sudan constitutional issue, I told the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs that it would be the greatest pity if constitutional questions were allowed to 
delay or be an obstacle to agreement of works which would be of such great practical 
benefit to the individual ordinary man. He said that he agreed with this and pointed 
out that there were always people who were ready to mar beneficial projects of this 
sort by insistence on political points, and went on to say that they should not be 
allowed to do so. I told him that His Majesty's Government would be pleased to hear 
this. The Prime Minister, when I raised this question with him, also agreed fully that 
political and constitutional difficulties should be avoided. 
4. As regards publicity for these projects, I fully appreciate that you do not wish 
to be accused of lagging behind the United States Government in a matter in which 
His Majesty's Government should obviously take the lead, but at the same time it 
would be unfortunate if we allowed it to appear that the Egyptian Government were 
tagging on behind the British Government in a project of this sort and the vanity of 
both King Farouk and Abdul Hadi Pasha might be hurt and the whole project dam-
aged in consequence if publicity made this appear to be the case. Subject to the posi-
tion of His Majesty's Government being safeguarded, I think we should do everything 
possible to give the Egyptians the illusion that they themselves will have their full 
share of responsibility if these schemes go through, and that they will earn the respect 
and gratitude of the outside world for farsighted statesmanship. As I stated in para-
graph 5 of my telegram No. 212, I propose to take an early opportunity to speak to 
King Farouk on the lines of your instructions in order to emphasise to him your per-
sonal interest and the importance that you attach to the work going ahead. 
I am sending copies of this despatch to the Governor-General of the Sudan, the 
Governor of Uganda and His Majesty's representatives at Washington, Brussels and 
Addis Ababa and to Sir John Troutbeck,2 British Middle East Office. 
Enclosure to 172 
With reference to your Excellency's letter of 19th January, 1949, regarding the 
proposed dam at Owen Falls, I wish to make clear the standpoint of the Egyptian 
Government with regard to the major irrigation projects for the control of the River 
Nile necessary to cope with Egypt's water requirements in the future. 
A Technical Committee of senior officers of the Ministry of Public Works was 
formed to study and report on these projects. They have already completed their 
study and submitted their comprehensive report recommending the following: 
1. The participation with the Uganda Government in the construction of the dam 
at Owen Falls for the purpose of over-year storage and building up of a reserve in 
Lake Victoria; and the construction of-
2 Sir John Troutbeck, head of BMEO, Cairo, 1947- 1950. 
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2. A regulator at Lake Kioga exit for control of the lake. 
3. A dam across the Albert Nile at or near Mutir. 
4. The Sudd channels, together with the requisite masonry and constructional works. 
5. A dam at the 4th or 2nd Cataract on the Main Nile between Khartum and Haifa. 
Either of these dams or both will play an important part in protecting the country 
against dangerous floods, over and above supplementing the working of the lake's 
reservoirs for the control of water supply in timely season. 
6. The dam at the Lake Tana exit for the benefit of both Egypt and the Sudan. 
7. The raising of the storage level in Gebel Aulia reservoir. 
Owing to the vital importance of these major projects the Egyptian Government have 
thought it fit and necessary to consult three eminent engineers of ex-Ministers of 
Public Works. 
This National Expert Committee have set to work ever since last November and are 
still meeting regularly with the object of completing their studies as soon as possible. 
The first result of these studies is their recommendation to hasten up the 
construction of the Lake Tana dam. They also approve Egypt's participation with the 
Uganda Government in the construction of the Owen Falls dam. 
I trust this committee will complete their studies of remaining projects and 
submit their final report to the Government in three month's time. 
The Egyptian Government is keen on conveying to your . Excellency the 
importance she attaches to the Owen Falls dam scheme being an important link in 
the chain of major projects on the Nile referred to above. 
The Egyptian Government is, therefore, losing no time in taking the necessary 
constitutional steps to put the matter before the Council of Ministers and to 
Parliament with the object of obtaining an early decision with regard to Egypt's 
participation in the construction of the Owen Falls scheme. 
The Egyptian Government trust that no steps be taken by the Uganda Government 
in the matter in order that the construction may be started on the lines of the joint 
scheme for the benefit of both countries. 
173 FO 371/73475; no 2400 15 Mar 1949 
[Trade union legislation and the general strike]: minutes by G L 
Clutton and Mr Bevin on trade union legislation in the Sudan 
On the 11th March the Workers' Congress in Atbara sent an ultimatum to the 
Governor-General of the Sudan demanding the immediate annulment of the Trade 
Union Ordinance, failing which a strike will be called on the 15th March. A report has 
just been received from Khartoum to the effect that it is believed there will be a one-
day strike of a general nature today. 
The Secretary of State will recall that after the three-day railway strike1 and the so 
called "indefinite strike" which took place in the Sudan a year ago,2 the Sudan 
Government drew up legislation regulating the setting up of Trades Unions, the 
means of settling trades disputes, conditions of employment and workers' 
compensation. Generally speaking, this legislation was well received, but the Trade 
1 See 152. 2 See 158 and 159. 
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Union Ordinance which was proclaimed in January last and is to become effective 
today has met with some criticism. 
The root of this opposition lies, of course, in the Anglo-Egyptian quarrel over the 
status of the Sudan which has divided intelligent Sudanese into two main groups, the 
Umma, who favour ultimate independence, and the Ashigga, who advocate union 
with Egypt. The dispute between these two parties is aggravated by conflicting 
religious and personal loyalties. The result has been that where the Umma have 
supported the Government over the establishment of the Legislative Assembly, the 
Ashigga have opposed them, and this opposition has been carried into other spheres. 
Where the Umma support the new Trades Union Legislation the Ashigga oppose it. 
The instrument of Ashigga policy in this case is the Workers' Mfairs Association 
which provoked the railway strike a year ago. The danger in the present situation lies 
in the extent to which Communists can take advantage of the rivalry between the 
Ashigga and the Umma parties. We know that the Trade Unions in Egypt are affiliated 
to the World Federation of Trade Unions which is no more than an instrument for 
the furtherance of Soviet Communist policy, and it is therefore highly probable that 
Communist elements are fostering the pro-Egyptian Ashigga party's criticism of the 
Ordinance, and are ultimately responsible for the present threatened strike. A report 
received from Mr. Cowan, the Labour Commissioner, that Communist converts have 
already made their appearance in the Workers' Mfairs Association, tends to confirm 
this view. Moreover, further propaganda against the Trade Union Ordinance has been 
circulated by the "Sudanese Movement for National Liberation" which is closely 
connected with the "Democratic Movement of National Liberation", which is the 
principal Communist organisation in Egypt. 
The Workers' Mfairs Association have two principal objections to the Ordinance. 
In the first place it gives freedom to all to organise, and the Association's "leadership" 
will in due course be challenged; secondly the Association will have to account for 
their funds by the responsible Audit, whereas last year a substantial balance of some 
thousands of pounds which they received from Cairo quietly disappeared. 
The Sudan Government are fully aware of the danger inherent in the present 
situation should they be obliged to prosecute the recalcitrants in the event of their 
striking, after refusing to register under the Ordinance. To meet the present 
emergency the Sudan Government has issued instructions that unclassified 
employees on strike will lose one day's pay, but no further action will be taken 
against them; classified officials who refuse, neglect or fail to perform their duty 
without reasonable excuse will be tried by a Board of Discipline, and the Sudan 
Government have suggested that they should be fined a few days' pay according to 
circumstances; with a maximum of 7 days. 
The Department are being kept fully informed of the situation by the Sudan 
Agency in London. 
Since the above was written the Department have been informed by the Sudan 
Agency that the strike began at 5.30 this morning. The strike has been 100% effective 
amongst the unclassified (non-pensionable) workers; all Post and Telegraph staffs 
have carried on but only 25% of the Public Works staff have refused to strike. No 
hospital staffs have struck. No incidents had been reported up to midday today and it 
is expected that the strike will end at 5.30 tomorrow morning. 
G.L.C. 
15.3.49 
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This may be a rehearsal for something later on. The Communist generally begins 
with one-day strikes. The Govt. should leave nothing to chance and begin now 
building up a counter organization. We should warn the Egyptian Govt. they may be 
playing with fire if they encourage the use of the industrial strike for political 
purposes. 
E.B. 
17.3.49 
17 4 FO 371173615, no 3034 9 Apr 1949 
[Nile Waters]: inward Savingram no 76 from Sir R Campbell to FO on 
the participation of the Sudan in Nile Waters projects. Minute by D J 
D Maitland1 
In paragraph 9 of my despatch No.2072 now on its way to you, I referred to certain 
policy questions now confronting us. 
2. These all arise from the need to protect the interests of the Sudan and appear 
to be as follows:-
(I) Participation of the Sudan in the White Nile scheme 
It appears that the Sudan will eventually require a considerable quantity of water 
from the White Nile scheme. The summary of the scheme handed to the Egyptian 
Government makes no mention of this requirement nor have the Egyptians been 
made aware of it in any other way except informally. Their reaction is therefore not 
known, but is likely to be unfavourable. 
It is important to consider the Sudan's claim now because (a) the Blue and White 
Nile projects when executed will practically exhaust the possibilities of increasing 
and regularising the flow of the Nile once and for all, and there will therefore be no 
other projects from which the Sudan's requirements could be satisfied later (b) 
although the Egyptian Government cannot in practice execute either the Blue or the 
White Nile scheme against the wishes of His Majesty's Government owing to the 
latter's influence in Ethiopia and Uganda and her position as Co-dominus of the 
Sudan, the bargaining weapon which this gives us will become increasingly difficult 
to use as the projects progress, unless we are to lay ourselves open to charges of bad 
faith and possibly of breaking of international law. 
The tactics to be pursued are difficult to decide upon. It can be held that by 
allowing the Egyptian Government to participate even in the Owen Falls scheme 
without any commitment to share the benefits of the White Nile project with the 
Sudan, we have already lost bargaining strength. This contention will apply with 
increasing force at each stage of the White Nile scheme if no agreement is reached on 
the Sudan's share. It can also be held that it is wise to defer the raising of this issue 
until the Egyptian Government are fully committed to the Tsana scheme in which 
they are now taking so welcome an interest and on which a division of benefits with 
1 Egyptian Dept, FO, 1948-1950. 
2 Reporting a conversation with the Egyptian foreign minister concerning Nile Waters (FO 371/73615, no 
2924). 
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the Sudan has already been worked out and recently endorsed in an Egyptian Aide 
Memoire.3 It will be recalled that in the short term the Tsana scheme is considered to 
be much more important to the Sudan than the White Nile scheme. 
There are many permutations of arguments in either direction. 
(II) The representation of the Sudan in the Tsana negotiations and agreement 
While an agreement between Egypt and the Sudan only on a division of cost and 
benefit might be honoured indefinitely by Egypt, it is generally considered to be 
desirable that such an agreement should somehow be consecrated in the agreement 
which will have to be negotiated with the Ethiopian Government and that the Sudan 
should somehow formally be a party to that agreement. Both Egypt and Ethiopia 
would in this way be bound vis-a-vis the Sudan by an international instrument, 
giving the latter proper security for her share of water and her financial 
commitment. But the caution which the Egyptians display towards any form of 
procedure which implies formal acceptance of the equal status of Co-domini or the 
equal status of Egypt and the Sudan, coupled with the fact that Egypt is a vitally 
interested party and the United Kingdom is not, makes it peculiarly difficult to find 
the right formula. 
(Ill) Revision of the Nile Waters agreement 
The execution of the Egyptian-Sudan technical agreement on division of benefits of 
the Tsana scheme, by altering the amounts of water to which they are entitled, ipso 
facto requires the amendment of the Nile Waters agreement. I understand that this 
technical agreement does not in any case provide in terms for the year-round 
entitlement of the Sudan, and an agreement regarding this will have to be negotiated 
before modification of the Nile Waters agreement is achieved. Similar considerations 
will apply in respect of the White Nile scheme. The Nile Waters agreement contains 
no provision for denunciation but is written in terms contemplating a review in 
changed circumstances. It is an open question how and when the revision of the Nile 
Waters agreement is to be tackled. 
3. I have discussed these matters at great length with members of my staff and 
briefly with Mr. Allan the Irrigation Consultant to the Sudan Government during his 
recent visit here. I have come to the conclusion that they can only be resolved after a 
full discussion between representatives of the Sudan Government, your own 
department, and this Embassy. Mr. Allan is planning to return to London later this 
month and I suggest therefore that the discussion take place here on April 21st and 
22nd which would enable him to attend this meeting by breaking his journey here. I 
have no doubt that the Sudan Government, if they agree to the meeting, will also 
wish to send a representative qualified to deal with the political side of the matter. On 
the assumption that you also agree, I venture to suggest that the representative from 
your department might be Mr. Donald Maitland, who I believe is well acquainted 
with these matters. It would not be necessary to keep him for more than two days if 
he could be spared only for a short period. 
4. I should appreciate a very early indication of your view, and that of the Sudan 
Government, upon this proposal. 
3 Seel72. 
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Minute on 17 4 
This telegram is a supplement to the despatch in 12924/14210/16, which is submitted 
simultaneously. 
I have discussed this with Mr. Stewart4 and our preliminary comments are as 
follows: 
On (1), it would be better to raise this question with the Egyptian Government 
sooner rather than later and on the highest level. An opportunity to do so might arise 
if we can offer the Egyptians a favourable solution to the tenders and contracts 
problem. 
On II and Ill, a revision of the Nile Waters Agreement is of course necessary 
because the 1929 Agreement consisted of an Exchange of Notes covering the report 
of the 1925 Commission which has been superseded by the technical agreement of 
April 1948. The Sudan constitutional question might be avoided if the new Nile 
Waters Agreement were tripartite or quadripartite-i.e. signed by and binding on the 
Egyptian Government (per se and as one eo-dominus), H.M.G. (as metropolitan 
country of Uganda and the other eo-dominus), the Ethiopian Government and, 
possibly, the Belgian Government. During the negotiation of the Agreement the 
Sudan's interests could be represented by advisers at the disposal of the delegations 
of both eo-domini; this would go some way towards satisfying Sudanese prestige. The 
Agreement itself would say, amongst other things, that so much of the Lake Tana 
water would be used in the Sudan and so much would pass on to Egypt and so on. 
Mr Stewart agreed that I should express the above as personal views in Cairo and 
that I should ask that any recommendations arising from the discussions should be 
subject to further consideration in the Foreign Office. 
4 FO, 1948-1951; assistant head of African Dept, 1950. 
D.J.D.M. 
15.4.49 
175 FO 371173842, no 3261 23 Apr 1949 
[Western Eritrea and the Sudan]: minutes by M N F Stewart and SirE 
Beckett on proposal to incorporate the province of Western Eritrea 
into the Sudan. 
[The future of the former Italian colonies, including Eritrea, was placed before the 
General Assembly of the UN. Britain was most concerned about the fate of the Italian 
colonists and the effect any settlement would have on its relations with Italy and Ethiopia. 
It was the US State Department which proposed to separate the largely Muslim Western 
Province from the rest of highland Eritrea, with its Christian majority, and cede it to the 
Sudan. Britain was at first reluctant to agree to this, for fear that it would provoke Egypt 
into raising constitutional questions regarding the Sudan. Egypt proved unexpectedly 
amenable to the proposal, however, and the text of a draft resolution was agreed between 
the State Department and the FO (inward telegram no 1756 from Clutton to the FO, 28 
Mar 1949, FO 371173842, no 2593}. The FO was still concerned that the debate in the 
General Assembly would lead to some proposed interference by the UN in the Sudan as a 
whole. In the end the South American caucus in the General Assembly proposed that the 
Western Province be placed under an international trusteeship, to which both Britain and 
Egypt objected. By the end of 1949 the international debate on Eritrea had moved away 
from partition and on to only two possible options: the total cession of Eritrea to 
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Ethiopia, or complete independence for Eritrea (minute by H G Bower, 'Withdrawal from 
Eritrea', 25 Nov 1949, FO 371/73847, no 8555). Despite the Sudan government's obvious 
reluctance to absorb Western Eritrea, the issue revived Campbell's complaint about 'the 
rapidly increasing tendency of the Sudan Government to take upon itself something of 
the nature of the government of an independent state', with Robertson apparently 
assuming the role of prime minister to the governor-general's head of state, especially in 
external affairs, as evidenced by his alleged desire to readjust the frontier with Kenya and 
Ethiopia (see 143) and annex Western Eritrea without reference to Egypt. Since the 
ambassador had ceased to be high commissioner for the Sudan the embassy in Cairo 
could exercise no oversight in such matters; therefore 'I beg of you to look once more at 
the question of what seems to me Foreign Office responsibility to control the actions of 
the Sudan Government.' (letter from Campbell to Wright, 14 May 1949, FO 371/73472, 
no 4357).] 
The Secretary of State said at a meeting held in his room on the 22nd April that he 
had no objection to the proposal to incorporate the Western Province of Eritrea into 
the Sudan provided 
(a) it would not involve either a U.N. Commission of Enquiry visiting the Sudan 
or the Western Province. 
(b) there was no form of interference by the Assembly in the affairs of the Sudan, 
e.g. by the former asking to hear the views of the Sudanese Delegation, or by 
otherwise enquiring into the affairs of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. 
He had in mind the possibility that, as apparently the Egyptian Government would 
make no advance, some member of the Slav bloc or even the South American states 
might take the opportunity of embarrassing the H.M.G., and of disturbing 
Anglo-Egyptian relations. 
These are primarily political considerations on which the U.K. Delegation will have 
to advise. The Secretary of State also wished for advice on the proper form of taking 
the Sudan Government's views on the proposal and of securing consent. 
The Governor General of the Sudan has already taken private and unofficial 
soundings of the Sudanese members of his Executive Council (see Khartoum 
telegram No. 72, Flag K) 1 who are dubious about the questions of the expense of 
administering the province and the possible unfriendly reactions of Ethiopia. The 
Governor General should be in a position to reassure them since the Secretary of 
State has said that he is willing to ask the Treasury to pay the cost of administration 
(at present calculated at between £25,000 and £30,000 a year) until such a time as 
the province can become self-supporting. As regards Ethiopian reaction, the 
Ethiopian Delegation in New York has given assurances and has asked their 
Government to confirm them.2 Perhaps Sir Eric Beckett would be good enough to 
1 The Sudanese members of the Executive Council were concerned about administrative cost to the 
Sudanese tax-payers, the possibility of opposition from the inhabitants of Western Eritrea, and the 
probability of creating difficulties over the Lake Tsana project should Ethiopia wish to take over all of 
Eritrea. The last was seen as the most important consideration, and Robertson reported that the Sudanese 
members of the council would be unlikely to agree to the proposal if Ethiopia did not consent (inward 
telegram no 72 from Robertson to Stewart, 12 Apr 1949, FO 371/73842, no 3031). 
2 The Ethiopian delegation to the UN assured the UK delegation that relations between the two countries 
would be unaffected by the General Assembly awarding Western Eritrea to the Sudan. They even went so 
far as to seek authority from Addis Ababa to renounce Ethiopia's claim to the Western Province (inward 
telegram no 944 from Clutton (NY) to Robertson (FO), 19 Apr 1949, FO 371/73842, no 3261). 
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advise on the question of officially ascertaining the Sudan Government's views 
mentioned above. 
M.N.F.S. 
23.4.49 
It is outside the authority of the Governor-General of the Sudan under the 
Condominium Agreement to accept a new province for inclusion in the Sudan. The 
decision on this point rests with the two eo-domini but the two eo-domini may think 
it proper, before deciding, to obtain the views of the Governor-General, and in this 
case an enquiry by both eo-domini to the Governor-General and a reply by him to 
both eo-domini is the right procedure, the decision on the point being conveyed to 
the Assembly by the two eo-domini. 
W.E.B. 
26.4.49 
176 FO 371/73406, no 4316 4 May 1949 
[Political climate in the Sudan]: memorandum byE A Chapman-
Andrews on a recent visit to the Sudan [Extract] 
The following is not intended to be a report in the ordinary sense of the term relating 
more or less exactly what various people told me, but rather to be some account of 
my visit to the Sudan indicating the sort of people I talked things over with, the 
general burden of what they had to say, though not exactly in their own language, 
and my own impressions of the result. 
I left Cairo by air on the morning of Thursday, lOth March, and returned on the 
morning of Thursday, 17th March. I got into action on the day of my arrival by 
having tea at the Governor-General's residence with the three Sudanese "Ministers" 
and I ended the proceedings with being entertained by them to tea the evening 
before I left. The only changes I made in the programme of engagements drawn up 
for me by the Governor-General's staff were to exclude interviews with the press and 
to include visits to the Officer Commanding Egyptian Troops in the Sudan, the 
Unionist Party Club at Omdurman and a short talk with a leading Independent who 
was until recently Secretary-General of the Umma Party .1 
Among the Sudanese, in addition to my two talks with the three Ministers 
(Agriculture, Education and Health) I had talks with the Speaker of the Chamber, the 
Under-Secretaries (there are no Ministers for these Departments) of the Interior, 
Defence, Irrigation, Economics and Trade and Finance, the Assistant Director of 
Works, the Town Clerk of Omdurman (who took me round both Omdurman and 
Khartoum to show me what was being done in the way of town planning and housing 
for the Sudanese), various members of the Legislative Assembly, including a certain 
number from the South and tribal Nazirs and, last but not least, long talks with the 
two irreconcilables, El Sayed Sir Abdul Rahman El Mahdi Pasha and El Sayed Sir Aly 
El Mirghany Pasha. I also visited the Chamber during a Session .... 
1 Possibly Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub, nominated member to the Assembly. Abdallah Khalil had been 
secretary general of the Umma Party since its inception. 
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Of all the above, apart from the members of the Unionist Party Club and the 
Egyptian Army officers, who had nothing to say about politics, only four or five could 
be classed as in opposition to the policies of the Sudan Government and of the Umma 
Party. Of these the most important individual was, of course, El Sayed Aly El 
Mirghany. I had a three hour talk with him over tea the day after my arrival. 
He took the line that as a holy man, the head of a sect that had long been 
established throughout the length of the Nile Valley and had its origin in Mecca, he 
could not also be a politician. You could not, however, altogether divorce religion 
from politics and he had advised his followers, who were the majority of the people of 
the Sudan, that they were free to adopt any attitude they wished towards political 
questions save only that they must not support the Umma Party. They could, for 
example, be for or against the Ordinance and the Legislative Assembly though it 
seemed clear to him that the Ordinance had been deliberately constructed to forward 
government policy which in its turn was to assure ascendency in the Sudan to the 
Umma Party. That was why most of his followers had in fact opposed the Ordinance. 
He had heard of people fighting and dying in order to have a Parliament, but surely 
never before had there been an example of the majority of people struggling against 
the Government and being imprisoned and losing their property in order not to have 
a Parliament. Yet such was the case in the Sudan. The reason why his followers were 
not free to join the Umma Party was that it was a revival of Mahdism under which the 
Mirghanists had suffered until the reconquest of the Sudan at the end of the last 
century. Mahdism was both a religion and a political creed. As a religion it was 
anathema to true believers. It had its origins not in the holy land of Arabia, but in the 
native soil of the Sudan and its first prophet claimed that he was equal to God's 
Prophet. The Mahdi had so declared himself (as had his successor the Khalifa) on the 
banners borne by the Dervish army in their first insurrection against the "Turks"2 
(by this expression he always referred indiscriminately to the members of the Sudan 
Political Service and their predecessors in Khedivial days whether British or 
Egyptian) which had led to the murder of the Turkish Governor-General, Cordon 
Pasha and during their resistance to the onward march of Kitchener's Army 15 years 
later. Those 15 years were surely the blackest period in the Sudan's history. The 
Mahdists claimed them as the only era of true Sudanese independence and it was by 
that standard that the present Umma (Independence) Party should be measured. 
Slavery, oppression and darkness descended on the Sudan in those days and rather 
than risk a return to such conditions Sayed Aly and his followers would prefer that 
there should be no independence for the Sudan and that the present Condominium 
should remain but if that were not possible they would have the Egyptian Crown or 
even Egyptian rule. There was nothing abhorrent about the idea of Egyptian rule as 
there was about a revival of Mahdism; and there was a real danger of such a revival. 
The Mahdists were well organised and strong. They had always been the martial 
element in the Sudan and once they got rid of the British and the Egyptians the 
towns along the Nile Valley which were the Mirghanists' strongholds, as in the past, 
would be at the mercy of the Mahdists. It was these towns that were the centres of 
2 Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi was, in fact, careful to declare his subordination to the Prophet 
Muhammad, even when imitating him. His flags carried the slogan, 'Muhammad Ahmad is the Khalifa 
(Successor) to the Prophet of God'. 
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commerce, international trade, cultural and religious institutions and in fact all that 
was most worth preserving in the Sudan. The Mahdist youth were already well 
organised and the uniform they wore was the patched jibba affected by the Dervish 
warriors. These Mahdist youth groups were even called by the very word ANSAR 
("Conquerors")3 adopted by the leaders of the Dervish armies during the Mahdia. 
Moreover the head of the Umma Party was a man of unbounded ambition. He wanted 
to be King of the Sudan. He might not admit it in so many words but such was the 
case. He was unscrupulous too and prepared to use his religion to advance his wordly 
ambitions and to take advantage of his increase in power and influence to impose his 
religion upon others. And it was the unmistakable policy of the Sudan Government 
to support the Mahdi. They had helped him to acquire land by which he had enriched 
himself. They had appointed his followers to government office all over the country 
and now they had so drafted the Ordinance as to ensure a very large Mahdist majority 
in the Legislative Assembly despite the fact that the other parties commanded more 
support throughout the country and represented the more enlightened classes. So 
long as this remained government policy Sayed Aly's followers would do everything 
in their power to oppose it. 
The other three or four Mirghanists with whom I spoke held the same view 
(though with varying intensity) about the danger of a revival of the Mahdia but they 
were not against free institutions as such. 
They were all (but one in particular-a man who had a son at Cambridge and who 
has himself refused the offer of a ministerial portfolio because he was opposed to the 
Ordinance in its present form) intelligent men and, as I thought, very reasonable 
critics. They wanted to see the Ordinance amended in order to provide for stronger 
representation of the towns and the representation of tribal areas by other than the 
Nazirs who were in fact really appointed by the Government and in a sense 
Government servants. These Nazirs were not only the supreme judicial, 
administrative and executive authorities in their districts but also represented those 
districts in the Assembly. Yet ordinary civil servants who stood for the Assembly had 
to resign. The rule should be that both civil servants and Nazirs were excluded or else 
that neither should be excluded. My interlocutors seemed to think that both should 
be excluded. 
They also thought there should be some rearrangement of constituencies .... 
El Sayed Sir Abdul Rahman El Mahdi ·Pasha invited me to breakfast in his house 
which no doubt in some ways was intended to resemble a palace. It is in fact called by 
this name, in competition possibly with the residence of the Governor-General which 
is similarly designated. There were silver-framed photographs of royalties in his 
drawing room and the old man himself with his little entourage has quite a regal 
bearing. While I was there they were working away on a very large reception room or 
hall on the ground floor which was being added to his residence; and the thought 
crossed my mind (as it has I believe that of many others) that this was to be a sort of 
throne room. At both my talks with him the Mahdi was accompanied by his son who 
had been to Gordon College and speaks quite adequate English. 
The Mahdi told me he was a posthumous son of his father, the founder of the 
Mahdia. Mter his father's death the Khalifa ("Successor"), of whom he retained most 
affectionate memories, treated him as his own son. Mter the battle of Omdurman 
3 
'Ansar' means 'helper', the term the Prophet Muhammad applied to his own followers. 
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and the dispersal of the Khalifa's Army, Sayed Abdul Rahman was concealed for a 
time but finally surrendered to Sir Reginald Wingate, then Sirdar and Governor-
General of the Sudan. Sir Reginald befriended him and got small grants of land for 
him in the provinces, but these years were a period of trial for his father's former 
followers. The Government in those days befriended the Mirghanists. But during the 
first world war the loyalty to the Government of some of these Mirghanists was called 
in question. Some of them followed the example of certain Egyptian officers of the 
Army and refused to take part in a war against Turkey because the Sultan was both 
Caliph and Suzerain of the Egyptian Khedive. It was at that time that the Sudan 
Government invited Sayed Abdul Rahman to tour the Sudan urging support of the 
Allies against Germany and Turkey. After the war the Sudan Government came to 
rely increasingly upon the support of Sayed Abdul Rahman and his followers and 
gave them increasing freedom to organise themselves and prepare themselves 
generally to serve the interests of the Sudan. In the intervening years he and his 
followers had prospered and there was no doubt that they now constituted the most 
reliable and best trained elements in the country. They had their detractors but their 
loyalty and gratitude to Britain should not be called in question. They fully realised 
that the days of colonial government were over and that people were becoming 
increasingly free to choose their own form of government. The Sudanese respected 
the British but they wanted quite naturally to run their own country. They would do 
this, when the time came, with British help and advice but they must hold the 
supreme power in their own hands. He realised that the Government of the Sudan 
still depended upon the Condominium Agreement, but the Sudanese had been 
promised that no further agreement concerning the Sudan would be entered into 
between the Co-Domini without the Sudanese being consulted and approving it. He 
was apprehensive lest in our anxiety to obtain a workable military arrangement with 
Egypt we should be prepared to sacrifice the Sudan or the interests of the Sudanese 
or come to some arrangement with Egypt affecting the future of the Sudan without 
the consent of the Sudanese and he warned me that any such action on our part 
would undoubtedly lead to widespread outbreaks of revolt. His people would not 
stand for it. His father had revolted against"Turkish" oppression and had achieved 
independence for the Sudan which would have remained independent to this day but 
for the British conquest. Although I asked him many questions about the period of 
the Mahdia, which he remembered quite well, he would not admit that it was a black 
interlude in the country's history arid therefore best forgotten. On the contrary his 
whole attitude seemed to be that it was a glorious epoch in which his father's 
achievements set the standard for his own strivings. I asked him outright whether he 
contemplated ever being King of the Sudan and he replied that he did not; but this 
was not a matter that called even for discussion at the moment. Some of his followers 
indeed wanted an independent Sudan within the British Commonwealth. All of them 
wanted an independent Sudan run with British assistance and advice and in most 
friendly relations with the British Commonwealth. None of them wanted or would 
tolerate Egyptian control. They would welcome an arrangement with Britain that 
would give Britain all she required in the way of military facilities. They were grateful 
to Britain but was not Britain also grateful to the Sudan? Did Britain not know that 
she could rely on the Sudan to fight at her side whenever Britain was at war? Could 
Britain . rely on Egypt? Was it worth alienating the Sudan to .get a military 
arrangement with Egypt and would it not be better to let Egypt go her own way and 
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make a military arrangement with the Sudan? The Umma Party wanted good 
relations with Egypt also. They realised full well that they must be on terms of 
intimate friendship with Egypt. Egypt and the Sudan could not get along without 
one another. They might be glad of help from Egypt provided they were sure that the 
Egyptians furnishing it and working in the Sudan were not foci of political unrest 
and spearheads of Egyptian imperialism as were without exception Egyptians 
working in the Sudan at the present moment notably the officer commanding the 
Egyptian troops and a large number of Egyptian schoolmasters. He realised (though 
he did not volunteer it-I had to wring it out of him) that Egyptian assent to the 
Ordinance was desirable. Indeed he seemed, on being pressed, apprehensive of the 
possible consequences of not obtaining it. He seemed ready to discuss this matter 
with me tentatively but, as I explained to him, as to all others, I was not briefed for 
negotiations but was merely enquiring about viewpoints. 
So much for the Mahdi. 
To compare the two men no more need be said than that the Mahdi impresses one 
as being undoubtedly the better man of the two. He may have ambitions but I think 
very few fears . He is probably a bully. The other may have no ambitions but is full of 
fears. Sayed Aly, I think, nurses feelings of frustration, disappointment, envy, hatred 
and malice and an ambition to see the Mahdi's power again destroyed. Sayed Abdul 
Rahman, on the other hand, is a full man and I think could be persuaded to 
compromise on practical issues if given assurances. 
The Mahdi's followers struck me as a good lot and I must admit that they did not 
seem to me to be the sort of men who would lend themselves to or tolerate anything 
like a revival of the Mahdia in the old sense. They were serious minded, well educated 
men, trying very hard, it seemed to me, in the face of great difficulties, to run the 
country decently and progressively and learning how to do this through a 
parliamentary system. They differed considerably among themselves about the 
future. Some wanted full independence very soon, others later. Some wanted British 
dominion status and the sooner the better. All wanted the continuance of British 
advice and guidance, and many told me they realised that it would be some time 
before the Sudanese themselves could be capable of running their own show as they 
wanted to see it run. At the same time they felt that although the existing Sudan 
Political Service provided an excellent administration it was very expensive and 
something of a luxury. They did not think the Sudan should or could afford it. There 
would admittedly have to be some sacrifice of standards of efficiency. That was 
inevitable. They did not think the maintenance of such high standards of 
administration necessary but they all said they were determined to try and maintain 
these standards themselves. At least they would know that such standards existed and 
could be maintained. All this struck me as very honest. These followers of the Mahdi 
too were almost without exception anxious to establish good neighbourly relations 
with Egypt. They were afraid of the Common Crown because, for one thing, to 
reassert the principle of it now after that principle had lain dormant for many years 
would be taken by the masses as an indication of a forward Egyptian policy in the 
Sudan; and that they would never accept. They realised, however, that so long as the 
Ordinance lacked Egyptian assent it was a weak instrument and they would welcome 
arrangements (in the negotiation of which they claimed to have a right to take part) 
that would bring the boycott parties to the polling booth. 
And now for a word about the British officials. They are, of course, beyond 
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reproach as administrators and magistrates; but they are undoubtedly strongly 
geared in with the Mahdi's supporters and indeed the opinions some hold regarding 
the future status of the Sudan seemed to me to be more extreme than those of many 
of the Mahdists. It is my opinion that the number of British officials should be 
reduced fairly rapidly and that a fiat should go forth from the Governor-General that 
these officials must not discuss with the Sudanese such questions as the future 
status of the Sudan or Anglo-Egyptian relations or relations of the Sudan with 
Britain and Egypt. They should be reminded of their duty which is to administer the 
Sudan and they should confine themselves to the performance of that duty, difficult 
as it may be to reconcile it with an increasing measure of self-government by the 
Sudanese themselves. The power of the senior British officials in the Sudan is the 
real governing power of the country. It is rather like the control exercised by the 
heads of houses in English public schools and indeed the attitude of these senior 
officials towards the Ordinance struck me as being rather like that of the head of a 
house or even a housemaster towards, say, an experiment in school self-government. 
A strong team spirit is almost spontaneously engendered by contact with these 
people and though that is all very well as far as it goes, it ought to fall short of 
encouraging defiance of the board of governors. 
I may be wrong but I think some importance should be attached to what was said 
to me by a young lawyer who, as stated above, was until recently secretary of the 
Umma Party. I saw him alone. He is said to be earning several thousand a year 
(fantastic for a Sudanese) at the Bar for he is regarded as quite the ablest native 
advocate in the country. Though of very humble origins (his mother is said to have 
been a slave) he told me he had left the Party in order to be independent in the 
Legislative Assembly with a view to forming a party of his own-a little later. I 
believe he represents Atbara (a railway junction town) and he has been concerned as 
a lawyer with railway workers [sic] disputes and their settlement. He is thinking of 
starting a sort of labour party with the support of the trade unionists and making a 
clean break away from the two Sayeds whose role in his opinion should be confined 
to religious matters. Regarding sovereignty of the Sudan he takes the view that it 
rests with the people of the country. He denies the existence of Condominium status. 
It may have existed at the time of the Condominium Agreement, but could not be 
substantiated now with the passage of years and the change of conditions. The 
Sudanese people have acquired sovereignty or perhaps re-acquired it. He thinks that 
insofar as this thesis could be challenged it might be challenged to some extent by 
the British Government who have, with the admitted consent of the Sudanese, 
provided a body of officials to govern the country for the past 50 years; but he does 
not think that it could be challenged by the Egyptian Government who 25 years ago 
ceased to have any real say in the way the country was governed. A day or two before 
I saw him he had introduced a private members [sic] bill in the Assembly something 
on the lines of the Egyptian Companies Law aimed at severely limiting the 
employment of foreign capital in the Sudan. This was defeated by what I thought was 
a surprisingly narrow margin. I see from the papers that since my visit he has taken a 
leading part in a debate about the period of time which should elapse before the 
Sudan should achieve full self-government. He told me that if there should ever be 
any question of imposing the Egyptian Crown or any increased measure of Egyptian 
control over the Sudan he would fight against it by every means in his power and not 
confine himself to the floor of the Assembly or to speech-making outside . ... 
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177 FO 371/73617, no 4598 7 May 1949 
[Nile Waters]: note by A L Chick on a discussion on Nile Waters by the 
Executive Council of the Sudan 
At an informal meeting of the Executive Council on 3rd May I reported that H.B.M's 
Ambassador in Cairo would shortly speak to the Egyptian Prime Minister about the 
Equatorial Nile and Lake Tana Projects. The Ambassador would propose:-
( a) that the technical agreements of May, 1935, and the supplement of November, 
1946, about the Lake Tana Project should be adopted by the Egyptian Government 
subject to such revision or modification by agreement as might be found nec~ssary 
for the full development of the project or in order to reach a satisfactory 
agreement with the Ethiopian Government; 
(b) that the negotiations with the Ethiopian Government should be conducted by 
delegations representing the British Government and the Egyptian Government, 
who would have at their joint disposal advisers from the Sudan. Any agreement 
reached with the Ethiopian Government would be signed by the Egyptian 
representative on behalf of Egypt and jointly by the British and Egyptian 
representatives on behalf of the Sudan; 
(c) that the Sudan's share in the benefits of the Equatorial Nile Project and her 
financial contribution towards its cost should be the subject of technical 
discussions between Egypt and the Sudan, the results of which would be embodied 
in the agreements to be concluded between the interested Governments 
concerning the Project; 
(d) that this procedure should be adopted regarding the Sudan's participation in 
any projects on the Nile other than the Equatorial Nile and Lake Tana Projects; and 
(e) that the British and Egyptian Governments should recognize that a review and 
amendment of the Nile Waters Agreement would be necessary to give effect to the 
arrangements made and to be made regarding the distribution of Nile Waters. 
2. I said that if the Egyptian Government accepted these proposals in principle 
we would have taken a long step towards our goal of safeguarding the Sudan's 
interests in Nile Waters. I remarked as regards (b) above that while we would all have 
liked the Sudan Government to be separately represented in any negotiations with 
the Ethiopian Government about Lake Tana, to press for this would raise the 
constitutional issue: there was no hope that the Egyptian Government would 
concede the claim and the only result would be yet further delay. Whether the Sudan 
sent representatives or advisers would, I suggested, make little practical difference 
since the British and Egyptian representatives would negotiate within a framework 
already agreed between Egypt and the Sudan. Moreover, we could rely on the British 
Government's representative (who would be advised by our own advisers) to protect 
the Sudan's interests: and both the British and Sudan Governments had the 
(admittedly negative) power of veto under the 1902 Treaty. 
3. Considerable discussion ensued on this point. The Sudanese members of the 
Council who were present (Sayyeds Abdulla Khalil, Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, 1 Ibrahim 
1 Abd al-Rahman Ali Taha was an Umma Party member elected to the Legislative Assembly, and minister of 
education in the Executive Council. 
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Ahmed and Abdel Magid Ahmed) felt strongly that the Sudan should be represented; 
other considerations apart, the fact that she would be paying part of the cost of the 
Project entitled her to representation. The Sudan's non-representation would 
inevitably be severely criticized in the Assembly and they would feel embarrassed if 
they had to defend it. They would like to be able to say that the Egyptian Government 
had refused to agree to separate representation for the Sudan and to have a written 
refusal. 
4. I replied that we already had such a refusal and quoted certain passages from 
the late Nokrashi Pasha's despatch of lOth July, 1948. While there seemed to be a 
welcome change in the Egyptian Government's attitude as regards the 
representation of the British Government in the negotiations, nothing had since 
happened to suggest that they would agree to separate representation for the Sudan. 
In support of this, I mentioned the Egyptian Government's recent objection to the 
Sudan sending a delegate to the International Cotton Advisory Committee's meeting 
in Brussels. 
5. The Sudanese members argued that the situation had been changed since the 
Egyptian Government's refusal by the setting up of the Executive Council and the 
Legislative Assembly and they felt that because of this, the Egyptian Government 
should again be asked to agree to separate representation for the Sudan. Sir James 
Robertson and I both stressed that that did not constitute a relevant change, since 
the Council and the Assembly were set up within the framework of the 1899 
Agreement and the 1936 Treaty. The Sudan Government had no right to separate 
representation and to ask for it would be to invite a rebuff and could only result in 
further delay. The Acting Legal Secretary, Mr. Lindsay, pointed out that the 
Sudanese members were, in effect, asking for a revision of the Agreement and Treaty. 
6. The Sudanese members agreed not to press their point but they asked that 
their views should be recorded. 
178 FO 371/73617, no 4201 16 May 1949 
[Nile Waters]: minute by DJ D Maitland to Mr Bevin on the Owen 
Falls dam and Equatorial Nile projects 
[Following the decision to inform the Egyptian government of the Sudan's need to 
participate in the Equatorial Nile project (see 174), the Embassy in Cairo prepared drafts 
of notes on the Owen Falls dam, Equatorial Nile and Lake Tsana projects for discussion 
with the Egyptian government who, however, claimed that they were not yet in a position 
to exchange notes concerning comprehensive Nile Waters schemes (inward telegram no 
663 from Campbell to FO, 9 May 1949, FO 371/73616, no 3343). The meeting between 
Bevin and Arm Pasha, for which these minutes were prepared, dealt with the related 
issues of the Owen Falls dam and the Equatorial Nile project.] 
The Egyptian Ambassador is coming to discuss the Nile Waters schemes with the 
Secretary of State this afternoon. 
The present position is that two questions remain to be settled:-
( a) the ownership of the Owen Falls dam, and 
(b) recognition of the entitlement of the Sudan to share in the benefit of the 
Equatorial Nile and other projects. 
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(a) presents no serious difficulty since we, the Egyptian Government and the Uganda 
Electricity Board have agreed that no reference should be made to the question of 
ownership in any announcement which may be made about the Owen Falls dam. The 
Egyptian Prime Minister has expressed his willingness to make a declaration in the 
Egyptian Parliament safeguarding the freedom of action of the Uganda Electricity 
Board so far as the generation of hydro-electric power at Owen Falls is concerned. 
As regards (b), both Sir Ronald Campbell and the Department feel that it is 
essential that the question of the Sudan's share in the waters of the Equatorial and 
Main Nile and the approach to the Ethiopian Government on the Lake Tana scheme 
should be settled simultaneously with the question of the Owen Falls dam. Our 
reasons for thinking so are:-
(i) It is important that the misconception that Egypt alone is entitled to the full 
benefit of the Equatorial Nile Project should not be perpetuated; in this connexion 
the Secretary of State will recall that no mention was made of the Sudan's share in 
the Equatorial Nile Project when the Summaries of the whole scheme were 
presented to the Egyptian Government in February last because we felt at that 
time that Anglo-Egyptian relations were insufficiently stable to allow us to take 
the risk of injecting the Sudan issue in any form into a matter such as the Nile 
Waters schemes, on which we were anxious to reach preliminary agreement.1 
Unless we settle the question of the Sudan's share of the waters now, it is possible 
that there will be another deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations which will 
make it more difficult to do so at a later date. 
(ii) To come to an agreement with the Egyptian Government on the Owen Falls 
dam without making any mention of the Sudan's share of the waters when the 
whole Project has been agreed would cause great dismay in the Sudan. 
(iii) The Owen Falls scheme represents only one part of the whole of the 
Equatorial Nile Project from which the Sudan and Egypt are both to benefit. If we 
settle the Owen Falls scheme alone now without making it clear to the Egyptian 
Government that the Sudan is also entitled to some benefit from it, it will enable 
the Egyptian Government at a later date, if they so wish, to protest that we are 
claiming benefits for the Sudan which were not made clear at the time when the 
agreement on the Owen Falls scheme alone was arrived at. 
The Department are discussing these questions with the Egyptian Ambassador this 
afternoon before he calls to see the Secretary of State and will inform the Secretary 
of State of any developments which may occur. Meanwhile, the Department 
recommend: 
(a) that the Secretary of State should inform the Egyptian Ambassador that he is 
happy to learn that there is now no serious obstacle to the settlement of the 
question of the ownership of the Owen Falls dam; 
(b) that he should inform the Egyptian Ambassador that H.M.G. consider that it 
would be harmful to the interests of Egypt and of the Sudan if our two 
Governments do not recognise the right of the Sudan to share in the benefits of 
the Equatorial Nile Project at the same time as our two Governments agree on the 
1 See 171 and 172. 
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Owen Falls dam. We need do no more at present than acknowledge the fact that 
the Sudan's participation in the Owen Falls and other schemes, including her 
financial contribution, should be the subject of technical discussions to take place 
at some future date between Egypt and the Sudan. H.M.G. are also anxious to 
agree now on the method of negotiating with the Ethiopian Government on the 
Lake Tana scheme in order to avoid delay. 
179 FO 371/73475, no 4322 16 May 1949 
[Trade Union legislation]: letter from Sir J Robertson to M N F 
Stewart reporting outcome of conference called to discuss Trade 
Unions and Trade Unions Disputes Ordinances 
I refer to the Secretary of State's despatch No. 288 of 29th April to the Ambassador in 
Cairo on which I am commenting by "under the counter" means in accordance with 
our normal procedure. 
2. I assume that you will have seen Sudan Political Intelligence Summary No. 2 
of 1949, para. 34 of which shows that after the one-day protest strike on 15th March a 
conference was convened by the Government to discuss the criticisms of the Labour 
Ordinance and to make recommendations to the Executive Council. The Sudan 
Government was represented by four Sudanese members together with the 
Commissioner of Labour and a representative of the Legal Secretary. Two neutral 
non-Government Sudanese accepted nomination as members. The Workers' Affairs 
Association appointed seven representatives and the Leader of the Legislative 
Assembly presided. 
3. It was known before the conference opened that the W.A.A. had appointed a 
moderate delegation following complaints from the workers about the strike on 15th 
March.1 At the outset the workers' delegation pointedly renounced the irresponsible 
manifesto which was issued last January denouncing the Sudan Ordinances. Instead 
they presented alternative Ordinances, which although less virulent, were still quite 
impossible. These, also, they set aside very early in the proceedings of the conference. 
In the course of seven lengthy sessions, the conference examined every detail of the 
Trades Union Ordinances, the Trades Dispute Ordinance, and the Arbitration and 
Inquiry Ordinance. The relevant sections of the Egyptian Laws were available for 
discussion but the workers' representatives made it clear that they did not wish any 
comparisons to be made. 
4. The Conference was an outstanding success owing in large degree to the 
patience and unswerving support of the principles of the Ordinance on the part of the 
Sudanese Government members and the two neutral members. The suspicions of the 
W.A.A. delegates were slowly dispelled and in the end complete acceptance of the 
Ordinances was secured following agreement to recommend several minor 
amendments. These amendments in no way touch the fundamental principles of the 
Ordinances nor do they exceed the bounds of customary practice elsewhere. Many of 
them indeed are devices to save the face of the W.A.A. I enclose a copy of the 
1 See 173. 
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Conference report setting out the recommendations in detail.2 Since the conference 
dispersed, the Workers' delegates are reported to have secured acceptance of the 
agreed recommendations, and it is expected that Trades Union registrations will be 
applied for within the next few months. It is hoped to have a British Trade Union 
Officer available shortly to advise and assist the new movement and already there are 
indications that his services will be welcome to the workers. 
5. It is premature yet to say that we are out of the wood and much will depend on 
the type and political sympathies of the leaders selected by the Union branches. 
When Unions are registered and the Government scheme of negotiating committees 
has been set up, Communist elements will no doubt do their best to make their 
influence felt. We are fully alive to this danger and shall do all we can to combat it. 
6. From the above you will see that for the time being at least the labour 
situation here has improved beyond our expectations and we do not think that at 
present there is any need to approach the Egyptian Government on the subject. But 
if in the future we have evidence that Communist or other sources in Egypt are 
attempting to stir up further labour trouble in the Sudan, we should certainly agree 
that the Egyptian Government be asked for their support in discouraging such 
action. It is note worthy, although perhaps only a coincidence that since the 
successful result of the Conference there has been a complete absence of Communist 
pamphleteering. 
7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Maclean. 
2 Not printed. 
180 FO 371/73472, no 5256 24 June 1949 
"The state of the condominium": minute by G L Clutton on the 
strained relations between the embassy in Cairo and the Sudan 
government 
[In April F Roberts from the FO visited Cairo. He reported back to Wright: 'I know too 
little about the Sudan to judge, but I have an uneasy feeling that we are too much at the 
mercy of the Sudan Civil Servant, who, with all his admirable qualities, has a rather 
limited and parochial public-school outlook. Nor do I like having to put our money on the 
Mahdist faction, which can hardly be said to represent the forces of moderation in 
the Sudan. As the Cairo embassy and Khartoum inevitably have opposing interests in the 
matter, might it not be a good thing for you or someone from the F.O. to go and see the 
problems on the spot?' (letter from Roberts to Wright, 18 Apr 1949, FO 371/43472, no 
4358). Strang minuted that Bevin 'thinks there is a good deal of truth in the criticism of 
the Sudan Civil Service. He would like this question looked into', and he further 
suggested that there be some interchange between the FO and the CO in respect of the 
Sudan (minute by Strang to Wright, 17 May 1949, FO 371/74372, no 4358). There was a 
growing anxiety within the FO about the effect the apparent intransigence of Sudan 
government officials was having on Anglo-Egyptian relations. Stewart wrote: 'The 
Egyptian Government have at least shown some willingness to make the Condominium 
work. ... If the Sudan Government continue to be suspicious of Egyptian intentions and 
continue to oppose Egyptian participation the general improvement in our relations with 
Egypt will be hindered, a settlement on strategic matters in Egypt will be delayed and an 
eventual solution of the Sudan problem will be made more difficult. Whatever our 
interests may be in the Sudan our strategic requirements in Egypt are of the utmost 
importance and any tendency which can hinder a satisfactory settlement of this question 
should be avoided' (minute on the Sudan by Stewart, 19 May 1949, FO 371173472, no 
4359).] 
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During the past few months there have developed strained (and in a number of 
cases very strained) relationships between the Foreign Office and the Embassy at 
Cairo on the one hand, and the Sudan Government on the other. These strained 
relationships were manifested in particular at the time of the International Cotton 
meeting at Brussels, the Owen Falls agreement, and the famine in the Sudan.1 
I have been much worried by this situation and have given it considerable thought. 
The following is my analysis of the situation. 
(1) There is, I think, at the Embassy in Cairo a certain lack of comprehension of 
the organic character of an administration. When the Sudan Legislative Assembly 
and the Executive Council Ordinance was promulgated this was not the end of a 
stage of constitutional development but the beginning of one. Political life does 
not march by sudden leaps and bounds, but is something progressive. There will 
therefore be all sorts of developments flowing from the concrete step of the 
promulgation of the Ordinance which are inevitable and some of which may cause 
us serious bother. The complaint made by Sir R. Campbell about the debate on 
self-government in the Legislative Assembly (see J 3610 at flag A) seems to me 
unreasonable. If there had been a debate on independence it would have been 
improper, bit [sic] the actual debate was on self-government, and I do not see how 
a body of men embarking on the first step in self-government could be reasonably 
expected not to debate self-government. 
(2) The Sudan is in many respects a very isolated country, and there is 
undoubtedly lack of comprehension in the Sudan of what is taking place in the 
world as a whole. For instance, it is true that the Sudan Government were to all 
intents and purposes responsible for the creation of the International Cotton 
Organisation, the meeting of which recently took place at Brussels. The Sudan's 
complaint here was that although they are a foundation member of the 
organisation, they are now excluded from it. What the Sudan Government officials 
do not realise is the manner in which matters which were previously purely 
technical have now become political. The International Cotton Organisation 
started life as a technical body. It has since become a political body, ranking with a 
diplomatic conference. In consequence, the Sudan cannot be represented any 
longer as a full member. Similarly, there is certainly a lack of realisation on the 
part of the Sudan Government of the fact that what goes on in a non-self 
governing territory is no longer a purely domestic matter. When the Indonesian 
question first came before the United Nations it was juridically speaking 
undoubtedly a purely domestic matter, but politically it was no longer so, as the 
Dutch have since learned to their cost. So it is in the Sudan. Administrative 
measures to which the outside world no longer paid attention are now, whether 
the Sudan Government like it or not, matters of international interest. 
1 There were reports of drought and famine in the eastern Sudan by the end of the 1949 dry season 
(Apr- May). When the Egyptian government voted to contribute to famine relief the Sudan government 
disputed their right to interfere, and were accused in turn by the Egyptians of obstructing relief. The FO 
accepted the Sudan government's claim that reports of famine were exaggerated, but nevertheless 
complained that 'the irascibility of the Sudan Government in these cases is to be deprecated' (minute by 
R W Bailey, first secretary, FO, 16 May 1949, FO 371173665 no 3469, and minute by Maitland, 21 May 
1949, FO 371/73665 no 4264). 
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This situation has been complicated by a series of factors of a more or less personal 
nature. 
(i) There is no doubt that the present governmental structure in the Sudan is not 
entirely satisfactory. The Governor-General is not an Administrator. Very properly 
he has spent much time touring his territory. 
The result, however, has been that during the past year out of the 200 days odd he 
has been in the Sudan, he has been 90 days out of Khartoum. The result has been 
that a very heavy burden of responsibility has been placed on the Civil Secretary, Sir 
James Robertson, and he has had to act as Governor-General in times of crisis (the 
Governor-General has not been in Khartoum for any of the big events except the 
opening of the Legislative Assembly during the past year; he was absent during the 
election troubles and at the time of the attempted visit to the Sudan by the Wafd 
Delegation and the Egyptian lawyers). Sir J. Robertson's responsibilities have been 
further added to by the fact that his two co-equals and colleagues, the Financial 
Secretary (Mr. Chick) and the Legal Secretary (Mr. C. Cuming) are men of very light 
weight. They were both appointed by Sir R. Howe and they were probably the best 
men available from the Sudan Political Service. On the other hand, it is questionable 
whether the Governor-General should not have sought recruits from outside. 
In short, the situation seems to me to be that the Governor-General has not as yet 
(although he may have later when he gets to know the country better) the grip on 
the Government owing to his absences that a Governor-General should have, and it 
is possible that if he had had greater grip he would have altered some of Sir James 
Robertson's telegrams, which at times bordered on impertinence. Sir R. Howe, as a 
Foreign Service man, moreover, is particularly fitted to lead the Sudan Government 
in questions where foreign policy is concerned. 
(ii) The personal relations between certain members of the Embassy at Cairo and 
members of the Sudan Government are not of the happiest and often, I am afraid, 
Sudan questions have been covered by personal animosities. The statement in the 
memorandum in J 4316 at flag B2 that the number of higher British officials in the 
Sudan administration could be cut down seems to be quite unwarrantable and 
outside the competence of the writer. 
Conclusion 
The situation as I have described it is difficult to handle, and I do not think direct 
action would help. On the other hand, in our conversations with Sir R. Howe we 
should certainly bear these matters in mind. 
2 See 176. 
181 FO 371173619, no 5927 19 July 1949 
[Nile Waters]: minute by G L Clutton on the Lake Tsana negotiations 
[In the discussion between Bevin and Arm about the Owen Falls dam on 16 May (see 178), 
Amr was reluctant to make public reference to the Sudan's participation in the benefits of 
the Nile Waters projects, as this would raise the discussion from the purely technical to 
the political level; thus running the risk of introducing an argument on the status of the 
Sudan. Bevin offered to allow Egypt to take the initiative in 'safeguarding' the Sudan's 
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interests, and Arnr agreed a formula (outlined in 178) whereby Bevin announced to the 
House of Commons that the Egyptian Government welcomed the participation of the 
Sudan in projects for the control of the Nile; and that 'the participation of the Sudan in 
these Projects will be the subject of technical discussions between Egypt and the Sudan, 
the results of which will be embodied in agreements to be concluded in connexion with 
these projects' (outward telegram no 991 from Bevin to Campbell, 19 May 1949, FO 
371/73617, no 4212; also outward telegram no 970 from Bevin to Campbell, 17 May 1949, 
FO 371/73617, no 4201). The Egyptian prime minister issued a similar statement before 
parliament, following which notes were formally exchanged between the two 
governments ('Exchange of Notes regarding Nile Waters Projects', 30-31 May 1949, FO 
371/73618, no 4749) . 1t was after this that Egypt objected to the Sudan being represented 
in the Lake Tsana treaty negotiations.] 
A difficulty has arisen in connexion with the form of the proposed agreement with 
Ethiopia about the Lake Tana Project. 
Article 3 of the 1902 Treaty with Ethiopia states that the Ethiopian Government 
may not construct any works across the Blue Nile and Sobat except with the 
agreement of H.M. Government and the Government of the Sudan.1 In the course of 
the Owen Falls negotiations in Cairo in the spring we proposed to the Egyptians (see 
J 3837/14210/16-Flag A) that the Lake Tana Agreement should be signed once by 
Ethiopia, once by the U.K. (as eo-dominus of the Sudan) and twice by Egypt (as eo-
dominus of the Sudan and on her own behalf). This would mean in effect that the 
Agreement would be signed by Ethiopia, Egypt and the Sudan. Since, however, H.M. 
Government would sign the Agreement as a part of the process of the Sudan signing, 
it could not be argued that H.M. Government had not signified their agreement to 
the work in accordance with Article 3 of the 1902 Treaty with Ethiopia. 
When Sir R. Campbell raised this question on our instructions on the 7th July, 
Khashaba Pasha objected to this formula on the grounds that it would raise the con-
stitutional issue which Egypt and ourselves wished to avoid (see J 5584/14210116-
Flag B). The form of the Agreement was, therefore, reconsidered by the Embassy and 
by the Department and we have reached the same conclusion that the only practical 
alternative is an agreement signed once only by Ethiopia, Egypt and the U.K. (see the 
suspended draft telegram in J 5584/14210/16-Flag C and J 5753/14210116-Flag D). 
This formula is legally correct. The only political objection to it is that the Sudan may 
resent the fact that they will not be a party to the Agreement in their own right. 
Khartoum have pointed out that the Executive Council would be unlikely to accept 
any formula which excluded the attachment of Sudanese advisers to both the Egyptian 
and British Delegations. 2 It has always been our intention that the burden of the nego-
tiations with the Ethiopian Government should fall on the technical experts from 
Egypt and the Sudan who are in any case on very friendly terms. 
The Department recommend that H.M. Charge d'Mfaires at Alexandria be 
instructed to discuss this new formula with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and to 
point out that we should, of course, like to see the Sudan represented in the 
negotiations by advisers at the disposal of the British and Egyptian Delegations as 
was so successfuly [sic] the case at the regional meetings of the World Health 
Organisation and the Food and Agricultural Organisation at Cairo early this year. 
I submit a draft telegram. 
The question of the exploratory discussions with the Ethiopian Government is 
being dealt with separately. 
1 See 27. 2 See 177. 
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182 FO 371173506, no 6441 9 Aug 1949 
[Anglo-Egyptian negotiations]: FO minutes of a meeting to discuss 
the Sudan [Extract] 
[A meeting attended by Strang, Campbell, Howe, Wright, Stewart and Maitland was held 
at the FO to discuss a number of issues concerning the Sudan, in particular the Sudan 
question in relation to a treaty with Egypt.] 
. . . 4. The Egyptians do not wish to see the Sudan independent. They realise that 
they cannot hold the Sudan themselves and that the presence of a British 
Administration in the Sudan safeguards their southern frontier. In this respect we 
are in a strong negotiating position vis-a-vis Egypt since we could threaten to leave 
the Sudan. We could not in fact leave the Sudan without betraying our trust in the 
Sudanese. 
The Egyptians' chief complaint has been that, in spite of the Condominium 
Agreements, they have been denied a share in the administration of the Sudan, while 
the preparation of the Sudan for self-government has been urgently pursued ... . 
14. The meeting agreed that:-
(a) the questions of the sovereignty of the Sudan and the ultimate future of the 
Sudan cannot and probably need not be settled for the present; 
(b) a settlement of the Sudan question on the lines of the Sudan Protocol of 1946 
is no longer possible; 
(c) His Majesty's Government cannot now justifiably ask the Governor-General of 
the Sudan to appoint Egyptians to the Executive Council; 
(d) an interim settlement identifying the Egyptian Government in some way with 
the preparation of the Sudanese for self-government is possible and desirable. 
183 FO 371/73665, no 6995 31 Aug 1949 
[Sudanese famine]: letter from the Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum 
to the Mrica Department (FO), on Egyptian and Sudanese reactions 
to reports of famine in the eastern Sudan1 
With reference to your request dated 17.8.49 (].5869/1711/16) for observations on 
the telegram from the Sudan Graduates' Congress to Mr. Bevin, the text of which 
follows, with the various points it makes numbered for reference with the comments 
below:-
"We were surprised at your reply to the question submitted by Member of 
Parliament Mr. Gallacher Esq., as it reveals that your informers were misleading and 
untruthful. (1) Last April the Civil Secretary officially declared his refusal of Egyptian 
aid and (2) denied its necessity. By virtue of press campaigns Civil Secretary (3) 
confessed the facts and agreed to accept the Egyptian aid (4) on condition that the 
Red Crescent shall not take part in distribution lest the bitter situation might be 
revealed. (5) But after three months the Civil Secretary and under various 
impressions agreed to allow the Secretary General of the Red Crescent to tour those 
1 See 180, note 1. 
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parts which were less affected by famine. (6) Despite this the Red Crescent Secretary 
announced that the situation is worse than pictured by press and that the Egyptian 
aid (£50,000) is only a meagre start. Your statement that none died as a result of 
famine is at least inconsistent with official report (7) by British Governor of Kassala 
in May last to the effect that in one section (Abu Deleig) twenty deaths due to 
malnutrition. It is not true that Sudan Government took precautionary steps (8) 
against the famine since July 1948 because a number of chiefs in Eastern Sudan 
directed the attention of Beja District Commissioner in August 1948 to the 
noticeable drop in grain and fodder production. (9) Nothing was done until things 
came to a climax after six months only. (10) As to public eating houses the Sudan 
Government has never opened any in this country. The groundless contention of 
Sudan Government that matters are in hand is defeated by the fact that the famine 
( 11) is growing acute in spite of the Egyptian aid and other national bodies including 
the outstanding donations and care of Sir Sayed Ali El Mirghani Pasha the Sudan 
Government contributed with (12) one thousand tons of dura. Official figures show 
that (13) one hundred and fifty thousand were affected by famine. (14) The spread of 
famine is primarily due to Government's gross negligence. In your capacity as 
Condominium partner the Graduates' General Congress asks for Parliamentary 
Commission to investigate and fix liability. (15) Graduates' General Congress. 
1. The Civil Secretary never, officially or unofficially, refused Egyptian aid 
though he did point out that the Egyptian Government had clearly been misled by 
exaggerated reports and, in an interview with the Egyptian Minister of Supply, 
expressed surprise at the discourteous and irregular manner in which the "offer" had 
been made. 
Far from making difficulties, the Government assisted the Egyptian authorities to 
purchase 1000 tons of millet from South Africa, made the necessary sterling available 
(£24,138:13:7) accepting payment in Egyptian currency, allowed it in duty free and 
provided free transport for it on the railway. 
2. He certainly denied its necessity, as the Government had the situation well in 
hand as is shown by subsequent figures, and the fact that although the main bulk of 
the Egyptian relief was not available till August, no deaths from starvation have yet 
been reported. 
3. The Civil Secretary has never admitted the "Facts" (sic) quoted in the press 
campaign. 
4. It was suggested, and readily agreed by the Egyptian Government, that 
distribution of Egyptian aid could better be done by those who were already 
distributing Government and voluntary assistance, assisted by officers of the 
Egyptian Army, than by parties of complete strangers to the country. 
5. The visit of the Secretary General of the Red Crescent was first suggested on 
June 16th, was welcomed by the Government whose guests he and his party were 
immediately invited to become, and he arrived on June 20th and proceeded straight 
to Sinkat and Erkowit the centre of the famine area. 
6. It is not known what the Secretary General of the Red Crescent may have said 
on his return to Egypt, but any announcement that the situation was worse than 
pictured by the press is quite inconsistent with the statement he made here to the 
press at the conclusion of his visit. 
7. No such report was made. The following are extracts from Governor Kassala's 
reports during April and May referring to the area in question:-
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17.4.49. "Omda of Abu Zuleig (Abu Deleig area) reports death of 20 people from 
what sounded like an acute form of dysentery which may be partly due to 
malnutrition." 
3.5.49 "Governor visited Abu Deleig area. Provision for further relief works on 
hafirs (tanks) and for free relief on a small scale to distressed persons are in hand. 
Condition of animals and people was better than expected. Grain from 
Government supplies for sale will be needed later on an increased scale as trade 
supplies are not sufficient." 
28.5.49 "District Commissioner Gedaref has made a further inspection of the Abu 
Deleig area and reports that relief on an increased scale is needed there. This was 
foreshadowed in my recent report." Arrangements made for provision of 225 tons 
of millet in the area for issue in June, July and August. 
The Ministry of Health confirms that no deaths from starvation or primarily due to 
malnutrition have yet been reported by any of their staff, which has been temporarily 
increased in that area.2 
8. First warning that famine conditions might develop received from Governor 
Kassala in a letter dated 6.6.48. Starting in July /48 relief works in Beja area were 
commenced, tickets at nominal fare issued to places where work was available, and 
issue of grain at reduced price arranged. In August /48 relief provided for the nomads 
of Northern Province on a fairly large scale (650 tons of grain). Relief on a smaller 
scale around Kassala for the aged and infirm (lOO tons of grain) also in August. 
Situation was temporarily relieved by the rains though they were poor. The 
Government had ample reserves of grain, and though certain relief works were 
continued and issues of grain on a small scale were made in February and March 
there was little to be done till famine conditions became imminent. 
9. A press statement issued 30th March, 1949 included:- "It is expected that 
conditions of famine will become general through the Northern part of the Beja 
district during the months of May, June and July and relief measures to deal with 
these conditions have been worked out by Governor Kassala and are now being 
considered by the Central Government." 
At the same time proposals for the assistance of the Nomads of Northern Province 
were received from the Governor. 
In April action on a considerable scale began, and increased as the famine became 
wide-spread. 
10. The reference to communal kitchens in the Foreign Secretary's reply to Mr. 
Gallacher was misleading. In one of our reports it was mentioned that Governor 
Kassala had reported on 27.10.48 that D.C. Gedaref had organised relief works and a 
communal kitchen to tide the people over till the 1949 rains. This no doubt was the 
origin of the report. It is customary in this country to arrange for communal feeding 
for workers engaged in such works, and doubtless similar arrangements were made 
at other places, but this part of the reply has been seized on by those who are trying 
to make political capital out of this famine, as showing that S.G. and/or H.M.G. are 
being deliberately dishonest. 
2 A study of the Sudanese famine in Darfur in 1984 has given support to the common local explanation 
that famine deaths are in fact caused by disease rather than starvation, see Alex de Waal, Famine that kills: 
Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985 (Oxford, 1989). 
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11. The famine was bound to continue growing more acute until the rains came 
to provide grazing for the animals and a harvest for the cultivators. Rains started 
generally at the end of July. 
12. Recent statement shows that 3,400 tons of free dura and over 1,400 tons at 
reduced price were issued by Government to end of July, apart from much relief of 
other kinds. Whereas Egyptian relief in same period was 400 tons maize and rice and 
8,000 yds. of cloth, with a further 1,000 tons of millet to come in August. Voluntary 
contributions from all sources had amount [ed] to about 275 tons of grain and some 
£7,000 cash. 
13. Free grain has been issued by Government to a considerably larger number 
than this. 
14. The spread of famine is due entirely to Act of God. The Sudan Government is 
not of opinion that a parliamentary commission is required to fix His responsibility 
and pay. 
15. The "Graduate General Congress" is now a discredited rump long since 
repudiated by those of the "Intelligentsia" with any claim to intelligence, which 
never even in its palmi est days represented the views of the great mass of the people, 
and which has now fallen entirely into the hands of that small but vocal party who 
appear to hope to gain political freedom by selling their country to Egypt. 
184 FO 371180358, no 10115 1 Dec 1949 
[Umma Party]: letter from Sir R Howe to Sir W Strang evaluating the 
political scene. Minute by R H G Edmonds1 
Since my return from leave at the beginning of November, I have had conversations 
with the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and the three Sudanese Ministers in the 
Executive Council, and I think you should know the way their minds are moving at 
the present time. 
As you know, these four Sudanese are leading members of the Umma Party and 
religious followers of Sayed Abdel Rahman. They all took much the same line with 
me in their talks, namely that the Condominium was all very well when one of the 
Co-domini was a sleeping partner, but now that Egypt is pressing its claim to share 
in practice in the administration of the Sudan, and in view of the Egyptian claim to 
sovereignty which would mean absolute Egyptian monarchical rule here, the 
Condominium has become not a means of progress but a stranglehold on progress. 
They all stated that the Condominium had outlived its usefulness; the only thing now 
was to pull down the two flags which were its outward and visible sign, after which 
the Sudanese would be free to push on with the development of their country under 
the advice and guidance of its present administrators. They all seemed to think that 
this would be quite a simple thing for me to do. 
This has been a favourite theme of the Umma Party for the past two or three years, 
and there were indications last summer from the Speaker and the Minister of 
Education, when they were in England, that the Umma leaders intended to press the 
Sudan Government hard during this winter to take a further decisive step towards 
1 Foreign Service from 1946; Cairo, 1947; FO, 1949. 
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the dissolution of the Condominium and a declaration of self-government in the 
Sudan. 
As was to be expected, the decision of the United Nations to grant independence to 
Libya in 1952 and to Somaliland in ten years has stimulated the Sudan Independence 
Front to an assertion of the Sudan's right to immediate independence, and has 
provided its leaders with a plausible excuse to pursue with renewed vigour their long 
cherished aim of ending the Condominium. 
I have had to remind the Speaker and the Ministers that the Sudan is still a 
Condominium and that the Condominium powers would be unlikely to acquiesce in 
any such action. The Condominium had been set up by treaty and treaties were not 
to be set aside unilaterally. It was unthinkable that Egypt would abandon her claim 
for the unity of Egypt and the Sudan. In any case any demand for the abolition of the 
present system would have to be visibly backed by the majority of the country. At 
present the Khatmia, who form a very considerable part of public opinion, are hardly 
represented in the Legislative Assembly so that any action by that body as proposed 
could not be regarded as representing the view of the country as a whole. The 
Independents admit this and have expressed their willingness to agree to a 
modification of the electoral rules of the Assembly to meet the objections of the 
Khatmia and so permit the latter to contest the next elections. There are indications 
that the Khatmia would be prepared to take part in elections to the next Assembly if 
the electoral rules were amended in accordance with their wishes, and the Sudan 
Government are at present considering the matter. 
The motives behind this increase of pressure from the Umma leaders are not far to 
seek. There is no doubt that they are sincere in their dislike of the Condominium, for 
it involves a continuation of the Egyptian connection, even in its present diminished 
form, which is abhorrent to them. Their fathers and grandfathers threw the 
Egyptians out bag and baggage in 1885 and they are afraid that if action is not taken 
to squash soon this threat from the North, Egyptian money and propaganda may 
undermine the morale of the Sudanese and enable the Egyptians to achieve their 
ends. We may think that their fears are sometimes exaggerated, but they are none the 
less real. 
But equally there is no doubt that self-interest plays a large part in their 
calculations. While the Umma admit the desirability of bringing the Khatmia into 
the Assembly-they cannot very well do otherwise-they are by no means happy 
about the possible effects on their own position after the next elections. At present 
they have it all their own way, but they would enjoy nothing like the same degree of 
power in an Assembly in which the Khatmia were fully represented. It is natural 
therefore that they should want to take the opportunity which their present position 
offers them of achieving their main object by urging the Sudan Government to 
commit itself now to a public promise of self-government in the very near future. 
The Umma raised this subject with a number of the country members of the 
Assembly when they returned to Khartoum in October, but they found little support 
for their proposal of immediate self-government. This may have the effect of 
damping their ardour to some extent, but nevertheless I shall not be surprised to 
receive soon some organised approach from the Umma and other Independents to 
announce either that the Sudan is now ready for self-government, or to fix a date 
when this desirable consummation can be stated. 
I think you should know of this possibility but at the same time perhaps we need 
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not worry too much about it. For the present we have the unasseilable [sic] reply that 
until the Khatmia take part in the constitutional machinery of the country it would 
be premature to talk of self-government, and the tribal leaders in the Assembly, who 
represent the views of the bulk of the population, are solidly opposed to any 
precipitate move in that direction. 
Minute on 184 
The immediate background to this interesting letter is contained in paragraphs 73 
and 94 of the Sudan Political Intelligence Summaries in J7206 and )8547/1013/16 
respectively, and in my minute on J9032/10114/16, all of which are attached. Sir 
Robert Howe's letter, however, raises the whole problem of the future of the Sudan 
and of its effect upon Anglo/Egyptian relations. I venture to submit a few 
observations which may be of some use if it is considered that his letter should be 
answered. 
2. The egyptophobia of the Umma Party is certainly, as Sir Robert Howe remarks 
at the end of the sixth paragraph of his letter, real, but it is also exaggerated. In the 
same paragraph he points out that their attitude stems from the events of 1885. It is, 
however, as well to remember, first, that these events cannot, as the Umma Party 
would have us believe, be regarded as purely an Egypto-Sudanese affair; they are 
equally a part of British history, since they led to the subsequent re-conquest without 
which there would be no British officials in Khartoum today. Secondly, the Egyptian 
interest in the Sudan is not purely legalistic or prompted by motives of national 
vanity; it has a sound basis in Egypt's dependence upon the waters of the Nile. The 
end to which Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan is devoted is a matter of opinion. 
One thing, however, is certain, that the sort of control over the Sudan which 
Egyptian politicians envisage, however deleterious to the Sudan it would be, will be 
highly remote. Egyptian politicians find it hard enough to stay in Cairo during the 
summer months: I can remember no recent case of any of them visiting the Sudan 
except in the depth of winter. It is only the better sort of Egyptian official (for 
example, irrigation engineers) who is prepared to spend most of the year in the 
Sudan. 
3. The last sentence of the 7th paragraph of Sir R. Howe's letter seems to me very 
pertinent. The basic issue at stake in the Sudan at the present moment is who shall 
control the machinery of government, and all the patronage which this involves, 
when we eventually hand it over. What is going on now, in my opinion, is a straight-
forward struggle for temporal power in a religious guise,* and as the Governor-
General points out, the Umma's advantage in this conflict is now greater than it is 
ever likely to be in the foreseeable future. At the moment the Sudan is being 
governed, or partially governed, by a Legislative Assembly, in which a large 
proportion of the educated class is not represented. (How large it is difficult to assess, 
but I should say at least half, which I believe includes a large number of the officers 
* (The Umma's religious guise is wearing pretty thin, except in the eyes of their illiterate followers, for 
Mahdism is generally regarded by Muslims of other denominations as a wholly bogus sect). [Edmonds' 
own insertion] 
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of the Sudan Defence Force). The possibility of an amendment of the Legislative 
Assembly Ordinance in favour of the Khatmia, designed to persuade them not to 
boycott the next elections, is, on balance, desirable, and I think Sir James Robertson 
holds this opinion.2 Admittedly, if they stick to their pro-Egyptian line, the extreme 
Ashigga wing of the Khatmia representatives could make a lot of trouble in the 
Assembly, but on the whole it seems to me that this will be very much less dangerous 
than their present trouble-making capacity outside the Assembly. 
4. There are two important questions which arise from this letter:-
(a) If the Umma Party decide to let the Khatmia in, would this provide an 
opportunity for some form of Anglo-Egyptian rapprochement as regards the 
Sudan? · 
(b) If, on the other hand, the Umma Party decide to demand immediate 
independence next year, what line will the Egyptian Government and the Khatmia 
adopt, and what should be our own attitude? 
5. Whether or not we discuss the answers to these two questions with the 
Governor-General now, I suggest that we should at any rate send him a letter 
approving the line he has so far taken with the Umma Party's leaders, as reported in 
the 5th paragraph of his letter. 
2 Marginal note by Clutton: 'I think we are all agreed on this'. 
R.H.G.E. 
8.12.49. 
185 FO 371/80352, no 2 15 Jan 1950 
[Communism]: letter from D Maclean1 to Sir J Robertson, on 
communist infiltration in Sudan 
[In a report on communist infiltration in the Sudan mention was made of Russian-
trained instructors in Egypt. When requested by MacLean in the Cairo embassy to 
elaborate on this claim the civil secretary replied: 'The reference in our recent paper on 
Communism to instructors in Egypt having been specially trained in Russia was based on 
information which came to the Commissioner of Police from a Sudanese source whose 
contacts had been in touch with Communist Agents in Cairo. The Commissioner had no 
means of checking the information but he accepted it because he knew, from his 
experience in Palestine, that not many years ago Muslim Arabs from that country went to 
Russia to be trained to disseminate Communist propaganda in Palestine' (Robertson to 
McLean, 29 Dec 1949, FO 371/80352, no 1). MacLean's reply (in full) is below.] 
Thank you for your letter No. SC0/36.G.4/4 of the 29th December, about the 
reference in your recent paper on communism to some agents in Egypt having been 
specially trained in Russia. 
We do not wish to be captious but is not this information based on rather too 
shaky evidence to be presented as fact? A good deal of effort is concentrated here on 
the question of communist activities in Egypt, and indeed this particular aspect of it. 
The people concerned, while in no position to say that this section of your report is 
definitely inaccurate, have no evidence to support it. 
1 Head of chancery at the embassy in Cairo until Nov 1950 when he returned to the FO; uncovered as a 
Soviet agent in 1951. 
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186 FO 371180514, no 33 2 Mar 1950 
[Nile Waters: Lake Tsana]: minute by R Alien on Egyptian obstruction 
of Nile Waters negotiations with Ethiopia 
It will be recalled that the Egyptian Government have been making difficulties about 
the approach to be made to the Ethiopian Government in order to start the 
discussions on the Lake Tana project. The Egyptian Government have asked our 
agreement to send a purely Egyptian delegation to Addis Ababa to present the joint 
memorandum which has been agreed with the Sudanese experts. The main issues 
involved in this proposal were, first, the constitutional one, namely, that the 
Egyptians are not entitled to speak alone on behalf of the Sudanese and to admit 
their right to do so on this occasion would weaken the Condominium Agreement, 
and, secondly, the fact that technical negotiations in Addis Ababa would be of little 
practical value without Sudanese participation. Mter consideration of these issues, 
and in view of the desirability of getting the negotiations under way as soon as 
possible, the Secretary of State approved the suggestion that we might agree to the 
Egyptian delegation presenting the technical memorandum alone, but that we 
should safeguard our position by notifying the Ethiopian Government of our 
agreement, and enlisting their support in insisting that after the presentation of the 
memorandum, Sudanese experts should participate in the negotiations.1 
Since then there have been two major developments. In the first place, the 
Governor-General of the Sudan has declared his inability to concur in the course 
proposed, on the grounds that it would prejudice technically the partnership 
between Egypt and the Sudan and that whatever reservations might be made in the 
early stages Egypt would be unwilling to agree to Sudanese participation in 
subsequent negotiations. The Governor-General has discussed the matter with his 
Executive Council who were unanimously and strongly of the opinion that urgent as 
is the Sudan's need for more water, the Sudan should accept yet more delay rather 
than allow herself to be elbowed out of her right and recognized position as a partner 
in the project. The second development is a report from the Embassy in Cairo of 
conversations between the Minister and the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of 
Foreign Mfairs, and between the Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Mfairs. 
From these conversations it appears quite clear that the Egyptian Government are 
thinking in terms not only of the presentation by Egypt alone of the technical 
memorandum, but also of action by Egypt alone in the later or political stages of the 
negotiations. In fact, the Egyptian position appears to be that, Nokrashy Pasha, 
having said what he had at Lake Success2 about the non-validity of the 1936 Treaty 
and the Sudan, the Government of Nahas Pasha cannot adopt a less advanced 
position. It is thus clear that the Egyptian Government are not concerned merely to 
discover a face-saving device with us, but that they are determined to exclude us and 
the Sudan from every stage of the negotiations. 
The Department have considered carefully whether there is any way out of this 
impasse. On both legal and practical grounds we cannot give up our right, and 
1 See 181. 
2 During the presentation of the Egyptian case against the UK at the UN in 1947, following the breakdown 
of the Anglo- Egyptian treaty negotiations. 
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indeed our obligation, to participate in these negotiations. Not only would it be 
politically unwise to authorise the Egyptian Government to negotiate on our behalf 
(one of the suggestions put forward by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs), but 
under the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty concerning (among other things) the Waters 
of the Blue Nile we are bound to be parties to any agreement which may be 
concluded in connexion with Lake Tana. 
Meanwhile our Ambassador in Addis Ababa has discussed the matter with the 
Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has made it plain that the Ethiopians 
would accept British and Sudanese participation in the negotiations. 
Recommendation. It is therefore recommended that we should instruct His 
Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo to return to the charge with the Egyptians, and that, 
subject to his views and those of the Governor-General of the Sudan, we should 
instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Addis Ababa to induce the Ethiopian 
Government to issue invitations to both the Egyptians and ourselves to open the 
negotiations. To refuse such an invitation would at least put the Egyptians into an 
uncomfortable position tactically, and it is possible that when the Egyptian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs has been more fully briefed and has had time to think things over, 
he may be prepared to give way. If he does not, we might consider going ahead with 
the negotiations on a bilateral basis ourselves with the Ethiopians even though we 
can hardly get to the point of signing any agreement without Egyptian participation. 
Telegrams to Cairo and Addis Ababa on these lines are submitted herewith. 
187 FO 371180358, no 2 8 Mar 1950 
[Self-government]: letter from Sir R Howe to Sir W Strang on Umma 
Party proposals to accelerate self-government and government plans 
to expand election rules. Minute by R H G Edmonds 
In my letter to you of the 1st December1 last regarding self-government for the 
Sudanese I said that I should not be surprised to receive before long some organised 
approach from the Umma Party and other Independents to announce either that the 
Sudan is now ready for self-government or to fix a date when this could be stated. 
As the date for the opening of the Second Session of the Legislative Assembly-
which took place on the 6th March-approached it became evident that this question 
was exercising the minds of the Umma Party and particularly the Sudanese members 
of this party in the Executive Council, and on the 13th February, the day before I was 
due to leave for a tour of the southern Sudan, the Leader of the Assembly-Abdulla 
Bey Khalil-came to see me on this matter. He said that his party were pressing 
strongly for the introduction of a motion during the next session of the Legislative 
Assembly stating that the Sudan was now ready for self-government or for 
independence at a definite date within the near future, on the lines of the 
declarations in regard to Libya and Italian Somaliland which had been made by the 
United Nations. Abdulla Bey said that he himself was not in favour of another motion 
on these lines being debated in the Legislative Assembly but its introduction there 
1 See 184. 
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was being very strongly pressed by leading members of the party and that if it were 
introduced in the next session he thought it would without doubt be approved by a 
majority of the Assembly because he and other moderates would not be able to speak 
against it. 
He and his colleagues in the government had accordingly thought to scotch the 
proposed motion through some other means of convincing the party that the 
Sudanese were in fact already exercising a measure of self-government and they had 
decided that the best means to do this was by an increase in the number of Sudanese 
Ministers in the Executive Council. Their proposals were for the promotion of the 
existing Sudanese members of Council who are not Ministers to be Ministers and the 
appointment of two additional Sudanese as Minister of the Interior and Minister 
Without Portfolio. 
Abdulla Bey Khalil asked me if I would approve the above appointments. 
I told Abdulla Bey that I had no inherent objection in principle to an increase in 
the number of Sudanese Ministers in the Executive Council. I myself regarded the 
present Ordinance as a first step only on the road to self-government for the Sudan. I 
would, however, prefer as the next step to widen the representation of Sudanese 
political parties in the Legislative Assembly as the best way of building the 
foundations for parliamentary government in the Sudan. It could not yet be said that 
the Assembly was a representative body of Sudanese opinion. The Khatmia were not 
represented as they should be and I would prefer, by such measures as amendments 
to the electoral rules, to make such representation possible. Moreover I did not at 
this moment want to disturb the situation here in view of the possibility of 
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in the near future in regard to the Sudan and the 
consequent necessity for the Sudanese to present a united front so that consultations 
with Sudanese opinion, as promised by the British government in 1946 as a 
preliminary to any change in the status of the Sudan, could be secured. I asked 
Abdulla Bey how such consultation could be obtained in present circumstances. He 
said through the Assembly. I replied that if the Condominium argued, as Egypt 
undoubtedly would, that the Assembly is not a representative body what would be the 
answer? Abdulla Bey Khalil said that that could not be helped. It was their own fault 
if the Khatmia were not in the Assembly. He thought that they would certainly 
contest the next election even if the rules were not amended as I had proposed. 
On my return from the South I sent for Abdulla Bey Khalil the day before 
yesterday. Meanwhile the Executive Council had drawn up the draft of my speech for 
the opening of the Assembly on March 6th with the references to the increase of 
Sudanese representation on the Executive Council and the ultimate political future 
of the Sudan about which Cairo telegraphed (Your telegram No. 45 of March 3rd) and 
which was subsequently amended as reported by telegram on March 5th to the 
Sudan Agent London. 
I told Abdulla Bey that I had carefully considered the proposal for additional 
Ministries which he had put before me. At present the Executive Council was 
composed of an equal number of Sudanese and British and his proposal would mean 
in practice eight Sudanese members to six British. This would give a Sudanese 
majority in the Executive Council and would in effect be equivalent to the granting 
of immediate self-government to the Sudan subject to the reserved powers of the 
Governor-General. For such a revolutionary proposal to be justifiable from the 
internal point of view I should have to be satisfied that it was backed by a majority of 
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Sudanese opinion. I was not satisfied that such support existed and to make such a 
sweeping modification in the present constitutional arrangements might well defeat 
any prospect of that body becoming a more representative institution since the other 
important party might well refuse to co-operate, even if the electoral rules were 
modified in the way which we had in mind, and would postpone any prospect of 
making that body the more fully representative institution which we hoped it would 
be. 
That, however, was not the only aspect of the matter. The Sudan was, as I had 
reminded him previously, still a condominium under the control of two powers, 
Great Britain and Egypt. It was true that the Governor-General had extensive pow-
ers under the Condominium Agreement but he did not, in my view, have the power 
on his own to make the radical departure from the status of the Sudan set up under 
the Condominium Agreement, as the proposal for four new Ministries involved. I 
should be obliged to submit the proposal to the Condominium Powers. It was true 
that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had given their approval to 
the Ordinance and to the idea of the progressive development of the Sudan towards 
self-government but the other Co-dominus, Egypt, had refused to accept the 
Ordinance and the Governor-General as agent for both Co-domini could not 
assume their agreement. I asked Abdulla Bey to consider what their reaction would 
be on being presented with such a proposal. Undoubtedly there would be a very 
sharp reaction on the part of the present government in Egypt the res.ult of which 
would no doubt be to harden still further their attitude regarding the unity of 
Egypt and the Sudan, which the new Wafd government had only recently pro-
claimed on coming into power. Apart from this it seemed to me absolutely essential 
that the proposal should manifestly have the support of the majority of the 
Sudanese before the Governor-General could possibly consider submitting it to the 
Co-domini. It was for this reason that I prefered [sic] to go ahead with the plans for 
making the Legislative Assembly more representative so that any such steps would 
be justified, although I would not rule out the creation of one or two more min-
istries as vacancies in the Council or other suitable opportunity occurred in the 
normal course of events. 
Abdulla Bey said that he and his colleagues in the Independence Party had, in 
making their proposals, been proceeding on the assumption that the Governor-
General had it in his power alone to carry them out. He confessed that they had not 
considered the external angle at all and he fully agreed with the arguments which I 
had put before him from the external aspect. 
The above is the background against which the references in the speech at the 
opening of the new session of the Legislative Assembly must be considered. In the 
event the opening ceremony and the reading of the speech went off very well but the 
Sudanese members of the Government were obviously glum that the references to 
political aspirations and greater Sudanese representation on the Executive Council 
had been so watered down. There had been some idea previously that they might 
resign from the Executive Council unless their proposal for a majority of Sudanese 
members were accepted. This would be awkward and until the debate on the speech 
is finished, as it will be within the next few days, we shall not be able to gauge 
accurately the extent of the support which the idea of a Sudanese majority in Council 
commands. We may yet be faced with a withdrawal of Umma support from the 
government. 
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Minute on 187 
In the last sentence of this extremely interesting letter, the Governor-General refers 
to the possibility of the Umma group withdrawing its support from the Sudan 
Government. In the event, Sir Robert Howe and Sir James Robertson seem to have 
been more successful in averting this possibility than they dared to hope. In the 
Legislative Assembly's debate on the Governor-General's Address, the amendment 
motion (regretting that the Sudan Government's policy regarding the Sudanese'[s] 
share in directing internal policy of the country was "vague and indefinite") was 
defeated by 57 votes to 14 on the 13th March. Almost all the "country members" and 
the "Southerners" voted with the Government; all Ministers and Under-Secretaries 
opposed the amendment. Counsels of moderation, therefore, appear to have 
prevailed at the last moment. So ends, for the time being, a crisis in the Sudan which 
might easily have led to results which would have been most embarrassing to H.M.G. 
2. As regards the main issue discussed by the Governor-General in his letter to 
Sir William Strang, namely, his right to increase the Sudanese membership of his 
Executive Council, there is no doubt that under Article 10 of the Ordinance, the 
Governor-General would have been fully justified in taking this step without 
reference to the Codomini. By taking the line that he did, however, (see in particular 
page 3 within), the Governor-General has virtually put the Umma leaders in a 
position where they will be obliged to agree-as the price of an increase in Sudanese 
membership of the Executive Council-to making amendments to the electoral rules 
of the Sudan, which are the sine qua non of the Khatmia's participation in the next 
elections for the Legislative Assembly. Since no real political progress can be made in 
the Sudan until both the main Muslim groups are represented in the Legislative 
Assembly, it seems to me that Sir Robert Howe has made a very astute move. 
3. For all this, the dangers inherent in the situation in the Sudan remain as 
before. The Legislative Assembly is not a fully representative body; a large and 
important section of the Muslim population has no share in the government of the 
country; the struggle for the eventual control of the machinery of government 
between the Umma and Khatmia groups continues; and there is always the risk-as 
was illustrated by the flirtation last month between the Umma and the Wafd-that 
the frustrated leaders of the Umma may be tempted to strike a bargain with the 
Egyptian Government behind our backs. 
R.H.G.E. 
15.3.50 
188 FO 371180358, no 3 11 Mar 1950 
'Report on the Southern provinces': note by the Civil Secretary's 
Office, Khartoum 
[The first biennial report on the Southern Sudan was produced in February 1948 and 
forwarded confidentially to the FO through the Sudan agent in London. On forwarding 
this report the civil secretary proposed, and the FO agreed, that its contents should not be 
published, and that future biennial reports should be sent unofficially to HMG alone 
(Robertson to Alien, 9 Mar 1950, and Alien to Robertson, 27 Mar 1950, FO 371/80358, 
no3) .] 
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(It must be noted that the period since the last report is too short to provide any 
definite conclusions concerning the Southern Sudanese capability to play a part in 
the development of the country, and that the report which follows describes what has 
been and is being done to assist in the progress of the Southern Sudan peoples). 
Capabilities of the Southern Sudanese to play their part in the affairs of the whole 
country on equal and not on servile terms 
The assessment of these capabilities can be made in three spheres: Central 
Government, Local Government, and the field of administrative careers. Important 
developments have taken place in all three since the last report submitted in 
December 1947, associating Southern Sudanese for the first time on equal terms 
with Northerners. In the official opening of the Legislative Assembly on the 23rd 
December 1948, thirteen Southerners took their places beside their fellow members 
from the North to share in the central government of the country. They had been 
elected to the Assembly by three newly constituted Province Councils. The first two 
warranted local government councils have been established in the Southern 
Provinces, and the number of provisional councils has been steadily expanding and 
now totals eleven. The conditions of service of classified Government staff have been 
amended to enable Southerners to attain the same classifications as Northern 
Sudanese. 
In their participation in the Legislative Assembly, Southern members are now in a 
position to get first-hand experience of the responsibilities of government and the 
interests of the country as a whole. They could not be expected at so early a stage to 
play a prominent part in the business of the Assembly, but one or two of them have 
made a considerable contribution to its proceedings. They have shown that they can 
stand up for and maintain the particular interests of the peoples they represent, and 
have certainly justified the entry of Southern Sudanese into the management of the 
country's affairs. 
The inauguration of the three Province Councils in 1948 was an important step 
forward in associating tribal heads with other educated Southerners in the affairs of 
state. These Councils are consultative bodies only, but they have two valuable 
aspects. Firstly, they give collective voice to many of the wisest and most experienced 
heads in the South, and their discussions have been of practical value in a number of 
issues and have helped to shape policy. Secondly, the Councils are educative 
institutions, introducing to the problems of the South and of the whole Sudan men 
whose horizon has previously been bounded by tribal or purely local affairs. The 
difficulty of conducting the proceedings in several languages, while preventing any 
real debates, has not impeded this necessary enlightenment. 
Inasmuch as it is the field of training for citizenship, the spread of local 
government is among the most important developments. Here the language problem 
is a more serious hindrance, and the expansion of the local government network is 
necessarily conditioned by it. The establishment of new units is, however, 
progressing steadily, and the work so far achieved by those which have been 
established has given satisfactory evidence of the ability of members to make useful 
contributions to local administration. 
The application of Northern scales of classification to Southern clerks and 
accountants with the appropriate educational qualifications has opened the way to 
equal composition with Northern officials. With the fulfilment of the new 
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educational programme, access to secondary schools, and general teaching of Arabic, 
in the course of time no post open to Northern Sudanese will be closed to 
Southerners; and there is no reason why, if they have the merit, they should not rise 
to the highest appointments. It is early yet to see how far the Southerner will avail 
himself of these opportunities, and the still limited facilities for education above the 
elementary level have not produced enough educated men for any reliable 
assessment to be made. It may be said, however, that experience so far indicates that 
the Southern Sudanese make good clerks, but a large proportion fail when given 
positions of financial responsibility. Many of the educated Southerners reveal an 
instability of character and proneness to alcoholic excess which is a little disturbing. 
This tendency may be due to the fact that education lifts them far out of their tribal 
environment, and up to now has failed to provide many of them with a suitable set of 
alternative values. It is hoped, however, that this failing will decrease as education is 
extended. 
To further the extent to which Southern Sudanese can fill vacancies in 
Government staff, and to enhance their prospects of promotion, the Ministry of 
Education has, during the past two years, opened a secondary school, an 
intermediate school, two teachers' training colleges and a training centre for better 
instruction in professional subjects. It has also continued the programme of 
elementary school expansion, in which local interest has been increasingly aroused 
through local education councils. 
Capabilities of the Southern Sudanese to contribute to the general economic 
progress of the country, and so to improve social services among themselves 
Under this heading progress has been slower. There are only two major fields for 
development in the South: agriculture and cattle. Climatic and geographical 
conditions, added to the Southern peasant's general lack of desire to produce any 
crop in excess of the family's staple needs, or to sell any available surplus, have made 
advances difficult. In large areas of the South an excess of water, either by rain or 
river floods, is the chief obstacle to agricultural expansion. The problem of food crops 
is therefore mainly an administrative one of opening up these regions by providing 
communications and storage reservoirs in the higher land suitable for rain 
cultivation. Considerable progress has been made in this provision in the Upper Nile 
Province, and mechanical reservoir excavation teams have made available much new 
land in which agriculture is making satisfactory headway. 
The primary exploitable wealth of the South, however, on which real economic 
progress depends, is cattle. Here the requirements are threefold: reduction of cattle 
diseases, extension of grazing areas, and inducement of the Nilotics to sell their 
beasts. Sustained veterinary efforts with prophylactics have reduced disease and 
herds are increasing. In particular, it is hoped that a rapid increase will result from 
the recent intensive campaign against rinderpest in which attenuated goat-virus 
serum has been used for the first time. The expansion of good pasture land, from 
which herds have hitherto been excluded owing to lack of water, has been proceeding 
well during the last two years. 
What has so far not been solved is how to overcome Nilotic conservatism, which 
regards cattle as a social institution and a means to the acquisition of wives instead of 
an economic asset. Efforts to induce them to sell their animals have met with limited 
success and new means of achieving this are being earnestly considered. If a large 
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increase in the size of herds does result from the mass inoculation and 
immunization being pursued by the Veterinary Department, cattle owners will have 
more for barter and local consumption and may become less averse to releasing more 
beasts for disposal in the markets. Other factors which, it is hoped, will change their 
attitude are a surer supply of agricultural products, more educational facilities, and 
intensified instruction in the preparation of hides for export. Province Councils have 
impressed upon chiefs the importance of cattle and hide exports, not only to their 
Provinces but to the whole Sudan, and they have begun to co-operate in propagating 
this amongst the tribesmen. 
Probably the most effective means of persuasion, however, would be stimulation of 
the demand for and supply of consumer goods. The tendency towards a cash 
economy would be greatly hastened if more goods were available to tempt the cattle 
breeder's fancy; but the general run of merchants are wedded to the system of large 
profits on a very restricted range of commodities, which has small attraction, and 
little progress has been achieved. 
In this connection, the experiment in social emergence being conducted amongst 
the Zande tribe in Equatoria Province may be of significance.1 The cotton crop, 
grown as part of the scheme and ginned locally, has been sold to the British Raw 
Cotton Commission. A spinning and weaving mill is in the course of erection, an oil 
press and soap factory are being built, and the Trading Division of the Equatoria 
Projects Board has managed to procure a wide variety of consumer goods for sale in 
the area by travelling vans. The success of this scheme, and the popularity of the 
broad range of goods which the people can buy with the proceeds of their work, are 
an encouraging sign of what may eventually be achieved throughout the whole area. 
Capabilities of the Southern Sudanese to win social consideration, as equals rather 
than as inferior people, from the North 
Little advance has so far been made in the evolution of social equality or the sincere 
association of Northern and Southern Sudanese. This fact must partly be laid at the 
door of the Southerner, who is not readily responsive or companionable outside his 
own immediate circle. At present the club-life so attractive to the Northerner, and 
encounters with different types of man, make little appeal to him. There is no open 
or general hostility between Arab and African, and they can work together well 
enough; but each tends to keep to himself, conscious of being different. Potential 
rancour is latent and occasionally manifests itself in a covert manner. 
Participation in the Legislative Assembly and the Northern classifications of 
Government employment have begun to remove the Southerner's feeling of inferior 
or limited status. At the same time, with the awakening of political consciousness 
there have appeared signs of a hardening of his attitude towards the North. He is still 
highly suspicious of the objects of closer association with the Northern Sudan, and a 
directive from the Ministry of Education, explaining the proposed inclusion of Arabic 
1 The Zande scheme, a project begun in 1946, administered by the Equatoria Projects board, attempting 
self-contained and self-sufficient agro-industrial development through the cultivation of cotton and the 
local manufacture of textiles and other goods at factories established at Nzara. It was conceived as a social 
experiment, aimed to achieve 'the complete social emergence and economic stability to the Zande people' 
which, if successful, could be used as the model for further development in the southern provinces (see P 
de Schlippe, Shifting cultivation in Africa. The Zande system of agriculture (London, 1956), pp 20-23). 
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teaching in the curriculum of Southern schools, was interpreted as a deliberate 
attempt to stamp out vernacular languages and retard the Southerners' emergence. 
In the south there is therefore still little confidence that the people are "being 
equipped to stand up for themselves as socially and economically the equals of their 
partners in the North", and still less that this policy is accepted by the Northerners, 
whom they observe being given more and more control of the reins of government. 
The fault is very largely the Northerners. While the attitude of senior Northern 
Sudanese Government officials to their Southern subordinates has been generally 
faultless, the attitude of less responsible Northerners has not usually been so good. 
Moreover one must not lay too much stress on the welcome accorded in Khartoum 
to the Southern members of the Assembly, the good impression they have made 
there, or the sentiments of a few high-minded and perfectly honest Northern 
Sudanese leaders. They have no doubt made the North aware that the Southerner has 
professional and social capabilities, and their Northern fellow-members have gone 
out of their way to show them outward respect; but there has probably been an 
element of political propaganda in the latter's acclamation, and a desire to impress 
upon the outside world that the North and South are already one. Outside the 
Assembly, Northerners appear tacitly if not avowedly willing to accept the Southern 
Sudanese as a potential equal only on their own terms, i.e. Arabicization, and there is 
as yet no noticeable change in the traditional Arab outlook on the South. 
The interval since the last report has been too brief for an assessment of the pace 
at which the effects of centuries of seclusion, geographical and ethnological 
circumstances, and an ability to resist outside interference developed from slave-raid 
times, can be dispelled; but it is bound to be very slow. Until the Southerner's 
suspicions of Northern intentions, and apprehension of the Northerner's increasing 
political power, have been overcome, he will be awkward in his relations with the 
Northerner who will continue reluctant to consider him as an equal. His increasing 
participation in the affairs of the country will be the best way of dispelling these 
doubts, and the speed at which this is achieved will depend upon the rate of his 
educational development. The spread of all forms of education, including special 
methods of enlightenment now being tried, such as the sending of Southern 
schoolboys on tours of the North, the appointment by the Ministry of Education of a 
senior Northern Sudanese to work specially for the improvement of mutual relations 
through clubs and other social activities, encouragement of the Scout movement 
and the teaching of Arabic, is thus the prerequisite for increasing Southern 
capabilities to win from the North social consideration as equals. 
189 FO 371180516, no 60 22 May 1950 
[Nile Waters: Lake Tsana]: letter from Sir R Campbell to M R Wright 
on a possible Egyptian strategy of obstructing Lake Tsana scheme in 
order to obtain recognition for sovereignty over the Sudan 
This is by way of an interim report on the Lake Tsana position and to let you know 
that the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to call and see him on the 18th May 
last. 
I am not in a position yet to report fully to you on our conversation because he 
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asked to speak with me through an interpreter, as he wanted to speak in Arabic in 
order to be careful of his words, and I have not yet received a written translation of 
them as recorded by the Interpreter. I have however arranged to see the copy of what 
has been recorded, to which I shall add my replies, and this will be sent to you in due 
course. The interpreter failed to take down my remarks, except to "note one or two 
points". 
You should know, however, that the interview went badly. I was prepared for this 
by two conversations which Chapman-Andrews had had one with Hakki Bey, the 
Under Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the other with Osman 
Moharrem Pasha, Ministry of Public Works. These two gentlemen spoke with one 
voice, saying that Egypt contended that all necessary consultations with the Sudan 
had already taken place, and that the 1935 Agreement and the 1946 one also between 
Egypt and the Sudan proved this. Egypt could therefore negotiate and sign with 
Ethiopia alone. So far as the Sudan was concerned Egypt was bound, and would 
continue to be bound, by her agreement with the Sudan. Chapman-Andrews told 
both of them plainly that he saw no possibility of progress unless this attitude was 
changed. The Minister took the same line with me. 
He spoke carefully, constantly referring to a document, and I was able to intervene 
about three times in the course of it. At the last interval I said that the original idea 
had been for a purely technical approach in the first instance with political 
negotiations to follow. I was not sure I understood His Excellency's present proposal 
which seemed to contemplate only one step, namely immediate negotiations with 
the Ethiopians; but this was impossible, as I understood it, for the technicians had 
not yet got all the information they required. This seemed to take him aback but after 
a pause he enquired whether in view of the difficulty of reconciling our points of 
view, we could not proceed with the purely technical step, the Sudan technical 
experts being associated with the Egyptian expert as members of his staff? By the 
time that step had been taken, who knew but that our two Governments might then 
be engaged in a general discussion and even have reached a conclusion and the 
constitution and difficulty resolved. I countered this with the usual argument of the 
necessity of the Sudanese to be technical colleagues of equal status, etc. and added 
that surely from his point of view, it would be a psychological error on the part of 
Egypt either to keep the Sudanese out or give their technicians an inferior status. 
The argument continued as I have already said for no less than an hour and a half 
and we got nowhere at all. 
That evening Hakki Bey, at dinner, asked me how my conversation with Mohamed 
Salah El Dine [sic] Bey had gone. I told him we had made no progress, and gave 
details . He in turn argued that Egypt had full right to negotiate alone, since she 
enjoyed sovereignty over the Sudan as had been admitted in the Bevin!Sidky 
Protocol. I said that surely our object was to avoid raising the question of sovereignty 
and thus the constitutional issue, and declined to argue further on the point. Hakki 
Bey then went on to say that Egypt was fully entitled to make an agreement with 
whomever she liked on a question affecting herself. What could prevent her from 
doing this? If it were subsequently considered that a given agreement would benefit 
the Sudan, the Sudan could accede to it. He said that paragraph 3 (he doubtless 
meant paragraph 4) of the Annex to Article 11 of the 1936 Agreement laid down what 
was to be done. (This deals with the accession of the Sudan to international 
conventions, generally of a technical or humanitarian character; but it is interesting 
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that Hakki Bey would be ready to use the analogy in the case of an agreement with 
Ethiopia on the question of Lake Tsana.) This idea is a variation of the one by which 
Egypt should negotiate alone with Ethiopia by agreement with His Majesty's 
Government; but since both procedures involve formal action by His Majesty's 
Government on behalf of the Sudan, it is surprising that he should think it would 
help Egypt whose object is obviously to figure before its public as being alone 
responsible in any matter concerning the Sudan's external relations. It is doubtful 
though whether he has thought the point out thoroughly. 
I am not at all sure that all these conversations do not point to one thing, that is 
the possibility that Egypt's real object is to use Tsana and our anxiety to proceed 
rapidly and successfully with the Tsana Dam scheme, to induce us to discuss the 
Sudan and to concede the Egypt case. 
AI; stated above, this should be treated as an interim communication only. I will 
report more fully when I have been able to agree the record of my conversation with 
Salah El Dine [sic]. 
I am copying this letter to the Governor-General, Khartoum, His Majesty's 
Ambassador, Addis Ababa and British Middle East Office. 
190 FO 371180387, no 13 25 Aug 1950 
[Self-government] : despatch no 349 from Sir R Stevenson to Mr 
Bevin on Hamid Zaki's proposals for a transitional form of self-
government 
[By Spring 1950 the embassy in Cairo sensed a change in the thinking of Egyptian 
government officials concerning the Sudan, and an acceptance that ultimately the 
question of the future of the Sudan was a decision to be taken by Sudanese (minute on 
Egypt by Wright, 24 Mar 1950, and minute by Stevenson, 31 May 1950, FO 371/80382, 
nos 4 and 20). This appeared to be confirmed in August when Stevenson had two 
meetings with Dr Hamid Zaki, minister of state for foreign affairs, who was the minister 
chiefly concerned with the Sudan. Zaki agreed that nothing, in the end, could stop the 
Sudanese from deciding their own future, and the eo-domini could not impose a solution 
on the Sudanese against their wishes. As a way of associating the Sudanese with the 
Anglo-Egyptian discussions he proposed the re-establishment of condominium rule in 
the Sudan: first by holding elections for a new Legislative Assembly which would produce 
a purely Sudanese Cabinet; second by attaching a British 'advisor' with some executive 
authority to each ministry, as in the Egyptian cabinet of 1914; and finally by replacing the 
governor-general with 'a prominent Sudanese as a kind of Viceroy with very narrow 
constitutional powers'. Sudanisation of the administration would continue at the same 
rate as before, and he hoped the Legislative Assembly might adopt a resolution 
'recognising the Egyptian crown as the symbol of the brotherhood of the peoples of the 
Nile Valley' (despatch no 348 from Stevenson to Bevin, 25 Aug 1950, FO 371/80387, 
no 12).] 
In my Despatch No. 348 (103114/SOG) of 25th August I reported the lines along 
which Dr. Hamed Zaki Bey, Minister of State, appears to be thinking in his efforts to 
find a solution to the Sudan question acceptable to both the Egyptian and His 
Majesty's Governments. 
2. In the practical and, on the whole, sensible nature of his ideas Zaki Bey is, of 
course, far in advance of his colleagues and indeed of most Egyptian thought on the 
Sudan; this particularly applies to his acceptance of the fact that the Sudanese are set 
on self-government and mean to have it. 
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3. But his tentative programme for the removal of the Governor-General etc. is, 
I think, a number of years ahead of its time. It is the sort of programme which 
might, at the right moment, be implemented in the normal process of evolution of 
the Sudan along the lines which have been set by the Sudan Government. But even 
if an amended Legislative Assembly Ordinance should result in producing a com-
pletely representative Legislative Assembly, I doubt whether it could reasonably be 
maintained that the Sudanese by then would have advanced far enough politically 
and administratively to run a government on the lines of the government estab-
lished in Egypt in 1914. Moreover, the question of choosing a Sudanese Governor-
General or Viceroy would at present pose almost insuperable difficulties, and I 
suggest that it could not reasonably be done until after the deaths of both Sayed 
Abdel Rahman and Sayed Ali el Mirghani, when the strong sectarian feelings and, 
particularly, the extreme personal rivalries of the two families may be expected to 
have lessened. 
4. A somewhat similar difficulty exists in regard to the question of associating 
the Sudanese with Anglo-Egyptian discussions. It is clear that, when the time 
comes, they must participate fully in deciding how the country is to be enabled to 
decide its own future. But a rather different problem would be presented by the 
establishment now of a tripartite commission having as its object the planning of 
the relations of the Sudan with the two Co-domini in the period intervening 
before the Sudan's final status is considered. In the first place, there would be 
great difficulty at present in obtaining a representative Sudanese delegation 
which, in future years, would not be repudiated by one or other section of the 
Sudan. In the second place, if such a delegation could be selected there would 
probably be a great deal of friction and intrigue between the Egyptian delegation 
and the various elements of the Sudanese Delegation, since the Egyptians would 
inevitably fall to the temptation to lobby on the question of the final disposal of 
the Sudan. There would be a real danger that other considerations would obscure 
the proper issue, namely, the relations between the three parties during the 
interim period, without prejudice to the final decision. Nevertheless, I see even 
more difficulty in trying to settle even the immediate future of the Sudan over the 
heads of the Sudanese. It therefore seems essential, as Hamed Zaki himself 
admits, that Sudanese should somehow be brought into any discussion for a 
settlement of the immediate problem. 
5. My own view is that it is no good even thinking of disrupting the present 
organisation of the Sudan Government unless some lasting advantage is to be 
obtained in the way of satisfying Egypt and establishing a foundation for a friendly 
and enduring relationship between Egypt and the Sudan. In the broadest terms, I 
suggest that our objects for the Sudan must now be:-
(a) to allow the present Administration of the Sudan to continue along the path 
they have set, as undisturbed as may be consistent with a regard for Egypt's 
legitimate interests in the Sudan; 
(b) a return, as far as may be possible without prejudicing (a) above, to the proper 
working of the Condominium; i.e. we must achieve greater Egyptian association 
with the Government of the Sudan. 
6. Our tactics over the last few years have been devoted to (a); we have 
endeavoured, and continue to endeavour, to prevent the Egyptians hampering the 
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day-to-day running and development of the Sudan, securing their cooperation at 
working level if possible but, if not, doing without it, and forming as far as possible a 
buffer against Egyptian interference behind which the Sudan could carry on. 
7. There are two reasons why we should now go further than this:-
(i) We want a general settlement with Egypt which, in deference to the latter's 
views, will almost certainly have to include the Sudan; 
(ii) Recent information from Khartoum suggests that the political parties there 
are working up for a period of increasingly bitter political strife centring round the 
question of the final relationship of the Sudan with Egypt. It may be that a 
statement this year by the two eo-domini together, laying down an agreed 
programme for the Sudan, would quell this strife before it became serious. 
8. In an effort to reach a settlement with the Egyptians, I suggest that we might 
offer the following:-
( a) A statement acknowledging Egypt's legitimate interest in Nile Waters, and in 
maintaining close and good relations with the Sudanese, many of whom are of the 
Arab race. 
(b) A statement that His Majesty's Government have no economic or strategic 
interest in the Sudan, and are quite prepared eventually to sever all connection 
with that country, if that proves to be the wish of the Sudan Government. 
(c) A statement that His Majesty's Government have no feeling, one way or the 
other, about the relationship between the Sudan and Egypt once the Sudanese 
have reached the stage of being able to choose for themselves. 
(d) An offer to revive the idea of a tripartite Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese 
Supervisory Council to advise on the development of the Sudan. I believe that the 
Sudan Government now think that the time is past for this and that it would never 
be accepted in the Sudan; but I suggest that this proposal has not lately been so 
closely examined as to force us to discard it and that, provided it had no executive 
powers, such a Supervisory Council might be put across. It might be best to delay 
choosing the Sudanese representation on the Council until after the general 
election for the Legislative Assembly. 
(e) Joint Anglo-Egyptian, or United Nations, observation of the next general 
election for the Legislative Assembly, and of any election or plebiscite that might 
be held to determine the constitutional status of the Sudan. 
(f) Withdrawal of the British Forces from the Sudan, as soon as the Sudan Defence 
Force and Police can take over (which may well be now). The Officer 
Commanding, British Troops is also Kaid of the Sudan Defence Force, and it 
might be necessary to provide for the continued occupation of this post by a 
British Officer. The Royal Air Force should also be withdrawn except in so far as 
they might want a staging post at Khartoum, or be required to remain in the 
Sudan for "integrated air defence." 
It would probably be unnecessary to demand the withdrawal at the same time of the 
Egyptian troops from the Sudan (this especially applies to those guarding the dams), 
but we ought not to concede this point at once. The Sudan Government might offer 
to try to step up the recruiting of Sudanese for the Egyptian Army. 
9. It is probable that we should have to reject any of the following proposals that 
might be made:-
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(1) Any statement implying recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, 
or any statement that might in any way prejudge the issue of the final 
determination of the country's status. 
(2) Any Egyptian participation in the work of the Executive Council. This was 
another of the main points of the CampbelVKhashaba agreement; but it seems 
certain that the time has now passed when it might have been possible, without 
causing too much trouble in the Sudan, to have Egyptian members of the 
Executive Council. 
(3) It is unlikely that it will be possible to arrange for greater participation by 
Egyptian officials in the administration of the country, but there is no reason why 
the Governor-General should not reiterate his undertaking to search for recruits 
equally in Egypt and in the United Kingdom for posts for which no Sudanese are 
available. 
(4) The removal of British servants of the Sudan Government, except in 
accordance with the existing programme of Sudanisation. 
(5) The appointment of an Egyptian as Governor-General. 
10. Subject to your remarks, and those of the Governor-General of the Sudan, I 
should like in due course to discuss these suggestions informally with the Egyptian 
Government. I am meeting the Minister for Foreign Affairs tomorrow for a 
conversation on the Sudan, at which I shall confine myself if possible to listening to 
what he has to say and promising to pass on his remarks to you. I do not expect him 
to put forward anything of a practical nature. 
11. Egyptian thinking had seemed to become so set in a dreary, unrealistic 
channel, that I have been encouraged to find a Minister with such an open mind 
on the subject as Zaki Bey, and I think it would be worthwhile if we could now 
show the Egyptian Government, by producing definite suggestions for a compro-
mise between our differing interests, that we are not the nigger in the woodpile 
that the Egyptian press makes us out to be. I suggest also that it would be a good 
move if the Sudan Government would now invite Zaki Bey to visit the country in 
the course of the coming winter, either officially or informally, as he might prefer. 
I also think it would be most useful if he saw and was perhaps entertained by an 
Under-Secretary during his stay in London. He will be there from September 3rd 
to 7th and again for a few days after the Inter-Parliamentary Union conference in 
Dublin. 
I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Acting Governor-General of the Sudan. 
191 FO 371180387, no 14 31 Aug 1950 
[Self-government]: inward telegram no 156 from Sir R Stevenson to 
FO, reporting a conversation with Muhammad Salah al-Din on the 
future of Sudanese self-government 
[Edmonds minuted that: 'The idea of a plebiscite ... is one which we, & the Sudan Govt. 
might eventually be able to accept: but not in existing circumstances, I suggest, & 
certainly not until there is a fully representative Legislative Assembly in being. The need 
for the latter is becoming increasingly urgent'. Comparing Salah ad-Din's attitude with 
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those of his minister of state (190), he noted that Hamid Zaki's proposal was 'a more 
realistic approach to the problem, which has unfortunately been made by a relatively 
unimportant member of the Egyptian Govt' (minute by R H G Edmonds, 4 Sept 1950, FO 
371/803887, no 14).] 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and I met again on 26th August. The same persons were 
present as at the previous meeting. 
2. After discussing defence matters for some time (see my immediately following 
saving telegram) we embarked on an examination of the Sudan question. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me a lengthy historical resume by means of which 
he sought to prove that Egypt and the Sudan should be left alone by Britain and that 
the Condominium should be brought to an end and replaced by a regime worked out 
by the Egyptians and Sudanese to their mutual satisfaction. 
3. I did not seek to dispute the historical facts which he adduced but maintained 
that the inferences which he drew from them were faulty. The mere fact that Britain 
had been deeply concerned in the administration of the Sudan for more than fifty 
years laid on her a responsibility for the welfare of the peoples inhabiting the 
territory which she could not and would not shirk. His Majesty's Government were 
ready to consider any practical solution of the problem which did not involve 
imposing anything on the Sudanese peoples against their will or without their 
consent. 
4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs rejected the thesis that fifty years of 
administration gave Britain any rights or responsibilities. She had throughout been 
acting on behalf of Egypt and the time had now come to hand back to Egypt the trust 
she had been carrying out. This claim to have some responsibility towards the 
Sudanese was quite new and had only been put forward when Egypt began to demand 
her rights. The whole course of British "imperialist" policy in the Sudan seemed to 
have been shaped with a view to keeping the Sudanese people in a backward state, 
separating them from the people of Egypt and prolonging British control. But when 
one came to compare the state of the Sudan's advancement with that of Libya it was 
obvious that the Sudan had progressed further. Yet Britain was prepared to see an 
independent Libya created in 1952 while she considered that the Sudan would not be 
capable of self-government for a long period. 
5. I had no great difficulty in disposing of the charge that our claim to respon-
sibility towards the peoples of the Sudan was a new one. I went on to say that 
Britain had no vital economic or strategic interest in the Sudan and had no feel-
ings one way or the other about union between the Sudan and Egypt. It would be 
quite useless for us to try either to encourage or discourage such a movement. 
One had only to look at a map to see that the lives of the two countries were inex-
tricably bound up together by the river Nile. No one could separate them except 
perhaps the Egyptians themselves by antagonising the Sudanese. It did not make 
sense to talk of an "Imperialist" policy on Britain's part. If she had had such a 
policy she would have made very sure that no situation such as the present one 
could arise. 
6. The Minister replied to the effect that if we had no material interest in the 
Sudan we should leave it as we had done in the case of India. The Sudan was essential 
to Egypt more so even than Alexandria as Saad Zaghloul Pasha had pointed out to 
Mr. Ramsey MacDonald. Moreover, the Minister said, he was confident that the 
Sudanese people ardently desired full union with Egypt. The results of the Municipal 
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Elections, and the resolutions of the Graduates Conference1 showed the feelings of 
the intelligentsia in this respect, as did the sympathy of the religious sects. He asked 
whether Britain would agree to the holding of a plebiscite in the Sudan under 
neutral supervision after the withdrawal of British forces and officials. He returned 
again to the comparison between Libya and the Sudan and maintained that the 
standard of education was higher in the latter and that therefore the Sudanese 
should also be capable of self-government and independence in two years. Finally he 
asked for my estimate of the time it would take the Sudanese to reach such a state of 
advancement. 
7. In reply I drew the Minister's attention to the fact that deep feeling, whether 
legally and historically justified or not, existed in Britain in regard to the Sudan and 
could not be ignored by Egypt. On the other hand we fully appreciated the latter's 
vital interests. I pointed out that neither he nor I had visited the Sudan and it was 
difficult for either of us to speak with confidence regarding the opinions and desires 
of the peoples inhabiting that country. Our reports on the subject evidently differed 
but in speaking of the sympathy of the religious sects towards Egypt I presumed that 
he did not include the followers of Sayed Abdel Rahman. As regards a plebiscite I 
would of course put the proposal forward if he wished but I would be glad to know 
whether he contemplated the simultaneous withdrawal of Egyptian troops and 
officials, including those in the irrigation service. I pleaded ignorance of the standard 
of education in Libya but I understood that only 3% of Sudanese could be regarded as 
literate. In reply to his question of how long it would take the Sudanese to reach a 
state in which they could govern themselves I gave him a personal estimate of ten 
years and added that that was probably rather under than over the mark. 
8. In reply to a question from me whether he had any concrete proposals to put 
forward he said that there should be a transitional period of two years during which 
the Sudanisation of the Administration should be pressed forward and at the end of 
which the British forces should be withdrawn and the Condominium should be 
regarded as at an end. The Sudanese would then establish their own Government 
under the Egyptian Crown with a common foreign policy, defence force and currency 
with Egypt. I asked whether he contemplated the withdrawal of all British officials on 
the expiry of the transitional period. He replied that the further employment of 
foreign officials would be a matter for the new Sudanese Government to decide. I 
then asked where in all this the plebiscite came in. He answered that the plebiscite 
must not be regarded as a definite proposal. It would be difficult for Egypt to suggest 
it. His aim in mentioning it was twofold: first, to demonstrate his confidence in the 
correctness of his views on the desires of the Sudanese and, secondly, to test the 
sincerity of Britain's claim that she was ready to accede to Sudanese desires. If the 
suggestion of a plebiscite found favour with the British Government then would be 
the time to consider what precise question should be put to the people of the Sudan 
and to decide on procedure. 
1 By this time the Congress was an all-Ashiqqa (pro-Egyptian) organisation. While unable to gauge its 
potential danger, the government had concluded earlier in the year that 'Congress is anti-Government, 
anti-Legislative Assembly, one hundred percent pro-Egyptian, and is backed morally and financially by 
Egypt, and although it does not command much respect at the moment either in the Sudan or in Egypt it 
is a potential menace to public security' (Civil Secretary's Office, 'Note on the Graduates' General 
Congress as a back ground to its potential danger to public security-( up to 31.12.1949)', 28 Feb 1950, FO 
371/80358, no 5). 
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9. I said that I would inform you of the foregoing and that you would doubtless 
give it full consideration. I could not pretend, however, to regard his proposals as 
practical. 
192 FO 371/80518, no 104 21 Sept 1950 
[Nile Waters]: minute by R All en to M R Wright on new Egyptian 
willingness to proceed with negotiations on Nile Waters projects 
The following is the position which appears to have been reached: 
Towards the end of August Moharram Pasha, the Egyptian Minister of Public 
Works who is at present acting as Prime Minister during the absence of Nahas, 
indicated that he would like to discuss the various Nile Waters projects with 
representatives of the Sudan Government. These projects are Lake Tana, the 4th 
Cataract dam and the raising of the storage level in the Sennar dam. We have been 
urging Khartoum to agree to this and to come to an arrangement with Moharram 
before Nahas gets back and the whole thing is put back on to a political plane. On the 
6th September the Sudan Government representatives went to Alexandria and saw 
Moharram, who made it clear that he regarded all three projects as inseparably 
linked together. Mter their talk with Moharram the Sudan representatives had 
further discussions with the Egyptian Public Works representatives and produced 
draft letters which were to be exchanged between the Sudan Government and the 
Egyptian Government. These letters would refer to each of the three projects and 
would confirm that the Sudan Government agreed to the 4th Cataract project on the 
understanding that technical discussions between the Governments should be held 
at an early date with the object of reaching agreement on the Sudan's share in the 
benefits and cost of the project. 
Meanwhile the Legal Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Mfairs and the 
Embassy Legal Counsellor had drawn up a joint report agreeing on the procedure 
with regard to Lake Tana. This report is very satisfactory, except for the fact that it 
refers to the Sudan "Administration" instead of the Sudan "Government". 
On the 9th September the Sudan Government representatives were informed, 
however, that Moharram had rejected the draft letters referring to the various 
projects, apparently because of the reference to the technical discussions covering 
the Sudan share in the benefits and costs in the 4th Cataract project. It seems that 
his view is that this project is purely designed to control the flood waters and is not a 
storage project in which the Sudan should share. If so, this view is quite incorrect. 
The Sudan Government have now drawn up a memorandum stating their case on 
this, and it has now been handed in to the Egyptian Government. 
The Sudan Government are likely to object to seeing themselves described in the 
Legal Advisers' report as an "administration", but we have not yet had their 
comments on this report. Sir Ralph Stevenson has said that he proposes to request 
Moharram's agreement to the procedure outlined in it as soon as he has had time to 
study the document, but the Department considers that it would be preferable that 
he should not discuss it with Moharram until the Sudan Government has had an 
opportunity of commenting. There does not seem however to be any reason why the 
Ambassador should not meanwhile try to clear up the misunderstanding or 
400 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [193] 
difference of opinion which has arisen over the 4th Cataract project, but he should be 
told to say that he has had no instructions yet if Moharram refers to the Lake Tana 
document. 
Two draft telegrams are attached:-
(i) instructing Sir R. Stevenson on the above lines; 
(ii) urging the Sudan Government not to make too much fuss about the 
misdescription of themselves in the Lake Tana document.1 
1 Both telegrams were approved and dispatched the same day. 
193 FO 371180388, no 27 28 Sept 1950 
[Self-government]: letter from Sir R Howe to Sir W Strang, 
responding to the Egyptian government's proposals for Sudanese self-
government 
[Howe set out his arguments against the Egyptian proposals in two letters: one, a full 
rebuttal to Strang, and another, more formal rejection to Bevin (see 194).] 
I have read with interest the two despatches Nos. 348 and 3491 from His Majesty's 
Ambassador in Cairo regarding his conversations with the Egyptian Minister of State, 
as well as the Ambassador's later telegram No. 156 on his talk with the Egyptian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs about the future of the Sudan.2 
2. The Minister of State showed, as Sir Ralph Stevenson remarks, a more liberal 
and realistic attitude towards the Sudan problem than has hitherto been displayed by 
the Government of Nahas Pasha. His attitude in fact is reminiscent of that shown by 
that eminent Egyptian statesman, Sidky Pasha, in the conversations of 1946 in 
London which led up to the Sidky-Bevin protocol. That instrument was however 
repudiated by Egypt and there is little or no likelihood that the views of Hamid Zaki 
Bey, a junior minister, would prevail against those of his Minister for Foreign Affairs 
whose attitude as revealed in Cairo telegram 156 is quite different. Moreover, even 
Hamid Zaki Bey insists on the recognition of the Egyptian Crown and I see no 
possibility of the great majority of the Sudanese swallowing this, whatever 
assurances to the contrary the Minister for Foreign Affairs may have received from 
the Graduates' Congress in Khartoum. 
3. The contrast between Hamid Zaki Bey's programme and that of the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs is indeed startling. Under the former the Sudanese would evolve 
quietly and naturally under the Condominium through self-government to their 
eventual status under the Egyptian Crown. Under the Minister for Foreign Affairs's 
programme the Sudan would be abandoned from now on by the British, the 
Sudanese and Egyptians would be left alone to work out in the next two years, 
Sudanisation having been completed, the nature of their future status under the 
Egyptian Crown, Foreign Office and War Office. 
4. I am well aware of the vital importance attached by H.M.G. to a settlement 
with Egypt of the problem of the defence of the Middle East at this critical epoch in 
1 See 190. 2 See 191. 
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international affairs and that in view of the insistence of Egypt in linking this 
problem to that of the Sudan, the Egyptians will demand their quid pro quo in the 
Sudan as the price of a new defence arrangement. I can only say that while I imagine 
there can be no likelihood of negotiations being undertaken on the basis of Hamid 
Zaki Bey's programme as long as it contains the provision for a common crown of 
Egypt, any agreement by H.M.G. to negotiate on the basis of the programme outlined 
by Saleh-ed-Din would be regarded by most Sudanese as a gross betrayal by H.M. 
Government. 
5. In considering the question of the future of the Sudan, there is one very 
important aspect of the problem which is constantly overlooked in any projected 
negotiations with Egypt and that is the problem of the South. The Southern Sudan 
represents numerically some 30 per cent. of the total population of the country. 
Predominantly pagan and negroid, they are only now barely emerging from a 
primeval state to the appreciation of the benefits of fifty years of enlightened and 
Christian administration. They are already apprehensive of their future under a 
purely Sudanese Government. What would be their prospects under an Egyptian-
dominated Sudanese Government? Given another twenty-five years of the present 
administration they might well be in a position to stand up against their Northern 
compatriots. Some even of our present Sudanese Ministers have said that when the 
Sudan is independent "there is going to be no nonsense about democracy". 
6. To return to the main problem, it is clear that there are certain fundamental 
matters of principle on which there cannot or should not be any compromise, such 
as any precipitate abandonment of our interest in the Sudan or the imposition of the 
Egyptian Crown. It would therefore seem that the only hope of an Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement must lie in agreement on matters of detail such as are outlined in Sir 
Ralph Stevenson's despatch No. 349 and which arise from his conversations with 
Hamid Zaki Bey. As regards some of the assumptions made in these two despatches, 
my views are as follows:-
(a) Practically all politically-minded Sudanese of whatever party they are, are 
asking for a purely Sudanese Government as soon as possible and an end of the 
Condominium. Some would retain as head of the state, a neutral officer, probably 
British; others would elect a President; others would have S.A.R. as a 
constitutional monarch. The Nazirs and Sheikhs, however, and the Southerners 
do not wish progress towards a Sudanese Government to be too rapid and are 
opposed to ending the present regime too speedily. It would be wrong in my 
opinion to transfer power too soon to the Effendi class against the wishes of the 
tribal leaders and the great mass of the Sudanese. 
(b) It is our intention to discuss amendments to the Ordinance in the autumn 
sitting of the Assembly, and to have the amended Ordinance ready before the 
elections for the new Assembly in 1951/52 (probably January 1952). 
(c) We aim at creating one or two more ministers shortly. This will not alter the 
present relative strengths of British and Sudanese on the Council (five and seven), 
but will give executive authority to perhaps two of those who now sit on the 
Council without portfolio or as Under-Secretaries. 
(d) No mention is made in these despatches of the present Egyptian propaganda 
and money which is being poured into this country, chiefly it seems at the instance 
[sic] of the Palace, and no opinion is given of the likely attitude of the King of Egypt 
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to any of these proposals. The King is personally very much interested in "his 
Sudanese Empire", and no proposals which do not have his blessing are likely to be 
successful, for in spite of alleged personal unpopularity with everyone, he still rules 
Egypt. The Sudanese Independents and especially Sayed Abdel Rahman are always 
insistent on our stopping Egyptian propaganda, which they consider is ruining the 
younger student classes by subversive propaganda which combines with commu-
nistic influences to undermine authority in the Sudan. Any settlement which allows 
this to continue, will be opposed by them. 
7. I am beginning to come to the opinion that administration in the Sudan 
might be easier if we had a Sudanese Cabinet advised by British advisers. They would 
be able to take a stronger line in many things than we can and the communist 
approach to the people through their nationalist feelings would lose much of its 
appeal. On the other hand, feelings of tribal leaders and of the Southerners have to be 
considered, as I have already mentioned. Practically all non-politically-minded 
Sudanese think we should go slowly in this matter. 
8. I now turn to Sir Ralph Stevenson's detailed comments on Hamid Zaki Bey's 
proposals in despatch No.349:-
(i) I agree generally with his views in paragraph 5 but doubt whether we can 
"satisfy Egypt" while maintaining the present organisation of the Sudan 
Government. We can obviously give Egypt assurances about her water rights, but 
not to the detriment of reasonable Sudanese interests. I also doubt whether we can 
give Egypt a closer association with the Government of the Sudan in any 
appreciable degree without disturbing the present organisation of the Sudan 
Government. Are we not deluding ourselves if we think Egypt really agrees to 
Sudanese self-government? Does Egypt not still wish to dominate the Sudan 
regardless of the wishes of the Sudanese? 
(ii) Paragraph 6 seems a good description of His Majesty's Government's policy in 
recent years. 
(iii) Paragraph 7(i) is obviously important for His Majesty's Government and it 
would clearly be valuable for the Sudan to have Egyptian co-operation in its future 
progress, if it can be obtained. 
Paragraph 7(ii). I am not sure if Sir Ralph is right here. There is more unity between 
the Parties in the Sudan on fundamentals than ever before. They all agree in ending 
the present regime as soon as possible; and they all agree on a Sudanese Government 
with a directly-elected democratic assembly. They differ only on the ultimate politi-
cal future of the country: complete independence or some link with Egypt. 
Having been in close touch with these affairs for several years now, I am inclined 
to doubt whether the political strife is more bitter than before. On the contrary, I 
believe that the Ashigga Party has lost much ground, and that the new National 
Front, which comes closer to the Umma Party in fundamentals, is gaining ground. 
9. Regarding paragraph 8:-
Sub-paragraph (a): A statement acknowledging Egypt's legitimate interest in Nile 
Waters 
Yes-provided the Sudan's reasonable interests are also safeguarded (the Sudanese 
are probably more Arab than the Egyptians, among whom Arab blood is extremely 
diluted). 
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Sub-paragraph (b): A statement that H.M.G. have no economic or strategic interest 
in the Sudan 
This is of course a matter for H.M.G., but the history of 1941-45 when the Sudan was 
important strategically comes at once to mind. I think any declaration in this respect 
would have to be very carefully worded. 
Sub-paragraph (c): A statement that H.MG. have no feeling one way or the other 
about the relationship between the Sudan and Egypt once the Sudanese have 
reached the stage of being able to choose for themselves 
Yes. His Majesty's Government have said this before. 
Sub-paragraph (d): A tripartite Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Supervisory Council to 
advise on the development of the Sudan 
It is true that we agreed to this during the Campbell/Khashaba negotiations on the 
Executive Council and Legislative Assembly Ordinance in 1948, but the idea is no 
longer welcome to Sudanese Ministers, who see two dangers in it. Firstly, that its activ-
ities will undermine the authority of the Executive Council and the Ministers, who see 
themselves thwarted and impeded by it. As time passes and the Executive Council 
becomes surer of itself this difficulty will increase. Secondly, Sudanese feel that the 
Egyptian members of the Tripartite Council will use the opportunities of travelling in 
the Sudan to spread Egyptian propaganda and to work against existing institutions. 
Sub-paragraph (e): Joint Anglo-Egyptian observation of next general election 
I much doubt if our Independents and Umma Ministers would agree to this, although 
the Sudan Government did agree to it in the Campbell/Khashaba agreement. Such 
supervision, in the eyes of the Sudanese, implies a slight upon the whole Sudan 
administration, over 80 per cent. of which is now Sudanese and which is fully capable 
of conducting elections in a much fairer atmosphere than that in which they are 
conducted in Egypt, for example. The Sudanese are proud of the impartiality of their 
government and consider this proposal unnecessary. 
Sub-paragraph (f): Withdrawal of British forces from the Sudan 
I think we should oppose any withdrawal of British troops unless the Egyptians go 
too. For the British troops to go alone would be an enormous fillip to the pro-
Egyptian Party and would indicate to all Sudanese that the British were giving up 
their task of leading the Sudanese to self-government and self-determination. During 
recent discussions among the Unity Parties about the formation of a common front 
this point was mentioned and some of these people even were very doubtful of not 
evacuating the Egyptians if the British went. 
In fact neither Force plays any role in day to day maintenance of public security 
and we have agreed that in certain eventualities the British should be withdrawn, 
e.g., on the outbreak of hostilities. We have a plan for gradually withdrawing British 
officers from the Sudan Defence Force until the Kaid becomes Sudanese and there is 
a British Military Mission. This could occur in about twelve years' time. 
10. Reference paragraph 9:-
(1) Yes. 
(2) Yes. 
(3) I agree. 
(4) Yes. 
(5) Yes. 
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11. I can see no objection to Hamid Zaki Bey coming to the Sudan either 
officially or unofficially. It would be most suitable if he were my guest at the Palace, 
and given every official assistance to see all sides of the Sudan Government's work. 
12. In view of the divergence of opinion on the Sudan shown in the talks with the 
Minister of State and the Minister for Foreign Mfairs in Cairo, it seems to me that it 
would be a mistake for us to offer anything at the moment. Nothing which the Sudan 
Government could offer would suffice to bridge the gap, and for H.M.G. to make 
declarations now would be to prejudice their own position in any future talks 
without gaining any advantage. AJ> far as the Sudan is concerned, I believe the right 
policy is to go ahead with our present plans knowing that we have the great majority 
of Sudanese with us. 
13. I am sending a copy of this letter to H.M. Ambassador in Cairo. 
194 FO 371180388, no 22 5 Oct 1950 
[Self-government]: letter (reply) from Sir R Howe to Mr Bevin, 
responding to Salah al-Oin's proposals for Sudanese self-government1 
At the end of August His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo had conversations with the 
Egyptian Minister of State for Sudan Mfairs, Hamid Zaki Bey, and a few days later 
with Saleh ed Din, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Mfairs. 
The Minister of State showed a refreshingly liberal attitude on the whole towards 
the Sudan question. He agreed that nothing should stop the Sudanese ultimately 
from deciding their own future. He thought that it was necessary that the Sudanese 
should be consulted in any discussion of their future status. There could be no 
question of imposing on the Sudanese. He hoped that the Legislative Assembly 
Ordinance could be amended so as to result in a more representative body. He still 
held, however, to the necessity for Egypt and the Sudan to be under the common 
Crown of Egypt. 
The Minister for Foreign Mfairs on the other hand showed no inclination whatever 
to abandon the most extreme Egyptian view as to the unity of Egypt and the Sudan 
and the necessity for the evacuation of all the British from both countries. 
There is little doubt which of these two views would prevail in the Egyptian 
Government. Nevertheless Sir Ralph Stevenson thought that it was desirable to make 
another effort to reach a settlement with the Egyptians and to this end suggested 
that H.M.G. might offer the following:-
(a) A statement of Egypt's legitimate interest in Nile Waters. 
(b) A statement that H.M.G. have no economic or strategic interest in the Sudan. 
(c) A statement that H.M.G. have no feeling about the relationship between Egypt 
and the Sudan once the Sudanese have reached the stage of being able to choose 
for themselves. 
(d) To revive the idea of an Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Supervisory Council to 
advise on the development of the Sudan. 
(e) Anglo-Egyptian or United Nations observation of the next general election to 
1 See 191. 
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the Legislative Assembly and of any election or plebiscite to determine the 
constitutional status of the Sudan. 
(f) Withdrawal of the British forces from the Sudan as soon as the Sudan Defence 
Force and Police can take over. 
Now these proposals are, generally speaking, an attenuated version of those put 
forward in 1948 in the course of the Campbell/Khashaba negotiations, with a view to 
inducing the Egyptians to give their agreement to the Ordinance setting up the 
Legislative Assembly and Executive Council and at that time it was considered well 
worth while for the Sudan to offer them in return for Egyptian agreement to the new 
constitutional set-up.2 In the event, the Egyptian Government refused its assent to 
the Ordinance and they should now be considered in the light of the progress which 
has been made in the Sudan in the direction of self-government under the 
Ordinance. 
On the whole the new constitutional arrangements are working well. It is true that 
the Assembly is not a wholly representative body as yet since many of the opposing 
parties in the Sudan, particularly those in favour of union with Egypt, declined to 
take part in the elections for it. Proposals are however now under consideration in 
Khartoum with a view to amending the electoral rules so as to induce the opposition 
parties to contest the next elections and so make the Assembly more representative. 
In general the pattern of evolution in the Sudan would take something like the 
following form:-
Stage I: Steps to make the Legislative Assembly more representative: in particular 
to include representatives of the Khatmia. These are now under consideration. 
Stage I!: Sudanese members in the Executive Council to be in a majority. This has 
already been achieved. There are seven Sudanese and five British members. 
Stage Ill: British members in the Executive Council to be entirely replaced by 
Sudanese members. 
Stage IV: The Sudan to decide its own future after direct discussion with Egypt as 
well as the United Kingdom. 
The Sudanese Ministers in the Executive Council support the above plan and the 
policy has been confirmed twice in the Assembly although the Nazirs, country 
members and the Southerners are firmly opposed to too speedy progress. It is against 
this background that the suggestions put forward by Sir Ralph Stevenson, as 
enumerated earlier on, will have to be considered. 
But in addition to these internal developments in the Sudan, there are certain 
developments in the international field which might have a bearing on the 
Anglo-Egyptian problem and also on the Sudan question, viz. :-
(a) The proposals for the reform of the United Nations Assembly. 
(b) The war in Korea and the consequent reactions in the United Nations and 
elsewhere. 
(c) Developments in Commonwealth planning for the defence of the Middle East 
arising out of the recent visit of the South Mrican Minister of Defence to the 
United Kingdom. 
2 See 160- 162. 
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In view of the progress which has been made in the Sudan towards self-government 
in the last two years, there can be little doubt that the Sudanese will be less prepared 
to accept the proposals put forward by Sir Ralph Stevenson than they were before. 
Viewed in this light and in that of the international developments above-mentioned, 
together with the fact that the Egyptian Foreign Minister will not be back from Lake 
Success much before the end of this year, it is for consideration whether it is 
necessary or even advisable to make the offers to Egypt which Sir Ralph Stevenson 
proposes. It seems to me that it would be a mistake to offer anything at the moment. 
Nothing which the Sudan Government could offer now would suffice to bridge the 
gap between the views of His Majesty's Government and those of Egypt in regard to 
the Sudan, and for ,H.M.G. to make declarations now might be to prejudice their own 
position in any future talks without gaining any advantage. As far as the Sudan is 
concerned, I believe the right policy is to go ahead with our present plans in the 
knowledge that we have the great majority of Sudanese with us.3 
3 Marginal note by Strang, 6 Oct 1950: 'Seen by the S/S, who agreed with the views set out therein'. 
195 FO 371180388, no 28 6 Oct 1950 
'The future of the Sudan': note by M N F Stewart recording a 
conversation between Sir R Howe and M R Wright on self-government 
Sir Robert Howe and Mr. Wright met on the 3rd October to discuss the future of the 
Sudan in relation to the proposals set out in Alexandria despatch No. 349 of the 25th 
August, Alexandria telegram No. 156 and Sir Robert Howe's letter of the 28th 
September to Sir William Strang.1 Mr. Alien and Mr. Stewart were also present. 
2. Mr. Wright said that he thought there had been certain developments in the 
international field which might have a bearing on the Egyptian attitude to the Sudan 
question. These were: 
(a) tentative proposals for the reform of the Assembly as set out in telegrams Nos. 
406 and 407 (Saving) from the U.K. Delegation, New York; 
(b) the war in Korea and the reaction which it had provoked in the United Nations 
and elsewhere; 
(c) certain developments in the Commonwealth planning for the defence of the 
Middle East. 
As regards (c) Mr. Wright said that amongst other things it had been proposed during 
the recent visit of the South Mrican Minister of Defence to the U.K. that there should 
be a conference of certain Mrican countries sometime in the course of 1950 to 
examine the defence facilities in time of war. The conference would deal primarily 
with technical problems such as communications, and the present idea was that it 
would be attended by most Mrican countries or territories (excluding West Mrican). 
Mr. Wright asked Sir R. Howe what he considered the Sudan Government's reactions 
1 See 190, 191, 193. 
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would be if they were invited to attend such a conference.2 Sir R. Howe said that the 
question would probably be considered on party lines in the Sudan with the 
Independents in favour of acceptance and the Khatmia taking the same view as 
Egypt. He thought, however, that he could secure a majority in the Executive 
Council for acceptance. 
3. Mr. Wright further remarked that the Egyptian Foreign Minister would 
probably not be back from Lake Success much before Christmas and that apart from 
the considerations set out in the preceding paragraph, it was perhaps doubtful how 
far it was necessary or advisable to discuss the Sudan with Egypt at all in the 
immediate future. 
4. The meeting then considered the six points which Sir R. Stevenson had 
suggested in paragraph 8 of his despatch No. 349 might be offered to the Egyptians. 
Sir R. Howe said that he really had little to add to the comments he had made in his 
letter to Sir William Strang. Sir R. Stevenson's first three suggestions were, so far as 
the Sudan Government was concerned, unobjectionable, though he doubted whether 
H.M.G. would wish to commit themselves to the statement that H.M.G. had no 
strategic interest in the Sudan. He confirmed his objections to the last three points, 
viz: 
The revival of the Tripartite Supervisory Council; Joint Anglo-Egyptian 
supervision of the next Sudanese General Elections, and the withdrawal of the 
British forces from the Sudan. 
In discussion, however, Sir R. Howe said that it might be possible to secure Sudanese 
acceptance of a Tripartite Advisory body provided this body had no authority to 
advise or to intervene in the internal affairs of the Sudan. It was suggested, and Sir R. 
Howe agreed, that this body might however have advisory functions in respect of Nile 
Waters, Defence and Foreign Mfairs. 
5. The discussion then turned to the next General Elections in the Sudan and the 
possibility of setting up a Sudanese Cabinet in substitution for the Executive 
Council. Sir R. Howe did not favour the dissolution of the present Legislative 
Assembly and the holding of new General Elections before the present Assembly had 
run its natural course. That is to say, the elections in the new Assembly would take 
place at the beginning of 1952. He considered that there was a good prospect of the 
Khatmia fighting the elections. It might then be possible to form a Sudanese Cabinet 
either on a single party or on an all party basis, with British advisers (see paragraph 7 
of Sir R. Howe's letter). Mr. Wright asked, with reference to Sir R. Stevenson's 
suggestions for greater Egyptian association with the Government of the Sudan, 
whether the Sudan Government would accept Egyptian advisers. Sir R. Howe 
thought it doubtful whether the Umma party would ever accept this, but agreed that 
it was theoretically possible that if the Khatmia were returned with a majority and 
formed a Government, they would accept Egyptian advisers. 
2 In Aug 1951 Britain and South Africa jointly convened an African Defence Facilities Conference in 
Nairobi. The other participants were Belgium, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia; 
the US sent observers. The conference dealt with the logistical problems of moving troops and supplies 
between Southern Africa and the Middle East in the event of war or emergency. A second conference was 
held in Dakar in Mar 1954. The Sudan was not represented at either, BDEEP series A, vo 3, D Goldsworthy, 
ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951-1957, part I, 69. 
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6. On the question of the relations between the Khatmia and the Umma, Sir R. 
Howe said that no reconciliation was likely as long as S.A.R. and S.A.M. were alive, 
but thought that if both these two gentlemen were removed from the scene of active 
politics, there would be a move towards the centre and that a national Sudanese 
policy, based on independence with some form of union with Egypt and a treaty of 
alliance with H.M.G., might emerge. These developments, however, were still 
entirely a matter of speculation. 
7. With particular reference to paragraph 11 of Sir R. Stevenson's despatch No. 
349, Sir R. Howe said he would be glad to see Hamid Zaki Bey or another Egyptian 
Minister in Khartoum and to invite him to stay at the Palace. 
8. In general, it was felt that there was little that Sir R. Stevenson could offer the 
Egyptian Government in respect of the Sudan, but that subject to Sir R. Howe's 
discussions with the Secretary of State on the 6th October, Sir R. Stevenson might 
be informed of the limit of the offers which he might at present make to the Egyptian 
Government, i.e. 
sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of paragraph 8 of his despatch, 
a modification of sub-paragraph (b), and 
sub-paragraph (d) modified as agreed in paragraph 8 above. 
Sir R. Stevenson could advise whether it was worth approaching the Egyptian 
Government on this limited basis. 
196 FO 371180359, no 29 17 Nov 1950 
[Future of the condominium]: inward telegram no 195 from Sir R 
Howe to Sir W Strang asking for instructions should the Egyptian 
government act on King Faruq's instructions to end the 
condominium 
[In his speech from the throne to the Egyptian parliament, 16 Nov 1950, King Faruq took 
the first step in the eventual abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty by announcing that 
measures would be introduced to bring to an end the condominium agreements of 1899 
on the Sudan. Britain's immediate reaction was that a unilateral renunciation by Egypt 
would be illegal, and its position on the Sudan remained unchanged (minute on the 
Sudan by Stewart, 25 Nov 1950, FO 371/80388, no 32) .] 
The statement in the speech from the Throne at the opening of the Egyptian 
Parliament on November 16th regarding termination of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936 and termination of Condominium Agreement of 1899 has caused considerable 
excitment here. I have not yet received the exact text of the statement and such 
versions of it as have reached Khartoum do not appear to indicate that it could be 
regarded as a formal act of termination but merely as a statement of a policy to be 
pursued with a view to achieving such termination by lawful means. If this is the case 
then I would expect the excitment here to subside but if the Egyptian Government do 
in fact mean it to be a formal act, or if they took any practical steps to indicate that 
they did regard the Condominium as having lapsed albeit unilaterally then I would 
anticipate a very strong reaction by political parties in the Sudan. 
2. In the above eventuality I should expect a strong demand by U.M.M.A. parties 
for an immediate declaration by the Sudan Government of the independence of the 
Sudan. A further possibility and one which would be widely acceptable here would be 
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a demand for a declaration by His Majesty's Government of a protectorate over the 
Sudan for say a period of 10 years. 
3. In any event however I am likely to be asked what is His Majesty's 
Government's attitude regarding yesterday's declaration in the Egyptian Parliament 
and also what would be our attitude should Egypt formally announce abrogation of 
the Condominium Agreement and 1936 Treaty. I presume that His Majesty's 
Government would take their stand on the principle of sanctity of the treaty and on 
the maintenance of the Condominium which is the basis of their policy in the Sudan, 
and it might be useful for His Majesty's Government to reiterate this publicly 
together with their pledge regarding the future status of the Sudan. I would welcome 
your views also on the legal position in the event of a unilateral abrogation of the 
1899 Agreement by Egypt and on the position of the Governor General in that event. 
We may be faced with questions on this in the Legislative Assembly very shortly. 
4. An announcement that Egypt no longer recognised the existence of the 
Condominium would be acclaimed by all the political parties here. The desirability of 
ending the Condominium Agreement is the one point on which all parties are 
agreed. The U.M.M.A. party would immediately demand the removal of the Egyptian 
flag and opposition to the removal of the British flag and we might have some 
disturbance of public order. We ought to see that British forces here should not be 
reduced below their present strength at any rate. 
197 FO 371180388, no 37 21 Nov 1950 
[Self-government]: letter from Sir R Stevenson to Sir W Strang, 
commenting on Sir R Howe's letter on Egypt's self-government 
proposals. Minute by R H G Edmonds 
I have been studying Bob Howe's letter LO/TSF/1 of the 28th September to you about 
the future of the Sudan.1 
There are various small points of difference between us, but I feel that I must 
record that, taken as a whole, the letter makes me a little uneasy. It shows clearly the 
difficulty of convincing the Sudan Government of the necessity for adopting a 
conciliatory attitude towards Egypt if the Sudan is eventually to be launched into 
fairly settled waters. 
I think that the letter brings out the fact that the Sudan Government are only too 
ready to assume in their various activities that the Condominium is at an end and 
that the Sudan Government themselves have rights at least equal to those of the two 
Co-domini. This attitude is perhaps more unconscious than conscious, but I think it 
exists in the minds of a number of senior officials of the Sudan Government and, 
unless controlled, it is liable to give force to the common Egyptian accusation that 
the British-controlled Sudan Government, whose executive Head is the servant of 
the Co-domini, is working against Egyptian interests. 
As I see it, the Governor-General has the difficult task of attempting, in the 
absence of any joint directives from the Co-domini, to reconcile the frequently 
1 See 193. 
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conflicting interests of the Co-domini and of the Sudanese themselves. In the face of 
the present Egyptian attitude the danger is, I think, for the Governor-General to 
identify himself too closely with the expressed desires of the Sudanese which, as in 
any dependent territory, are often not in accordance with or at least in advance of 
what is considered best for the proper and orderly development of the country. 
Without in any way trading the rights of the Sudan against benefits for His Majesty's 
Government in a settlement with Egypt, I suggest that we should not allow ourselves 
to be deflected from a particular course just because the idea of it seems at the 
moment to be unwelcome to any or all sections of informed Sudanese opinion. 
For the sake of the interests of either or both the Co-domini, or for the long term 
interests of the Sudanese (for example, by paying due regard to Egyptian interests), it 
may sometimes be necessary to insist on a policy being carried out to which the 
initial reactions of the Sudanese and even of the Sudanese Ministers have been 
unfavourable; in such a case, as I see it, it would then be the duty of the Governor-
General and his officials (having previously represented to His Majesty's Government 
the disadvantages of it) to administer the policy and, by proper handling of it, to 
reduce objections and obstructions to the minimum. 
In short, I suggest that if our long term object is to leave the Sudanese in a status 
of their own chosing [sic] and in good relations with Egypt, our short term object 
must be to seek to draw the Egyptians into a more reasonable and co-operative 
attitude over the Sudan, and that this may well involve "concessions" unwelcome to 
Sudanese opinion; it certainly involves due recognition by the Sudan Government of 
the fact that they are not an independent Government. 
P.S. Since the above was drafted I have seen Foreign Office despatch No.505 of 15th 
November.2 I agree that, at this moment, the less said about the Sudan the better, 
but if and when we see an improvement in the atmosphere we should be ready to 
take advantage of it. 
Minute on 197 
I regret the delay in submitting this letter: it has taken some time to assemble the 
relevant papers. 
2. The thesis developed in Sir R. Stevenson's letter, which has often been 
advanced by H.M. Embassy in Cairo in recent years, can perhaps be summarised as 
follows:-
( a) Sudan Government officials, including the Governor-General himself, regard 
the Condominium as virtually at an end, and identify themselves with the 
independence movement in the Sudan; 
(b) In so doing, they ignore the fact that ultimately, in the interests both of the 
U.K. and of the Sudanese themselves, some form of settlement between Egypt and 
the Sudan must be brought about; 
(c) The Foreign Office are themselves liable to adopt the same attitude; 
(d) Instead, we should adopt a policy in regard to the Sudan based on the last two 
paragraphs of the letter within. 
2 Embodying the conclusions reached in 196. 
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3. Opinions on this question are bound to differ, but for what they are worth, 
mine are as follows:-
(a) and (b). This tendency, which began after the events of 1924, has been vastly 
strengthened in the last five years. It is in many ways unfortunate, but it seems to me 
also to be historically inevitable, in view of the intransigent Egyptian attitude towards 
the Sudan generally and the working of the Condominium in particular. Since the 
war we have made two attempts to reconcileAnglo-Egyptian differences in this respect; 
on both occasions they were initialled by the Egyptian negotiator ad referendum; and 
both were ultimately rejected by the Egyptian Cabinet. Had the Egyptian Government 
ever shown any real desire to meet us half-way over the Sudan, the attitude of Sudan 
Government officials would be far easier to criticise. As it is, I do not think that we can 
do more than to try to remind them from time to time that the Sudan is still a 
Condominium and that the Governor-General is still in theory the servant not only 
of H.M.G. but also of the Egyptian Government (E.g.-by encouraging Sudan Govt 
officials to pay their respects in Cairo, on their way to & from Khartoum). 
(c). There is a danger that, in view of the obstinate absurdity of the official 
Egyptian attitude towards the Sudan, the Foreign Office should tend to forget that 
the Sudanese opponents of the Independence Party represent a very large section 
of the Muslim population of the Sudan and that Egypt has legitimate interests in 
the Sudan (in particular, in Nile Waters, as was recognised by the Secretary of 
State in Parliament recently). On the other hand, it is-I think-a danger of 
which we are aware. We have-for example-during the past year done everything 
we could to impress upon the Sudan Government the urgency of securing Khatmi 
representation in the Legislative Assembly and to moderate excessive Sudanese 
nationalism in regard to questions affecting Nile Waters. 
(d). With respect, however, it seems to me that the real answer to Cairo's thesis is 
that the alternative outlined in the last two paragraphs of this letter does not offer, 
in present circumstances, a workable alternative. As was recognised in our despatch 
in JE 1059/29 and recently confirmed by the Cabinet, the gap which separates British 
and Egyptian policy in respect of the Sudan is for the moment unbridgable. For this 
reason it is impossible to envisage now a situation, such as that indicated in the fifth 
paragraph of Sir Ralph Stevenson's letter, in which either the two Codomini would 
unite to impose a policy against the wishes of the majority of the Sudanese, or H.M.G. 
would attempt to do so alone (which they would, incidentally, not be entitled to do 
under the provisions of the 1948 Ordinance.) 
4. It would in fact be possible to go a step further and argue that the Sudan has 
progressed so far towards independence that, in the present stage of Mrican 
nationalism as a whole, it is impossible to imagine either Codominus imposing upon 
the Sudan a policy resisted by the majority of the Sudanese. This is, however, 
debatable ground. What seems to me certain is that there can be no chance of an 
agreed Anglo-Egyptian settlement of the Sudan unless the Egyptians are prepared to 
modify what they regard as their historic demands. In the meantime the loyalty of 
Sudan Government officials, and to some extent of the Governor-General himself, is 
bound to be directed more and more towards the Sudanese people, and what they 
believe to be in the latter's best interests. 
R.H.G.E. 
5.12.50 
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198 FO 371180360, nos 46 & 47 14 Dec 1950 
[Self-government]: inward telegrams nos 221 & 222 from Sir R Howe 
to FO on Egypt's protest at the self-government debate in the 
Legislative Assembly, and the Sudan government's reply 
[Following Faruq's speech to the throne the Umma Party tabled a self-government 
motion for debate in the Legislative Assembly in Khartoum. The debate coincided with 
the Egyptian foreign minister's visit to Britain. In explaining to Bevin his decision to 
allow the debate Howe gave the reasons outlined here in his response to the Egyptian 
prime minister, but also added that he felt it best not to stifle open discussion in the 
assembly at this point, especially as he felt the motion had little chance of passing (inward 
telegram no 216 from Howe to Bevin, 12 Dec 1950). Bevin was sympathetic but replied: 'I 
earnestly hope that you will do all in your power to ensure that no action is taken in 
Khartoum, particularly during the next few days, which is likely to embarrass me while I 
am engaged in delicate conversations with the Egyptian Foreign Minister' (outward 
telegram no 169 from Bevin to Howe, 13 Dec 1950, both telegrams in FO 371/80359, 
no 39).] 
[No. 221} 
Following is text of a telegram I have received from Mustafa el Nahas: "We have 
learnt that you have decided to table to discussion by the Legislative Assembly the 
proposition presented to Your Excellency by some members of that Assembly 
concerning the demand to grant the Sudan self-government. Egypt who is keen on 
the Sudanese enjoying self-government within the unity of Egypt and Sudan under 
the Egyptian Crown, considers that this is a purely political matter and does not fall 
within the jurisdication of Sudan Government. Your Excellency, as representative of 
the two countries administering the Sudan, should not deal with or discuss this 
matter which is at present the object of political discussions taking place in London. 
As for the letter sent to you by el Sayed Saddik el Mahdy and his colleagues of el 
Umma party, we resent its contents.1 This party does not represent the Sudan people. 
Please inform me with the immediate measures you have taken to stop this planned 
campaign meant to challenge the people of Egypt and Sudan. I would like to inform 
you that a copy of the above mentioned text was communicated on the 9th December 
to the Agent of the Sudan Government". 
[No. 222} 
Following is text of my reply. 
1. "I have received Your Excellency's telegram about a motion concerning self-
government which I have allowed to be debated in the Legislative Assembly. Your 
Excellency's telegram only arrived here on December 13th at 16.27 hours i.e. after 
the debate had started. 
2. The motion which I have allowed to be debated reads as follows "that an 
address be presented to His Excellency in the following terms:-
We the members of the Legislative Assembly of the Sudan are of opinion that the 
Sudan has now reached the stage at which self-government could be granted, and 
request Your Excellency to approach the Condominium Powers with a request that a 
1 This was a reaction to Faruq's speech from the throne, reiterating the Umma party's rejection of 
Egyptian claims to the unity of the Nile valley, and repeating its demand for immediate self-government 
(Siddiq al-Mahdi to Howe, 20 Nov 1950, FO 371/80360, no 53) .] 
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joint declaration of the grant of self-government be made before the end of the third 
session of the first Assembly, so that the next elections may be held on this basis". 
3. To this an amendment has been moved to delete all the words after the words 
"that the Sudan" in the third line and to substitute the following words "has made 
good progress towards the stage at which full self-government can be granted, and 
request Your Excellency to press on urgently with such measures which, while 
consistent with the maintenance of good government throughout the country, will 
ensure not only that such self-government shall be full and complete, but also that in 
working towards that end, all sections of the community and all parties may 
cooperate in developing the institutions of government so as to hasten the day when 
this goal is attained". 
4. Your Excellency will see that this motion requests me to approach the 
Condominium Powers and in no way derogates from their ultimate authority. Even if 
the motion is passed by the Assembly, the only action which I would propose to take 
is to refer the matter to the British and Egyptian Governments. 
5. There is in my opinion no planned campaign against either the Egyptian or 
Sudan people and I am confident that Your Excellency would not wish me to 
interfere with the exercise by the Sudanese of their right to free speech inherent both 
in the laws now in force in the Sudan and throughout the world. 
6. I very much regret that Your Excellency has been misinformed about the 
terms of this motion, and I can assure you that I have no intention of acting outside 
my jurisdiction as representative of the Powers administering the Sudan". 
199 FO 371190129, no 1 15 Dec 1950 
[Statement on the Sudan]: FO note of a statement made by Mr Bevin 
at a meeting with Salah al-Din 
At our meeting here on 9th December, as your Excellency will remember, I undertook 
to study your statement about Egyptian policy regarding the Sudan and to refer it to 
my colleagues in the Government. I have not yet been able to put it before the Cabinet, 
who have been greatly preoccupied with other matters, but your Excellency may like 
to have a short account of my own reactions to your statement now. 
In the first place, I have been struck by the gap which separates us, not so much 
about policy, but about our interpretation of the facts about the Sudan. Without 
going into the remote past, I should like to take three examples from the more recent 
history of the Sudan, to which you referred. 
First, I cannot accept the contention that, taking advantage of the presence of our 
forces in Egypt, we compelled the Egyptian Government to withdraw from the Sudan 
in 1885. 
Secondly, there is no evidence, of which I am aware, that it was under compulsion 
that the Khedive allowed British forces to assist in the re-conquest of the Sudan. 
Finally, if the 1899 Agreement was indeed concluded under duress, it seems 
surprising that your present Prime Minister, as recently as 1936, should have signed 
a further Treaty, containing an Article which specifically provides that the 
administration of the Sudan should continue to be that resulting from the 1899 
Agreement. 
414 PREPARATIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT [199] 
Then there is the question, which we have already discussed at our previous 
meeting, of the interpretation of the protocol which the late Sidky Pasha and I 
initialled in London four years ago. I have nothing further to say about this, except 
that I did not agree then-and I do not agree now-with the interpretation which 
Sidky Pasha placed upon this protocol. Moreover, it is important to remember that 
we have had certain actions in the Sudan, which I believe are in the spirit of my 
agreement with Sidky Pasha, and that as a result the political development of the 
Sudan in the intervening years has been so rapid, that that protocol has been 
overtaken by events. 
Your Excellency suggested at one point in your statement that, for reasons of self-
interest, my Government were deliberately encouraging separatism in the Sudan, in 
order to split the country from Egypt. I assure you categorically that the primary 
interest of my Government in the Sudan is simply the welfare of the Sudanese people 
and their progress towards self-government and self-determination. I have, however, 
consistently emphasised the economic facts of the Nile, and that nothing must be 
done to jeopardise the security of Egypt's water supplies and their development to 
the maximum extent possible. My Government are willing to associate themselves 
with any rational policy designed to achieve this end. Equally, we expect of Egypt 
that she, for her part, will do nothing to prejudice the water interests of the Sudan. 
But again it is clear, from the four points which you listed in your statement, that 
our two Governments do hold different views on the facts of the political situation in 
the Sudan, both past and present. I shall take these four points one by one. 
The first concerned the Graduates' Congress. I understand that they have said they 
are in favour of a union between Egypt and the Sudan. But the Congress does not 
even represent the majority of Sudanese intelligentsia, and it has in recent years 
come under the domination of an extremist clique, which represents only a very 
small proportion of the Sudanese people. 
As regards the municipal elections I really do not believe that the facts support 
your Excellency's view that there is something approaching unanimity in favour of 
union. In fact the unionists are in a minority in Khartoum. In Omdurman they have 
a majority of only one. I give there [sic, these] as examples. 
As regards the percentages of the electors taking part in the Legislative Assembly's 
election the facts are that this election was held both by direct and indirect election. 
Ten seats were filled by the former means, and 55 by the latter. In the direct elections 
it is estimated that 18 per cent. of the electorate voted. (Incidentally, I believe that in 
the last Egyptian general election, which returned the Government of which your 
Excellency is a member, only some 15 per cent. of the Cairo electorate voted.) In the 
indirect elections in the Sudan no figure at all can be given, since the primary 
elections on which they were based were mainly decided by acclamation. 
As regards your fourth point, concerning the views of the religious sects in the 
Sudan, I think I should say that, on my information, those Sudanese who profess to 
favour union with Egypt are not more than about one-fifth of the total population of 
the country. 
I now turn to another question raised by your Excellency which, although it 
appears relevant to the future of the Sudan at first sight, does not in my opinion 
affect the issue; namely, the decisions recently taken by the United Nations about the 
future of Libya and Eritrea. 
In the first place I must make it clear that these are decisions taken by the United 
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Nations with which, as a loyal member of that organisation, my Government was 
bound to comply. Neither decision represents what, in our opinion, would have been 
the ideal solution, and great care will have to be exercised in their execution. 
As regards Libya, we agree to independence within two years, since the United 
Nations were in favour of it. Having done so, our first consideration, as in the case of 
the Sudan, is that the Libyan people shall be allowed to determine their own future. 
As regards Eritrea, it was our view that that part of the territory where the 
overwhelming majority of the inhabitants wished to be reunited with Ethiopia, 
should be united with that country.1 In the event a different solution-federation-
has been adopted. Here again we have complied, because in the circumstances there 
was no alternative. 
But circumstances in the Sudan are quite different, and as I said in the House of 
Commons, it would be tragic if anything were to disturb the progress which has been 
made in the political and material fields. 
I should now like to say a few words about what my Government considers the real 
core of the Sudan problem, namely, how soon the country should attain complete 
self-government and determine its own future. It is my object to persuade your 
Government to work with mine, towards this end. Predeclared policies of both our 
Goverments in regard to the Sudan are the same. What we must solve, therefore, is 
the practical problem, namely, how to assemble the elements necessary for a stable 
Government in the Sudan, and how to guide the Sudanese people towards self-
government. Before I discuss this, however, I should like to refute one suggestion 
made in your Excellency's statement. I mean your suggestion that the Sudan 
Government, with my Government's approval, has deliberately kept the Southern 
Sudan "in a primitive condition and complete segregation from the North" and has 
not allowed Northern Sudanese to enter the South. 
Frankly, if you study the Southern Sudan, you will find that this is not correct. 
History has shown over and over again that if primitive, indigenous cultures are to be 
preserved from extinction when they first come into contact with more advanced 
peoples, they must be treated with the greatest care. This the Sudan Government 
have successfully done. 
The difference in development between the Northern and Southern Sudan 
presents a serious problem. In recent years, however, the Southern Sudanese have 
reached a stage where closer contact has become possible. To-day their 
representatives sit in the Sudan Legislative Assembly, where they debate on equal 
terms with their fellow-members from the North; Southern Sudanese civil servants, 
like Northern Sudanese, serve in any part of the Sudan; and I would commend to 
Your Excellency's study the Sudan Government's education plan for the South, 
which contains, among other things, provisions for the increased use of Arabic in all 
schools in the Southern Sudan, including those directed by Christian missionaries. If 
there is one sphere of the Sudan Government's administration which is beyond 
reproach, an impartial and unprejudiced body of observers would undoubtedly agree 
that it is their administration of the Southern provinces. 
To return to what I described as the "core" of the Sudan problem: the granting of 
self-government to the Sudanese is, in my opinion, largely a matter of timing. Both 
1 See 175. 
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our Governments have a duty to discharge in this matter. If, setting aside mutual 
suspicion, we can work together to solve this problem, we shall have achieved a great 
work. The Governor-General's Executive Council now has a Sudanese majority. As I 
have already said, the Sudan Government hope to broaden the electoral basis of the 
Legislative Assembly before the next elections. There are two important steps in the 
right direction. 
A further step would be the Unionists' participation in the next elections for the 
Sudan Legislative Assembly. If they do so, the Sudan people will for the first time be 
represented by a body not only democratically elected, but one whose members will 
be drawn from all classes and creeds. This would be a tremendous step towards a 
Sudan settlement. 
At the moment, however, I feel bound to point out to Your Excellency that the 
principal obstacle to the election of a fully representative Legislative Assembly in the 
Sudan is the rigid attitude adopted by the Egyptian Government towards the future 
of the Sudan. Compromises may have to be made. The United Kingdom have a long 
experience of the successful guidance of other peoples, in Asia, in Africa, and 
elsewhere, towards self-government. So long, however, as the Egyptian Government 
refuse to modify their insistence on the unity of Egypt and the Sudan, their 
supporters in the Sudan must naturally find it hard to achieve a compromise with 
those Sudanese who sincerely believe that the best interest of their country lies in 
independence. 
Meanwhile, the policy of my Government remains as before-that we shall do 
everything in our power to ensure that the choice which the Sudanese people finally 
make about the way in which their country is to be governed-is a free one. 
In conclusion, I should like to say that I believe that our two Governments are 
agreed in principle about the future of the Sudan. I was glad to see that, at the end of 
your statement about the Sudan, Your Excellency made it clear that both our 
Governments are agreed that our aim in the Sudan is to give the Sudanese self-
government as quickly as possible. 
Unfortunately, we still differ about the means whereby this end should be 
achieved. Can we agree to create the conditions necessary for Sudanese self-
government? Can we agree, forgetting mutual suspicion, to shepherd the Sudanese 
people and to do all in our power to assist them to achieve this end? If so, the 
problem of the Sudan can be solved. 
200 FO 371180360, no 60 17 Dec 1950 
[Self-government]: letter from Sir R Howe to Sir W Strang on the 
self-government debate in the Legislative Assembly. Enclosures 
[Following the narrow passage of the self-government motion in the Legislative Assembly 
(see 198) Howe forwarded background material on the debate and the motion itself. In his 
reply Strang agreed that the Umma party memo required no further action and added: 
'We also agree that the future of the Southern Sudan is a matter of the highest 
importance, and that the South should not be placed under the administration of a 
wholly Sudanese Government in the near future. We therefore think it would be useful if 
you could follow up the suggestion, made in the last sentence of your memorandum, that 
you should find out from the Sudanese Ministers, and indeed from any Sudanese of 
political importance, including those belonging to the Opposition parties, what 
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guarantees they would propose for the South in the event of the Sudanese assuming the 
whole responsibility for the administration of their country at any time within the next 
ten years' (letter from Strang to Howe, 13 Jan 1950, FO 371/80360, no 60).] 
I am sending you herewith a memo. on the political future of the Sudan which was 
sent to me at the end of last month by Abdulla Bey Khalil, the Leader of the 
Legislative Assembly and Secretary-General of the Umma Party. 
2. This memo. which alleges that it expresses the opinions of the Sudanese 
members of the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly summarises their views 
as:-
(1) The immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet. 
(2) The next elections at the end of 1951 to be declared to be on the basis of self-
government. 
(1) is considered to be within my powers as Governor-General, (2) must, it is 
admitted, be referred to the Co-domini. 
3. Since this memo. was received, there has been tabled to the Assembly the 
motion on self-government which formed the subject of my telegram No.217 of 12th 
December. At the same time as the request for my consent to the debate on the 
motion was received I had a letter from 32 Members of the Legislative Assembly, a 
copy of which is attached, asking that self-government should be gradual. The 
Assembly have also approved a further motion to set up a Commission to examine 
the workings of the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly Ordinance and to 
suggest improvements within the present constitutional framework. 
4. You will note that the memo. is said to represent the views of all the Sudanese 
members of the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly. One of the reasons 
which induced me to give my consent to the motion on self-government in the 
Assembly was to test whether this statement was indeed a true one. I will refer to this 
point later on. 
5. I have discussed this memo. with Abdulla Bey Khalil and I asked him to define 
precisely what he and his party (for it is of course an Umma party document) mean 
by this term. I pointed out that full self-government seemed to me to be pretty much 
the same as independence and that the Sudan already enjoyed a very large measure 
of self-government by reason of the fact that the Executive Council had a majority of 
Sudanese members while the Legislative Assembly was wholly Sudanese except for 
five British members only among a total of ninety-two. Abdulla Bey replied that, for 
him, self-government meant Sudanese ministers for most of the departments of the 
Government, the present British officials to be advisers in those departments. Apart 
from that there would be no change in the administration. Sudanisation would 
proceed according to the programmes already drawn up and approved. There would 
be representatives of the Tribal Areas and the South in the Executive Council. As far 
as the South itself was concerned its present administration must continue down to 
the most junior British District Commissioner until the South was equipped to stand 
by itself. Abdulla Bey was prepared to say all this to the Legislative Assembly. The 
ultimate aim of the Independence Party was Dominion Status within the British 
Commonwealth. 
6. I told Abdulla Bey that while I thought it was possible to increase the number 
of Sudanese Ministers and I was in fact considering at the moment promoting one or 
two of the present Sudanese on the Executive Council to be Ministers the 
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achievement of the other aims set out in the memo. was another matter. I was sure 
that they would only be considered by the Co-domini if they could be shown to be 
backed by a majority of the country. This could only be done by some device such as 
a plebiscite or through a more fully representative Legislative Assembly. The device 
of the plebiscite seemed to be ruled out in present circumstances. The Legislative 
Assembly is not yet wholly or even predominantly representative. The Khatmia are 
almost unrepresented. The South has 14 members representing some 2~ million 
people as compared with the North who have 73 representatives for 5 million people. 
I have developed this theme more fully in the attached memo. (B). 
7. During the days preceding the debate in the Assembly the Umma Party 
began to exert considerable pressure on the members of the Assembly to vote in 
favour of it. S.A.R. himself came up from Aba Island and telegrams poured in from 
Umma organisations to Members of the Legislative Assembly who were considered 
to be opposed to immediate self-government. The debate was lengthy and spirited 
and the result was that the motion was passed by 39 votes to 38, the barest possible 
majority. 
8. The result must be a hard blow to the Umma and to S.A.R's ambitions. The 
motion which obtained only a majority of one in a house which is supposed to be 
predominantly Umma is a proof that self-government as envisaged by the Umma 
commands no majority in the country as a whole; this however is no sign that if 
the House was reconstituted in such a way as to attract those who now oppose it 
to come in, there would not be a much larger vote in favour of self-government. It 
would no doubt depend largely on whether any motion for self-government were 
sponsered [sic] by the Umma. The vote is certainly not a vote for unity of the 
Sudan and Egypt; every Sudanese member who spoke against the motion made 
this clear but it is quite clearly the reflection of the general attitude outside 
Khartoum that the country does not want the present British administration to go, 
that the country does not want to be governed by the politically minded townsmen 
and half-baked effendia and that the South should be given more time under its 
present rulers. 
9. I do not propose to send this memo. to the Co-domini or in fact to take any 
further action on it. 
Enclosure A to 200: memorandum by Abdallah Khalil, 28 Nov 1950 
His Excellency the governor general of the Sudan 
I beg to submit to your Excellency the following memorandum which, in my 
opinion, expresses the views and aspirations of the Sudanese members of the 
Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council in regard to the political future of 
their country. These views may be summarised as follows:-
(1) The immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet. 
(2) The declaration of the next elections on the basis of Self-Government to be 
established immediately after the end of the 3rd Session of the present Assembly-
that is before the end of 1951. 
How to achieve these two aims will call for a detailed explanation of many points. 
The following is an attempt to explain briefly these points. 
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The present condominium rule 
While we admit the useful services which the Condominium Rule has been able to 
render to this country during the last fifty years, we believe that if it is allowed to 
continue for any longer period it will seriously affect the political, economic & social 
development of this country; and the following are a few examples to show how this 
rule is becoming unsuitable:-
(!) The difference of opinion between the two Condominium powers in regard to 
the future political status of the Sudan. While England believes in and works for 
the Sudan's ultimate goal of freedom and independence, Egypt is doing all it can to 
obstruct and check this movement towards freedom, because it looks upon an 
independent Sudan as nothing but a real danger and threat to her interests as 
regards the Nile waters; but Egypt conceals her imperialistic aims under the usual 
claim that the Sudan forms an integral part of her territory and as such has no 
right to set up a separate constitution. 
(2) The disapproval of Egypt of the present political set up and her determined 
attemps [sic] to encourage as many Sudanese as it can and persuade them to 
boycott the Legislative Assembly and other progressive institutions. 
(3) The unanimous agreement of all Sudanese political parties that the 
Condominium Rule is no longer suitable and therefore must be terminated 
without delay. 
The examples we have given are sufficient to illustrate the unsuitability of this rule 
and show the necessity for its termination as quickly as possible so that we can 
govern our own country as other free peoples do. We cannot tolerate in this age of 
freedom that we should remain in this anomalous situation and that we should not 
be self-governing and that the interests of our country should continue to progress 
slowly merely out of regard for the alleged interests of Egypt. While we can 
understand Egypt's imperialistic attitude, we can hardly believe that England-with 
its long democratic traditions-will support it, especially after having recognised and 
declared the Sudanese right to self-determination and having approved the 
establishment of the present political institutions. 
We were and are still asking for the termination of this rule. We were already 
looking for the first suitable opportunity to get rid of it until the second World War 
broke out when we voluntarily came to the side of the democracies and contributed 
as much as we could at a time when Egypt refused to participate in it. Neither her 
partnership nor her alleged sovereignty could induce her to defend us. On the other 
hand we, the ruled, never thought of securing her permission to enter the war or 
appealed to her for any kind of help. We ought to have proclaimed our Independence 
at that time but unfortunately we missed the opportunity through a belief that 
England after having tried both of us during that decisive war would not hesitate to 
grant us our independence after the end of the war. But instead of coming out of the 
war as an independent nation the sovereignty of Egypt was about to be imposed on 
the Sudan as a result of the 1946 Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had it not been for the 
firm stand of the Independence Front, the great efforts of the late Sir Hubert 
Huddleston and the personal contact made by Sayed Abdel Rahman el Mahdi with 
the British Government. We are sure that your Excellency is fully aware of the details 
of these transactions and of the advice which Mr. Attlee gave to Sayed Abdel Rahman 
to return to the Sudan and work in full cooperation with the Governor General 
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towards the realisation of the Sudanese national aspirations.1 The Independence 
Front proceeded to cooperate with His Excellency until the first steps towards 
Independence were realised by the setting up of the Legislative Assembly and the 
Executive Council. 
Egypt resorted to the Security Council after the breakdown of the negotiations 
with Great Britain and after her failure to impose her Sovereignty over the Sudan. At 
Lake Success she tried to make a case but failed. She gained nothing from her 
denunciation of British policy in the Sudan, nor from abandoning her earlier claim 
based on the right of conquest and introducing a new formula that the Sudan was 
part of Egypt. She came back from America with one result-the recognition by the 
Security Council of the right of the Sudanese to self-determination. 
Your Excellency is fully aware of Egypt's attitude towards these two institutions-
she repudiated them and circulated false rumours about them. She incited her 
supporters to boycott the election for the Assembly and to stage demonstrations in 
protest against its creation; she undertook to give money to any one who would work 
against the Independence movement. Nevertheless the majority of the Sudanese who 
were and are still firm believers in their rights to self-determination, accepted the 
two institutions as a first practical step towards independence. The Independence 
Front stood for the elections and succeeded in winning them. Subsequently the 
Assembly was formed from the majority party and continued to work for the well-
being and progress of the Sudan in a manner which was commended by Your 
Excellency early this year. It was gratifying to see that as a result of Your Excellency's 
satisfaction with the achievements of the Assembly the Sudanese obtained a majority 
in the Executive Council. 
But we are anxious that a big and decisive step forward should be taken as soon as 
possible. There are factors which urge us to request that such a step should take 
place without delay. The following are some of them:-
( I) It is right that we ask for freedom in order to Govern our country like other 
free peoples-this is a universally accepted principle. 
(2) We see around us peoples who are smaller in numbers and less well prepared 
for freedom in many respects and yet they have enjoyed or are about to enjoy their 
right to self-determination. 
(3) That if we adopt in our progress the policy of caution and slowness, we shall 
expose the country to dangers, the consequences of which cannot be contemplated 
by any true citizen of the Sudan. 
In the hope of increasing the number of its supporters in the Sudan, Egypt has 
intensified its propaganda using all visible and invisible means-offering attractive 
educational facilities, building mosques, attempting to open schools and start 
hospitals etc. etc. 
As a partner, Egypt refuses to see the Sudan represented in any international 
organization or any World conference so that the Sudan should not have a separate 
voice. She is determined to spend considerable sums of money on propaganda in the 
Sudan-a former prime minister of Egypt is alleged to have made a declaration to 
this effect. The objective behind this intention as he put it was to release the 
Egyptian piastre so that it reaches every house in the Sudan as a result of which 
Egypt's name will be on every tongue-but the real objective is obvious. 
1 See 114. 
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From the above it will appear that slowness is obviously in the interest of Egypt 
because the time factor will help her to achieve her ambitions through increasing her 
supporters in the Sudan and the country's future will be exposed to grave dangers if 
we follow the policy of caution and slowness. A continuation of this Egyptian propa-
ganda will lead to moral chaos, internal dissension and corruption in social life. Egypt's 
continued and varied methods of propaganda are bound to have their effect on the 
masses and are also bound to weaken the morale of the at present cooperating major-
ity which in order to prove that it is a majority, is calling for a plebisite [sic]. 
But the danger to the Sudan comes not only from Egyptian propaganda but from 
the potential struggle of World Powers for the control of strategic points. Such a 
state of affairs if it arises-as it may well do-may force statesmen to ignore, even 
temporarily, the rights of small nations on the assumption that World peace is at 
stake. Although we are confident of England's promises and do not believe for a 
moment that she will betray the Sudan or bargain with Egypt at our expense in case 
of a third World War, yet we believe at the same time that such a war will at least 
expose our claim to independence to the danger of postponement. 
We therefore request that our problem be solved without any further delay and 
recommend that it be solved on the following basis:-
Anyone who reads this note and anyone who sees the plight of the Sudan as a 
result of this exceptional status would not hesitate to ask for complete Independence; 
but we realise that such a recommendation must be preceded by other steps which 
will enable your Excellency to approach the Co-domini and recommend to them the 
termination of the present situation. 
We, therefore, venture to put before your Excellency the following 
recommendations:-
( I) The immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet, 
(2) The declaration of the next elections on the basis of Self-Government to be 
established immediately after the end of the 3rd Session of the present Assembly-
that is before the end of 1951. 
We realise that Your Excellency as a representative of the Co-Domini must refer to 
them the question of Self-Government, but we also realise that the setting up of a 
Sudanese Cabinet is within your powers. 
We therefore consider that the immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet will 
have two advantages, namely, 
(a) it will strengthen the recommendation for Self-Government, and 
(b) it will allow your Excellency ample time for necessary correspondence and 
perhaps personal contact. 
Your Excellency is well aware of the benefits that will acrue [sic] to this country from 
declaraing [sic] the next elections on the basis of Self-Government. Such declaration 
will, in our opinion, lessen Egyptian propaganda, will bring the Sudanese together 
and will consolidate the position of all men of good will. 
In submitting these recommendations we feel we must explain briefly such points 
as:-
(1) the composition of the Sudanese Cabinet. 
(2) what is meant by Self-Government. 
(3) the future as we see it. 
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Here is an attempt to do so:-
Composition of a Sudanese Cabinet 
Your Excellency will probably agree with us that most departments could be 
converted straight away to Ministries with Sudanese Ministers, but the following 
points in regard to the composition of the cabinet should be made clear:-
( a) British Directors of Departments should have the status of advisers. 
(b) that the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry responsible for Foreign Affairs 
should have Sudanese Ministers only when technically qualified Sudanese are 
available for appointment. 
(c) that this cabinet should have on it representatives for the South and for tribal 
areas-perhaps without portfolio at the present time. 
What is meant by self-government 
We realise that the declaration of Self-Government would neither terminate the 
present condominium rule, nor would it cause a change in the position of the head of 
the state but it will no doubt bring the country nearer its final goal-that is self-
determination and decision on the form of Government which the citizens of this 
country may like to choose for themselves. 
But here we must answer a question which will be in the minds of all who read 
this document, namely, what would be the fate of the present admirable adminis-
tration while the Sudan is achieving Self-Government and later complete indepen-
dence? 
It is unquestionable that the Sudan enjoys at present a very high standard of 
administration which every wise Sudanese is determined to maintain. 
We therefore feel it imperative that all British executive officers should remain in 
their posts until such posts are Sudanised in accordance with the principles laid 
down in the Sudanisation Scheme and in accordance with existing obligations as 
regards contracts and pensions. 
The future 
The immediate setting up of a Sudanese Cabinet on the lines suggested elsewhere in 
this notice will, without any shadow of doubt, be backed and supported by almost all 
the Sudanese and will thus enable both the internal and external affairs of this 
country to be established on a sound basis. It is this Cabinet which will be able to see 
the urgent need for the Sudan to make treaties with a powerful nation which will 
come to its aid in time of peace or war. 
Conclusion 
These, in our belief are the minimum recommendations which we can put forward to 
your Excellency. They have been dictated by our anxiety about the future of our 
country, by the present anomalous situation and by Egypt's determined efforts to 
deprive us of a universally accepted right to Self-determination-a fact which has 
been closely defined in the recent crown speech. 
We sincerely hope that the realisation of these recommendations will be met by a 
quick response from Great Britain which has for so long inherited the ideals of 
freedom, fraternity and equality. 
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Enclosure lA to 200: petition by tribal chiefs and notables 
His Excellency, The Governor-General of the Sudan, Thro' Civil Secretary 
(1) We, tribal chiefs and notables, representing the majority of the Sudanese 
people in the Assembly, have noticed a proposal by some members of the Assembly 
demanding self-government before the end of 1951. 
(2) Although we agree to this in principle, yet we want to [sic] progress of our 
country to be gradual and steady. 
(3) We also want to give a chance to our fellow countrymen to participate in this 
Assembly by their taking part in the new elections. They could then have a share in 
deciding on the interests of their country.2 
Enclosure B to 200: memorandum by Sir R Howe, 29 Nov 1950 
A number of members of the Legislative Assembly are asking to have a motion and a 
debate on self-government in the Assembly. The reason for this sudden demand is 
doubtless the statement in the Egyptian Speech from the Throne that the Sudan and 
Egypt are one. It does not yet appear what form the motion would take but probably 
it would be to the effect that the Sudan is fit for the immediate grant of self-
government or for a further step towards it. If the motion were approved the next 
step would presumably be pressure by the Umma Party for a wholly Sudanese 
cabinet. 
An entirely Sudanese Cabinet could maintain itself in power and function 
successfully in two ways:-
( a) if it had the backing of a majority of a freely elected Legislative Assembly 
representative of the country as a whole, 
(b) if it were backed by force (presumably British) 
Now the present Legislative Assembly is not representative of the whole country. The 
Khatmia, probably numerically as strong as the Ansar, are almost unrepresented. 
The South have 13 members representing some 2% million people compared with 
the North who have some 75 representatives for 5 million people. 
A wholly Sudanese Cabinet now, even if it were backed by the present Assembly, 
would not necessarily be supported by the people in general and in fact would be 
bitterly opposed by many of the educated and townspeople, notably the Khatmia. 
The consequences might be incalculable. For example would such a Cabinet be able 
to command the absolute allegiance of the S.D.F. and the Police and would not the 
whole machinery of Egyptian propaganda, the Khatmia, the Ashigga and other oppo-
sition. political parties, the labour unions and the students try to block it at every turn, 
and make the administration difficult if not impossible? We have recently seen S.A.M's 
influence powerfully exerted in the W.A.C. (Workers' Affairs Congress) [sic WAA]. 
1 Thirty-two signatures follow, the first being that of Sharif Ibrahim al-Hindi, the leader of a small 
religious order with less influence than either the Ansar or the Khatmiya. Signatures 2-20 were shaikhs 
and notables from the rural areas of the northern Sudan; 21-31 were southern Sudanese, including lames 
Tembura (a Zande chief), Cier Rehan (a Dinka chief), Buth Diu, Edward Odhok Dedigo and Siricio Iro who, 
along with Surur Muhammad Ramli (a Jaali Shaikh and signature 32) had all been delegates to the 1947 
J uba conference. 
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The Governor-General's position as representative of the Co-domini would be 
difficult. 
Any demand for self-government for a country to be receivable must have the 
approval of the majority of the people. That approval can only be expressed 
manifestly by some device such as a plebiscite or through a representative Assembly. 
The first device is. out of the question in the Sudan as most people will admit and the 
question has been pretty well ventilated recently. 
There remains the Assembly. It is not representative and if it is to be the 
mainspring for a demand for self-government, a necessary preliminary step must be 
to try to make it a nationally representative body. This means new elections in the 
north which will be not boycotted by the more important and numerical opposition 
parties and a more equitable representation for the south, who, on the same basis as 
the north should have about 30 members-a very difficult target to achieve at 
present. 
It seems to me therefore in view of the present high degree of self-government we 
should discourage the Umma ministers from pressing these motions, or else ensure 
that they fail in the Assembly. We must endeavour to persuade them that the way of 
further self-government lies through the Assembly and not through pressure by 
individual political groups. If, as it may well be, their reply to this is that they must 
do something to counter the blast from Egypt about the unity of Egypt and the 
Sudan, we can say that we have forwarded their protest to the Co-domini. They have 
moreover the pledge of H.M.G. and the opinion of the U.N. They might of course 
resort to other forms of pressure such as resignation from the Executive Council or 
Assembly but this would be to play straight into the hands of their political 
opponents and I would be surprised if they were to commit such an error of 
judgment. 
There is no reason why we should not say now that the Sudan has self-
government. The facts of the situation fully warrant it, i.e. Sudanese majorities in 
both the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly. 
My chief motive in coming to the opinions expressed above is largely anxiety as to 
the fate of the Southern Sudan. I could not contemplate with any peace of mind 
placing the south under the control of a Sudanese Government at the present time. If 
adequate safeguards for the south could be worked out or if it were agreed as a 
condition of self-government that the south should not be under the administration 
of a wholly Sudanese Government, my views as regards hastening self-government 
might possibly be modified. But it might be interesting to find out from our 
Sudanese ministers who are pressing the question of an immediate grant of full self-
government what guarantees they would propose for the south, for I am certain that 
H.M.G. at any rate, would have to be satisfied on this matter. 
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Appendix to Part I 
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 
AGREEMENT between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His 
Highness the Khedive of Egypt relative to the future administration of the Sudan. 
WHEREAS certain provinces in the Sudan which were in rebellion against the 
authority of His Highness the Khedive have now been reconquered by the joint 
military and financial efforts of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the 
Government of His Highness the Khedive; 
AND whereas it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the 
administration of and for the making of laws for the said reconquered provinces, 
under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled condition of 
large portions thereof, and for the varying requirements of different localities; 
AND whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to Her 
Britannic Majesty's Government, by right of conquest, to share in the present 
settlement and future working and development of the said system of administration 
and legislation; 
AND whereas it is conceived that for many purposes Wadi Halfa and Suakin may be 
most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces to 
which they are respectively adjacent; 
Now it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the undersigned, duly 
authorized for that purpose, as follows: 
ARTICLE I. 
The word "Sudan" in this Agreement means all the territories South of the 22nd 
parallel of latitude, which: 
1. Have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882; or 
2. Which having before the late rebellion in the Sudan been administered by the 
Government of His Highness the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt, and 
have been reconquered by Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian 
Government, acting in concert; or 
3. Which may be hereafter reconquered by the two Governments acting in concert. 
ARTICLE I!. 
The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on land and water, 
throughout the Sudan, except in the town of Suakin, in which locality the Egyptian 
flag alone shall be used. 
ARTICLE Ill. 
The supreme military and civil command of the Sudan shall be vested in one officer, 
termed the "Governor-General of the Sudan." He shall be appointed by Khedivial 
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Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and shall be 
removed only by Khedivial Decree, with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's 
Government. 
ARTICLE IV. 
Laws, as also Orders and Regulations with the full force of law, for the good govern-
ment of the Sudan, and for regulating the holding, disposal, and devolution of prop-
erty of every kind therein situate, may from time to time be made, altered, or abrogated 
by Proclamation of the Governor-General. Such Laws, Orders, and Regulations may 
apply to the whole or any named part of the Sudan, and may, either explicitly or by 
necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing Law or Regulation. 
All such Proclamations shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic Majesty's 
Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and to the President of the Council of Ministers 
of His Highness the Khedive. 
ARTICLE V. 
No Egyptian Law, Decree, Ministerial Arrete, or other enactment hereafter to be 
made or promulgated shall apply to the Sudan or any part thereof save in so far as the 
same shall be applied by Proclamation of the Governor-General in manner 
hereinbefore provided. 
ARTICLE VI. 
In the definition by Proclamation of the conditions under which Europeans, of 
whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or reside in the Sudan, or to 
hold property, within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the subjects 
of any one or more Power. 
ARTICLE VII. 
Import duties on entering the Sudan shall not be payable on goods coming from 
Egyptian territory. Such duties may, however, be levied on goods coming from 
elsewhere than Egyptian territory, but in the case of goods entering the Sudan at 
Suakin, or any other port on the Red Sea littoral, they shall not exceed the 
corresponding duties for the time being leviable on goods entering Egypt from 
abroad. Duties may be levied on goods leaving the Sudan, at such rates as may from 
time to time be prescribed by Proclamation. 
ARTICLE VIII. 
The jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals shall not extend, nor be recognised for any 
purpose whatsoever, in any part of the Sudan, except in the town of Suakin. 
ARTICLE IX. 
Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise determined by Proclamation, the Sudan, 
with the exception of the town of Suakin, shall be and remain under martial law. 
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ARTICLE X. 
No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents shall be accredited in respect of nor 
allowed to reside in the Sudan, without the previous consent of Her Britannic 
Majesty's Government. 
ARTICLE XL 
The importation of slaves into the Sudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely 
prohibited. Provision shall be made by Proclamation for the enforcement of this 
Regulation. 
ARTICLE XII. 
It is agreed between the two Governments that special attention shall be paid to the 
enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd July, 1890, in respect of the import, sale, 
and manufacture of fire-arms and their munitions, and distilled or spirituous 
liquors. 
Done in Cairo, the 19th January, 1899. 
s· d { BOUTROS GHALI 
tgne : CROMER 
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Index of Main Subjects and Persons 
This is a consolidated index for both parts of the volume. It is not a comprehensive 
index, but a simplified and straightforward index to document numbers, together 
with page references to the Introduction in part I, the latter being given at the 
beginning of the entry in lower case roman numerals. The index is designed to be 
used in conjunction with the summary lists of the preliminary pages to both parts of 
the volume. A preceding asterisk indicates inclusion in the Biographical Notes at the 
end of Part 11. 
Three British officials-Bevin, Sir R Howe and Sir J Robertson-and three 
Sudanese personalities-Ismail al-Azhari, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and Ali al-
Mirghani-appear prominently in both parts of the volume. In these cases the index 
provides, in addition to page references to the Introduction, the first document 
reference only; subsequent references can be identified from the summary lists. In 
the case of Sir A Eden, references are provided up to the point at which he became 
foreign secretary in 1951; thereafter references can be identified from the summary 
list in Part 11. 
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used in the introduction and editorial apparatus, with the most common spellings 
appearing in the documents given inside round brackets. Arabic names are 
alphebetised according to the English convention of listing the last name first. 
The following abbreviations are used: 
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N -editor's link note (before main text of document) 
n -footnote 
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